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ABSTRACT
The whole study is cast in an historical mould 
and, falls into three basic parts corresponding roughly 
to the first two decades, the inter-war period, and post­
war developments. In the first part, colonial motives 
are briefly examined, followed by a general description 
of the salient.features of early administration. An 
account is also given of administrative attempts to impose 
Governmental authority upon the unwilling peoples of the 
Southern Sudan by the method of punitive expeditions.
The point is made that although no general or compre­
hensive policy for the, South had emerged at this stage, 
the period was significant for the formation of an 
official impression of the 'needs' of Southern Sudanese. 
Such an impression was not especially favourable to the 
introduction of external, Arabic and Islamic, influences 
in the Southern Sudan.
In the inter-war period> as a result of a half­
hearted application of the policy of native rule, the 
South actually stagnated in the sphere of education, 
which the Sudan Government devolved almost entirely to 
Christian missionary societies. The lack of develop­
ment schemes is noted and, as it turned out, no piece 
of socio-economic development effort initiated by the 
Administration ever advanced beyond the experimental 
stage. 'Southern Policy', the offshoot of native 
administrative policy, is of course discussed. The 
impression is created that the main preoccupation of the 
Administration till the outbreak of the Second World War
had been how to block the infiltration of Arab elements 
coming from the North. These efforts proved difficult 
to achieve in view of the reality of the. Southern^ 
situation and the:continuing dependence on Northern 
personnel by the Administration.
In the post-19^5 period, combined nationalist 
pressures from both the Northern Sudan and Egypt 
forced a review of policy whereby the South was thrown 
open to external, mainly Northern Arab and Islamic 
influences. In the meantime any crash programmes for 
the economic and social development of the Southern 
Sudan ran put of time, and the Southerners found it 
almost impossible to adjust to the changed political 
circumstances. The outcome was a civil war, by which 
time the British had made their exit from the Sudan.
INTROBUDTIOH
At the turn of the century the Southern Sudan 
(approximately the Sudan south of the twelfth parallel 
of latitude) had already experienced two successive 
regimes. / The first, often hut mistakeniy known as the 
Turkiya, was a foreign regime of Muhammad All, 4 the 
rulen of Egypt, and lasted from 1821 to 1885. The 
other, the, Mahdlya, was a Muslim theocracy which came 
into existence as a result of the overthrow of the 
first. Based in the Northern Sudan and founded by 
Muhammad;Ahmed al-Mahdi, a religious leader of magnetic 
character, it is widely regarded "as the first Sudanese 
indigenous regime. Partly because of the limited objec­
tives of both regimes but largely because of sheer 
physical distance coupled with a strong tradition of 
local resistance, the pagan African peoples further 
south were hardly ever brought under effective control 
of either the Turco-Eygptian rule or the Mahdlya.
Remote, hostile*; inaccessible and extremely suspicious 
of all foreigners, the Southern peoples continued to 
enjoy a large measure of tribal independence.
This relative tribal freedom and independence 
was, however, frequently interrupted by tribal warfare
1. For the history of the Southern Sudan in the nine­
teenth century* see
(i) R. Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan 1839-1898 
(London 1961) '  ^ ~
(ii) The Southern-Sudan 1883-1893 R. 0. Collins (New 
 ^ Haven X962)
and the depravations of European as well as Northern 
Sudanese slave traders which the administration in 
Khartoum was unable or unwilling to check. At any 
rate government control in the South, to be sure, 
remained weak, shabby and fragmented depending upon 
local conditions and strength of character (or lack of 
it) of the official representative ’on the spot’. In 
the impenetrable swamps of the Upper Nile and northern 
half of the Bahr al-Ghazal (the homeland of the intrac­
table, cattle owning Nilotes - Shiliuk, Nuer and Dinka) 
’Turkish* authority was scarcely ever visible. On the 
other hand, in the south of the Bahr-al-Ghazal and 
Mongalla provinces where sociological and other condi­
tions were different, and native interests were chiefly 
with agriculture, government control was possible but 
only within a very restricted range. Beyond the 
immediate confines of administrative markqz (or centre), 
violence, destruction and bitter hostilities often pre­
vailed.
Under the rule of the Khalifa Abdullah, the 
successor of the Mahdi, the Southern Sudan reverted 
once more to a tribal independence, regarded by some 
foreign observers as a state of chaos. Private slave 
trade as well as organised cattle and slave-raiding by 
the Mahdists continued to flourish. The Khalifa’s 
demand for slaves was dictated by the need of his army, 
fck® .lihadia. When two serious efforts to conquer the 
Southern provinces failed, the Mahdist forces virtually 
withdrew from the South. The only influence the Mahdists 
had had in the South was restricted to areas along the
Nile and some parts of the Bahr al-Ghazal.
The joint Mgip-Egyptian rule, bettemknown as 
the Condominium, resulting from the victory of Lbrd 
Kitchener’s forces over the dervishes in September 1898, 
was not, prima'facie* different from the; iwb previous 
regimes. It provoked the.uspal Southern3hostility .Which 
in turn invited punitive expeditions, thus contributing 
to the cycle of violence.*^ The period of pacification 
which lasted from roughly 1900. until the early 1 9 2 0’s 
and in the casejof^the -Nuep ‘ tab til 1920,.was one of the 
bloodiest and mbst prolonged in Africa. Notless than 
thirty expeditions took African lives and destroyed 
.African property. Several of these expeditions employed 
light artillery, and oh two serious occasions R.A.F. 
bombers were deployed. V , v
In the meantime,- the Southern tribesmen 
tended to identify the bohdomlnium with the Tufklya.: 
After all, the Anglo-Egyptiah forces entered the South 
by the same route, and, in several districts used the 
same government stations. Over and above that, the new . 
Administration employed Egyptian and Northern Sudanese 
.personnel. The lower ranks of its regular army were; 
entirely composed of Arabic-speaking Muslims until 
'recruitment of Southern, Equatorial Corps began In‘1911 • 
Furthermore, day-to-day district administration was - 
; carried out; not by Eritish officials but by Egyptian; 
ma’murs (district officers), pies soldiers and ma’murs 
may have beehpettdr disciplined than thpir Counterparts
1, R . G . Collins, The Land Beyond the-Rivers ^l898»-19l8 
(New Haven 1971JT ■ \ * :;Vr;' ' ' ^
in the Turkiya, tout their duties were very similar to 
those enjoined by.the Turco-Egypt!an regime. The Condo­
minium Government, like its predecessor, also relied for 
revenue on the appropriation of grain and eattle (often 
seized by raids) and a state monopoly of ivory.1
In due course, the Condominium was able to 
stamp its mark upon the societies of the Southern Sudan. 
If Cither the Turkiya or the Mahdlya was oriental in 
form and tended to exhibit the character of the transi­
tory, the new administration unmistakably displayed 
something of a novelty. It sought to impress upon the , 
natives the image of permanence designed to convey the 
message that the British were here to stay. It inter­
vened in inter and sometimes intfa-societal conflict by 
making demands upon the southerners that they should 
keep the peace. It employed the method of punitive 
expedition in an attempt to impose its will. More signi­
ficantly, it could make and break tribal chiefsfwhere 
these existed.■
Judged against the record of its predecessors, 
the Condominium Administration seemed to have brought 
some positive benefits to the South. The Turco- 
Egyptian rule had symbolised all sorts of evil in 
government: corruption, irieffieiehcy, misery, oppression 
and exploitation of the natives to the maximum. . The 
Mahdists had raided the southern peoples for recruit­
ment into the army. The Mahdist state itself had had 
as its driving force the ideology of. Islamic religious
perfeotibnism,.which was quite irrelevant in the context 
of the Southern experience. In any pa.se, the South was 
looked upon by both regimes as . a vast reseryoir;-of 
slaves ready to be drawn upon,, whether^to satisfy the 
greed of MUhammad All, ;tbe ^ Khediyelpf Egypt, or to 
furnish recruits for the-.'Mahdlst ..fbrbe '^ i^By- contrast, 
the Condominium ^ Administration;1haV. a clean record as 
the Government that put an end^  ^tb/these-evil practices 
and gradually effected the emancipation of slaves in the 
Sudan as a whole. The hew era also witnessed the intro­
duction of the civilised and civilising notions of law 
and order, of justice and good government to the benefit 
qf all. Missionary work which included the introduction 
of Western medicine and the rudiments of education was 
commenced. The display of military force that was 
necessary in the early.stages was kept to the minimum 
and to be resorted to only in circumstances of extreme 
necessity. Tribal warfare on a large scale was also 
fairly effectively checked and with the advent of 
settled administration in the 1920*s the stage seemed 
set for the South to clinch a better deal than was ever 
possible under the Turco-Egyptian regime or its Mahdist 
successor. ,
Vet^ neglect of the South was very much a key 
feature of British colonial rule in the Sudan. This 
colonial, neglect found inadequate expression in the lack 
of material progress and educational advancement of the 
Southern Sudanese. In 1935 a senior British official 
described the economic condition of the south as
"virtually prehistoric".1 A couple of decades later, 
the majority of the southern peoples were still without 
a cash-crop,v they still paid their taxes in kind and 
bartered any surpluses of food-crops or livestock for 
cloth or iron goods. Education in the South was left 
almost entirely in the hands of the Christian.'missionaries 
whose primary object was evangelisation rather than 
.general uplift or enlightenment. Until 1949 the 
Southern Sudan had no secondary school and has no 
University of its own to date.- The native administra­
tion policy which was in vogue was never developed 
beyond the stage of judicial devolution. Worse still, 
the application of indirect rule policy In the South 
tended to slow down educational advancement and the 
social emergence of the southerner. In an area only 
slightly less than the size of Kenya there were, by 1934$
•j' ' ’ • * 1 -
-only 42 British political officers and 18 senior tech­
nicians. In these circumstances, it is not at all 
"surprising that in 1952 another high-ranking official 
frankly admitted that "in the Southern Sudan there are 
no large towns,, no politicians, no newspapers. To the 
world at large these people do not exist." When these 
words were written the Sudan was only three years from 
gaining its independence.
—  — T-  ...... ' »-J'L. ....... ........ . ..... — —    •’   *—     •............ *..
.1. L. F. Nalder, "The Two.Sudan: some aspects of the
South", in the Anglo-Egyptlan Sudan from Within, (ed)
J. A., de C. Hamilton (London"T93§T*" P« 110.
2, J. S. H. Duncan* The Sudan, A Record of Achievement 
(Eoitidon 1952 ), p , 3 T  1---------“ --------------------- ---- -----
In an attempt to account for the economic and 
social backwardness of the South, apologists of British 
colonial rule have been quick to point to the concrete 
conditions of the. South itself. Of special importance 
are its remoteness, the inhospitable climatical condi­
tions, lack of natural economic resources, and the 
extreme conservatism of some of its people. The 
Southern Sudan was also different from the rest of the 
country in other respects. In this segment of the 
country, the administrator walked a muddy and swampy 
area (literally as well as in a metaphorical sense) 
and the recurrent official qualifying phrase, ’except, 
for the South’, reminds us of this uniqueness. Lacking 
the cementing influence of Islam and the Arabic language 
which had given the Northern Sudan a semblance of a 
’Nation', the South was characterised by social and 
political fragmentation. Its 'African' culture, 
loosely defined, scarcely provided a sure guide to a 
people threatened by powerful Islamic influences from 
the North. There were, in the South, estimated to be 
fifty tribes and tribal groups, speaking distinct 
languages or dialects. Different tribal systems with 
corresponding levels of political centralisation or 
fragmentation contributed a great deal to the overall 
picture of confusion.. Set against the background of 
centuries of foreign intrusions and the depredations of 
the slave traders of the last century, the conditions 
of the South seemed bleak enough to warrant separate 
treatment.
The special conditions of the South invoked
an official British paternalism which aimed at the pro- 
tection of the Southern Sudan-against any possible 
future exploitation by the North, in pursuance of this 
objective, the Southern provinces were more or less 
effectively sealed off, from: the Northern, Arab and 
Islamic influences for much of the period of the 
Condominium. The device employed!to effect the cultural 
and even physical ’separation1 of the South from the 
North assumed the form of a ’Southern Policy’ formally 
announced in 1930, but which had been germinating since 
the start of the Condominium Administration. Very soon 
after the second World War and-for the reasons discussed 
in Chapter VI, British paternalism became inoperative 
and 'Southerh Policy' was dramatically stood on its 
head. The net effect of this vacillating policy proved 
to be costly for the. Independent Sudan in the context of 
the North-South relationship.
The British.were the first to conquer the 
South and to rule it effectively; but having conquered 
it, they.failed to develop its people educationally as 
well as economically to any appreciable extent. Develop 
ment efforts were,-by contrast, concentrated in the 
North, so much so that at independence on 1st January 
1956* the inheritors of political and economic power in 
the Sudan were drawn almost wholly from the Northern 
Sudan. The resulting imbalance generated in the minds 
of many Southern people fear and' suspicion, whether 
well-grounded or not, of Northern domination and exploi­
tation of the South, leading directly to the outbreak of 
hostilities between the two. communities in August 1955*
Until quite recently, academic and general 
Interest in. Southern Sudan has been focused on the 
'Southern Problem* meaning, the relations between the 
North and South, in the context of post-independence, 
political developments, a phase dominated primarily by 
civil war and the expulsion of Christian;missionaries 
from the South. In the propaganda war, the Khartoum 
government supported by political leaders in the North 
on the one hand, and the Southern insurgents on the 
other, each interpreted British colonial policies in 
the South to suit their purposes. In either case, no 
major Sudanese study of British colonial administration
' ■ , i  • v ‘..
in the South emerged. The present study is an attempt 
"to satisfy this particular need. It is. devoted tora 
critical examination of British, Colonial performance in 
the Southern Sudan in key areas of policy identified as 
education, economic development and native administra­
tion. The theSis propounded here purports to demonstrate 
that the half century or so of British rule in the 
Southern Sudan can plausibly;be .interpreted as a history 
of colonial neglect and near-indifference.
My task in .respect of availability of source 
material was infinitely facilitated by the existence of 
a wealth of archival,material in the Sudan as well as in 
this country. The research work was carried out, there­
fore, partly at the Central Archives of the Government
1. My attention has been drawn to a recent administrative 
study in the French languageNicole Grandin-Blanc,
*Le Soudan Nilotique, .eh Son Administration Colonial© 
Britanique'1898-1956r (Doctorat de 5e Cycle, Eoole des 
hautes Etudes en Sciences SoCialeS, farls,: 1975)*
of the.Democratic Republic of „ the Sudan** but the bulk: of 
it .was.completed at the Public Records Office, London> 
supplemented by a couple of trips .to the School of 
Oriental Studies, University of Durham. Some official 
publications as well as private papers not available in^ 
the British Museum were consulted in.the Bodleian’ 
Library at Oxford and the University Library, Cambridge. 
1 also paid*frequent and;useful visits to the Library 
of the- Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Special mention 
must be made here of the fact that the Sudan, came under 
the Foreign, not the Colonial Office. Aside from 
official correspondence available at the Public Records 
Office, extremely valuable sources included various F.O. 
publications, particularly the handbook series packed 
with detailed information on individual*provinces and 
even districts.'
The most telling of the correspondences of the 
Sudan Government (like some of the F.O* handbooks) are 
marked 'confidential1 or 1 secret* or *very secret*.
This is no doubt because of the highly political and 
controversial nature of the policies adopted for the 
South which were increasingly coming under criticism 
both in the Northern Sudan and Egypt. The assassination 
of Sir Lee Stack (the Governor-General) in broad day­
light in Cairo in 19^4 by Egyptian nationalists provided 
the,British with a pretext for the wholesale expulsion 
of all Egyptian officials and army officers from the 
Sudan. Henceforth the British, who had been at any 
rate the. senior: partners in the Condominium, ruled the 
Sudan virtually single-handed. Even when, by the Ango-
Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1936, 
Egyptian officials and technical staff were to return to 
the Sudan, very few indeed did so. The Governors 
General, SiriStewart Symes and Hubert Huddleston in 
succession, consistently refused to take-in more 
Egyptian personnel on the ground that few were suitably 
qualified or that there were no vacancies.
Formal communications between Khartoum and the 
British Foreign Office were never direct. Official cor­
respondence and Annual Reports of the Governor-General 
were first submitted to the British High Commissioner 
for Egypt and the Sudan (later renamed Ambassador) 
resident in Cairo who then transmitted them to the F.O. 
with or without comments of his own in a series of con­
fidential despatches. The secrecy was all the-more 
important when,' during the Second World War and afterwards 
the Sudan Government had to cover up the acute shortage 
of British staff occasioned by the war-and when *Southern 
Policy* was being severely denounced in Northern Sudanese 
nationalist circles. Because the Governor-General*s 
Annual Reports were submitted to the British Parliament 
and made public ;ih Egypt, embarrassing remarks were 
often cut off from the final drafts.
Except for a brief period under Lord Cromer, 
-neither the British Foreign.Office,nor the Ambassador, 
in Cairo supervised the administration in Khartqum. The
Goverhor-General and his senior .colleagues had a free 
hand in determining the policy of the Government and 
the manner of its execution* Khartoum policies for the' 
South, it must be remembered, were sometimes vigorously 
contested by British Foreign Office staff but were 
never subject to a veto of any kind* This study is 
based, to a large extent, upon what.British officials 
in Khartoum and the South thought, felt, and did or 
thought they were doing* Expressed in these terms, it 
can also be asserted that, very often, individual and 
private sentiments went for policy*
The Peoples of the Southern Sudan*,,
A few cursory remarks on the various tribal 
systems of the,-Southern Region may assist in under- . 
standing the following account*
?The negroid and predominantly . ’pagan* peoples 
, of the Southern Sudan may foe divided into three broad 
categories based on the rough criteria of linguistic 
affinity and geographical location* The sub-groups of 
the two ethnic and cultural groups known;, as the Nilotics 
and Nilo-Hamltes are subject to the linguistic criterion;, 
unlike those of the "Western Sudanic<l types, often , 
lumped together merely on account of a common mode of
1* The supreme body responsible for the administration 
of the Sudan was the Governor-General1s Cpunoil, 
instituted in January 1910* The 1three secretaries1, 
i.e., the financial, legal, and civil secretaries who 
used to act as advisors to the^Governor-General, 
became ex-officio -members of. the Council*
life and physical location* The Nilotics inhabit the 
great flood plains of Upper Nile and northern Bahr el- 
Ghazalj the Western Sudanic types occupy the ironstone 
plateau, which stretches from the Nile-Congo divide 
northward to the frinces of the swampy area. The; Nilo- 
Hamites live in the east and south-east of the country.
1- The Nilotes;
These comprise the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Anuak, 
Bor Bellanda, Burun, Jur, Shatt, Dembo, and Acholi.
The Nilotes are usually tall, long-headed, long-legged, 
slender, and dark-skinned. The Dinka, Nuer, and 
Shilluk are the best-known representative Nilotitic 
groups. The British found them to be extremely conser­
vative, proud, reserved, and exceedingly hostile to all 
foreigners. The missionaries found them unimpressionable 
The Nilotes despised clothing and scorned Arabic and 
European cultures* They are still to-rday mainly pastoral 
living a semi-nomadic life, and staying nearly half of 
the year in cattle camps in search of water and abun­
dant pasturage. The Nilote’s intimacy with, and love 
for, his cattle (which he seldom sells) abounds* This 
is because the Nilote is dependent, almost wholly, on 
the cattle for livelihood and the supply of basic 
necessities. Cattle provide him with milk and the cow 
dung he burns for fuel as well as for keeping out flies. 
Cattle also furnish him with sleeping-skins and girdles 
for adult women.' More importantly, his marriage restitu­
tion and sacrificial gifts are all made in cattle.
Of all the Nilotics, only the Shilluk1 have a 
centralised political system under a monarch, ,th,e Reth. 
The hereditary monarchy dates.back to the 16th century.
In the past the King-used to be killed if he showed 
loss of vitality, as it was believed that the health of 
the monarch was bound up with the welfare of his people 
and their livestock. The peoples who speak dialects of 
Shilluk are widely dispersed. ; The Acholi for instance 
live on the border with Uganda. The Shilluk-speaking 
peoples are pre-eminently, agricultural and several have 
borrowed from the cultures of their neighbours. The 
; only member of.this linguistic group whose political 
system resembles that of the core Shilluk is the Anuak^ 
of Pibor district.
The Dinka^ constitute the largest single tribal 
group in the Southern Sudan, numbering about .one million 
and a half and inhabiting a larger land area than any 
.pother'‘ethnic group. Unlike the Shilluk, the Dinka do 
not form a single political entity but fall into a number 
. of independent tribal units, very often warring with each 
other. Nevertheless, the sub-tribes; (Malwal, Raik, Twich, 
Chich, and Agar) are all culturally homogeneous. The
.1. For ethnographic detail on the Shilluk,, see E.E,
Evans-Pritchard, The Divine Kingship of the Shilluk 
(Cambridge, 1948). For a general ethnographic account 
, on the South, see C. G* and Brenda Seligman, Pagan 
Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan (London, 1932)•
2, For ethnographic detail on the Anuak, ,see Evans-Pritchard, 
The. Political System of the Anuak of the Anglo-Egyptian , 
Sudan TLondon^ 1946). ' ' .   ^ ,  :fr~  5
3* For ethnographic detail on the: Dinka* see Rv G. Llehhardt,
Divinity and-Experience. The Religion of the Dinka 
(Oxford, 19547; F. M. Deng, The Dlnka of the' Su'd'an^ (New
' York, 1972). , _ ■ • • ^  ' '■ ~
influential authority in the tribe, was the hereditary, 
rain-maker who used to be. buried alive on attaining old
'age. . ■ "
- .
The Nuer are the second,largest tribe, after 
the Dinka, whom they resemble very closely in physical 
characteristics, language, and customs. Among the Nuer, 
authority was exercised by persons wielding hereditary 
religious, rather than political, powers. Under the
Condominium, it was not uncommon for 'prophets1 
claiming divine authority to emerge who gained wide ■ 
recognition. It is reported that, in the 19th century 
the Nuer crossed the Nile from the West Bank and ousted 
or absorbed most of the Dinka to the East of the Nile, 
They settled in their newly conquered territory.
11- The Nilo-Hamites:^
The major sub-divisions are: the Bari.and Bari­
speaking peoples, Lotuko-speaking, Didinga-speaking, and 
Turkana-speaking. In appearance the Bari resemble the 
Dinka,, but differ greatly from the:Nilotics in matters 
of language and culture. Bari language is far"more 
Hamitic in type than Nilotic. In fact, the Bari­
speaking peoples are akin to the tribes of the ironstone
1. For ethnographic detail on the Nuer, see:
Evans-Pritchard, The_ Nuer. . A description of the modes 
of livelihood and political institutions of a" Niloticr. a p u u r jnijlopi  
people '(Lohdoh,r 19%6)T Kinship and Marriage among the
Nuer1 (Oxford, 1951) * - 'P., P. Howell, A -Manual of Nuer 
Law (London, 195%)*
2. For ethnographic detail on the Nilo-Hamites^see:
L. F. Nalder (ed.) A Tribal Survey of Mongalla Province 
(London, 1Q7>7). &. W." bT Huntingford. The Northern
Nilo-Hamites (London, 1955)•
plateau, and Evans-Fritchard suggests that they might 
have been conquered by the Bari, whose language and 
customs they have adopted. He also suggests that the 
Bari were far more numerous in the past than they are 
to-day, and were probably as pastoral as the Nuer and 
Dinka. They seem to be in a state of* transition from 
pastoral to agricultural modes of life as a result of 1 
'depleting livestock. The Bari political system
is not clear-cut, but Bari society exhibits class 
divisions in which rain-makers have great prestige.
Ill- The Peoples of the Ironstone Plateau.
The tribes of the ironstone,plateau present a 
sharp contrast to the Nilotes and,Nilo-Hamites in physi­
cal appearance, in temperament, and in culture. They 
may be divided into the following categories: The.
Azande, Bongo-Mittu group, Ndogo group, Moru-Madi group,
1Gbaya, Golo, Mundu, and Babuckur. The Azande offer the 
best-known of these peoples and will serve for illustra­
tion.
They are of medium build, and have a copper- 
coloured skin. Lighter-coloured: than any other Southern 
tribes, the Azande in fact considered themselves 'White 
men'. They impressed British officers of the early 
period as being 'the most intelligent, keen and well- 
ordered tribe in the /^ lc£7 Bahr el-Ghazal.' Zandeland
1. Eor ethnographic detail on the1 Azande, see Evans-Pritchard, 
Witchcraft, Qracles, and Magic- among the- Azande,. (London 
lQ^ V. P . T. W. B^axter and Audrey Butt , The Azande and 
Related' Peoples of the Anglo-Egypt! an Sudan and: Belgian 
Congo (London, 1^53)• : — —  — —
was described as 'a fine country* and 'the cream of the 
Bahr el-Ghazal'. They showed themselves easily adap­
table to changing conditions and were among the first to 
welcome/trade, goods and opportunities for wage-earning.
The Azand?possess no cattle, but they are great 
cultivators. Their staple crop is maize; groundnuts, 
manioc, bananas* and a number of leguminous and oil- * 
bearing"plants are also cultivated. The Azande immi­
grated to their present home from;former French 
Equatorial Africa at about the turn of the 19th century; 
at the arrival of the British they were already organised 
in three large kingdoms. To-dayi two-thirds of the Azande
3ive in neighbouring Zaire. Political authority was
■ 0 ’ ' wielded by an aristocracy, the Avungera, whose nobles
enjoyed hereditary status. No son of a commoner be he
Zande or of the subject tribes could ever hope to attain
noble rank.
2A
CHAFTER I ’
BRITISH CONGEREST AND EARLY ADMINISTRATION.(1900-20) 
Introduction.
The first two decades or so of joint Anglo- 
Egyptian rule furnish a convenient starting point, for an 
assessment of the impact of the new administration upon, 
the societies of the Southern Sudan. Corresponding 
roughly with the Governor-Generalship of Lord Kitchener 
and Reginald Wingate,, the period represents the formative 
years during which the foundations; of British Rule in the 
Sudan were laid and Government policies towards,the natives, 
their religion and beliefs and their way of life were 
evolved. The immediate objective was,,of course, the 
establishment and maintenance of law and order without 
which the instruments of government, could not operate 
smoothly nor progress of any kind made or anticipated.'.
But the initial requirements;'and needs of the- North and 
South as seen through the eyes of the British conquerors 
were different and so also were.-the' strategies adopted.
It is the differential impact of this decision upon the two 
halves of the country with which this chapter is concerned.
In September 1920 a; senior Government official 
in Khartoum admitted that administration in the Southern 
Sudan had hitherto been a failure. "What a failure”, he 
wrote, "after twenty ■years* time can be seen in (i) the 
frequency of the need for semi-military operations
25.
(ii) the appalling excess of expenditure over revenue.”1 
To this list of administrative shortcomings may he 
added the very restricted range of Government control, 
over the Southern peoples. As a rule the Administra­
tion was able to maintain its sway only over the 
smaller and more accessible groups. Of the larger 
tribal or ethnic groups only the Azande, geographi­
cally remote but more easily accessible than the Dinka 
and Nuer to the north> came under effective Government 
control in the first decade of British rule. Other­
wise, the authorities contented themselves with keeping 
open vital lines of communication by patrolling the 
rivers and the very few tracks.. Most of the clusters 
of people of the far south were also fairly effectively 
brought under Government sway. As for the people 
inhabiting'the mountainous areas east of the Bahr el- 
Jefoel, in the territory acquired from Uganda in 191^ -* 
these too were subjugated but only by a series of 
virtually uninterrupted military campaigns between 191  ^
and 1918. This chunk of territory itself had never 
been administered of even occupied by the Uganda
authorities. Meanwhile, in the great triangular 
2marshland inhabited by the Nilotics, administration
1. W. Sterrv (Legal Secretary) To V. R. Woodland (Governor, 
Mongalla),.CS/SCR/l/C/l, 2^rd September 1920, Sudan 
Government Archives /js.G.A^ Khartoum.
2. The swampy area resembles a huge inverted triangle 
of land with its apex on the Bahr r*el Jebel at about 
6 N and its base running for some 500 miles roughly 
along the tenth parallel from 26° to y\ .
was confined to the northern and southern fringes of 
Dinka and Nuer country. Not until during and after the 
First Worid War were serious attempts made to subjugate 
the.two largest groups; the Dinka and Nuer. The Dinka 
were finally pacified toward the end of 1918; the cam­
paign against the Nuer, the most turbulent of all, 
continued intermittently till their final pacification 
in 1929"31• As for the collection of Southern peoples, 
the Burun, who lived east of the Nilotics along the 
Ethiopian frontier [theyWere not administered at all. 1 
Briefly, then, the three numerically significant cul­
tural groups whose subjugation shall be examined 
presently in some detail are the Azande, Dinka and 
Nuer.
The very slender administration could not 
even pay for itself. In the immediate pre-war years 
Bahr el-Ghazal and Mongalla never managed to cover more
than sixty per cent of a very unimpressive administra-
• 2  tive expenditure of £30*000 and £23*000 respectively.
If Upper Nile Province was able to make its accounts 
balance it was probably because it left the vast 
majority of its inhabitants unadministered. The need 
for military expeditions between 191^ and 1918, how­
ever, brought a sharp rise in expenditure, but this was
1. For an introductory account of Burun, see A. R. J. 
Davies, "Some Tribes of the Ethiopian Borderland ...’ 
Sudan Notes and Records, Vol. XLI (i960), pp. 21-3^*
2. R. 0. Gollins, Land Beyond the Rivers, (New Haven, 
1971), PP. 2 3 5 - 2 3 6 .  ^ ..
not matched by a corresponding rise:in receipts. Some 
of the military action was devoted to the conquest of 
y the mountainjFcountry ceded by, Uganda ixi 19lA, but most 
of it was undertaken in response to disorder or resis­
tance among groups which had been nominally subject to 
Khartoum,since the establishment of the Condominium. If 
the Administrationfs record in the South does not measure 
up to colonial expectations, then it is most appropriate 
to examine closely British motives for the conquest of 
Southern Sudan.
Motives for Conguest.
The celebrated Hobson-Lenin thesis on 
imperialism and colonisation singles out the economic 
motive as the driving force behind the nineteenth- 
century European colonisation of Africa. The whole 
enterprise was seen in terms of a plot by big 
financiers and the business world in general to 
utilise state power for the securing ofi (i) raw 
materials fbr home industry, (ii) outlets for surplus
•t
capital and industrial goods and (iii) as source of
cheap labour.1 In the case of the British conquest of
that
the Sudan, it must be pointed out at once/there was no 
clear economic gain to be made nor was the country fit 
for European settlement in the same way as, for instance,
1. J. A. Hobson, Imperialism, A study (London, 1902); 
Lenin,. Imperialism, The Highest' Stage of Capitalism 
" (New York, 1933) * : "
Kenya. The immediate occasion for the conquest of the 
Sudan was to avenge the death of General Gordon at the 
hands of the Mahdists. Gordon.himself had entertained 
little optimism for the future of the country. He 
once wrote that "No-one who has lived in the Sudan , 
can eseape the reflection what a useless possession 
is /the Sudan/. Few men also can stand its fearful 
monotony and deadly climate."1 His right-hand man 
Colonel J. D. H. Stewart agreed: "The country is only
intended by nature for nomad tribes and a few settled 
Arabs along the banks of the Nile. It annoys me 
greatly to see blood and treasure wasted on it. I see 
nothing to be gained by its occupation."2 The Southern 
Sudan above all almost represented hell on earth. Of 
the Southern Sudan Ewart Grogan, the first man ever to 
walk from Cairo to Cape recorded the following: " ..* a
desolation.of desolations* an infernal region, a howling 
waste of weed, mosquitoes, flies and fever .." and 
added "I have passed through it, and have no fear of 
the hereafter*"^
The British were from the very start reluctant 
imperialists. Way back in 1897 Cromer persistently 
warned Salisbury, at that time British Prime Minister,
1. Quoted in Sudan Today, University Press of Africa 
(Nairobi, 1971) P* 1; cf. The Journals of Gordon at 
Khartoum by A.-Egmont Hake (ed), (London, lbb5)
pp. 125, 2 3 8. - -i . . -
2. Quoted in Sudan. To-.day, (University Press of Africa, 
Nairobi, l‘97l)* p. 1. .
3. Ibid.
against the policy of taking, over "large tracts of use­
less territory which it would be difficult and costly
T  ■ ‘ , ‘
to administer." .Big Power rivalry■in. the Nile Valley ! 
at the turn of the century, however, swept overboard 
all arguments against the acquisition of territories, 
south of Egypt. Prestige and strategic considerations 
were, therefore, very much the driving force behind 
Salisbury’s decision in June 1898 to take over as a 
single political unit "the whole Mahdist State from 
Wadi Haifa to Wadelai."2 Several elements went into ; 
the British calculation: Great Britain was a major
European colonial power and had manoeuvred the French 
out of Egypt a decade earlier; the French-under the. 
command of Colonel Marchand had established a presence 
in the Bahr el-Ghazal and at Fashoda; King Leopold II 
of Belgium had occupied,the Lado Enclave in the far 
south, prompted by the Anglo-Congolese Agreement of May 
189 ;^ and Menelik IT of Abyssinia had threatened encroach­
ments in the Sobat Valley that might link up With the 
French in the West. Their success could cut off British 
possession in East Africa as well, as expose Egypt:’s 
southern frontier to security risks. In the final 
analysis these encroachments, if left unchecked, would 
seriously undermine British-standing.in the world at 
large. As an overr-ridlng priority, therefore, the 
British Foreign Office instructed the Sudan Government
1., Cromer to Salisbury, 5th November 1897, F.O.78/5050.
2. Cromer to Salisbury, 15th June 1898, F.O. 78/5050.
to establish outposts in the disputed territories and
lto maintain lines of communication to them.
The problems of actually administering the 
local population would have to take their turn, if local 
resistance .were encountered the.urgent need of "effective 
occupation" meant that there would be no time for diplo­
macy or conciliation. As;one observer noted, "the 
automatic reflex was to crush it as quickly and as 
thoroughly as possible."2 Gn this reading, Fashoda and 
Wau between 1900 and 1906 when the borders were finally 
settled approximated less to the administrative head­
quarters of provinces than the rear and advanced bases 
for "patrols" which were,essentially moves in the diplo­
matic strategy. In the meantime, administration proper 
was neglected. The primary cause for the British con­
quest of the South was, therefore/ the local "scramble", 
for Africa, highlighted by the "Fashoda Incident" of 
1898 which brought Great Britain and France to the 
brink of w a r ,
Early Administration
Even when the British had the occasion to apply 
themselves to the task of administration proper, military
1. The first Government expedition:to the Bahr el-Ghazal 
was dispatched in the winter of 1900* when the conquest . 
of the South officlallyccommenced,
2. G. N, Sanderson, "Some Problems of Colonial Rule and 
; Local Response in-the Southern Sudan, 1900-1920"
(private), (London 1976).
3* For diplomatic history of the "Fashoda Incident", see 
G. N.. Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile, 
1882-1899, (Edinburgh/ ----
considerations remained paramount. The Administration 
made what it regarded as'minimum demands on the natives 
namely, to keep the peace, to clear roads/ to provide 
carriers, bo build simple rest houses, for Government 
officials and (in the early days) to bring in grain,' 
meat, rubber and'ivory for sale at; fixed .prices.
Believing (correctly) that high taxation was a major 
cause of revolt* against the. Turco-Egyptians, the Govern­
ment tended to keep the level of formal taxation-.;as ' low 
as possible both in Northern and Southern Sudan;“ Taxes 1 
were payable In kind, particularly in the/Southern'Sudan. 
These demands, it is 'to be stressed*; were. consciously 
intended to be as light_as.possible in the hope^bf gaining 
confidence and .securing, the loyalty of the natives.,,
-, Good; intentions oh the part of the/Government 
was one thing but .the reality of the Southern situation 
was quite another and the ’light’ demands were not 
necessarily so perceived by the ,natives, who were, quite 
determined to resist this latest brand of intrusion.
The Africans in the Southern Sudan, .“particularly the 
Nilotic group, had defied- the/repeated, efforts of, the 
Turco-Egyptiahs. and the Mahdlsts tp establish -;a: s.emb- 
:, riance of administration in the South. /What they had 
■ ^ succeeded . in/doing in the/past they hoped to , repeat 
with" the new' regime.. The response of the Government 
assumedithe familiar pattern of punitive expeditions 
which burnt villages,'carried off ;cattle and' destroyed 
■crops. As ,thei ’’spiral tof violence" provoked partly by 
. IpcaTsresistance ".and partly- by ■ the Southerners ’ refusal
to keep the peace even amongst themselves continued,, ;
punitive expeditions become a permanent feature, of the
first two decades or.so of British administration in
'•the*Southern Sudan.In consequence:
"... the natives could detect but little; 
difference .between the old Turkish Government, 
the Dervishes, and the Sudan Government/
They* all raided, but the last was not 
interested in slaves but. took cattle only 
and was possibly more efficient in its , 
methods of getting them ., ♦£ r::
The Government needed the animals as provisions for its
soldiers and carriers or as remunerations.; But cattle
were to the- Nilotes what money was to the European and
more. For instance, marriage restitutions and sacrifi-
cialvgifts were all made in cattle. There is a sense
in which cattle were as sensitive an issue to the:
Nilotics as religion was to the Northern Sudanese. If
religious (neo-Mahdist) uprising, constituted the main
threat to iaw and;order in the North,ueattie raids were'
very much the cause of endless inter-tribal warfare.
Lack of appreciation of this fact was partly responsible
for the massive and widbspread^Southbrh alienation which
characterised, particularly, the'period from 1914 to about
1922.' ' . . . " ‘ ; v ■
It is regrettable that military patrols should 
have been pervpetuated partly out of sheer force of
1. See R. 0. Collins, The Land Beyond the R i v e r s (New 
Haven and London, 1971) .  — —
r *  ^ -
2. C * A. Willis (Governor, U.N.F. ), "Af Brief Survey of 
the Policy oflthe Government in the Upper Nile,"
June .1927, Sudan Archive> University of Durham,<
Box 212/10/1.
1habit and partly from military careerism. As late as
1926, one Inspector professedly “sick with patrols”,
2could manage to find occasional fun in them. Further­
more, these patrols were only very rarely followed by 
settled administration. Even where settled administra­
tion was a reality, as in the Western District of the 
Barhr el-Ghazal, it was very much a second priority to 
military operations 5 and officers who took serious 
interest in native administration received little 
encouragement.' Thus Bimbashi D. C . E. Comyn of the 
Western District who made a serious effort to 
administer the natives by peaceful management rather 
than punitive expeditions (of which he strongly dis­
approved) remarks sadly, ”My maps and reports on-the 
District I later discovered from a waste-paper basket
in Wau office (i.e. the Province Headquarters).. £ In the 
 ^ . • " *
confusion of conducting the Wiam-Niam (i,e. Zande)
"’SP j.
patrols they were flung aside,which is indicative 
enough of “official thinking” in this period.
The Horth
The picture of administrative failure in the
1. D. C. E. ff. Comyn then Inspector, of Western District, 
Bahr el-Ghazal Province, asserted that punitive expedi­
tions were undertaken “more often than not to give/some 
one a promised beret or decoration,” see (Anon)
Service and Sport in the Sudan.
2» The Story of Fergie Bey (London 1930), (A Biography of 
V .1 HV FergussQn), p. £2 0. ;
3. Comyn, Service and Sport in,the Sudana op. cit 
. p. 253. '?■ ■ ■ ■■/ ■' ■
Southern Sudan contrasts sharply with the success story 
in the North. There, the principal object of British 
rule was for long the suppression of neo-Mahdist upris­
ings. To this end punitive expeditions were also 
employed, but with a difference namely, that the 
strategy of "divide and rule” which was adopted proved 
to be a success. In real, practical terms this meant 
that a maximum of severity to Mahdist dissidents went 
hand in hand with maximum conciliation to the adherents 
of orthodoxy as prescribed by the Government. ^ In the 
Northern Sudan the Administration began with an idea of 
how to be conciliatory, and under the able leadership 
of Wingate they Worked hard to keep open channels of 
communication with religious as well as other notables. 
The opinions of these dignataries provided the neces­
sary feedback for policy formulation. District Commis­
sioners were instructed to master the local language, 
identify themselves with the people, and penetrate as 
deeply as they could into the minds and characters of 
those over whom they ruled and to cultivate trust and 
confidence in them. In response to the wishes of the 
people the government was thus prepared to embark on a 
major revision of policies. One.example of the Adminis­
tration^ responsiveness to local demand and wishes was 
the decision to climb down on an original commitment to 
abolish slavery. Rather than abolish it, the Government
1 , For a narrative of neo-Mahdist uprisings in the North 
and their suppression, see G. Warburg, The Sudan Under 
Wingatei: Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan J
1971) 3 pp . loo-106?
used its authority to enforce slavery when it became 
clear towards the end of the first decade that the . 
threatened disappearance of the traditional labour 
force was causing intense disaffection not merely among 
the "shaykhs” and notables but also ordinary Northern 
cultivators. The Government probably realised that a 
society long used to the luxuries of domestic slaves 
and free agricultural labour furnished by slaves would 
not take lightly to any drastic action aimed at their 
total abolition. Land reforms were also undertaken 
involving the.restoration of alienated land to lawful
owners and the prohibition of sale of land to non-
1 • Sudanese. These reforms effectively removed any cause
for grievances on the part of the sedentary Arab culti­
vator or herdsman that might' be attributed to foreign 
rule. Moreover, taxes were unrealistically kept low as 
matter of policy.
Careful administration also brought real 
material benefits and prosperity to considerable numbers 
of people in the Northern Sudan. As an index of material 
prosperity there was.considerable increase in the volume 
of external trade and commerce.
The Increase in the volume of exports and 
external trade was greatly facilitated by improved communi­
cations and the creation of a harbour on the Red Sea
1. G . Warburg, The Sudan Under Wingatei Administration 
in the AnglorEgyptlan Sudan Ib9§-1£? CLondon, l9?i), 
pp. 153-02. '
2. Down to 1913 Egypt subsidized the Sudan.
coast which brought the Sudan within easy reach of 
international commerce as well as closer to the Industrial 
centres of the world. In 1906 the construction of a 
vital railway line linking Khartoum with the Red Sea 
coast was completed and three years later Port Sudan 
harbour was formally opened. In 1910 works on two 
important road and rail bridges, one at Khartoum on the 
Blue Nile and the other at Kosti further south vere con­
cluded. From Kosti the rail route was extended westward 
to the heart of Kordofan, reaching El Obeid the provin­
cial capital in 1911. Thus at the end of the first
decade there were in existence in the Northern Sudan
11500 miles of rail road.
These development efforts were later crowned
by four years of unprecedented prosperity throughout
the First World War. As it turned out, there were good
rains, good harvests and good prices for agricultural
exports. In his annual report the Governor-General was
able to record that,
the people are contented, happy, and loyal.
When expressions of this happiness and content­
ment are heard it is satisfactory to feel that 
they are not merely word painting for the 
benefit of the rulers of the country, but are 
based ... on solid facts. 2
With Muslim susceptibilities of both notables and
commoners conciliated by the almost exaggerated respect
1. The first rail road to the South reached Wau in the 
Bahr el-Ghazal in October 1962.
2. Report by His Majesty's Agent and Consul General on 
the Finances7 Administration and Condition- of Egypt 
and' the Sudan in 1911* Egypt, No. 1 (1912), cd. 0149$ 
p. 55.
37.
1 ‘
paid to “orthodox” Islam, the Government could count 
on virtually complete support of Northern Sudanese at 
the outbreak of war in Europe in 191^ -. Of special 
significance to the Government was the cultivated 
friendship of the two great religious leaders, Abdel 
Rahman al-Mahdi. and his rival the Khatmiya leader, Ali 
al-Mirghani, Secular: notables such as tribal shaykhs . 
in predominantly nomadic. communities, special influen­
tial urban personalities, urban:merchants and a 
surprisingly large number of relatively prosperous 
middle-ranking ex-Mahdists also assumed the role of 
"collaborators”. In short, although it was undesirable 
that Muslims should be subject to 'infidels, 1 few 
Northern Sudanese could see any practicable alternative 
to British Administration, .
So far as the actual conquest of the South is . 
concerned the first people to acknowledge the authority 
..of the Sudan Government were, naturally, the small and , 
disrupted, tribes around Wau some of whom faced the 
threat of total disintegration. They had.fled their 
original home further; south on the ironstone plateau in
the wake-of the Azande expansion and in fear of Tambura
2“who appeared to have terrorised the whole province,” 
Sandwiched between the Dinka in the north and the Azande 
In the south, these fugitives inhabited the zeriba 
(pallisaded enclosure) country, which had been greatly
1. G. , Warburg, The Sudan Under, Wingate, (London, 1971) *
2. Diary of El Miralai Sparkes Bey on Niam: Niam; (i.e. ,
Zande) Patrol, 6th January 1901, Sudan Intelligence
.Reportj No. 80, March 1901.
devastated and depopulated during the nineteenth-century 
slave trade. Foreign invaders from the slave dealers 
to the Mahdists had always found this; area the soft 
under belly of the Southern Sudan. . The British expedi­
tion under Colonel Sparkes utilised the same soft spot 
for the establishment of a bridgehead.for the eventual 
conquest of the South." Despite initial difficulties 
of obtaining supplies and carriers, the invading force 
made a rapid progress into; the interior. On January 1st, 
1901 Sparkes hpisted the two flagh of the Condominium ,at 
Jur Khattas, a former slave depot about 120 miles south­
west of Meshra er-Req, the original landing-ground. -
Leaving Major. Boulnois in charge of the organisation 
there, he proceeded to Tonj where, hei,established the 
temporary headquarters of the expedition. On 17 th 
January, 1 Wau (or Fort Desaix, which later became the 
permanent headquarters) -was Occupied. By the summer the 
whole area from Deim Zubeir, ‘in the west to Rumbek in 
the east was dotted with Government posts. These 
included: Deim Zubeir, Wau, Tonj, Shambe, Meshra er-Rek 
and Rumbekl It Is remarkable that these military posts 
were located at strategic points, usually on the site 
of a former slave trader’s zeriba or Egyptian Govern­
ment post.
The Azande.
The expedition’s next task was to secure,the
1. R., Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, 1839-1889* 
(London 1$}'6X)T""   ' ..
allegiance of the Azande or vtrie.'lr'; Ayui^%fa”“:Ch.iefs -who 
inhabited the/territory concurrent with the,Nile-Congo 
Divide, strategic for the supposed border's’ with the 
Belgians and French* This was not to be done by force 
if submission could be obtained by peaceful methods.
But qf the paramount Zande Chiefs, only/Tambura , volun- < 
tarily sought accommodation with/lhe British right from 
the ,start by agreeing , to place/himselfand all . his 
resources at the disposal of the Government. These 
included his army estimated at 1 ,000 rifles of all sorts 
and some 3*000 bow and spearmen. . He also, made gifts to
the Sudan Government of eighty tusks"of ivory valued at
2 ' •v ' well over £E1200, undertook the- construction of a
garrison at the site of a former French post,^ and
promised to* open trade relations with Khartoum. If the
refugee tribes around Wau welcomed British rule on
grounds of security, Tambura'did so for quite different.
reasons, his acceptance of, and co-operation with, the
British were dictated by considerations of:enlightened
self-interest. Quite apart from the fact that his/-
previous experiences with Europeans, particularly* the
Belgians and the French, had taught him'to respect
1. Tambura was one of two sons of- Liwa,/the aristocratic 
Avungera Chief who had established his/rule in the 
Bahr el-Ghazal in the mid 1800’s. All the big"Azande 
Chiefs belong to the aristocracy of the Avungera 
clan.
2. ’’Diary of Sparkes Bey on the Zande Patrol, 4th June to 
;>7th July 1901", Sudan Intelligence Report,. Hot 86, 
Appendix B (l), September 1901. ,
3. A; B. Bethell, "Report on Post in Sultan Tambura's 
Village", P.O. 78/5367.
their superior technology, the majority of his subjects 
were not Azande at all, but consisted of a cluster of 
tribes notably the Bellanda, the Bongo: and Ndogo. His 
opposition to the British would have almost certainly 
resulted In the defection of these clients. To ensure 
his continued control over the non-Azande tribes,
Tambura could not but submit peacefully to the Govern­
ment in return for their confirmation of his paramount 
position. Moreover, he hoped to elicit British support 
against his Avungera rivals, especially Yambio, the 
other most powerful Azande Chief within the Sudan 
Government territory. "When, Yambio is dead”, said
Tambura, "I shall be a much bigger man, for numbers of
„2people will come to me."
South of Tambura and with half of his country 
in Belgian territory, was Ndoruma, another paramount 
Azande Chief. He, too, submitted peacefully to the 
forces of the Government. Unlike Tambura, who under­
stood the existing boundary with the Belgians perfectly 
well, Ndoruma did not realise that part of his country 
was outside the British sphere of Influence Neverthe­
less, "he was doubtful if he was backing the right horse
1. A. B. Bethell, "Notes on.the Different Tribes in 
Tambura1 s Courtf-f, 2nd July 1904, F, 0 .78 /5367 * Sudan 
Intelligence Report, No. 121, August 1904, Appendix
l»'n » ' ’ .
2. Quoted by Bethell in "Notes on the Different Tribes 
. in Tambura.1 s Court", op. cit.
3 . A. F e l l ,  "Notes on S u lta n  ( i . e .  C h ie f)  Ndoruma" Sudan 
In te l l ig e n c e  R e p o rt, No. 128 (March 1905) Appendix D 
(a) 3. ’
or not in supporting the Sudan Government. " 1 The impres­
sive force mustered by Colonel,Sparkes might have coloured 
his decision to recognise the Government, Having reviewed 
the Government’s troops assembled at.Tambura*s Mbanga 
(Court), Ndoruma marvelled that "soldiers like these must
■* p
be the work of God."
In return for his cooperation, the Government 
promised Ndoruma non-interference with his own system 
of government on the condition that it was efficient and 
to the satisfaction of Government and that he and his 
people should give the Government their unqualifled 
loyal support. Anxious for the creation of the Govern­
ment presence in his country and following Tambura’s 
example, Ndoruma constructed a permanent post for the 
troops. Thus, round about the end of 1904, the Sudan 
Government had, by persuasion, cajolery or threat of 
force, succeeded in winning the support and loyalty of 
two important Zande Chiefs. The Government was able to 
patrol the borders more effectively than ever before 
and "to show the flag".
The most powerful and most feared of the Azande 
Chiefs within the British sphere of influence, Yambio, 
had, however, yet to be subdued. But unlike Tambura or 
Ndoruma who had managed to strike a sort of modus vlvendi
1. Major Boulnois, "Diary of Yambio Column, Bahr al-Ghazal 
.Expedition", Sudan Intelligence Report, No, 128 (March 
1905)* Appendix '"Dil. (a) 1.
2. H. Fell, "Notes on Chief Ndoruma", op, cit., p. 16,. ,
with the British, Yambio was reputed for his extreme 
hostility to all Europeans irrespective of their 
nationality. When the Sudan Government forces arrived 
at Tambura's court all indications were that Yambio 
would oppose the British invaders with all the means 
available to him. In vindication of his contempt and 
defiance of the Sudan Government’s call to submit this 
Avungera aristocrat, made a deserter from the Govern­
ment regulars into a ’Chief’ and gave him a village. 2 
Yambio was so powerful and his prestige so great*that a 
careful preparation was needed before launching the 
invasion in 1905- Tambura himself.had warned his 
British allies, that Yambio*s men were numerically 
superior to his own. Ndoruma had concurred.-^ However, 
when the Sudan Government was ready to launch its offen­
sive two important factors were already at work which 
vastly eroded Yambio's power of resistance.
The Yambio expedition comprised two columns, 
with Tambura’s men playing a supporting role. Prior to 
the British invasion,.however, the Belgians south of 
the border had embarked upon one of their repeated 
incursions into Yambio’s territory. The latter had 
responded in a characteristic fashion: summoning all 
his important lieutenants and their men, he hit back at
1. A. B. Bethell, "Notes on Tambura’s Country", (3rd July
1904), F.O.78/5367.
2. A. B, Bethell's "Notes on Tambura’s Country", (4th July 
1904), Ibid.
3 . H. Fell, "Notes on Chief Ndoruma’s", Sudan Intelligence 
Report, No. 128. (March 1905), Appendix "£)" (a) 3*
the Belgians. The two-day* fight resulted in little 
success and Yambio and his troops were repulsed with 1 
heavy losses. The point to remember. Is that the Azande. 
of this part; of the country had been In a permanent 
state of war with the Belgians or with Tambura: and 
Ndoruma, so that even when they were hot actually 
fighting a war with the Belgians they were engaged in 
a conflict with one or the other. Thus weary and 
exhausted by wars, both Yambio and the natives lost the 
will-power to fight the British advance. Unable to 
face, the superior forces, of the Sudan; Government,' Yambio.:: 
fled but was pursued, captured and died later in the 
Government camp of gunshot wounds. Thus the massive 
expeditionary force accomplished the task of subduing 
Yambio without encountering stiff .resistance as was 
originally feared. But a large part of the credit for 
the successful conclusion of the campaign goes to the : 
Belgians whose actions indirectly contributed to the 
defeat of the otherwise intractable Azande Chiefv In : 
the words of one commanding officer, "We have to thank 
the Belgians for giving us an easier task than was 
anticipated as far as fighting is concerned." . In any 
case, it was supremely imperative to bringYambio m  
control as his region lay on the ..way to the Lado 
Enclave which was under Belgian occupation. /
l;’ Bbulnois Bey, "Diary of Yambio Column", Sudan Intelli­
gence Report, No. 128 (March 1905), Appendix "d " ’ ‘ ;-
' - (c) 1 . •
2 . Ibid. "
A second factor relates to the. gradual erosion 
of the support and loyalty of the * subject’ tribes in 
"Yambio*s country, Yambio, in addition to holding a 
direct sway in his own central district, maintained an 
overall control in the rest of his kingdom where minor 
chiefs, including,some of his sons, ruled at the peri- ' \ 
phery. It was these ’Chiefs * and their subordinates in 
the peripheral districts who ruled over most of the non- 
Azande tribes such as the Babukur, Baka, Mundu and Baris. 
Pressed on both sides by two columns of the expeditionary 
force, these ’Chiefs’ went into hiding after many of the 
subject tribes revolted and sought Government protec-
l •- - - - . . . . .
tion. The cruel and oppressive rule of Yambio and his 
lieutenants may have contributed in no mean; way , to the 
revolt of the non-Azande tribes. . ’’Yambio”, it has been 
said, ’’knew of but one puhishment, and that was death, 
and it appears.to,have been meted out with great lavish-,
ness, life being held very cheap; Prisoners were taken
’ '■ ' „2 ■ 
out to the forestland killed with/spears.
Tambura*s ability to retain hegemony over most 
of his non-Azande.subjects had called for an alliance 
with the Sudan Government which in. turn discouraged 
further defection fr<xn his court, ; Yambio, . in prefer­
ring the course of war to the wise instrument of diplo­
macy, was doomed to destruction on two counts: internal
1., Diary of Sutherland Bey, Sudan Intelligence Report, 
No. 129 (April 1903), Appendix "c"'.
2. H. Fell, "Notes on Yambio * s Mbanga (i.e. Court) 
and Country", Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 128, 
(March 1905)* Appendix "D*‘ {c j 2*
'■ . ■- ' V  - . ^5-
weakness of his. kingdom/and the technological superiority 
of‘his British foes* Believing that the British invasion, 
like' the-French ■-and''Belgian incursions before it, was a 
transient phenomenon, Yambio sought in vain to prove the 
military prowess of the Avungera aristocracy. But as 
one British Officer remarked, "We did not want war, but 
were prepared for it* Yambio wanted war and had been 
killed. h1
Round .about the Spring of 1905 most of the
southern Bahr al-Ghazal area had come under effective
control of the Sudan Government. In consequence Major
Boulnois, the Governor of Bahr al-Ghazal, withdrew
most of the troops, leaving a token force, to patrol the
borders and report frontier violations by either the
2French or the Belgians.
The Nilotics. -1’
The relative tractability with which Azande 
were, conquered and pacified was bound to generate the 
fake impression that the application of the same methods 
to the Nilotics immediately to the North would produce 
similar results. But the.pattern of conquest of Zande- 
1and could not be repeated in Dinka-country, much less 
in Nuer-land;:and the application of the same methods
1. "Diaries of Officers dealing with Yambio Expedition",
Sudan Intelligence Report, No* 129> (April 1905)>
Appendix "c".
2. A garrison of 150 officers and men was later established 
at Yambio to counter the activities of the Congolese.
would yield the desired effects only if sociological 
and other conditions were the same. They-were not. 
Because authority in Zande society was sufficiently 
organised and institutionalised, the total collapse of 
the central force entailed the dissolution of the whole
■ i
political system. The fundamentally acephalous insti­
tutions of both Dinka and Nuer, by contrast, offered’ 
little chance of a quick submission of an entire tribe 
following a defeat in war. As a matter of fact there 
was no conclusive war but a succession of battles;which 
could be won or lost.
(a) The Dinka
Government alienation of the Dinka seemed pre­
dictable in the light of the demands It made on them.
The demands for menial labour such as the clearing of
roads or the providing of carriers were especially
• ■ • p
detested by the Dinka and Nuer. The Government also
made the unacceptable demand that the Southern Sudanese 
should "keep, the peace" when the Administration itself 
was unable to suppress or effectively punish trans­
gressors of peace. None of the Dinka and very few of
1 . In times of crisis, "emergency leaders" (some, but not 
all, of whom were "prophets") had appeared whose power 
and visibility tended to obscure the essential segmen­
tary nature of Dinka and Nuer societies.
2. The Nilotes detested being used as carriers not only 
because it effeminate but because carrying service 
deformed the decorative coiffures Which were of great 
social and aesthetic, Valure to young;warriors• \
the Nuer had been under any Government; they saw no - :
reason why they should submit to this latest lot of
"Turks". The Nilotes’ belief in their superiority- was
not easily shaken. Bimbashi R. B. Airey,' on a;patrol
through the country of the Raik Dinka in 1905:, found he
could not possibly enforce a fitting attitude; "their
attitude throughout to me was that of a superiorto an
inferior."1 This attitude of the Nilotes to all
foreigners was later confirmed by social anthropolo- 
2gists. The Dinka were also little impressed by the 
strength of the Hakuma which consisted of isolated posts, 
and small patrois. At best "the government" was seen as 
a potential ally against a traditional or Intractable 
adversary in the perpetual game of cattle-raiding..
The first gimp of Southern Sudanese to rise in 
rebellion against the British were the Agar Dinka who in 
1902 killed a British officer, Bimbashi Scott-Barbour,, 
and most of his escort. The grievance of the Agar was 
simply that they did not want "the government" in their 
country. The revolt threatened the earliest line of 
communication to be opened to the south-western frontier. 
The Government was determined not to be delayed in its 
dash for the frontier, and fearing a general Dinka
1. R. B. Airey to Governor Wau, 15th February 1905, Cairo 
Intelligence Report, 3/17/285* Sudan Government 
Archives, Khartoum. ; r v ^
2. See, for instance, E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The .Nuer 
(London) 19^0), p. 15*
>. R. 0. Collins, Land Beyond the Rivers, p. 80,' .The 
line of communication ran from the river post at 
Shambe to Zandeland via Rumbek (in Agar territory) 
and Tonj. In the second half of 190I the transport 
system collapsed and Rumbek and Ronj were cut off * 
from Shambe.
uprising reacted with extreme violence. The Agar were 
doubly punished; first by a small force under W. H. 
Hunter, who scattered the Agar warriors, burnt villages 
and captured cattle. Later, the "Shambe Field Force" 
under L. 0. F. Stack (the future Governor-General) 
spent one month systematically laying waste the Agar- 
country, seizing- cattle and grain and leaving "not 
more than a dozen houses ... standing in the whole 
district. ”1
The punitive expeditions against the Agar 
furnished a lustrous example of the Dinka exploita­
tion of the Government to settle old scores and to 
help themselves to cattle and women, thereby perpe­
tuating and intensifying inter- and intra-tribal 
violence. Where the regular troops were supported by 
other local groups on a punitive expedition these were 
known as "friendlies". The status of the "friendlies", 
however, was nothing like an iron-cast guarantee of 
continuing support and loyalty to the Government. The 
Atwot (a mixed half-Dinka and half-Nuer people) who
-i
acted as the friendlies on the Agar patrols were.soon 
to resist the Government under the leadership of a 
"prophet” by the name of Awo. The point being pressed 
here is, although the Government relied initially on 
Dinka for the supply of information, interpreters and'
1. W. Boulnois, "Narrative of the Expedition to the 
Bahr al-Ghazal", (November 1900 - April 1901), 
pp. 25-7, Cairo Intelligence Report, Sudan Govern­
ment Archive, Khartoum.
guides, the primary motivation of such individuals and 
the "friendlies" was unquestionably self-enrichment.
Even as late as the 1920*s the "friendlies" could hope
"to slink under shelter of Government-and enrich them-
■ 1 selves with captured cattle."
That the Dinka looked upon the Sudan Govern-, 
ment more as an ally than a conqueror is indicated.by 
; .the way some of the tribes choSe to pay tribute and to 
aecept limited control in return for Government protec­
tion against the Nuer, their traditional foes. At the 
arrival of the British there were In existence two areas 
of acute political conflict immediately north and south 
of Nuer-lahd. In the South, the Nuer were steadily 
expanding at the expense of the Southern Dinka. In ■ 
March 1905 the Inspector of Upper Nile, H. H. Wilson;, 
.reported that the Ghol Dinka were "in a horrible state 
of fear of the Nuers" and that they wished to migrate 
,en masse to Khor Fulias at the mouth of the Sobat 
river. The condition of their neighbours, the 
Nyareweng Dinka was even worse; Wilson found them 
living in the forest, "like game" for fear of the Nuers 
and remarked that they were "only one example of the
many (Dinka tribes) who through the absence of any
’ ' ; 2 security are deteriorating; into wild men of the woods."
The request of the Ghol to migrate to the
1 . The Story of Fergie Bey, (London 1930), A Biography 
of "Vere H .” Furgusson) p. 117*
2. H. H. Wilson, "Report oil an overland patrol from Sobat 
to Bor" (10th March 1905).. Cairo Intelligence Report, 
5/17/277, Sudan Government Archive, Khartoum.
north was turned down because the Khor Fullas itself was 
another region of acute friction. Dinka refugees from 
Nuer control had moved into this relatively accessible 
region at about the time of the arrival of the British 
and, like the small peoples of Western Bahr al-Ghazal>; 
they had promptly offered to pay tribute and place them­
selves under Government protection. Thinking themselves 
thus , secure ’’they kept up a kind of guerrilla warfare 
against the Nuer.” From their protected base or sanc­
tuary they launched hit-and-run raids and rustled Nuer 
cattle. Wilson also reported that these Dinka,refugees 
- missed no opportunity to vilify the Nuers to the Govern­
ment.'1'
By 191*1- the only Nilotic, groups under adminis­
tration were the Northern (Khor Pullus) Dinka; and the 
southernmost Dinka tribes in the Bahr al-Ghazal and 
Mongalla Provinces. Here administration was direct and 
. ’’bureaucratic”, by Egyptian ma’murs,: under British 
inspectors. In the far north-west> along the borders 
with Kordofan and Darfur Provinces, there was no adminis­
tration of any kind. In between, in the land of the 
Raik Dinka there was a penumbral zone of light adminis­
tration. British officials experimented with ’’native 
administration’1 but these attempts failed for lack of
-1. H. H. Wilson, ’’Report on an overland, patrol from Sobat 
to .Bor” (10th March 1905*) Cairo Intelligence Report, 
^/l7/277i .Sudan Government.Archive, Khartoum.
2. Corresponding roughly to the Agar, Bor, Ghol, Twi, 
Aliab, Chich and Luaich Dinka.
natural leaders. The appointed “chiefs” proved Incompe­
tent or treacherous and the frequent changes of Govern­
ment “chiefs” only led to further confusion. Some of 
the appointed “chiefs" simply gave up like "chief” Jok 
of the Malwal, who went to live at the Governmentpost 
at Nyamlell on account of weariness to. pay from his 
-personal, cattle the fines imposed upon "his” village. 
Where possible, administration was restricted to 
tribute collecting expeditions (i.e. Government by 
raids):
■* ■ j
Tribute was collected by-the simple process 
of taking an adequate force of soldiers and : 
seiSihg the animals. Apparently the troops 
behaved as if in an enemy country
Needless to say, behaviour of this kind simply alienated 
the cattle-owning Dinka. Even where "direct” administra­
tion existed the Government was quite unable to protect 
the Dinka against their local enemies. When (between 
19lK and 1918) th e  S ou the rn , a d m in is te re d , D inka  were 
under severe pressure from the Nuer, the most that the 
Government could do to protect the Ghol, Bor and Twi 
Dinka was to issue them in 1915 with firearms and ammuni­
tion - the very negation of pacific control. In the 
circumstances, it seemed legitimate that the Agar,
Chich and Luaich Dinka should.refuse to pay taxes in 
protest of the administration’s failure to protect them
1 . There appointed chiefs were often repudiated by their
people and regarded as Government dogs, see Chapter
III. -
2. C. A. Willis, "A Brief Survey of the Policy of the 
Government in the Upper Nile , June 1927* Sudan 
Archive, Durham.
1against the Nuer. Meanwhile, in 1917 and 1918 the
Government launched major punitive expeditions against
o
the Agar and.Atwot Dinka. The:Agar responded by 
attacking in concert with the Atwot, the .District 
Headquarters at Rumbek.
The tax-paying Bor Dinka were equally unpro­
tected from annual raids by their unadministered 
eastern neighbours, the Murle or "Beirs". The standard 
Government response - "Patrols against the Beirs" - 
failed to make any impact upon the Murle. Raids on the 
Bor Dinka continued uninterruptedly from 1906 to 1912, 
after which date the Government abandoned the idea of 
punishing the "Beirs" and sought to provide money for 
their administration.^ Under settled administration 
the much feared "Beir" ceased to worry either the Bor 
Dinka or the Government. In 1926, K. C. P. Struve 
described them as "a quiet and easily-handled 
people.
Another area of acute friction existed in the 
far north-west where the unadministered Dinka were 
under constant pressure from their traditional enemies,
1. R. 0. Collins, The Land Beyond the Rivers, (New Haven 
and London, 1971), pp. 190-2.
2. Ibid.. pp. 210-13*
3 . R. 0. Collins, ’'Patrols against the Beirs", Sudan 
Notes and Records, XLI (i960), pp. ,
A. K. C. P. Struve, "Handing-over Notes on Upper Nile 
Province," Sudan Archive, Durham, Box 212/10/1.
the Baggara Arabs of southern Kordofah and Darfur, who 
raided for cattle as well as slaves. Government 
efforts, which did not begin until 19Q9* to check these 
incursions by a system of frontier patrols and the 
creation of a post at Nyamlell ended in complete failure. 
The limited Government resources proved inadequate to 
man effectively the overstretched border. By 1914 the 
Baggara were raiding the Dinka unchecked one hundred 
miles deep into the Bahr al-Ghazal and over an area of 
two hundred miles. Despite the crisis, the Dinka 
refused to cooperate with the Government even for their 
own defence. Not only did they refuse to construct the 
road to Nyamlell post to facilitate patrol of the border 
but actually rose in open revolt against the Sudan Govern- 
ment. As one observer recently summed upi "Much as (the 
Dinka) hated and feared the Baggara, they hated and feared 
the Government more." The permanent state of warfare and 
rebellion in the north-west of the Bahr al-Ghazal persisted 
well into the early 1920's when a close and careful 
administration was instituted.
By 1918 the alienation of the Dinka (save in 
the Khar Fullus region) appeared complete. Even parts 
of the area of the hitherto amenable Shilluk could not 
be visited "without a guard of at least twelve armed 
men, whilst none moved into the ,.. Dinka area without
1, R. 0. Collins, Land Beyond the Rivers, (New Haven 
and London, 1971) PP- l8b-9V .. .
2. G. N. Sanderson, "Some Problems of-Colonial Rule and 
Local Response in*the Southern Sudan, 1900-1920" 
(Private) London, 1976. -. -
jf ;
f a r  m o re .’ In  December 1919 th e  " d i r e c t ly "  a d m in is te re d  
A l ia b  D inka re v o lte d  and were Jo ined by th e M a n d a r i.  To 
f o r e s t a l l  th e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  th e  Bor: D in ka ;;in  t h i s  
la t e s t  wave o f  r e b e l l io n  a s tro n g  fo rc e  was-despatched 
to  p a t r o l  th e  a re a . The o p e ra tio n s  a g a in s t th e  A lia b  
co s t th e  A d m in is tra t io n  the  l iv e s  o f  two s e n io r  o f f ic e r s .  
A severe p e n a lty  was exacted a g a in s t th e  A l ia b .  For 
th re e  months (March-May 1920) th e  "A lia b  P a t r o l” systema­
t i c a l l y ;  ravaged th e  c o u n try s id e , s e iz in g  c a t t le ,  d e s tro y ­
in g  g ra in ,  s ta n d in g  crops  and b u rn in g  v i l la g e s .  In  sum, 
"No more th a n  5 per cen t o f  th e  A lia b  (D inka) w i l l  have 
a decent house to  l i v e  in  d u r in g  the  r a i n s . . N e g l e c t  
as w e ll  as o pp ress ion  stung th e  A lia b  in to  r e v o l t .  .F o r 
one th in g  th e  Government, f a i le d  to  check th e  m a lp rac ­
t ic e s  o f  t h e i r  ma’m urs, and f o r  a n o th e r, i t  f a i le d  to  
p ro te c t  th e  A l ia b  from  n e ig h b o u rin g  A tw o txm arauders. 
F u rthe rm o re , th e  A d m in is tra t io n  was unab le  o r 
u n w il l in g  to  p ro v id e  any m a te r ia l b e n e fits .: to  th e  
A lia b , . ; The G ove rno r; o f  M onga lla , V . Woodland, a d m itte d  
b lu n t ly  t h a t ,  " th e  Government has done n o th in g , f o r  the  
A l ia b . "  Y e t in  r e tu M  f o r  n o th in g  (o r f o r  w o rse ); i t  
had d e m a n d e d 'b o th ^ tr ib u te  and th e  d e te s te d  c a r ry in g  
s e rv ic e .^  ; , v  .
1 . 0 .  A.  W i l l i s , ; " A  B r ie f  Survey o f  th e  P o lic y  o f  th e  
Sudan G overrunent-in  th e  U p p e r ,N ile " ,  June 1927>
Sudan Government A rc h iv e s , Durham, Box; 212/10/1. :
2. RV'O. Collins,' "The A l ia b  D inka U p r is in g  and I t s  
S u p p ress ion ",; Sudan Notes and Records, 48 (1967).
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Paced with the veritable threat of total des­
truction, (from the Government, the Baggara and the,Nuer), 
the Dinka seemed to have found salvation in the charis­
matic leadership<of a certain Bui Yol, universally known 
by"his prophet name, Ariendit. A Malwal Dinka from the 
unadministered north-west, he rose to prominence from 
relative obscurity and to achieve a level of political 
unity rarely known .to the Nilotics outside the Shilluk 
country, / Unwittingly, hhis:measure of political 
cohesion inevitably occasioned a central force the 
annihilation of which (as has been .”:?*een irf Zandeland) , 
often resulted" in the total collapse either of the 
political system or of organised resistance* The -
eventual pacification (or subjugation) pf the Dinka 
subscribed to this padefn of conquest. Thus having 
defied the British Authorities as sub-groups, the Dinka 
achieved an astonishing, degree of political unity under 
a !tprophet” only to succumb to the superior forces of 
the Administration,
There-can be little doubt that Ariendit him­
self was a great man. The British described him as ”a
fine, intelligent-looking man” who, later in captivity,
: -■ ■ ■ ■ 1 was even capable of impressing Muslim Northern Sudanese*
His rise to fame and veneration,dated from 1917* when
he returned from self-imposed exile from ”a far country”
equipped with a magic stick and a divine mission to rid
1 . Intelligence Report, 1/2Q/1Q (Ariendit), R.K. Winter 
(Acting Governor, Wau) to .Civil Secretary, 8th 
December 1921: Kainmakam G. Brander, 01 ,C* Patrol 
No. 101, Report-of 3rd April: 1922, Intelligence 
Reportj 1/20/10 Sudan Government Archive, Khartoum.
the Dinka of oppression. The supernatural powers attri­
buted to him were very impressive indeed.: Apparently, 
he eould raise men from the dead or f,wili,f them to 
death. It is also alleged he could turn the Govern­
ment^ bullets to water. Most striking of all, he is 
reported to have witheld (in 1921) rain from-the Govern­
ment *s Dinka while granting it to his own followers. 1 
His other "miracles” included the construction of an 
audience chamber ("House of God") - with a capacity of
over 300 men - unmatched by any traditional Dinka
structure.
Toward the end of 1921 Ariendit was the.
undisputed leader of all the unadministered Dinka, who
were now united in open rebellion against the Govern­
ment. This involved virtually the whole population of 
Bahr al-Ghazal Dinka, as far south as the Gok and the. 
Agar. As for the Dinka tribes in the administered and 
semi-administered zone, these were ready to rally to.
Ariendit1 s support at the first indications of his 
2success. On hearing that Ariendit was about to launch 
a concerted attack (involving the whole Dinka population) 
upon Province Headquarters at Wau, R, K. Winter, the 
Acting Governor, was convinced that Ariendit was a 
"national hero,” Thoroughly disconcerting to the Sudan
1. R. K. Winter to Director of intelligence, 10th 
December 1921, W. Owen (inspector of Nyamlell) to 
Winter, 28th December 1921; statement by *Ali-(Arab 
merchant trading with Northern Dinka), 10th November 
1921, Intelligence Report, 1/20/10, S.G.A. Khartoum.
2. Winter to Civil Secretary, 24th November, 8th December 
and 21st December 1921. M. J . Wheatley (Governor Wau), 
to' Brander, 12th January 1922, S. G. A. Khartoum.
Government Authorities was Ariendit *s appeal across 
tribal lines coupled with his skill in political 
organisation, For, he was capable of creating an 
efficient network of agents who ’’worked” the Dinka
i ■ *
irrespective of tribe*
Ariendit*s political movement ms not 
directed against specific grievances. His was a 
simple and radical programme aimed at the liberation 
of the Dinka from Government oppression. The 
fighting ideology of his movement derived, not 
unnaturally, from a traditional religious stock, 
save that this ideology operated in quite untradi^- 
tional fashion to create a pan-Dinka independence 
movement. So valid is the assertion that among the 
Nilotics
... no man may really claim to have a voice 
in the affairs of the ”state” unless he has 
established himself as-a true worker of big 
magic, fully capable of propitiating or 
calling in evil spirits and able to produce
rain in time of drought,^
Ariendit had distinguished himself in these matters in
a big way and was rewarded with astounding political
success by his Dinka folk. His fatal mistake, possibly
the result of his supreme confidence in divine inspira-
tion, was his failure to combine political organisation
1. H, K* Winter to Civil Secretary, 8th December 1921, of* 
Bahr Al-Ghazal Intelligence Report, November 1921, ’’There 
is no question but thatlAfiendit is a national hero.” 
S.G.A. Khartoum.
2. The Story of Fergie Bey* A biography of Vere H.
Fergusson feey, (London, 1930), p* 113*
3. Winter to Civil Secretary, 21st December 1921, op. cit.
with adequate military preparations. Thus when (in 
February-March 1922), Patrol No. 101 was despatched
against him, Ariendit*s movement collapsed almost
1 ■ ■without a fight.
Ariendit*s efforts did not end in total 
failure, however. His defeat was followed, not by the 
severe punishment often exacted against the natives as 
on previous occasions, but by a radical change ain 
policy. Following the defeat of Ariendit, the Governor- 
General (Sir Lee Stack) firmly "set his face against 
any more patrols ... especially against cattle-raiding. 
(And) a return was made to the old plan of peaceful 
penetration." It was then agreed that fines on the 
Dinka should be light, that, there should be'no indis- 
criminating killing, or destruction or confiscation.^
A careful (and caring) administration was introduced. 
The."thoroughly Egyptian system", whose drawbacks were
V- * _ '
now recognised was abandoned. The title of "inspector1* 
was dropped and "District Commissioner" substituted, A
District Commissioner was placed in charge of each dis-
» * 4trict and ma murs were gradually phased out. By the
1. Sitrep, Report of Patrol No. 101, 24th February 1921; 
Wheatley to Civil Secretary, 14th March .1924, S.G.A. 
Khartoum. t
2. C, A, Willis, "A Brief Survey of the Policy of the Sudan 
Government in the Upper Nile , June 1927* op. cit.
3. Owen to Brander, 7th November 1921, S.G.Ai, Khartoum.
The total fines (upon several Dinka tribes) of under- 
500 head of cattle contrasted sharply with-the treat­
ment of . the Aliab two;, years earlier whereby, 6,300 head 
of cattle were taken and nearly 500 Dinka and Mandarl 
were killed.
4. G. M. Bakheit, British Administration and Sudanese 
Nationalism, 1919-1939* Unpublished Ph.P. Thesis 
("Cambridge I965), pp. 5^-5•
early 1920*s the number of British administrative
of fleers : serving; in the South almost doubled the pre>»
war figures"Fur thermora^ the calibre of the new
recruits was remarkably different from that of their
predecessors, l?hey were carefully chosen from men,
who hy their patience^ good temper and 
sympathy obtained the confidence of the , 
tribes. They learned, something, sometimes 
a great deal of slanguage and of the customs 
of the people. They discovered matters in 
which unwittingly the Government had been 
riding roughshod over their tribal customs ;
* * * 1 f
Once attempts were made to communicate with the Dinka 
rather than plunder and punish, they became responsive 
having accepted defeat after the collapse of Ariendit*s 
"Nationaltr movement.
(b) The Nuer.
The Nuer by contrast accepted ho defeat and 
were largely unpacified. The process by which they 
were eventually pacified (or subjugated) continued 
throughout the 1920s and was not concluded until'early 
19^1. In the beginning, the British made little 
effort to administer the Nuer, As well as being more , 
formidable warriors than the Dinka, the Nuer had for 
the most part never recognised or been administered by 
any Government. They were even more convinced than the 
Dinka of their own absolute superiority to all foreigners,
1. C. A. Willis, "A Brief Survey;of the Policy of the 
Sudan Government in the Upper Nile11, June 1927 >
SA. Durham, Box 212/10/1.
the British included. Because Nuer-land was less
accessible than Dinka-land, it was. far mere difficult
to patrol. Any patrol at all had to be conducted when
the country was at its driest. Occasionally, the
Government employed the system of despatching armed
administrative patrols to Nuer regions in sufficient
strength to enforce decisions "on the spot". Patrols
of this kind did indeed command local respect but as
soon as they were withdrawn or the rains came, Nuer-
land easily reverted to another eight-month period of
1freedom and independence.
Strategically, the insular position of the 
Nuer did not warrant the permanent stationing of troops 
in Nuer country. Gnce, in 1902, when it became neces­
sary to demonstrate effective British occupation in the 
Upper Sobat Valley and to thwart Menelik!s ambitions, a 
patrol was despatched there which made the first serious
contact with the Nuer. Led by Kaimakam A. Blewitt, an
2officer of unsavoury reputation, the patrol bore all
the hallmarks of the.shortcomings of early British
"administration":
indifferent personnel; subordination of all 
, else to a "presence" on a disputed frontier; 
the almost - automatic recourse to violence 
when faced with difficulties or delays; the 
indiscriminate use of "friendlies"
1. Sudan Intelligence Report No. 187, February.1910, 
W.O. IO6/2 3 4.
2. Some of his colleagues thought of him as a *cynical 
careerist*.
3 . G. N. Sanderson, "Some Problems of Colonial Rule and 
Local Response in the Southern Sudan, 1900-1920", 
(private), London, 1976. •
The "friendlies" on this occasion were drawn from the 
Khor Fullus Dinka, a fact bitterly resented by the Nuer. 
Suspicious of Government patronage of the Khor Fullus 
Dinka, the Nuer were apt to regard the patrol as a large- 
scale Dinka raid with Government support. As may be 
expected, the Nuer took to the bush and refused to "come 
in" whereupon Blewitt proceeded to demonstrate "control" 
by a wholesale devastation of Nuer villages and raiding 
cattle.
This initial unfortunate encounter was not 
followed by any serious attempt to impose "administra­
tion" by force upon the Nuer. The Government simply 
had not the military and economic resources to embark 
upon such a venture* Unwilling or unable to extend con­
trol to the Nuer, the Administration restricted its 
activities to the "external" relations of the Nuer. It 
had to, because the. Nuer were regularly raiding their 
neighbours and the tax-paying Dinka for cattle (and 
slaves). The District Commissioner of Central Nuer 
district once reported that "It was an established cus­
tom of the Nuer to raid the Dinka and steal their
cattle whenever they were moved by the desire to
r " 1  possess more than lawfully belonged to them." In fact,
the Nuer regarded the raiding of the Dinka for cattle
as in the natural order of things. In the.attempts to
1* The Story of Fergle Bey, A biography of V* H. Fergusson, 
(London, 1930'/, p." 129.
2. Evans-Pritchard, "The Nuer: Tribes and Clans", Sudan 
Notes and Records, Vol. 17, Part One, pp.. 1-57*
contain these raids and to regularise Nuer relations 
with the neighbours the erroneous perceptions ,by both 
sides (by'the Government of Nuer political structure 
and by the Nuer of the nature and functions of Govern­
ment) were brought out in a far more dramatic manner 
than with the Dinka. A further complicating element in 
the relations with the Nuer pertained to the-'uncontrol­
lable (and uncontrolled) traffic.in firearms across the 
border from former Abyssinia* The possession of fire­
arms by one or the other of rival groups often produced 
sudden and radical changes in the local.balance of 
power thereby generating acute and widespread 
instability and conflict, which it was the lot of the
British to sort out (often with only temporary success).
* *
The Nuer, though for the most part independent 
and aloof, were not consistently hostile to Government.
In 1905 a British officer'described the central (Lau 
and Gaweir) Nuer as "cheery and open-hearted people", 
once you got to know them. The officer involved^ 
Kaimakam H. H. Wilson, was able to establish.friendly 
relations with Diu Deng, a "prophet" who had become 
the "emergency leader" of the Central Nuer. In 19©T the 
Authorities were also able; to.conclude a "diplomatic" 
modus vlvendi with Diu. The Nuer agreed to pay a light 
tribute and to tolerate occasional peaceful visits of
1. H. H. Wilson* "Report on an Overland Patrol from Sobat 
to Bor",r 10th March 1905, Cairo Intelligence 3/17/277* 
S,G.,A. IGaartoum, R.O. Collins, Land Beyond the Rivers, 
op. cit., pp. 196-7 ; A. S. Cudsi, Sudanese Resistance 
to British Rule, 1900-1920* M.Sc. (Ecbn.) thesis, 
(Khartoum 1969)# pp * 143-51 • - • *
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.. inspection. By this diplomatic move the Nuer hoped to 
counter .the claim of the Khor Fullus Dinka that they, 
a^d they alone, were the Government’s allies. In 
return the Government undertook to check the depreda­
tions of the Dinka in Khor Fullus area. In July, Diu 
Deng died and the southern Dinka (Ghol, Nyareweng and 
Twi), hoping to exploit the situation, launched an . 
offensive against the Central Nuer. The Nuer counter­
attacked and the traditional raids and counter-raids 
between Dinka and Nuer in this region were resumed. In ,
19Q9 the Government Intervened and a boundary between 
the two warring parties was agreed at an ”international” 
meeting convened on the spot by senior British officials 
of Mongalla and Upper Nile Provinces. The right of the 
Nuer in the area they had conquered was recognised; and 
a police post was established at Duk Fadiat, two miles 
south of the new border line, to serve as a buffer 
between Dinka and Nuer.
In 1910 the eastern (Jikaing) Nuer in the 
Pibor area, alarmed by the growing military strength of 
the Anbak, decided to ’’keep in with the Government”; 
they agreed to pay the very light tribute demanded of 
them in return for security. But the western Nuer: (to 
the west of the Bahr al-Jebel) remained totally indepen­
dent: they felt they had no enemy with whom they could 
not cope. The western Nuer also had the further advantage
1 . Sudan Intelligence Report No. 177* February 1909*
Appendix War Office 106/232 (London); Cudsi, 
op. oit.,.pp. 151-61; Collins, op. cit.,-pp. 197-8 .
of being isolated by the belt of Dinka who were 
either unadministered or "administered by raids. ’1 
When visited in 1917, this section of the Nuer were 
found to be "completely independent, very rich in 
cattle, and the most trucelent natives I- have till now 
come across.”
The modus vivendi with the central and eastern 
Nuer proved to be precarious mainly because the Nuer and 
the Government attached to it radically different inter** 
prstations. Whereas to the British it connoted acceptance 
of Government authority, to the Nuer it was a diplomatic 
bargain between equals. If, to the British, payment of 
tribute symbolised a subject status, the Nuer viewed 
tribute as a means of buying Government goodwill and pro­
tection. The Nuer were even inclined to conceive tribute- 
paying as a form of subsidy to an ally, "placing that 
ally under an obligation to assist the Nuer in their 
conflicts, or at the very least, to observe a benevolent 
neutrality while the Nuer settled matters after their
p
own fashion” - by war. Indeed when, in 1905# H. H.
Wilson (an intelligent and perceptive officer) visited 
the "cheery and'open-hearted” central Nuer he soon 
realised they were capable of frank and realistic 
political discussion. The Nuer were prepared to live 
in peace with (if not as subject of) the Government if
1. 0. Bentley, (Senior Inspector Nuba Mountains Province) 
29th October .1917# Intelligence Report, 2/26/215, S.G% 
(Khartoum).
2, G. N. Sanderson, "Some Problems of Colonial Buie and 
Local Response in-the Southern Sudan 1900-1920”, 
(Private), (London 1976).
><
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1only the latter refrained from siding with the Dinka.
The Nuer perception of the nature and func­
tion of Government was clearly demonstrated by their 
reaction to the resurgence of Anuak military power.
At the arrival of the British in the Southern Sudan 
the Anuak were engaged in a profitable business trans­
action with the Galla tribes of Ethiopia. This con­
sisted of, mainly, the trading of ivory and slaves for 
arms in Ethiopia, where there was a virtually inexhaus­
tible supply of arms and ammunition. As a result 
"practically every grown man among the Anuak had a
m 2rifle at least. 1 By 1911 estimates put the number of 
the arms acquired by the Anuak at 10,000 guns, most of 
which were comparatively modern breach-loading rifles. 
Encouraged.by their newly acquired strength, the Anuak 
resolved to settle old scores with their traditional, 
Nuer enemies. They attacked the eastern (Jikaing) and 
central(Lau) Nuer, making away with cattle and women in 
four separate raids. In the last raid, the Anuak 
managed to penetrate as far west as the neighbourhood 
of Bahr el-Zeraf, some 250 miles from their original 
base. Captain G. S, Symes (the future Governor- 
General, at that time Chief Intelligence Officer) 
summarised the reaction of the Nuer in the following
1. H. H. Wilson, "A Report on Overland Patrol from Sobat 
to Bor", 10th March 1905# op. cit.
2. Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 19^, September 1910, 
War Office, 106/25^, p7r7o. (London).
5. Capt. G. S. Symes, "Notes on the Arms Traffic,
28th November 1911n# Intelligence Report, 1/8/59# 
S.G.A. (Khartoum)..
words:
In consequence of these raids the Nuers, who 
have just commenced paying a light tribute to 
Government, are loud in their demands for pro­
tection by the latter; and, in the meantime, 
are losing no opportunities of acquiring the 
rifles, by fair means or foul, which they con­
sider# not unnaturally, to be essential for 
their protection.^
The ominous thing was, Captain Symes reported, that the 
Gaajak section of the Jikaing, immediate neighbours of 
the Anuak, had already acquired some 600 rifles, The 
die was cast..
In response to Nuer complaints the Government 
twice (in 1911 and 1912) mounted punitive expeditions 
against the Anuak, but to no avail. The Anuak resisted 
with a certain amount of success and must have inter­
preted the ultimate withdrawal of the patrols as an 
Anuak victory. The eastern Nuer were not impressed by 
Government performance either. After the withdrawal of 
the expeditions they probably wrote off the Sudan Govern­
ment as useless. In September 1912 the eastern Nuer, 
drawing inspiration from their own prowess and equipped .
with their newly acquired rifles, made a devastating
2reprisal raid on the Anuak. By 1915 the central and 
eastern Nuer had acquired fresh rifles. The central 
, (Gaweir and Lau) Nuer resumed their raids on the southern 
Binka in contravention of the Nuer-Dinka frontier agree­
ment of 19G9. The Government resolved to punish this
1. Capt. G. S. Symes, "Notes on the Arms Traffic, 28th 
November l£ll , Intelligence Report, 1/8/59# S.G.A. 
(Khartoum).
2. Cudsi, Sudanese Resistance to British Rule, 1900-1920, 
op» cit.'s Pp. l^-Tl; Collins, kand Beyond the Rivers, 
op. cit., pp. 20A-6 .
Violation of an "offioial" frontier by a punitive 
expedition, the first .of a series of ,campaigns against 
the central.Nuer which involved large-scale confisca­
tion of cattle. Unfortunately for the Government the 
expeditions merely served to revive in full strength 
,the cdhviction that the "Government" was# by all account, 
a dangerous and predatory ally of the Dinka.
Faced with the combined threat from both. 
Government and Dinka,.two major sections of the Nuer 
(Lau and Gaweir):took the rare step of forming a 
defensive alliance, and in 1915 and 1916 they success­
fully raided the Dinka tribes to the south of them., In 
the raids on the :D i n k a  in the Khor Fillus area, most of 
the cattle were taken. These Nuer successes encouraged 
the-western-Nuer to raid the neighbouring Dinka tribes.
In 1917 the Government staged a major punitive expedi­
tion led by Major E. A, T. Bayly, mainly against the 
central Nuer . ; Once again Villages were destroyed and 
over'll-,000 heads of cattle;-captured. The Lau Nuer were 
effectively discouraged from further large-scale raids 
on the Dinka.
In February 1920, similar large-scale opera­
tions against the eastern Nuer amounted to a full-scale , 
war in which two columns of troops, each several hundreds 
strong, were supported by gunboats which patrolled the 
rivers to destroy canoes.1 This was an effective way to 
restrict Nuer mobility. In the meantime, R.A.F. aircraft
1 . Fi,W. Woodward (Governor# U.N.P.), "Notes on gun- 
running, 6th September 1913"# Intelligence Report, 
1/8/59, S.G.A. (Khartoum) i - ..
bombed Nuer villages and cattle-camps. By the end of 
the. year, the eastern Nuer were forced to submit to the 
Sudan Government authorities. But the western Nuer 
were still regularly raiding the Dinka to the south of 
them. Another three years of major punitive expedi- . 
tions elapsed before they were subdued in
1923.1
In the first twenty years or so the British 
failed to establish effective administration, particu­
larly, in Nilotic areas. For the-most part, they were 
engaged in supervising events with the help of temporary 
alliances. Administration1 of any sort had to be done 
on the cheap, hence the reliance on the natives either 
as Allies1 or as collaborators. While they had 
superior technology, they lacked superior administra- . 
tion. -The one thing they did establish fairly firmly 
in the minds of the natives was the futility of resis­
tance to British power. Expressed differently, the 
notion of British hegemony was accepted as a result of 
fear of getting shot. Within that broad notion of 
hegemony the British were able to establish flimsy 
administrative structure, but knew as yet very little 
about the people they had come to conquer and to 
administer. The task of studying the customs, lan­
guages and tribal systems of the Southerners in the 
light of which a general and comprehensive policy could 
be formulated would have to take its turn in the follow­
ing decades.
1. B. 6 . Collins, Land Beyond the Rivers (New. Haven and 
London, 1971) pp. 190-27 £0 2.
CHAPTER TWO
GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISLAM:
The Genesis of Southern Policy”.
The religious policy to be pursued by the
Sudan Government was" initiated by Lord Cromer in his
speech to the Shaykhs and notables in Omdurman on
4 January 1899. While pledging low taxation he also
assured them that there would be no. interference in the
religion of the people. The policy statement received
further emphasis and elaboration from Kitchener in a
later memorandum to the provincial governors:
... Be careful to see that the religious 
feelings are not in any way interferred with, 
and that the Mohammedan religion is^respected. 
At the same time FikiS' teaching different
Tariks, and dealing in amulets .... should not 
v he allowed to resume their former trade . . . , 2
The important point to remember is that this prohibition
did hot apply to the Southern Sudan, which was in a
different category. However, Cromer in Cairo and
Kitchener in Khartoum were both agreed that it would
be politically undesirable to allow Christian missionary
work in the Muslim provinces of the Sudan and had warned
-z
Salisbury in similar Veins.-' The Anglican Bishop of
1 . Viscount Cromer*s speech to the Shaikhs and notables 
of the, Sudan at Omdurman, 4 January 1899, F.O. 633/25*
2. Memorandum to Mudirs, enclosure in Cromer to Salisbury 
17 March1099, F.O.70/5022.
3 . Cromer to Salisbury, 11 October 1898, F.0.407/14-7*
Jerusalem shared with them the view that it was neces­
sary to “restrain the undisciplined invasion of the 
Sudan by missionary agents ... until the government of 
the'country is fully and firmly settled . ..ffl
But the prohibition did not apply to the pre­
dominantly pagan south, where “the establishment of 
missions at Fashoda and southwards:*1 was permissible. 2 
Once again Cromer was the chief architect of the. policy. 
In his Annual Report for 1904 he attempted to give a 
justification for the adoption of this policy.--5 He 
placed Egypt, the Northern Sudan and the South in three 
separate zones, identified their peculiarities and pres­
cribed for them separate treatment. In Egypt, there 
was a majority of Muslims but with an important 
Christian minority. A good number of the Muslim popu­
lation was, however, highly educated, had been in long 
contact with Western ideas and Western methods of 
government. They understood the principle of reli­
gious toleration and were tolerant of other religions.
In the light of this fact a sort of laissez-faire 
religious policy was advocated whereby both Muslims 
and the Christian minority were allowed the freedom 
to convert each other, if they so wished, subject to 
the legitimate methods of persuasion. The Northern
1. Blight to Crpmer, 21 February 1900, F.O. 407/155*
2 . .Ibid. ; ■/ , : /
3. Report"on the. Finances, Administration and Condition
or "'the Sudan' ''l'96¥7'l''MgWtv,'NQr.‘ 1 (1905) ed. 2409. 7
Sudan was in a totally different situation., With a 
population composed almost entirely of Muslims ffat a 
very low state of civilisation”, less exposed to 
Western ideas, Western influences and methods of govern­
ment the same open policy could not safely he applied.
He-reckoned that the average Sudanese Muslim was still 
far from being able to distinguish between the action 
of the British Government in its corporate capacity and 
that of the individual European missionary.
The third zone, the Southern Sudan, was some­
thing approximating to hinterland of the hinterland and 
with an exclusively pagan population* Until the time 
of the conquest, the Southern Sudan had little contacts 
with any Christians except a few European travellers. .
Its contacts with the Muslims of the Northern Sudan, 
on the other hand, were often associated by Southerners 
with the cruelties of the'Dervishes under the rule of 
the Khalifa, and with those of the;Arab slave-traders 
under the previous regime . Thus * it was decided to con­
fine Christian proselytisation to the Southern provinces. 
There was no question of allowing: Islamic missions into 
the South at this stage. In any case, no applications 
were received from interested bodies in this regard. 1 
In; summary, then, Cromer was absolutely convinced that
1 . Ibid; the problem of Egypt Vs. right as a; partner in the 
Condominium to send Islamic missions into the Southern 
Sudan did hot arise until the nineteen thirties, cdinv 
cidental with the period of the decline of Egyptian 
influence in, the Sudan, see P.O. '571/20o70<-
the Sudanese were fanatical Muslims; that the prema­
ture start of missionary work in the Northern Sudan 
might injure Government as well as missions; that there 
was strong evidence to suggest, that Muslims in the Sudan 
already believed the object of the British in conquering 
their country was to make them Christians. In that 
case they were bound to look upon missionaries as
i . -
government officials. Thus both Cromer and Wingate 
submitted to the view that "the time was still distant
when mission work could, with safety and advantage, be
v-. „2
permitted amongst hhe Moslem population of the Soudan.
This policy which entailed the7preservation of the
status quo In the Muslim,North while encouraging the
gradual Christiahizatioh of; the South was the genesis
of "Southern Policy”.
The Sudan Government's religious sensibility 
ih the Northern Sudan was prompted by political considera­
tions rather than deference to the Islamic faith. Many 
years afterwards and in a, private letter to Cromer,
Wingate gave his opinion about Islam which was far 
from favourable:
... anyone who has been in close touch with 
the Egyptians and Sudanese Moslems for many 
’ years - as we both have been « can arrive at 
, only: one conclusion as regards the rotteness
of Islam *.. ~z ' ~
, ' ' • 5 :
; 1’. Report on the Sudani Egypt No. 1 (1905) 1902 cd. 1529» 
(p.6o); 1904, ch. :24C9, p. 140. _
2* Quoted in Cromer^s Annual Report for Egypt and the Sudan 
1904, Egypt, Ne. 1 (1905) cd. 2409.
5* Wingate to Cromer (private), 51 March 1915* Wingate 
Papers, Durham. - .
. This vievr. was widely shared by British administrators in
the Sudan: some also.felt that- "the religion, the people
already have is good enough for them; it is all they
need, and all they can comprehend#But Gwynne, the
Anglican Bishop at Khartoum who had been the arch
critic of the Government’s religious policy was equally ,
contemptuous of Islamic; practices; "Mohammedanism has
succeeded in making a woman a toy, a drudge and a 
»2slave.” He wanted the Government ban on Christian 
"evangelical work in the Muslim provinces lifted because, 
he believed, the! whole Sudan awaited the coming of 
Christ. Gwynne’s.was representative of the view widely 
shared at the time by many Christian missionary bodies 
which envisaged a erusadeagainst Islam. Missionary 
propaganda literature of the late Victorian era conceived 
of the Sudan in terms of a battle-ground in the war 
between Islam=and Christianity for converts in pagan 
Africa. "Over forty African tribes", declared one of 
them, "not yet captured by Islam, are said to be open to 
Christian approach# True missionary strategy demands
.,•55
that they be won before Mohammedan influences get in. ^
The urgency for the need to launch a missionary 
offensive in the Sudan was underlined by the alleged fas­
cination of the blacks with the Islamic.faith; "The v ,
1# -J. K. Gif fen,. The Egyptian Sudan, (Hew York, I905).
.. . - * n
2. H . C ., Jackson, Pastor on the Nile (London, i960),
p. 27• .
3 . "Christianity and Islam", The Missionary Review of the 
World, January. 1918, p. 29•
blacks of the Sudan, whcfnre largely non-Muslims, need 
no incentive to become Mohammedan, and very few of them 
need any urging,” The reason for the special appeal of 
Islam to the blacks was given out to be that ”The 
Mohammedan religion with its loose-morality, plurality 
of Wives, its ease and simplicity of divorce and, above 
all its love of loot, naturally appeals to the passions 
of the black man, as' it: always has to Uncivilised
*) ' V '  .
peoples.” Winston Churchill writing in 18.99.» sub­
scribed to the same view that, the Mohammedan faith 
appears to possess a strange fascination for; negroid 1 
races. f He drew attention to the fact that Muslim 
influence was gradually permeating the Sudan and that 
despite the relative ignorance of the people and natural 
obstacles in the way. of the diffusion of ideas, the 
whole of the black race was,gradually adopting the new 
rbligion. Furthermore, the Sudanese were already 
developing Arab characteristics., The negro in more 
remote.an^, inaccessible regions further South and West 
were as yet unchanged,by the Arab influence. These 
awaited the:salvation of the Christian faith.
The biased attitude and distaste for the 
Mohammedan-rSiigion displayed by the Missionary Societies 
and certain prominent individuals in Western Europe and
1 . H. yelin/ "General Gordon and Education in the Sudan”,
The Missionary Review of the World, Vol >. 1908,
pp. 360-4. “  1
2. W. S.. Churdhill, The River,Mar. (London, 1899)> Vol. X,
pp. 15‘"1 6," ,
America were: clear testimony of; their Ignoranc e of the 
tenacity with which the Nilotes,' for ;instahoe, held :to 
the,ir pagan beliefs,-and practices; < The bias and dis- , ; 
taste, however, only provided additional fuel toimis- 
sionary, fervour which iri turn led to increased pressure 
on the Sudan Government to permit"evangelical work in 
the newly acquired territory. It was partly on account 
of the C.M.S. and;'Roman>M3athol'ie missionary societies - 
and as a concession to them that the Southern Sudan was 
thrown open to missionary work. ;i The Sudan Government on 
;Its part entertained the hope - that missionary evangelical 
work in.the pagan areas would not only help In. its 
attempt to halt the spread of Islam into the heart of 
Africa but that it stood equal'chance to lift or 
’.Civilise;' the ’pagan savages’ - a formidable,enough 
task. The" enormity- - of the task the Government:, set 
itself became apparent when, in 1909, Wingate wrote:
"the Dinka and Nuer of the Upper Nile are well off from 
their point of:yiewi;as they possess cattle, and their 
crops are Sufficient for their.needs, and they, are 
intolerant of any attempt to raise them in, the human 
scale. ~ " v .
Islamic penetration of the Southern provinces 
made considerable progress during the Turco-Egyptian 
rule. It suffered a set-back during the Mahdia. on
1. Report on Egypt and the Sudan (1909), Egypt No. 1 
(1910), Cd. 5121, p. 79.
account of the brutalities of Mahdist raids and its 
fanaticism, but the picture was not completely reversed. 
As a matter of fact slave-raiding during both the Turco- 
Egyptian period and the Mahdia materially assisted the 
spread of Islam; Slave raiding had tended to either 
solidify group resistance rendering its members imper­
vious to Islamic and foreign influences in general, or 
to.wipe out or Scatter or absorb weaker groups who were 
in turn Islamised. Weak and detrtbalised individuals 
or groups lacked tribal identity and, without tribal 
sanction or tribal protection, fell easy prey to 
isiamization* The second and more important way by 
which Islam gained a foothold in the Southern Sudan 
was as a byr-product of trading activities of the 
riverain Arab tribes of the Sudan. Islam had always 
spread southwards, if gradually, to the interior of 
Africa along trade routes. Whenever and wherever 
, Africans found themselves in contact with Arab nomads, 
traders or fekis, they lighter caught the ’plague1 or 
resisted it sometimes not for long. ” ... African 
Islam is,r different from Asiatic Islam”, writes 
Trimingham. In pagan Africa, ’’Islam came, not as a 
religion, but as a cultural system which imposed itself 
upon African cultures* or rather there was a gradual 
transference and fusion,of culture which produced a new 
unit. The new civilisation, Islam, was assimilated and
1. J. S. trlmingham,. ’’Islam in the Sudan”, (London, 19^9, 
2nd Impr., 19^5 ), p. 2455 incidentally a comprehensive 
study of Islam in that country.
became indigenous, the religious factor being secondary 
...” Except for Nubia in the Northern Sudan this was 
the manner, however sketchy the description, in which 
Islam came to the Sudan. At the time of the conquest 
Islam was gradually but surely gaining grounds in. the 
pagan areas.
The special agencies fostering the spread of
Arabic and Islamic culture in the Southern Sudan were,
2as may be expected, the jailaba. In the borderland
areas there were also Arab settlers who also played a 
considerable role in the propagation of Islam. As early 
as 1903, Major Mathews, the Governor of Fashoda, reported 
the existence of a significant colony of Arabs living and 
trading in the Shilluk country. The sections of the Arab 
tribes involved were the Kenana, the Gawama, a few Baggara 
Arabs, and a sprinkling of the Hawazma further south.
These Arab Immigrants had their own Sheikhs. The Nuba 
were the only exception. Driven into the Shilluk country 
by the Dervishes, they automatically came under the juri­
sdiction of the Shilluk chiefs.^ In the same year Sparkes 
encountered two Arab traders,. Ahmed Ali and Kambal 
Bishara, while on an administrative patrol in the
1. Trimingham, op. cit., p. 2^9*
2. Jallafoa: trader; more specifically, traders mainly from 
the riverain Arab tribes of the Sudan. During the Turcor 
Egyptian period many of them acted as intermediaries in 
the Slave trade and some of them continued this practice 
well into the early years of the Condominium.
3 . G. Mathews, "Report on the Shilluk Country”, Sudan 
Intelligence■ Report, No. 107, June 1903, App.*~nCir7
territory lying-between wau and Hofret en-Nahas in the 
Western Bahr el Ghazal who alleged robbery at the hands 
of local/natives. Perhaps nowhere in the entire 
Southern Sudan were the British administrators struck 
by the evidence of Islamic arid Arab influence in so 
dramatic af manner than when, on bne "occasion, Captain 
Greemfood visited six ffriendlyf. chiefs of the Western 
Dinka.. He ifas* impressed th?at: some ob them,:spoke Arabic 
of a kind^ were well-dressed (in the Oriental fashion) 1 Y'
and, to his surprise, were well-behaved. , One-of the 
chiefs, Suit an Abdel Rahman, .!■was long at Omdurman as . 
prisoner of the Khalifa, and said he was an Emir in 
Slatin Pasha's time of captivity. ^He/ is still more 
like-an Arab than.aSBinka." The. brother of one of the
chiefs also proved a valuable guide to Greenwood. An 
ex-soldier who also subsequently served in the police 
force at Pashoda, “he now calls himself Hawaga (sic)
Habib . •U ^ pV7 is an extremely shrewd man ... He 
explainedcthe Fashoda system of cattle tax to the 
Sultans, and he told me he believed there would be no 
difficulty about it.
That traders from the North should be found 
doing business in this part of the Bahr el, Ghazal and
1. ffDiary of Sparkes Pasha: Patrol to Hof ret en-Nahas, 
13 January to 31 March”, Sudan intelligence Reports 
No. 105, April 1903,*
2. R. C. Greenwood,. “Intelligence Report on Chak Chak 
Markaz and the Dinka Country between the Chell 
and Pongo11, Sudan Int el 11 g enc e Re port, No. loA , 
March 1908. App. “c“
3. Ibid.
every chief or person of importance should exhibit 
Islamic cultural influence was inevitably given that 
this segment of Dinka country, like the Western Bahr el 
Ghazal, commanded the traditional trdde routes between 
the South and the Northern Sudan. The alternative 
route of the White Nile, clogged by a creeping plant, 
the sudd, year in year out had always proved, a frus­
trating experience for European travellers, missionaries, 
and traders alike. Not until the coming of the Condominium 
administration was the White Nile opened up to better 
navigation by the strenuous, but determined efforts of 
the British and Egyptian engineers. On the other hand, 
the overland route via Southern Kordofan and DarFur 
provinces was closed only during certain period of the 
year. By skirting the swampy region in a south-westerly 
direction, even traders from as far away as.Khartoum 
and beyond could penetrate the Southern Sudan. . Wrote 
Captain Greenwood, ”1 was told everywhere that traders 
flocked in during February and March chiefly for cattle
•t
and sheep, but there is also ivory.” These annual 
trading expeditions, a feasible proposition only during 
the dry season, accounted for much of the Islamization 
and Arabization of this part of the Southern Sudan.
The facts of past history, of trading penetra­
tion and proximity to the Muslim, provinces were one pack 
of factors responsible for the spread of Islam in the
1. Greenwood's Intelligence Report, op. cit; under the 
two previous.regimes, the search for ivory included 
the search for slaves.
!Southern .Provinces, hut the Anglo^Egyptian regime Itself
was another, if incidental, agency. Because of the
Islamic character of its army and,the .lower ranks of its
officials and as a result of the more permanent nature
.of its administration it became, unwittingly, an agent
fostering Islam in these pagan areas. The posts which
were occupied by its mainly Muslim army in the process
of pacification of the South naturally attracted the
jallabas and became/centres for Spreading Islam.
Wingate, the Governor-General till his transfer to
Cairo as High Commissioner in 1916 knew that - .
... for one Christian officer or official 
who goes into the Southern districts there 
are hundreds of Muslims each one of whom is 
by the very nature of his religion, an 
embryonic missionary; moreover, the Moslem 
religion appeals to the blacks very much 
more than fche Christian religion can
The gradually stabilizing influence of the Condominium
regime itself may have accelerated the Tslamization of
the South as well as the Nuba mountain region. .Stack,
then Sudan agent in Cairo lamented this point when he
commented:
... It is sad to think that when by our 
administrative and civilising efforts we are 
able to induce the heathen tribes of the < 
Sudan to live at-peace with, their hereditary 
> foes, the Arabs, the former incline at once 
to Mohammedanism •••g'
Although of only partial validity as regards the South
this assertion certainly held its ground with respect to
1. Wingate to Gwynne (private), 4'December 1910, Sudan 
Archive, University of Durham. .
2. Stack to Wingate, 25 March 1912, .Sudan Archive, 
Durham. ' ■
the Nuba Mountains Where .increased public security- 
brought the Nuba out of their hills to cultivate in the 
plains below thus, inter-mixing freely with the Arab 
traders and settlers. Migration in search of work and 
recruitment for,the Army also brought a large number of 
Nuba tribesmen into a purely Muslim. environment. In 
either case, ,the het--effeet on the Nuba had been their 
Islamization and Arabization.
Elsewhere, the transplanting of Muslim 
elements into the Southern Sudan was equally dictated 
by circumstances,beyond the Administration's control.
When, the Lado Enclave reverted to the Sudan in .1910 
from the Congo Free-State, “a detachment of 500 soldiers, 
Muslim by religion, was stationed.there and'schools 
with Muslim teachers were begun." Some individual 
Governors, as.a matter of fact, favoured the spread of 
Islamic culture in the South and gave it active . 
encouragement. ; Consequently, there was a growing 
number of Muslim-,communities in Wau and its surrounding 
districts in addition to the border territory of Kodok 
and Henk in Upper Nile Province. In 1906 the first 
mosque in the South was built at Wau. Mosques were 
also erected at a later date at Kodok and Benk. By
1911 there were--small private Koranic schools in the
... -  2 
Bahr el-Ghazal at Kabaluza, Kossinga and at Wau.
1. C. P. Groves, "The Planting of Christianity in Africa", 
vol. Ill, 187411914  ^ (London, 1955), p. 2 5 8* :
2. Bahr el-Ghazal Province Handbook., 1911 (Sudan Govern­
ment Publication), p. 45.. ,
Increased security in the Northern,District of the
Bahr, el-Ghazal also attracted a considerable number of
merchants reportedly, making a profitable business 
1
there. In the Western District, an increasing use of
money was recorded as a result of the activities of 
2Arab traders. At Tambura Post further south, the 
existence of a colony of Arab settlers had a similar 
impact upon the surrounding Azande tribesmen as it had 
had elsewhere in Southern Sudan. Friday, the Muslim 
day of rest, was kept as well as all Mohammedan festivals. 
Arabic was the official language with the natural result 
that "those who wished to appear civilised would pick up 
as much as they could of it, speak it at every opportunity, 
and, adopt Arab names". The logical consequence was that, 
as the Inspector of Tambura Post recorded, "a definite 
northern atmosphere hung about the p l a c e . A b o u t  1914, 
however, orders came from Governor Bahr el-Ghazal to the 
effect that, as a condition of their stay, the Arabs 
must accept Tambura, the native chief, as their over­
lord and be bound by Zande law. Unable-to put up with 
the new terms, many left for Wau. Their return fitted 
neatly into the Government's secret plan to get rid of 
Muslim elements especially,in the remote areas of the 
South. During the first two decades of. the Condominium,
1. Governor-General's Report for 1910, Egypt No. 1 (1911),
■ Cd. 5633. . -
2. Ibid.
3 . P. M, Larken, "Tambura Administrative Notes" in Zande 
Background (typescript), T. A. T. Leitch (ed.) S. G, 
(1954), pT 44. - -
therefore, the British authorities inthe Sudan became 
increasingly aware of the rapid progress of Islam and 
the Arabic language in-Southern Sudan. This was rather 
alarming because as more and more Muslims came into the 
South, the general influence of Islamic culture was 
bound to render less and less the opportunities for 
the spread of Christianity. This, Wingate did not 
like.
However, apart from throwing the South open to 
missionary enterprise, Wingate had very limited options 
indeed. Given the small number of British Officers, 
the lack of locally recruited battalions and'with the 
pacification of the South far from, complete, the ser­
vices of the Egyptian Army proved indispensable to the 
Sudan Government. Politically, he Government was 
engaged in cultivating the support and loyalty of. the 
two most important religious notables, Sayed Abdel 
Rahman el-Mahdi and Sayed Ali el:~Mirghani. These 
efforts borne divident in 1914 when World War I broke 
out in Europe. For some time it was feared that Turkey
might sponsor holy war against Britain (and France)
■*?
with German encouragement. Turkey did eventually join 
the war on the side.of Germany, but the Sudanese Muslims 
remained loyal to their British masters throughout. 
Clearly, any administrative attempts to- contain Islamic 
expansion in the South,, particularly1 during the war. 
years, were necessarily limited in scope and shrouded 
in utmost secrecy.
There was, however, one area of negative 
action open to Wingate, i.e., educational development.
Fearing the effects of Muslim education, he decided the 
Government would:not extend its educational facilities 
to the South. Consequently, he ordered the closure of ' 
the school that was commenced in 1904 by the Governor 
of Bahr el-Ghazal to educate the. children of province 
staff. The Director of Education and Health,James 
Currie, himself argued that by employing Muslim 
teachers11 the net result of his teaching must tend 
towards Mohammedanism". The employment of Lebanese 
Christians was recommended instead.- The'Government also 
decided to stop the teaching of reading, writing and 
arithmetic. In 1906 when a proposal was made to re-open 
the school for the children of Government employees the 
Director refused once more and suggested that the 
eligible children should be’educated in Khartoum. But. 
the purely negative measures designed to check Muslim 
penetration of the South proved inadequate and Islam 
continued to make'progress in both the South and the .
Nuba Mountains.
Why, it may be asked, was the Government so 
intolerant of Islamic progress in the pagan areas? If, 
as it was often alleged, the Mohammedan religion possessed 
an Inherent power of attraction to-the negrb race, why 
was it necessary for the Government to attempt to 
arrest its progress.in these pagan territories? It 
appeared safe enough to have allowed things to follow 
their natural'course. Publicly, and as enunciated by
1. Boulnois to CurrieJanuary, 1904, (Private), Sudan 
Archives, Durham.' . -
2. G . Warburg.-v-The: Sudan Under Wingate. Administration in 
the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, l8'9'b-1916, "('London, 1965) .
Cromer, the Government assumed the posture of religious
neutrality exemplified by the pledge of 'non-interference
in the religion of the people'. Privately, however,
Wingate who personified the Government of Khartoum was .
adamantly opposed to the spread of'the •Muslim faith _
"beyond its 'defined boundary'. Way.back in 1904 and in
a private letter, he wrote:
... I am not at all keen to propagate 
Mohammedanism in countries in which that 
religion is not the religion of the inhabi­
tants. As a Government I do not intend 
interfering.with religious beliefs and 
prefer to leave all that,in the hands of 
Missionaries .... Then again the language 
question comes.in; the language of the Bahr 
el-Ghazal is not really Arabic,, and there­
fore if any foreign language is taught, it 
ought to be English ...  ^. •
Thus the fate of Arabic and the Mohammedan religion was
sealed. Despite the -natural' appeal of Islam to pagan .
.Africa, Mohammedanism was not to be the religion of the
South after all.1 A new and significant factor had.been
Introduced into the picture. Needless to say the
alliance of Christianity and the English language with
the Senior Colonial power of the Condomini tended to
further the cause of both to the obvious disadvantage of
Islam and the Arabic language. Wingate's postulate
regarding the Southern Sudan envisaged a 'cultural
vacuum'; if this vacuum had to be filled then Christianity,
not Islam, was the better candidate for the job. This
implied the superiority of Christian civilisation over
its Mohammedan counterpart. In the words of' one Mis^
. sionary propaganda literature: "We must offer the pagan
1. Wingate to Boulhois (private), 13 February 1904, Sudan 
Archive, Durham.
86.
tribes of the Sudhn something obviously .superior to 
I s l a m . B u t  the claim of the superior values of 
Christianity oyer those of Mohammedanism rested on no 
sounder basis than British preponderance in both Egypt - 
and the Sudan *» a.reflection of power politics rather 
than the'objective worth of a particular religion or 
culture. The point to remember, however, is that, a 
beginning had been made and the seeds of future conflict 
sown. When, in some distant future, political power 
changed hands and Circumstances now favoured Islamic 
propaganda the new Sudanese Authorities would react in 
a similar manner to check the advance of Christianity 
with equal determination as did the British Islam. The 
old but familiar drama of the cross and crescent would . 
once more be played though In a different guise, under 
different circumstances and with some participants at 
a greater disadvantage than others,. In the final 
analysis, and as neither Arabic and Islam nor English 
and Christianity were the language and religion of the 
South, only the, inhabitants of that region stood,to 
lose and evento suffer as the result of a cultural, 
religious- and political conflict.
As has been said,' force of circumstances and 
diplomatic: considerations compelled, Wingate to exert - 
only a minimum effort in an attempt to frustrate Islamic
1. ,fA Continental Programme for Africa, *.- Missionary Review 
;of the World, February 1918, pp. 29-36.
progress'in’the’Southern Sudan. His real hope remained 
that only, the Missionaries could, provide the ultimate 
antidote to Islamic propaganda in the South. Missionary 
work (both medical, educational and evangelical), des­
pite initial difficulties and on however limited a scale 
he perceived as a sure and eventual weapon in the fight 
against Islam. Prom 1910 onwards the Government doubled 
its efforts -against Islamic penetration of the South and 
other pagan areas. Restrictions were imposed upon the 
Jallabas (Northern traders). who needed a special permit 
to trade in the-Southern Sudan.; In March 1911 the 
Government took an important corrective measure to 
further its Undeclared policy. Following a tour of 
inspection of the Southern provinces Wingate decided, 
to terminate the system which prevailed in.the.Sudanese
battalions of th.e".Egyptian Army whereby every recruit
1 '
became a Muslim. . He had little doubt in his mind that 
the system had greatly aided.the progress of Islam In 
the pagan areas. In accordance with the new system, 
locally recruited Southern Sudanese under the .command 
of British Officers'replaced the■Egyptian battalions.
The birth of the Equatorial battalion, as 
these Southern Sudanese units came, to be known, was 
instrumental in the gradual reduction of Egyptian units 
stationed.in the South. Although religious motive 
played a dominant role the reason for raising the new 
battalion was given out as financial and territorial.
1. G. Warburg, The Sudan Under Wingate, op. cit.,
p. 118.
The Government argued that financially, the Equatorials 
were cheaper than the regular ’Egyptian* units: terri­
torially, they were needed for the occupation of the 
Lado Enclave... To enhance the Government’s desire to 
eliminate Muslim elements in the South, Southern Sudanese 
were sent to military classes in Khartoum. The practice, 
however, proved counter-productive as the combined 
pressure of Northern colleagues and Muslim environment 
resulted in the recruits taking on Islamic names and,
in some instances, making a formal profession of the 
1
faith. Despite some set-backs the recruitment of 
native units continued and on the outbreak of the First 
World War, there were five Equatorial Companies and the 
number of Egyptian units stationed In the South was 
accordingly reduced. 2 Similar ‘native* or territorial 
battalions were also recruited in the Nuba Mountains 
between 1913 and 191^* The process of eliminating Muslim 
elements or curbing Islamic influence in the South was 
slightly retarded by the war and owing to the mutiny of 
the Equatorials at Yambio In 1915* These minor interrup­
tions over, the Government’s policy of Native Administra­
tion or Indirect Rule although instituted for the country 
as a whole, became a.principal instrument for checking the 
advance of Islam in the pagan provinces.
1. L. M. Sanderson, “Education, _ _ , • in the Southern
Sudan * 1900 -1948; , unpubli shed Pbf.DV thesis^ (London,
1966'}
2. Wingate to Feilden, 28 March 191^, Sudan Archive,
• Durham.
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NATIVE ADMINISTRATION
The principal lines of the administrative
policy of the Sudan Government were set out in a
Memorandum drawn up in 1921. “The administrative policy
of the Sudan Government towards the native population,"
it was stated in the memorandum, "is one of decentralised
control.” The memorandum in fact was an echo of the
Milner Mission Report of 1920 which said of the Sudan:
"Having regard to its vas^ fe extent and the 
varied character of its inhabitants, the 
administration of its different parts Should 
be left, as far as possible, in the hands of 
the native authorities, wherever they exist, 
under British supervision .... Decentralisation 
and the employment, wherever possible of native 
agencies for-the simple administrative needs of 
the country, In its present stage of develop­
ment, would make both for economy and effici- 
cency.
The strategy to be adopted implied that the con­
quering Power would, by advice, guidance and correc­
tion where necessary, utilise the chiefs and shaykhs 
with,the view to "assimilate traditional usage to the 
requirements of equity and good government."^ The
1. "Sudan Government Memorandum on General Administrative 
Policy”, see A Note on Government Policy Towards the 
Native Population, 1926. App."AV. (typescript), Sudan 
Archives, Durham.
2. Quoted in "Sudan Government Memorandum”, op. cit., 
p. 5*
3 . Report on the Administration, Finances and Conditions 
of the Sudan' in 19^5* Sudan No. •■£ (1926) Cmh.'2?4£, p. 7*
proposed method of employing native agencies under 
British supervision for administrative purposes called 
for a criterion of selection. Two categories of 
prospective candidates were readily available and dis­
tinguishable. The first and most important group 
. consisted of traditional Chiefs and Sheikhs who were in 
actual control of their people; the second comprised of 
executive officials selected and trained from the ranks 
of the common folk but of special character and a good ' 
.family background. Of the two, the crux of the matter 
clearly revolved around the character of the Individual 
Chief or Sheikh involved. If he proved efficient, his 
loyalty to the Government unquestionable, and retained 
the respect and confidence of his people, he could count 
on the continued support of the Government. If, on the 
other hand, he failed to prove his worth on account of 
moral degeneration and thereby ceased to command the 
respect of his people, he was to be replaced. A certain
amount of inefficiency could be tolerated but total
1failure In a Chief was unacceptable.
For the first two decades of the Condominium 
Hule, administration was more or less direct all over 
the Sudan. It was military in nature and its principal 
objective was simply the maintenance of law and order 
and the punishing of infractions. The Inspector*, as 
the District Commissioner was known, came to look upon 
;himself increasingly as the father of the people with
1. "Sudan Government Memorandum" op. cit., pp. 6-7*
the result .that he expected, and. encouraged, every
• i
dispute to he brought to him-for settlement. Direct 
Rule, however, had/its drawbacks. For one thing 
collaborators, if any, were, difficult to come by and for 
another, the visible presence of a Foreign Power often 
provoked resentment, hostility and even open rebellion. . 
The endless list of political or tribal uprising 
especially in the Nilotic districts of the Southern 
Sudan were notable as confirming evidence. Native 
Administration, by contrast, promised two valuable 
assets to the Sudan Government, namely economy and 
expediency. Direct Administration, if practised in a 
country of the size and resources as the Sudan It was said, 
could be expensive. It was expensive. The only attrac­
tive course of action open to the British Authorities in 
the Sudan was some form of devolution of authority upon 
native agencies.' Failing, the alternative would be "... 
a costly elaboration of the administrative machinery, 
such as is impossible to contemplate with equanimity 
..." Sir J. Maffey, the Governor-General and a staunch 
advocate of Native Administration saw in the Sudan of 
the ,’twenties and'’thirties its "Golden Age". He .was 
anxious that opportunities were slipping away for the 
foundation upon which a lasting structure of Native Rule 
might be built, utilising the'best ’material’: available
1. Quoted In "Sudan,Government Memorandum", op. cit., ;
P- 3- • •'
2* Report on, the Administration, Finances and Conditlons_-
of the Sudan in :192~67 Sudan No. 2 (1927) Cmd. 2991*
p. 6 ." " / , .;
in the country. "A tribal- organisation, tribal sanc­
tions, and traditions," he wrote, "still survive, though 
their validity varies from province to province." His 
main worry was that;” ;.. under the. impulse of new - 
.-ideas and with the rise of a new generation all these 
alike will tend to crumble away unless they are forti-
■ - i  ‘ * ... • .
fied betimes." > ; ,
Sir J . Maffey’s analysis of the situation of 
the Sudan in the; 1920s was basically sound. The bene­
fits and results of the Government education policy in . 
the North were beginning to show. This enabled the / 
Government, since the: expulsion of the Egyptian Junior 
Administrators and Officers in 1924, to place an 
Increasing number of 'Northern Sudanese in Government 
jobs as Executive Officers in the provinces. Out of 
a total of, for example, 130 executive posts of sub- 
Mamur in the Southern Sudah 103 were held by Northern . /
Sudanese. There was already a military school in 
Khartoum confined to Sudanese which turned out . \
officers for the army. There was also a medical school 
in Khartoum and ,.over 500 Sudanese clerks in the various
, ■ * V ... - - 2 ; ■ ■ :Government departments and the provinces. Yet the
enclave-of Western influences was confined, to the
sedantary, mainly the riverain, Arab tribes. The vast
rural pppulatlon remalned almost untouched--by the, new
ideas and methods of Government that were becoming ,
1. Report on the : Administration,, Finances and/Obnditions
of the Sudan in 1926, Sudan No. 2 (1927) Cmd. 2991* P* 6 .
2. Report on the Administration, Finances and Conditions
..of the Sudan in 1923* Sudan No.-2 (1924) Cmd. 2281, p. 6 . .
familiar to the urban educated few.
It was to the rural population of the Sudan 
that the Government policy of Native Administration was 
to apply. To avoid a repetition of mistakes committed 
elsewhere, notably in the Oriental world, British 
Authorities-in the Sudan, were inclined to experiment 
with their own version of the Lugardian idea of 
"Indirect Rule". It.was claimed that the common error 
Europeans had made in the East had been "to* exalt 
Western civilisation.almost to the exclusion of the
native system, Instead of using them as mutually correci-
1 " ■ ■' ■ 
tive." This apparent admission of the principle of
cultural relativism'in the sphere of administration 
need not, as a matter of fact, lead to a loss of faith 
in the alleged superiority of Western civilisation over 
all others. It merely .pointed to another option open to 
a colonial Government confronted with the concrete task, 
of administering a.vast country with a population 
regarded as still at a loW stage of social and political 
development. If. guided by the creed of Native Adminis­
tration, it was indicated in the Memorandum, a conquering 
Power could start from things as: they were, rejecting 
what was dangerous,and unjust and supporting what was 
fair and equitable in the usages of the natives,- and 
any Inherited system of legislation was left to wait 
.upon occasion. When felt needs arose, they were 
examined and provided for by measures specifically
1. Quoted in "Sudan Government Memorandum", op. cit., 
p. 5-
tailored for them rather than by imported, ready-made, 
solutions. To ensure conformity to local customs the
consent of the people was obtained before enforcing the
1 ;measures.
.That the applicability of the principle of 
Native Administration should tend to vary from one 
locality to the next depending upon the quality of 
tribal, organisation had a universal validity, in the 
Sudan. Needless to say it is one thing for an idea or 
theory to gain acceptance in a particular place and 
time but it is quite a different thing to attempt to 
effect its application to the letter. Even if genuine 
enthusiasm were shown for a thorough implementation of 
a programme, force of circumstance or accident could 
always conspire to defeat the cherished objective.
This remark applies with equal vigour both to the for­
tunes of "Indirect Rule" as originally conceived by 
Lord Lugard and to "Native Administration", its off­
spring. For instance, from a purely conservative 
philosophy of Indirect Rule, Native-Administration 
emerged both as a replacement and modification of the 
present thesis even in Northern Nigeria, its homeland, 
"indirect administration iii the Sudan," by contrast, 
"had evolved, not from a tradition of Indirect Rule (as 
was the case in Northern Nigeria), but from a tradition 
of indirect influence of wider political, connotations 
in which the revival of tribalism figured
1. Quoted in "Sudan Government Memorandum", op. oit.,
P* 5*.
prominently, " 1 The application of the principle of 
Native Administration in both; the South'.and the Northern 
Sudan differed-considerably .because:local Conditions, 
differed''widely. * Despite the sharp differences in terms 
of custom and mode of life.:, between1 the nomad and seden­
tary Arabs, the situation was. simplified and,made ihtel- - ; 
ligi.ble-by the,, factors. ;of Islam, a: Commoh language and > ...
a /national’ consciousness. The Mahdist revolution 
before the turn of -the century may. have had some dis- < 
ruptive effect upon tribal'life,> but the situation was r ; -
not thought as beypnd salvation,;.."The Arab"; it was . 
said, "particularly,the nomad, is tenacious of tradi- ' ,~ 
tlon, .Tribal institutions, tribal authority aid 
tribal consciousness, of some sort had survived into the 
Condominium period and were not constructed from 
scratch,^ The Sudan Government1s brand of native rule, 
it is to be remembered, was closely modeiledbn 
Kitchener’b instruction to the Governors as a:policy 
guideline according to .which they were to acquire the 
confidence of ithe’people,.develop their resources with 
the view to lifting them in the social and political 
scale. To realise this objective District Commissioners 1
1. G. M. A. Bakheit,,"Native Administration in the Sudan"
in. Y,; F, Hasan, (ed), Sudan, in- Africa (Khartoum, , 1971) # A
pp./256^278; see• especially! Bakheit''"s doctoral'thesis,
British Administration and Sudanese Nationalism 1919-1939*'
Ph ,D.' Thesis (Cambridge 1965) ch ,V.' Brief ly,- the author 
argues passim, that Indirect Rule was adepted in the Sudan "I
. as an antidote to Northern Arab nationalism and: the strategy' 
adopted involved the erection of tribal walls in the.country-, 
side against urban nationalist! agitation. ; , 1 ,
2,. Governor-General’s Report:for 1925# op.,cit., p« 6, 1
For the opposite view, see
5 . / G/ M,. A. Bakheit,, British Administration and Sudanese -
" Nationalism,/op. cit. i
were to maintain perfect and harmonious contacts with 
the better class of natives, "through whom we may hope 
gradually to influence the whole population. " 1 The 
two classes of native agencies involved, the Chiefs or 
Sheikhs and Executive officials, represented the instru­
ments of devolution and bureaucracy, respectively. The 
attempt to associate the educated elements with Native 
Administration was designed to give them a stake in 
vE‘the system. In this regard the Government took advan­
tage’of tribal or family ties wherever possible. "By 
this means," the^Governor-General explained, ,"the 
tribes gain from the services of educated men, and at 
the same time something is done to eliminate the sus­
picion with which the educated class is still inclined
' 2  '' ' to regard the policy of devolution." But the strategy
did: not work.. The educated urbanists, drawn mainly
from the sedentary.Arab tribes, turned out to: be, in
due course, 'the. arch critics of the system.
The development of Native Administration in 
the Southern Provinces did not proceed along similar 
lines as in the North. The activities of the slave 
traders,- the Turco-Egyptian Regime and the Dervishes,, 
in, succession, plus the punitive expeditions which 
characterised the first two decades of the Condominium 
had, in their various ways, contributed to the disrup­
tion of tribal life in the Southern Sudan.^ Lack of
1. Vide his Memorandum- to Mudirs, enclosure in Cromer to 
Salisbury, l^March* 1899, P.O.78/5022,
2. Governor^General’s Report for 1930, Sudan No. 1 (1931) 
Cmd.3935, p. 13*.
3. Governor-Generalfs Report for 1931, Sudan No, 1 (1932) 
Cmd.4159, P* 130.
knowledge of local customs and traditions, of the
numerous languages and cultures of the South compounded
the task of British administrators in this sector of
the country. The social and political organisations
of the South, with the two exceptions of the Shilluk
and the Azande, appeared confused and obscure to
British administrators. They constituted more or less
a maze of tiny clan heads or groups of elders with dark
customs and the manner of the exercise of effective
1influence was a mystery. In consequence, the primary 
objective of the Government was confined to the preser­
vation of law and order and subduing turbulent tribes*
It was only when, in the 1920s, the Mamurs were removed 
and the control of British District Commissioners con­
solidated that it became possible to start experimenting 
in a few districts with ”Lukiko Courts” borrowed from 
Uganda. These courts composed of panels of tribal 
leaders at district level and their main function was 
to enforce native custom and relieve the District 
Commissioner from petty litigation. Judicial devolution
was regarded as a convenient starting point to experi-
2ment in Native Rule.
In 1924, J. H. Driberg, a political officer 
with anthropological interest circulated a note in which 
he pointed out the flaws in existing native tribal 
organisation which might hamper progress in judicial
1 , C. G. and B. Z. Seligman, Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic 
.Sudan (London,, 1935) (financed by the Sudan Government).
2. Governor-General1s Report for 1928, Sudan No. 2 (1929) 
Cmd*3^039 P«9.
devolution. He distinguished three types of tribal struc­
ture in the Southern Sudan: those with the primitive 
organisation, of segmented societies; those which had had 
some form of centralised tribal, system in the past but 
had lost- it in War, famine or catastrophe; and a few 
which retained real tribal organisation* Tribal con­
sciousness and unity,, however,. were unfortunately 
lacking in all’:three. The essential thing before 
Chief’s Courts could function properly, he proposed, 
was an educational process which would re-awaken the 
"tribal soul”. The administration was to devote 
itself to strengthening the fabric of native organisa­
tion by‘conferring upon it such prestige as would revive 
it and make tribal authority effective... When that stage
had been reached the council of Chiefs in each district
1 ’ 1 1 might be endowed with administrative functions. The
Governor-General recognised the wisdom of this strategy
when he wrote: ' . -
”The most obvious line of advance towards the 
,vf- realisation of the objective (of effective
indirect administration) was that of strengthen­
ing the authority wielded by the native chiefs 
over their people as judges in criminal and 
civil cases; for the power and status required 
by the chief as a judge, whether sitting alone 
or as president of a tribunal of elders, must : 
naturally tend to enhance his authority as 
administrative and executive head of his tribe 
or. district.”2
The Civil Secretary, MacMichaelTs proposal for native
advisory councils in each district which was circulated
1. Note on Administration In the Southern Sudan by J . H. 
Driberg,%25 May ;:1924 (Secret), attached to Civil Secre-
\ tary’s Circular to‘ Southern Governors, 9 September 192k, 
Sudan Government Archive, CS/SCR/l/C/l. Khartoum.
2. Governor-General’s Report for 1926, Sudan No. 2 (1927)! 
Cmd.2991j P* 6*
together with-Driberg rsVnote? was thrown 'over-board by 
the Governors of the three Southern .Province's as impfae- - 
ticable. Experimenting with ”Ihkiko"rtype courts while 
gradually strengthening'the fabric of .native institu­
tions if,available, continued to exercise the imagination 
of British administrators inthe Southern Sudan.
Measures designed to enhance the power and. 
authority of native chiefs or clan heads: were not 
altogether wanting in Southern administration. In-the 
Zande districts of Tambura and Yambip-where'ex-service- 1 
men behaved Is if they were no longer bound by native 
customs, the,District Oomraissioher took appropriate . 
measures to ensure their return to tribal discipline. 
Guided by the mistaken belief that their-military 
standing entitled,'them to a special status these retired 
soldiers had .proved themselves a nuisance to their 
fellowr-tribesmen as well as to the chiefs. A strategy 
was.adopted whereby the discharged soldier, on 
reporting his,arrival to the District Commissioner 
was immediately sent off with a chieffs policeman to 
.the" chief concerned for his .acceptance or rejection of 
the newcomer, ”whieh.'made it quite clear that detribalisa- 
tion was not looked on with favour.” Similarly, a colony 
of detribalised young men which had long served as a pool 
for’carriers and labourers was.disbanded and its members 
returned to tribal discipline - for the same reason of
p
unmitigated nuisance.- As a rule anything, including.
1. Major P. M.'Larken, ”Yamblo Station Notes” In Zande • 
Background by T. A.,T. Leitch (ed.) Sudan Government 
Publication' (1952?). ■
Government activities, which had tended to disrupt tribal 
(family) life was discontinued. Thus in Equatorial Pro­
vince, the established practice of tax-assessment and 
collection on an individual basis had had a tendency to 
break up family units which was the basis of many com­
munities. This system was reversed, permitting’the, 
assessment and collection of taxes not on, an individual 
but a-family or clan basis. The ultimate object of the 
. change was explained as, being "... to educate t&e people 
into appreciating that the rich should pay more tax 
than the poor, by leaving the decision between indivi­
duals to the elders of the tribes themselves. In Upper 
Nile Province, tribesmen were kept away from Malakal 
town where it was feared that beer shops and contact 
with, mixed traders from the North and the detribalised 
elements from the South might exercise a demoralising 
influence on them.,
’ Missionary education was doing just as much
as anything else to break the indigenous customs, tra­
ditional usage and beliefs of the natives, the very 
infra-structure of a viable native rule: "any child 
passing through their hands becomes detribalised."
This experience applied to most graduates of primary 
schools but, on going higher educational centre at 
Wau, it was noted, they-were apt to become "either
1 . Governor-General's Keport for 1931, Sudan No. 1 (1938) 
Cmd.5895* p. 124.
2, Governor-GeneralTs Report for 1935* Sudan No. 1 (1938) 
CmqL528l, p.124; in 1935 a tribal village was constructed 
on the outskirts of Malakal town for visiting natives.
The tribal villages, known as native lodging areas, or 
Malakia became a permanent feature of every principal 
Southern town and District Headquarters. ,
converts apeing Europeans or types of Effendi class
despising their own people," The practice was
especially common amongst pupils from the Italian
Catholic Mission which had itself occupied an important
position in the life of the Southerners. Drawn mostly
. from the peasant stock or small townsman class, few of
the Catholic priests and fewer still of the Brothers
and Sisters understood sufficient:English to render
possible the explanation or comprehension of the
principles upon which British, administrative policy in
the Southern Sudan was founded. There was also ample
evidence to suggest that the few priests of sufficient
education and culture were not at all disposed to pay
Indirect Rule policy anything more than lip-service.
This was understandable because " ... when Italian
nationality, peasant up-bringing and ignorance of the
English language are added to Catholicism, there is
little hope that genuine understanding and cooperation
■2(between Mission and Government) could be obtained."
The remedy consistently advocated by the staff at the 
British Foreign Office’ was wholesale expulsion of the 
Italian Missionaries from the Southern Sudan and their 
substitution by English clergymen.
If Italian loyalty to the furtherance of the 
Government Administrative policy was suspect, neither
1. District Commissioner Northern District Bahr el Ghazal 
to Governor Bahr el Ghazal (n.d.), (Strictly Confidential) 
ND/SCR/l/C/l, S.G.A, Khartoum. -
2-. Mr. Coxfs Summary Note on Italian Missionaries in the 
Southern Sudan (Strictly Confidential), enclosure in „ 
Stewart Symes.to R. I. Campbell, 15 October 193T (Private 
and Confidential) F.O.'371/20939*
expulsion en masse nor the gradual reduction of Italian 
nationals in the South'offered an easy way out. Sir 
Stewart Symes who. succeeded John Maffey in 1934 as 
Governor-General Vigourously.opposed the Foreign - 
Office's suggestion. Not only was it materially 
impossible to effect the proposed substitution but it 
was common knowledge that the supply of English priests 
willing to undertake missionary work in backward parts, 
of Africa,'under harsh climatical conditions1 had always 
been notoriously inadequate., The only people, it was 
stressed, who in practice had both the resources,:. 
organisation and personnel sufficient to furnish a ’ ■ 
religious foundation deemed, necessary for the education 
of Southern Sudanese were the Italian Catholic Mission. 
nTo drive them out’1, said the Governor ~G.eneral,,.,,would 
mean creating a vacuum which it would be impossible to 
fill from any other quarter,1^  -The. Homan Catholic 
Mission, he seemed to suggest, were doing the’ - 1
Englishman's dirty job for him and it would be contrary 
to the dictates of reason to seek to expel them. To 
supply the badly needed clerical and accounting staff, 
and chiefs court clerks, the Government set up an 
Intermediate School^ of its own in 1926 alongside those 
of the Mission. ;Thus the Italian Roman Catholics were
1. Minutes by Mr. Pink of the Foreign Office, 10.January 
1937, F.0,371/20870; see also files 2756/5W1 in F.O. 
371/20939.
2. The first graduates of the. Sir Lee Stack Memorial School 
received their training:in accountancy towards the end 
of 1928; and ih the following year 22- out of a.total of 
forty clerical and accounting staff were locally edu­
cated inhabitants of. the Province and for the first time 
accounts were kept in English.
allowed to. stay, and, continue to perform their missionary 
and educational work as a necessary evil* .
. * . Two factors, the‘differential mode of life and
the.mture of the tribal structure, provide a-clue to the 
trend of Native:Administration in the Southern Provinces. 
They account not only for. the varying developmental 
stages achieved, in the., different, areas but also for the 
"effective enforcement, or lack of it; of the decrees of 
the native courts. In general, where tribal authority 
was centralised and leadership institutionalised, as
I--
among the Shilluk, Azande and related peoples, 
rapid progress in ,judicial devolution-was forthcoming / 
and;execution, -effective. The only: snag was that the 
autocratic nature of such chieftaincies !was often 
unfavourably matched by a corresponding weakness of 
the clan system. Among the pastorallst Nitolics 
(Dinka and Nuer): and the, Nilo-Hamites, by contrast, 
the social (tribal) system was highly'-fragmented and 
leadership,'widely'dispersed. Lacking.a tradition: Of, - 
political leadership, ,:.the chiefs appointed by the 
Government hadltended to be ineffective in execution 
with the result that native administration was too , 
slow to take off the ground, A glance, at the,develop- / 
ment of native administration inthe .provinces serves 
to shed a hay. of'light upon the matter.
1. Baxter and Audrey Butt, "The :Azande, and Related
Peoples of the Anglo-Egyp.tian Sudan" in D.wEorhe 
(ed) Ethnographic Survey of Africa, Part IX (London,
1953) ' ‘ ' . ■ /
BAHR EL GHAZAL PROVINCE1
In the Bahr el Ghazal Chiefs Courts had been 
created to administer tribal custom in every district 
since .1922. Their purposes were, as'the Governor des­
cribed them ffto relieve the District Commissioner of 
the countless number of petty cases and to teach the 
Chiefs and the people that the former are responsible
for their country and that the latter must look to
«2their Chiefs in the first instance* He was right. In 
the Zande district of Tambura 'where the experiment was 
first begun the District Commissioner, Major Darken, 
was instrumental in initiating Chiefs Courts. To save 
him enough time for the tour of his district, he called 
a meeting of all headmen and ”as many people as possible” 
to obtain their consent for instituting a native court.- :
The consent given, a court of three Chiefs rotating, at 
monthly intervals was set up. Cases were written down 
in^Zande by a clerk trained specifically for the purpose, 
and subject to revision by the,District Commissioner who 
also heard any appeals., When, in 1926, the Government 
ordered that Chiefs Courts should be established through­
out the country, the experience of the unofficial Court 
proved a most valuable asset to thejDistrict Commissioner 
as well as the people.^ The existence of a class of
1. On January 1, 1936 the Bahr . el Ghazal and-. Mongalla Pro­
vinces were merged together to form the Equatorial Pro­
vince. A whole district with its Headquarters at Yirrol 
was also transferred from.Upper ,Nile to the new Province.
2. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 27 October 
. 1924, BGP/SCR/l/o/1. S.G.A. Khartoum.
3 . Leitch, Zande Background. op. clt., p. 55*
paramount Chiefs with hereditary- powers based on the 
rights of tribal conquest ensured the speedy implemen­
tation of the,Court's decisions. Native Courts in the 
Zande district In general grew from strength to strength 
so much so that.in 1937 some of them were able to try 
and sentence their own members without partiality or 
favour.
Elsewhere in the Province/.however, particu­
larly in the Nilotic districts, the task of judicial 
devolution had been more difficult. The .big Dinka 
block extending from the-'Nile to the borders of Darfur 
consisted of pastoral Nilotics who still retained their 
cattle and cattle culture.: "Their tribal system was 
devoid of a single autocratic Chief. Powerful war- 
leaders had from time to, time emerged, whose influence 
varied depending; upon-the character and exploits of -the 
individual concerned, but there was no evidence of a 
class of chiefs,‘as among the Azande, or a temporal and 
spiritual authority in the manner' of the Shilluk King 
in the Upper Nile' province. Executive chiefs had to be 
selected, trained and appointed by the Governments 
Among the Nilotes in general, as the Governor explained, 
the secular Chief was an imported institution and the
success or failure of the appointed. Chief depended
2
almost entirely on his personality. The Chiefs set up
1 , Governor-General1s Report for 1937# Sudan No..1 (1938) 
Cmd.b895j p.124. The trial of Chief Renzi by Tambura- 
Court of which he was President furnished an-excellent 
example. The Court examined over 400 witnesses,, recorded 
parts of the evidence and recommended sentences which,the 
District Commissioner on review upheld. • , '
2. A . C Beaton, Equatorial Province Handbook, (1936-1948),: 
Sudan Government Public at ion, p. 47 • , . - -
by the Government had to receive encouragement and 
instruction in duties in an attempt to counter any 111- 
qualities in them before firm and high standard of. 
Chieftainship could be established, which needed time.
"in indigenous life,” wrote one student of Dinka tribal 
system, "there was nothing comparable with the execu­
tive Chief ... among the Dinka, though in the history 
of their government some of them had become accustomed 
to an attempt at autocratic rule by official nominees. ”1 
If the idea of a strong, autocratic secular 
'authority was foreign to Dinka culture, a highly developed 
totemic exogamous clan system had sustained tribal organisa­
tion before the Introduction of Colonial Government. The 
clan and clan heads constituted an essential pillar upon 
which the edifice of Native Administration could be 
built. The clan or extended family group (!gol') was 
regarded as the "bricks of the Dinka Nation” upon which 
judicial power could be devolved. Thus the Courts set 
up by the Government appeared to be much nearer to the 
natural Dinka way of doing things and were able to 
score a measure of success from the start. Procedure 
was public and custom administered by elders whose 
integrity and commonsense had established their reputa­
tion. The Dinka courts, however, proved far too demo­
cratic for efficiency. "The Dinka”, it was recorded "is 
intensely democratic." One District Commissioner
1. R. G. Leinhardt on the position of the Dinka Chief of 
the Sacred Spear, quoted in Beaton in ibid., p. 43*
2. District Commissioner Aweil to Governor Equatoria,
19 January 1938> 66/A/IX LF, filed in BGP/l/5/28, S.G.A. 
Khartoum.
answered a questionnaire from the Governor as follows:
When does the Court sit and where? Whenever 
Chief and people consider,a case worth hearing. 
Composition of Court? Anyone of eminence with 
the Chief as President. Place? Preferably 
under a tree, where ordinary tribesmen can 
take part in the discussion as if they were 
court members. Method of Record? The 
memory of the general public.' Fees to members? 
Nil. The Dinka regard.fees as bribes. 1
What were the issues that engaged the attention of Dinka
courts most? "Every man", the District Commissioner
reported on another occasion, "is interested in several
cases and there are several about every cow and almost
every bull." Any of three things might occur when a
Dinka filed a complaint to the District Commissioner
that his cattle had been stolen and he was sent off
accompanied by Chiefs police to bring in both the offender
and the cattle: either the defendant would run away or
resist the police, or the police would be bribed and
bring in the wrong man or wrong cattle, or the case
would turn out to be falsely laid as a pretext to obtain
police assistance in what amounted to robbery. However
impartially the District Commissioner decided in the
case, one or other of the parties involved would continue
' 2 
to act as if he had been wronged and robbed. One
explanation of this curious behaviour stems from the
Nilotics1 love of cattle. Dinka clans were not only
exogamous marriage groups but also owned cattle and a
1. District Commissioner Central District, Wau to Governor 
Bahr El Ghazal, 20 July 1924, BGP/SCR/4l~E, S.G.A. 
Khartoum, also cited in Bakheit.
2. District Commissioner Central District, Wau to Governor 
Bahr El Ghazal (n.d.) "Notes on Dinka Cases (1926),. 
BGP/SCR/41-E. S.G.A.- Khartoum.
piece of territory. , As aVrule no'sub-chief:: how ever 
loyal to the Government wished to see the cattle’passing 
out Of the family group .ehd would resort toi: every 
;-pbssihle/' meah's^hr"geteln■ the possession of the cattle. 1
v- in'Rumbek district there was evidence to 
1suggest that ithe structure of Native Administration was 
not based:upon solid foundations/nevertheless, a rudi­
mentary system of native courts was in existence. Agar 
and Gok Dinka.1'Chiefs continued to hear customary laws.
If ,two parties;.Wbre agreed or satisfied, the District 
Commissioner entered the result in his notebook; if 
they,were not, he heard the appeal. In 1929 Dinka 
Chiefs had no judician powers.Five years later Chiefs 
Courts^wi'& af Presi'4^nt :anfci a ..panel of Chiefs and’family 
leaders had beentinvested with substantial powers of 
imprisonment,^^Despiite,'the modest progress the courts 
fwere too weak>th:;eh?orce their decisions and sentences 
were still scrutinised by the District Commissioner.^ 
The-Dinka clan sysibm, the pillar of Dinka administra­
tive justice,, was ’not uniformly developed^ District 
vCommissiohers of Dinka district^ meeting, as late as in 
1938,'recorded the followihg observation regarding the 
"brick" or: the ext end edi family grouy, the fgolf
"'inYirro! the/bricks are stacked and ready 
1 : :for -;use>:; and in some, cases, have been laid.
1. Governor-Gdrierhi’S .Report for 1936, Sudan No. 1 
(1937) cmd. 5575, P. 123.
2. Governor-General's Report for 1934, Sudan No. 1 
/ (1935) Cmd,5019, p. 8 8.
In TonJ they are 'Stacked and ready* In Aweil 
. 1 they have been "burnt, but not yet conveniently 
stacked ready fqr the builder Vs.hand. In 
' Rumbek it is doubtful whether the bricks have .v 
even been made, some may have been made, but 
they are not yet burnt.
Further, customary law had been gradually disintegrating
‘..partly through the direct influence of .Government and
partly, owing to changing conditions and1 arbitrary code
of laws with .scales of compensation by cattle had to be
introduced, and-enforced. f,lt is now extremely difficult,” .
, reported one District Commissioner of Dinka districts.,
”t'o find out what is'real customary law and what the e .
^-Government had introduced” with the result that, in
many cases, the natives had; almost, come-to regard- the
' ' ’ p
imposed law as the real one. The old customs them­
selves varied greatly from tribe to tribe within a
single district and the District Commissioner .suggested
..
some form of a levelling up of scales and codes involved.
In the Westem District the division of the 
.population into scattered tribes made the application 
. of the policy especially difficult. The,-tribal customs 
of.the countless sections of this district whose tribal 
\ life was shamelessly disrupted by foreign Invasions and ‘ 
plunder did not strongly support hereditary rule. It 
. was said of them that “anyone who had a powerful enough 
right arm could set himself up, at least temporarily, as
1. Addition to Minutes of Dinka District Commissioners1 
r meeting: held at Tonj, January 21st - 26th, 1938, vide
Governor Equatoria to District Commissioners Aweil,
Ton j, Rumbek, and Yirrol, 2 February.1938, EP/16/l/C,
:filed in BGP/1/5/28. S.G.A. Khartoum.
2. -“Notes on Dinka District (1935)” by District Commissioner 
Yirrol, filed in B.G.P. 1/5/28,-S.G.A, Kharbourn.
3. Ibid.
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a chief” ~ not by any means an exaggeration. On the 
credit side some progress had been made.;in the*.province 
as a whole and . in* the Azande districts in particular 
Chiefs were progressively relieving the; District Commis­
sioners of many elementary routine duties. Chiefs 
Courts themselves had* become so- popular that V  tmaTl, 
fee had to be charged to litigants ’to discourage the ; ■
purely frivolous complaints. The volume of cases heard 
by native courts continued to .rise. The majority of ’ 
the Courts commanded the respect and enjoyed the confi­
dence of the people to whom;they administered justice. , 5 
• As elsewhere in the Southern Sudan, their authority was ■ -
not, however, so firmly rooted in the customs-and trar; ,
ditions of the people as was ideally desired. " t
MONGALLA PROVINCE * , 5'
The inception of native administration in ; > .
Mongalla Province was the work of two young officers 
viz., Bimbashi Grove and Walsh. , The, first Chiefs Courts 
or ”Lukikos*’ were set up in Opari District in 1921. . The 
Courts were based on the Ugandan model and consisted of 
benches of between six and eight leading Chiefs under the .> 
presidency of the most important ,pf them. The Courts sat 
at fixed periods of every one to two months,. In-the 
following year Walsh introduced the same system in the .
(Latuka District and by ,1929 the f,lukikosff were estabr- t ' ■; -
lished in all Districts. Modest fees were collected and
1. A. C. Beaton, Equatorial Proving e,Handbook Vol. II, 
op. clt., p. ^2 .
records were kept by mission-educated clerks if- avail­
able.
In 1930 the Chiefs received payments for the 
first time hdsed on the number of iax-payers and almost 
simultaneously Chiefs’ police were established on the 
same basis. The defects of the ’’Lukiko” courts (the long 
intervals at which,the courts sat and the long distances 
the people had to travel to attend) were corrected when, 
in, 1932, ”A” Courts were started. The different Chiefs 
were given their own courts composed of themselves andi . 
their local elders,. Great emphasis was placed upon; 
these cour ts. They had the freedom to do their own , 
things without too much interference by the District 
Commissioner' and to evolve their procedure. Lower fees 
were taken,and records kept in the same manner as in 
the ”B ” or ”Lukikos”. The ’’A” courts proved a great 
success as they gradually,,took, over a great deal of the 
work of the-”B” courts whose functions came; to -be con­
fined to acting as inter-tribal courts and as courts of 
appeal. They were also consulted by the District 
Commissioners in general matters of common interest..
In the Central District for ’ instance-, there was a 
Council of Bari Chiefs which met twice a year for the 
purposes' of consultation.
The popularity. of the ’A” courts was demon­
strated by the interesting differences of procedure 
evolved^ In some Districts, in. order to -’have; the floor 
of the house” the speaker must hold the ’’Talking stick”,
and move up and down a,measured space. On the east
was
bank among the Lotuka, the court/composed of the whole
body of those assembled and everybody had1 the right of 
speechi; Elsewhere,, elders were more in. evidence. -In 
Opari District: where the' experiment was first started ? „
oasesj were, heard by the headmen; who must report their 
decisions to the: Chiefs. Among the Bari, in the Central 
District the litigants addressed themselves to, the head­
men who in turn addressed the assembled Chiefs." .But the 
"A” Courts had not been successful;in this^District as 
elsewhere in. the Province. The^  f!Af Courts had, in the 
main, shown little difficulty in distinguishing between 
which cases they should try and which should be referred 
to the higher Courts. There-was also a growing tendency 
of plaintiffs tq: seek direct redress in the Court of 
another Chief rather than await , the reconvening of 
the inter-tribal courts. The. bulk: of the cases, dealt H
with were civil cases and concerned matters of debt, 
bride price but adultery also figured prominentlyespe-
■ ' • '■ " ' . i ' ‘ • ’cially in certain districts. . -
Among the dominant ethnic groups in the 
Province, the Batuka,1Toposa and Bari, no strong or auto­
cratic Chief had*ever emerged and Chiefs were arbitrarily 
appointed by the Government and, the success or failure of 
the appointed Chief depended almost entirely on.his- per- ,;.-: 
sonality. Traditional institutions- of authority such as 
the rain-chiefs were not usually competent as-Government 
appointees... Wherever rain-chiefs were discoveredlahd • :
invested with temporal office,nothing but failure was •
1. These Districts included, as a matter' of course,'the
Azande districts . following the-amalgamatiohiof Mongalla * 
and Bahr el Ghazal. Provinces in 1936.; ! ;
1recorded. Two factors, according to F. L. Nalder the
Governor in 1935s accounted for the failure of the rain-
chiefs as executive head. These were:
u ... his almost necessarily innate conser­
vatism and his people1s probable disinclination 
to have his spiritual character disturbed by 
undue preoccupation with mundane matters.’^
The clan and clan heads; particularly among the Baris, 
were the solid foundation of-1 tribal structure. It is no 
wonder therefore that in the absence of a single and 
autocratic ruler the popular councils rated high in the 
eyes of the natives. That these courts commanded the 
confidence and respect of the people,;to" whom they 
administered justice is indicated by the sheer volume 
of cases handled. In 1935 Mongalla area produced a 
total of 15*697 cases while the courts of the amalgamated 
province dealt with 23 ,500 cases and with the accretion 
of-Yirrol District, from TJpper Nile Province the record 
total of 29 ,99 3 was-registered.^
In' spite of the enthusiasm shown by the
tribesmen of ’Mongalla (later/'Equatoria) Province, no 
.financial responsibility was devolved on Native Adminis­
tration Authorities -beyond teaching the Chiefs to
account for moneys received as Court fees and as fines
\ • ■ , ' Al­
and for those disbursed as salaries or remuneration.
1. A. C. Beaton. Equatorial Province Handbook, Vol. II, 
op. oit., p. 47.  ~ ”
2. Mongalla Handbook, op. cit., p. 64.
3 . A. C . Beaton, Equatorial Province Handbook, Vol. II, 
(1936-48), op.' cit., p. 46V
4. Vide Governor-General*s Report"for 1936, Sudan No. 1 
(1937) Chid.' 5573, P. 128.
Indeed, it is .doubtful if the Khartoum Authorities were 
seriously interested in raising the "Lukikos” to a 
higher plane of financial and administrative devolution. 
In 1924, three years before Maffey's enunciation■of 
Indirect Rule policy, Governor Woodland was convinced 
beyond any shadow of doubt of the immense value of the 
"Lukikos” in relieving District Commissioners of “petty 
litigation, enforcing tribal discipline and getting 
things done. Without hesitation he proposed that the • 
Lukikos be empowered to raise local revenue and to 
expend it on rudimentary educational and health measures 
they were to be equipped with tribal police to enforce 
the Courts orders, be given the powers of.the second 
class magistrates under the Criminal and Civil codes 
and to cater for-roads, leper colonias and to enforce 
better agricultural practices.- Without doubt these far- 
reaching proposals would have transformed the, Lukikos 
into something approximating to Native Administration 
proper. But the Governor's scheme was blocked by 
Khartoum's unwillingness to grant "Native. Courts any 
financial powers. Consequently, the Lukikos like Native 
Courts elsewhere, never developed into anything like 
their counterparts in the Northern Sudan.
UPPER'NILE PROVINCE
Whether viewed in terms of pacification, 
missionary enterprise or native administration, the two 
Nuer districts of Upper Nile Province were certainly the 
most difficult to manage' as well as the most intractable
This impression was confirmed many-years later by K. D.
Williams (then Inspector of Education) when -he wrote
thht : although the Southern Sudan as a whole was under Y>
developed, the Upper Nile province "is perhaps the
most backward, the most resistant to foreign influence
of trade or religion, or education. Inhabited
almost exclusively by the^cattle-owning Nilotic tribes
(Nueri Dinka and Shilluk); Upper-Nile province, had,
. ' ■ ‘
3 -"4 *1 ' ‘ " •
indeed, been "the despair of 'the Governor"; and follow­
ing the pacification of the;early decades the Nuer in 
particular' were ominously bracketed as "the problem of ■
the future”. Throughout the 1920's the Nuer persisted v
in their refusal, to communicate with the Government or 
to^have any dealings with it by simply removing them- 
selves and their cattle to the interior>of their very 
difficult territory. Thus; in 1924 District Commissioner 
of Central Nuer despondently remarked that "he -rarely ' 
saw more than the distant backs of Nuer, and then only 
fleetingly” When in 1927 Cdptain/y. H. Eergusson,
an enthusiastic and sympathetic officer admired by 
colleagues and superiors alike, entertained optimism 
about Nuer hostility to Government, he was murdered by
1. K. D. Williams, "The: first year” in Overseas Education, 
Vol. 17, 18 October 1946. . ' ““  /
2. Anglo-EgyptIan Sudan Handbook Series No. 107, (Confiden- * 
tial), September 1919,p.'51. " ~~
3- P. P. Howell, A Manual’of Nuer Law (London 1954), p* 56.
Nuong Nuer.1
NuerXand was also vast; it had a land area of 
over 20*000 square miles of waterless plains which turned 
into swamp and bog during the rainy season. What is more* 
there were no roads of any kind. The two District 
Commissioners supported by two sub-Mafmurs and sixty 
police constituted;quite insufficient force and 
personnel for the bid to control a population of 
300*000 Nuer tribesmen.2 These administrative diffi­
culties were further complicated by:the'lack of identic 
^iable traditional authorities upon which to devolve ':v 
ovcnrthe minimum"of Judicial power, Indeed> Nuer ^ 
vocabulary was devoid of the word for."command" or 
"authority".^ According to one observer "the Nuer is
the complete democrat and every man is as good as his
4‘ . ,
neighbour". ",
Vv . As.a result primarily of later anthropological
studies we ilmoW-more about the Nuer and their social
structure than British administrators of the 1920*s
and their .predecessors could have possibly known. The
Nuer are* in the literature of social anthropology* a
1. The Story of ffergie Bey, (A biography,of Vere H. 
Eergusson)’ (London 1930) * p. 117 * "Pergie Bey" was
. very much-in love with the Nuer; he once wrote*-"If you \
.could, see the real, genuinely uncivilised natives*" 
hitherto untouched by anyone at all, you would fall in 
. love.with them at once i,." Ibid., p. 122. '
2. Governor Upper Nile to Civil Secretary,' re. Nuer
, Administration 12 March 1923, CS/SCR/l/C/3* S.G.A. 
Khartoum.
3• P. P. Howell* A Manual of Nuer Law'(London 1954),  ^
pp.. 29 *^3 0. . -
4.. J. S. R. Duncan, The Sudan* A Record of ,Achievement
(London 1952) P* 166. ■' ”^TI
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classic case of the segmentary lineage system. Dr.
P. P. Howell who combines anthropological training 
with wide administrative experience of the Nuer spells 
out the implication of the. fragmentation of the Nuer 
social system in the following striking terms: "a 
group of persons or a segment of Nuer tribe may have 
political significance at one moment, and at another
p
no significance at all". In his book, The Nuer (1940), 
Professor Evans-Pritchard wrote that political cohesions:-, 
in Nuer society Is maintained by the process of fission 
and.fusion. Clearly a social system of this kind 
rules out, any form of stable, institutionalised and 
hierarchical authority. This scheme of thing's does not, 
however, preclude the existence of4personal leadership 
of an ephemeral kind-, thrown up by accident or emergency 
factors.
In point of fact, a few influential men did 
exist among the Nuer * as there must be in every 
society - who were more or less ritual experts-such as 
the "Leopard-SkinrChiefAlthough such individuals - ~ 1 7'V
commanded a measure of influence and could mediate dis­
putes if asked, they lacked the enforcement powers and 
authority of an effective ruler. As far as 'administration
1. For an earlier treatment, see E. E, Evans-Pritchard 
"The Nuer of the - Southern Sudan" in Fortes and Evans- 
Pritchard (eds.) African Political Systems* 13th 
Impression (London 19&9), PP * 272-'29 6.
2. P. P. Howell, A Manual of Nuer Law. (London 1954),
p. 221. *
3 . Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer (London 1940), pp. 147-8.
4. In Nuer Religion (1956), p. 290, Evans-Pritchard admits 
that this is a misleading term whose usage gained currency 
among administrations of the day; he himself prefers "Priest”
was concerned, prospective Nuer headben refused-to be
vested with any power the exercise’ of which might prove
troublesome or renderthem unpopular- in the eyes of
fellow tribesmen. Thus in 192^ the, only two experiments.;;-
iniappointedChiefs1 ended in>total failure;- one whs ' .
murdered by his own people, ahd.;the other was driven
out. 1 .According*to:a former District Commissioner of
Central Nuer, ,fAdministration of the’Nuer up to 1928
was. of an attenuated form, and in the least accessible
areas there was no administration at all. " 2 Government ,:i
action was restricted to,the maintenance of public. . ’
order, the prevention of Nuer raids on. the Dinka and-
the collection of the very light cattle tribute. Need-
less to say, none of these efforts achieved any measure
of success as the Nuer -continued to defy the Govern™ ’ !
ment. ■
If, for nearly three decades, the Nuer had 
succeeded in'defying the authority-of the Sudan Govern­
ment, 1928 represented a dividing line in the history 
of Nuer administration. Despite the lack of authoritarian 
political structure, the Nuer were sufficiently united" , 
to mount a concerted action against the Government, in 
'a? final ..hid to rid themselves of the ’pale-faced Turks'. . 
Ironically, and like the Dinka "national" movement under 
ArienditiVthe great (and last) Nuer uprising of .1928 
invited massive government response which ensured .the
1. Governor Upper Nile to Civil Secretary, 2 December 19^3 
UNP/SCH/14, SiG.A,. K&artoum. . ;
,2V P.P. Howell A Manual of Huer -Law (London 1954), p. 5 6.
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final defeat and pacifidation of the Nuer. The killing 
of Captain Pergusson Bey in December 1927 sparked 
widespread Nuer rebellion-in which more British 
officials were .killed and police posts attacked. Raids 
on the Dinka were also resumed on an.unprecedented scale. 
Meanwhile, Government-appointed 'Chiefs’ were powerless 
before the influence of 'witch doctors' who spearheaded 
the rebellion. The Governor, C. A. Willis, considered 
that the Nuer had ceased to be a problem in native 
administration and ought to be regarded as enemies, "the 
object of extensive military operations until they .have 
learnt such a lesson that they will never need another." 
On this note,, the next two years witnessed large scale 
military operatiphs against the Nuer in which cattle 
were confiscated and hostages taken; Ground forces 
were supported by a "squadron of the R.A.P. which bombed 
the swamps to force, out the young warriors who had fled 
there. By 19^0 the ringleaders had been rounded up and ■ 
most, if not .all, of the Nuer region was pacified.
This 'Nuer Settlement' involved a thoroughly 
constructive administrative reform. A "No-Man's land" 
was created between the Dinka and Nuer to prevent 
further raidings. : The displaced Nuer were resettled 
elsewhere and the different Nuer groups concentrated 
in specific areas. The Government also'undertook to 
make a study of Nuer .social organisation, amalgamate j'
1. Governor, Upper/Nile to Civil Secretary, "General
situation in the Nuer", A December 1928, CS/SCR/l/C/10 
Vol. I SiG.A, Khartoum.
splinter groups into-.their parent communities and 
appoint Chiefs from dominant lineages or from Leopard- 
Skin Chiefs* A British District Commissioner was 
attached to each .Nuer section to ensure, that each 
group kept well within the camping and grazing sites 
alloted them* 'Meanwhile^- the, restive young'warriors ' 
with their insatiable;, appetite for cattle-raiding were 
absorbed ihto tribal police forces* ?Evans-Pritchard 
Who,had successfully carried out research work among 
the Azande, was'brought in to-act as anthropological r 
advisor to the?scheme/
,? The partially subdued Nuer came to accept the
District Commissioner. as their ’Chief1; and: to have res­
pect for the power ■ of the Government. Like; the Dinka 
and others^before* the Nuer realised at long last the 
futility of■ rebellion against a superior foe. On the' , ■
•other hand* time was\ripe for the Government to approach.;,
the'Nuer in.-a more conciliatory manner so that the 1930
2
turned out to be a period of appeasement . All the-.same, 
it took considerable time for the Nuer to overcome the - 
siaock of their defeat. When Evans-PfitcharcL revisited } 
theNuer in ; 1931 $ they wereunusually hostile - to' him' on1! 
account.of their humiliation by the government forces 
and the measures adopted to ensure the final submission.
  —         — ..— -   ■■«  -■■■-— ... ■ ■*.■- *   
. r ' ■ < lV , : ' - " 3
1. Minutes of Conference held at Malakal ph the-?:5 and 6
January 1921 chaired by. the, Governor-General and attended 
by Civil Secretary* Commander Sudan-Defence Force* and : 
Nuer District Commissioners; see CS/SCR/l/C/10 Vol. 11 
Governor Upper.Nile to Civil Secretary*118 February 1929/ 
. !,Nuer Policy”*• CS/SCH/l/C/10 Vol. - 1** S .G .A. ;,Khartoum.
2. PI P. Howell* A Manual of Nuer Law (London 1951), P* 36.
3. Evans-Pritchard* The Nuer- (London‘■ 191-0) j pp. 12-13»
'V.; Until the outbreak .,of war in Europe- in 1939 
District Commissiphers ip. 'Upper Nile province" tended to" 
devote more* time to/the external relations of the tribes 
"within their districts than to promoting native adminis­
tration*;1 : The importance of this function -was -/under-- r , 
.lined by the regular holding of Chief*s meetings attended 
.by. District Commissioners for settlement of ihter-tribal 
. disputes . One such meeting held in February-1935 and 
attended by the governor resulted;in the establishment 
of exceptionally cordial relations between the central 
Nuer and the Southern Dinka. The Dinka Chief had asked 
for the return, pf the Nuer to their former-homes (in the 
no-man*s zone).. When the*request was granted "relations 
/between Dinka/and Nuer7 seemed more amicable than could 
have been believed possible ten years ago". The native 
courts instituted1 throughout Nuer-land remained weak and 
unpopular1 until the; 19^0;*s by which time the Nuer regarded 
, litigation as a "stimulating pastime."
In the non-Nuer districts of the province the
Court of the Shilluk Reth continued to function satis-
■5 .....
factorily. The authority of the divine Reth was
sufficiently strong and vigorously, backed by the District
Commissioner and-the Shilluk police, but the Reth's
1* Governor-General*s Report for 1935.» Sudan No. 1 (1936),
., cmd. 5281, p. 122. .
2.- P.. P. Howeli, A/Manual of Nuer Law (London 195^)* P*
3* Governor-General*s Report for 1928, Sudan No. 2 (1929) 
cmd. 3^0 3, p. 1 0. : ; :
- ■ ' 1 subordinates were;exceedingly weak. Among the.segmen­
tary/ Khor Filins,Dinka the courts held by Government- 
appointed Chiefs enforcing custom were undeveloped.
Worse still, because of their proximity to the Northern 
Sudan the Northern Dinka tended to ”ape the Arabs” and 
adopt a form of Islam to the ..disregard of tribal organi­
sation. Though they loved litigation, like the Dinka 
everywhere else, their ’Chiefs’ were found to be r
untrustworthy and incapable of enforcing decision. By 
1936 there had been’no significant improvement in the 
overall state of native administration in Upper Nile 
province. 'The1Governor,reported that because of lack 
of educated ’boys’ it was difficult and often impossible
tolkeep accurate records of the work done by the. Chiefs ’
■ . *5 ' • • * :
tribal courts. At the close of the thirties Upper Nile
province had made little advance in either education or 
native^ administration compared with Equatorial province 
(following the - amalgamation, of Mongalla and Bahr dl- 
Ghazal provinces). , ' ,
On a more general level, any attempt to apply 
indirect rule theory to Southern Sudan was doomed to 
failure almost from the start. A highly elaborate struc­
ture of native rule could not easily be achieved among 
people With segmentary tribal structures only lately
1. Governor Upper Nile to Civil Secretary, 4' March 19^7 
. SCB/1/F/I, Vol. Ill "Shilluk and Devolution” 3.G.A.
Khartoum.
2. ibid. ’’Dinka and Devolution”.
J.:, Governor-General *s Report for 1939*
, 1 ' *' • • . 
pacified. And in .the light of the fact of the very few
British administrators engaged in the -South as against 
the size and population of that country, one can only
suspect that the rhetoric of native rule had served to
conceal the Administration’s inability to provide 
adequate guidance, control and development. The point 
has also been made that the idea of native administra­
tion was a pure delusion and, that the mere presence of 
.the white man in Africa made it impossible for the 
’primitive* condition of things to continue;
Every motor-car, every mission station, every 
. packet of cigarettes or yard of cotton print, 
every book to be read, every black man who can
write -.these and a thousand other things are
.altering.the conditions in which and the ideas 
by.which African natives live. 2
It need not be stressed too strongly, in1retrospect at
least, that the quote summarises the direction of social
change Southern Sudan would inevitably take, but which
the British realised, only belatedly.
1. G. M. Bakheit, British Administration and Sudanese 
Nationalism, op. cit., p. 197".
1. J. Huxley, Africa View (London 1932), p. 299-.
CHAPTER IV
SOUTHERN POLICY; 1950
... the only man who ever tried to carry out 
the Southern Policy was Carole - and, he got 
a LEMON for his pains - so be warned in '
time.^
The so-called; Southern Policy enunciated for­
mally in January 1930i : was either redundant or doomed. 
Redundant^ because the Nilotes did all right by them­
selves in-keeping out alien cultures; doomed, because 
western Bahr el-Ohazal* and the Wau area were too deeply 
penetrated by Northern, Islamic and Arabic, influences 
even.to begin any serious implementation. What can. 
plausibly be asserted is that Southern Policy was the 
logical outcome of- Indirect Rule strategy; it was not,
>• . ■' : ' >  ' .!■’ 4 . /s' -)>'
. as: is often believed by .Sudanese nationalists, part of a 
British design tb separate the Southern,Sudan from the . 
Northern provinces. The appearance of the Sudanese 
brand of Arab nationalism in 1919inecessitated. the,insti­
tution: of Native-Administration as an antidote.- The 1924 
mutiny of the Egyptian "units stationed in Khartoum (which 
had the sympathy of prominent Sudanese nationalists) and 
the assassination, in the same year, of Sir Lee Stack
1. ’Handing, over NotesWestern District Bahr el-Ghazal,
_ 21 Dec ember;1933, WD/SCR/16/A/l. S.G.A. Khartoum,
•2. In October 1943 the then. Civil Secretary, Sir, Douglas 
Newboid,-. said that for certain parts of the Southern 
Sudan economic indicators pointed North and South for 
others but nothing final came out of it; see P.O. 371/ 
45986.
(the Governor-General of the Sudan) in Cairo were 
indicative of the growing strength of Arab nationalism 
which could spread southward to an Arabicized and 
Islamised Southern Sudan. Under these circumstances, 
it was thought necessary to block Arab influences 
from reaching the South. ’Southern Policysupplied the 
rhetoric for this objective.
The salient features of the approved policy 
for the administration of the Southern Provinces were \ 
spelled out by Harold MacMichael, the Civil Secretary, 
in a memorandum dated 15th January 1930. The memoran­
dum, which was circulated to the Governors and all 
District Commissioners of the Southern Provinces with 
instructions to study it, stated:
The-policy of the Government in the Southern 
Sudan is to build up-a series of self-contained 
racial or tribal units with structure1 and 
organisation based, to whatever extent the 
requirements of equity and good government 
permitted upon indigenous customs, tradi­
tional usage and beliefs.^
Among the measures to be adopted were: the provision of : 
non-Arabic-speaking staff (administrative, clerical and 
technical); the control of immigrant traders from the 
North; British staff to familiarise themselves with the 
beliefs, customs and languages of the local tribes; the 
use of English where communication in the local verna­
cular was impossible. The aim of the Government was 
obviously to stamp out Arab influence in the South. If 
Arabic appeared to serve the function of a lingua franca 
among the heteorogenousfpeoples of the South,. English
1. Civil Secretary to Governors Bahr el-Ghazal, Mongalla 
and Upper Nile> 25th January 1930 Memorandum; ’Southern 
Policy1 S.G.A. Khartoum..
was to replace it. Furthermore, the four intermediate 
and technical schools in'Mongalla and the Bahr el- 
Ghazal were to produce Southern *staff and artisans to 
replace the Northerners. The language of official ' 
correspondence in:the South was to he English instead 
of Arabic, 1
Immigration from the North to the South was 
to be severely restricted as well under the 1922 
Closed District Ordinance. It was the aim of the 
Government, the memorandum continued, "to encourage, 
as far as possible, Greek and Syrian traders rather 
than the Gellaba type ... . Only the best type of the 
Gellaba whose interests are purely commercial and pur- 
sued in a legitimate manner should be admitted.", To 
shield the rural community from, as it were, the 
Obnoxious* influence of the Muslim traders, the; 
memorandum forbade the Gellaba to trade in areas where 
there were no administrative or police post: "The
limitation of Gellaba trade to towns or established 
routes is essential.”?
Along with the Civil Secretary's appeal to 
the British Field Staff to learn the cultures of the 
people whom they administered went the task of convert­
ing the Southern native vernaculars into literary media.
1. Ibid.
2. Civil Secretary to Governors Bahr el Ghazal, Mongalla
and Upper Nile, 25th January 1950, Sudan Government
Archive/CS/very secret/1-C-l. "Southern Policy".
5. Ibid.
The Hejaf Language Conference held in April 1928 and 
attended by representatives from the Sudan, Uganda and 
Congo Governments as well as Christian Missionaries from 
the three territories had selected certain language 
groups for development into literary media. The out­
come had proved fruitful from the points of view of 
both Government and, Missions. It was noted that while 
the Gospel could be preached and learned through the 
media of group languages, they also provided solid 
barriers against the spread of Arabic♦ In the Equa­
torial Corps of the Sudan Defence Force English words 
of command had been introduced. While this was lauded, 
the Memorandum added that "Every effort should be made 
to make English the means of communication among the 
men themselves to the complete exclusion of Arabic."
English classes were to be opened for the purpose with
the Missions providing the instructors. British / 4
Officials were advised to learn the local vernacular
and drop Arabic in conversation with the natives or
resort to interpreters of the local tongue. Provided
V 4 ,
District Commissioners mastered the local vernacular,
"The use of interpreters is preferrable to the use of
•i
Arabic." Because the restriction of Arabic was an 
essential feature of the general scheme it was hoped 4
that if these guidelines were properly observed, 4
Arabic would die a natural death being neither the language 
of the governing nor of the governed.
  - __________________
1. Civil Secretary to Governors Bahr el Ghazal, Mongalla 
and Upper Wile, 25th January, 1930, S.G.A./CS/very 
secret/1-C-l. "Southern Policy" Section D.
Governors of the three Southern Provinces of 
Mongalla, Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile were instructed 
by Khartoum in March of the same year to refrain from 
direct reference to the “Policy” and, . instead, to 
allude to it vaguely under “arablei-sation”, Arab custom, 
etc., to convey the impression-that it concerned adminis­
trative matters only. In reality, however, the whole 
region had been “made subject to an exclusive and secret 
policy designed to isolate it as much as possible from 
Northern /?Trab and Islamic influences/* contra-
verts the existing constitutional system"and such 
commercial nexus as has survived with the Northern.
Sudan”. Expressed in different terms, it was
“directed to .... constructive political objective and
' 2.... determined by political criteria”.
In pursuance of this policy Brock, then 
Governor of Bahr el Ghazal, instructed his District 
Commissioners to discontinue the use of Arabic words 
such as Sheikh, Sultan and waklls and their native, 
equivalents substituted. Similarly, Police, Chiefs, 
dressers, and clerks should be called by native names 
and, falling that, by English names; chiefs and people 
should be discouraged from taking on Arab names either: • ;
for themselves or their children.^. Merchants were to 
be advised to ”cut out Arabic when dealing with their1
1. Sir G. Symes to Sir.Lampson, 3rd July 1934. (No. 99 
Confidential) P.0.407/217*
2. Civil Secretary to Governors Mongalla, Bahr el Ghazal 
and Upper Nile, 22 March 1930, CS/l-C-l/very secret/ ..
Sudan Government Archive (henceforth abbreviated as S.G.A.) 
Khartoum. >
3. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to all District Commissioners in ; 
the Province, 19 March 1930, B.G.P./SCR/1-C-12,, (Strictly
Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum.
customers an$ to'talk either in English'or the verna­
cular “.1,: ‘The Gpyernorfl actually felt. that the state of 
affairs,as regards the spread of Northern influence in.,, ,
his,province was eminently unsatisfactory and"that to 
obtain quick results more vigorous measures-were urgent!^ 
needed. In the Western District, for instance, where 
“practically all the natives” were in the hahlt of 
adopting Arabic names, {the authorities faced consider­
able difficulty in Inducing the people to; re-adopt 
their own tribal hames. In an effort to break this 
down one District Commissioner insisted on the 'Police, 
Chiefs, Chiefs Police, and Native Dressers all using
their own names and. entered only tribal names in Case
-3 \ '1 -' " - *■ ■ ’ .
Books of Chief Courts. Merchants were forbidden, to
make Cr sell Northern style clothes (*jallabia’) and
•ff ''I*. ' „ ‘ *•
chiefs from buying them. Nevertheless large quantities* . 
of “Arab” (sic) clothing were;still -being sold and worn 
and the District Commissioner gave fresh orders that 
“shirts should be made short, with a collar and opening 
down the front in, the European fashion and not an open 
neck as worn by the Baggara of Dar. Pur. Also ftagiasf ;/ 
(skull-cap) as worn by Arabs to wind emmas (turban) 
round are not to be sold in.future. No more fArabf ‘/
1. A/Governor Bahr el:Ghazal to all District Commissioners 
in the Province, 20th January 1932# B.G.P./SCR/1.C.14 
(Secret) 3.GlAh Khartoum.
2. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil-Secretary,-22 March 
1930 B.G.P./SCR/1.C.6, (Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. 
Khartoum. e „
3 . District Commissioner Western DistrictfBahr el.Ghazdl 
to Governor Bahr el Ghazal, 17 January 1932, WD/S0R/ 
l/C-1 (Confidential)/S.G.A. Khartoum. .
* •• • ' 150.
^clothing is; to be made as from today.”"*' The next 
District Commissioner commented on. this ludicrous order
as/follows; . ”l do not think this is being obeyed ...
- p
The polo collar is the key to the Southern Policy.” .
;;Ali:rover tha South the message emanating from provincial 
headquarters was /the same: if. Southerners could not be 
induced to return-'to their traditional way of life but 
instead, displayed a taste for the civilised;way of 
life then European civilisation rather than its 
-Middle.Eastern counterpart was recommendable.
Wau* the provincial capital of Bahr el Ghazal 
presented another trouble-spot* if not a ^melting-pot” 
frqnr the viewpoint of ”Southern Policy”, .Attracted by 
■job opportunities*, tribesmen from the surrounding areas 
had flocked there where they came in direct contact 
with numerous Northern traders* fugitives from West 
Africa (the Bellata) and exiled criminals from Egypt 
under the Turkish.regime. There were in Wau in addi­
tion to a colony of redundant Northern artisans* a 
reserve company of ex-Sudanese soldiers and a mosque;
Arabic , was being, taught in the Mission Elementary :School 
whose pupils were drawn not only from the Wau area but 
also from the remoter regions of Central District.
The resulting picture was quite clear; from its founda­
tion everything was done to foster Arabic in Wau ,
1. District Commissioner, Western District Bahr el Ghazal 
to Mr., Emmanoil Logotaris* Agent of Messrs. Papautsides
'and Agent of Sheikh Arnein El Tayed at Raga (headquarters 
Western District)* 21 June 1952* ' S.G.A. Khartoum.
2. Minuteiby District Commissioner Western District Bahr 
el Ghazal*' in Pile WD/SCR/16-B-2* Sudan Government 
Archive, Khartoum*
1
tokhv Y The important Rejaf Language Conference in 1928 
had:reoognised the special status of Wau and so did the 
subsequent Civil' Secretary-*sr Memorandum.. of- January’
1930. To Governor Bahr el Ghazal, however, the strate­
gic position of Wau. regarding Northern influence made 
it all the more.-compelling that "everything which in 
the smallest degree, might contribute to the suppression 
of Arabic in the province should be done. ^ The measures #
adopted included the elimination of the principal Arabic- 
speaking population of Wau,,namely petty Northern 
traders (the Gellaba) and Fellata; the amalgamation and 
transfer of the Stack School and the Mission Inter­
mediate School to Bussefe* some twelve miles ;out of easy 
reach of Wau; the admission of pupils from the Wau area. ; Y 
only to the Mission Elementary School, to; the exclusion 
of children from the surrounding districts; the, substi- --
tution of a "group language" for Arabic in the Wau,
2l •' - •
area. The latter proposal involved the teaching of 
two "group languages", viz., Dinka and Zande with the 
numerous relatively insignificant tribes in and around 
Wau having to learn the one or other depending upon : 
their affinity to the "language group". "It Will not be
1. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 22 March 
1930. B.G.P./SCR/l.G. 6 (Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. 
Khartoum.
2. Civil Secretary’s Memorandum on Southern Policy,
15th January 1930, op. cit.
3 . Governor Bahr el Ghazal to all District Commissioners 
in the Province, 19 March:1930, BGP/SC/RC^C-12; also 
Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 22 March 
1930, BGP/SCR/1.C.6, (Strictly Confidential), S.G.A. 
Khartoum.
... 1^2.
easy” the Governor admitted, ”to popularise either of 
the ”group languages” In Wau area as many of the inhabi­
tants, if not entirely detribalised, are neither Dinka 
nor Zande, and I doubt their adopting a completely 
strange vernacular in place of Arabic. English would 
stand a chance.”^
Good progress was made in producing text-books 
in native languages and grammars and in teaching English.
In Wau itself there were fourteen English classes in 
June 1930 running for Equatorial Corps N.C.O.s, male
hospital dressers, police N.C.O.s, and men, office
; • : ' P
messengers, drivers, sweepers and servants. The
Governor was able to observe with some satisfaction
that ”the elimination of Arabic in conversation with
people such as messengers and servants, with whom one
is in close contact, is not a lengthy progress.”-^ By
1932 the number of English classes for Province,
Departmental, Army, Native Administration, employees
and civilians had risen to over thirty-five and seven
Northern merchants deported from the Western and Central
4
districts alone. These were not spectacular advances, 
however, when weighed against set-backs. Except for
1. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to all District Commissioners 
in the Province, 19 March 1930, BGP/SC/Rl-C-12ralso 
Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 22 March 
1930, BGP/SCR/1.C.6, (Strictly;Confidential)i S.G.A. 
Khartoum.
2. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 9 June 1930, 
BGP/SCR/16-B-I, quoted in G.M.A. Bakheit British 
Administration and Sudanese Nationalism 1919-1939,
Ph.D. Thesis, s't'Z Johni s College Cambridge, 190 5.
3 . Enclosure in Governor BGP to all District Commissioners 
in the Province, 2Q January. 1932, (Secret/BGP/SCR/l.C.lA, 
S.G.A. Khartoum.
A. Ibid.
the clerical and accounting staff who had a unique 
advantage over the others in keeping up and improving 
their English, few people conversed in English where 
communication in the vernacular proved impossible; 
explanation of drills in the military and police 
continued to be in Arabic: "Arabic is ingrained in the 
military and police forces in Wau and Raga”.3, That 
visitors to the South brought along with them their 
Arabic-speaking servants was lamented; the Public Works 
Department, reinforced by Northern artisans, made little 
progress in English but advanced further in Arabic and 
so did most of the big merchants in the Province. 
Similarly, English made little progress in Western 
District and the Wau area so that the Missions found
it necessary to conduct part of their service in
2
Arabic.
More constructive suggestions were made at an 
educational conference in Mongalla to the effect that 
reputable European traders /i.e. Greeks/ should he 
encouraged to employ local fboysr as sub-agents on com­
mission in out-stations, but these failed to materialise 
because the traders did not co-operate.*^ A second 
suggestion that Southerners should, with Government
1. Enclosure in Governor BGP to all District Commissioners 
in the Province, 20 January 1:932, (Secret/BGP/SCR/l.C.14, 
S.G.A. Khartoum.
2. Ibid.
3. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to all District Commissioners,
10 June 1930, BGP/SCR/1.C.9 (Strictly Confidential). 
S.G.A. Khartoum.
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loan, he encouraged to set up business of their own did
not improve the situation or prove a viable proposition
either. For one thing there was lack of sufficient
local talents and for another* prospective Southern
traders would still have to maintain business links
with the Omdurman merchants to ensure steady supply of
goods. Of the two native traders:in the Yambio district
who managed to prove their worth* one had long been in
Omdurman and maintained client relationship with some
of its merchants, the other had borrowed forty pounds
1worth of goods from a Northern merchant. The way 
these two set themselves up in business was undesirable 
from the standpoint of the Government. In the Northern 
District one Nilote capable of running his own private 
business turned out to be a Muslim with a Northern
2mother and had spent most of his life in Omdurman.
The District Commissioner advised "Until local 
natives have gained some experience as agents it would 
be most unwise- to set one dp as a trader by a Govern­
ment loan ... the Nilotes were just in the process of
'3 'learning the use of money. Certain clauses of the 
Civil Secretary’s Memorandum were obviously impossible 
to implement especially in the Dinka areas. For 
instance, the limitation of trading to stations could 
not apply where, hs in Dinka country, lies most of the
1. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to all District Commissioners, 
10 June 1930, BGP/SCR/1.C.9 (Strictly Confidential), 
S.G.A. Khartoum v"^
2. District Commissioner Northern District Bahr el Ghazal 
to Governor Bahr el Ghazal, (nd?) ND/SCR/l/C/9* 
(Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. - Khartoum. ■
3* Ibid. s .
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trade in native produce, cattle, hides, sismsim and 
dura /iTorghum/ . 1
The policy of encouraging local languages, 
tribal consciousness and English and of suppressing 
Arabic, could not be brought to a successful conclusion 
while continuous■contacts -between Southerners and Arab 
traders and nomads were maintained aeross over­
stretched borders with the Northern Provinces of 
Kordofan and bar Pur. To check Muslim and Northern 
influences coming into Bahr el Gha.zal along these, tra­
ditional trade routes, Governor Bahr El Ghazal 
erected an artificial wall which consisted in the 
ejection of 500 West African Muslims’ from the sub- 
district of Kafia KIngi which was closed and its
headquarters left to dilapidate to 'create a ’’No-Man's
■' 2 land” which nobody-was allowed to cross. Latitude
8°45 North was designated as the Northern limit of the 
Southern Policy. It was also proposed to move the dis­
trict headquarters at Kaga and the Roman Catholic 
Mission westwards to a new site because "there is a 
Mosque at Raga and I would like to see it fall into 
disuse as. it would if RUga were m o v e d . A r a b  tribesmen
1. Governor Bahr el Ghazal- to Civil Secretary, 22 March 
: 1930, BGP/SCR/1.C.6 . (Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum.
2.. Governor,Bahr el Ghazal to District Commissioner 
Western District Bahr el Ghazal, 9 June 193Q, BGP/SCR/ 
16-B-2 (Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum; also 
Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 9 June 1930, 
BGP/SCR/16-B-1 S.G.A. Khartoum;. .
3..5ecretary for Education-and Health to Civil Secretary,
30 April 1930; No. 1 C/1. (Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. 
Khartoum; ...Governor Bahr el Ghazal to District Commissioner 
Western District Bahr el Ghazal, 9 June 1930, (Strictly 
Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum,
were also banned from entering Bahr el Ghazal and If 
they did;so'illegally, they were to be arrested and' 
extradited to their province of origin. The .same ban 
applied equally to tribesmen from.Bahr el Ghazal 
entering Kordofan and Dar Fur. >
To give the new measure teeth the cooperation 
of Governors of Dar Fur and Kordofan Was sought and
“I
obtained and a system of “pass’1 instituted. But the * 
“pass” system did not work, at least not as efficiently 
as was originally hoped. District Commissioner Western 
was quite certain “ ... the regulations for trading in 
Closed Districts are honoured more in the breach than 
the observance .... The Arabs of the south of' Dar Fur 
appear to be totally ignorant of the Ordinance and most 
other Northerners seem to be •under the impression that 
permits are only required by licensed traders and that 
everyone else may come and go as they please ...” The 
Police of the Western District were purged of “all 
devout Mohammedans because they would in their present 
posts infect all new police.To,complete, the picture, 
grazing arrangements were revised to prevent;contacts 
between Nilotes and Arabs as it was--soon discovered 
these annual meetings were producing some ’ilb-effect*
1. Agreement between Governors Darfur and Bahr el Ghazal 
at Safaha,"28.3*35 ,and also Minute; of Meeting at Safaha 
signed by District Commissioner,^Western District-Equa- ; 
toria and District Commissioner South Daffur, 4 March 
1941. S.G.A. Khartoum. ’ ;
2. District Commissioner Northern District.Bahr el Ghazal , 
to Governor Bahr el Ghazal (n.d.?), ND/SCR/l/c/I. ;..
(Strictly Confidential) S.G.&. Khartoum. ;
3. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 22 March 1930, 
op. cit. also. District Commissioner^Western District to 
Governor Bahr el Ghazal, 8 August 1930, (Confidential)
: WD/SCR/16.B.2. : 1
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on the conservative Nilotes evidenced by their taste in
1dress and a slight spread of Arabic. The point of the 
whole exercise was put more candidly many years after­
wards by a new District Commissioner Western District* 
Equatorial Province: ** ... We do not want contacts
.because whether an Arab comes to hunt or graze or preach 
Islam or. trade he is spreading Northern influence.*1
The difficulty of giving Northern traders in 
other parts of the Province, say/ five years* notice to 
quit was pointed out by Governor Bahr el Ghazal who. felt 
it inadvisable and unfair. *'The majority of the native 
trade in the Province/ 1 he explained, 71 is in their 
hands.. If they are removed en bloc non-native mer­
chants could not.be found to replace them. Some of 
them are men of substance who have been in the Province 
for many years and have done good.11^  In other spheres, 
however, he- recommended that Central Government Depart­
ments should send none other than non-Muslim employees 
in to the'Southern Provinces. Police.training was to 
be conducted in the South and Northern Officers in the 
Sudan Defence Force to be removed from the Equatorial
' i i
Corps and replaced by British Officers.
  .  — ..     .—I.—. ................   -.........................
1, District Commissioner Northern District Bahr el Ghazal 
to Governor Bahr el Ghazal (n.d.?) ND/SCR/l/C/l. 
(Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum.
2.. District Commissioner Western District Equatoria to 
Governor Equatoria, 9 April 1941, WD/SCR/l-C-1 (Secret) 
S.G.A. Khartoum.
3. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 22 March 
1930, BGP/SOR/I.C.6 (Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. 
Khartoum,
4. Ibid.
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British administrators in* the field were, not 
.unexpectedlyy amongst the first tq,point a finger 
privately to the follies and shortcomings of Southern 
Policy. In 1952' District Commission, of the Western 
District of Bahr el Ghazal indicated that "although the 
’policy1 was still, secret and Khartoum afraid that .pub­
lic opinion in the North will be scandalised if the * 
truth is told about the missions and so-forth," it was, 
nevertheless, no secret. The intelligentsia in ' . 
Omdurman were well aware of the Government policy of 
attempting to eradicate Muslim and Arabic influences in 
the Southern Sudan. In fact "the only people completely 
in the dark were the English officials in the. North.”
For the information of his successor ths District 
Commissioner wrote: "what the Southern Policy means 
here is trying to make these people as unlike Baggara 
Arabs or Moslem religious notables as possible.". The 
attempt was worthwhile because "their instincts are, in 
some ways, more English than Arabian,” but he, was doubt­
ful if Roman Catholicism "mostly instilled by Italian 
peasants” was the best substitute. "From the Southern 
Policy point of view," he continued, "the administra­
tion or maladministration" that was practised from the 
establishment of the Condominium till 1950 had not been 
helpful. The trend in the three decades had been to 
.encourage Arablclsation and Mohammedanism which had 
destroyed any sense, of tribal unity that might have 
existed. The aim of Southern Policy was to reverse
1. Note by District Commissioner. Western District Bahr el 
Ghazal, 15 November' 1952, WD/SCR/l-C-1, S.G.A. Khartoum.
this trend."1*
In note-form the District Commissioner wrote ' 
in elaboration to hie successor: ” **• the sort of 
things to go fon (mostly difficult) are; " (i) Languages 
(English and Kpala), (ii) Clothes ( ... we-'haven’t - 
‘tackled the ladies yet, (iii) Keep people out of the 
North and Northerners out of here ' (this is great fun, 
see various files.) By the way, no women from here are 
allowed to marry ’north1 and in the (rare) case of. a 
foreigner in the district marrying a local woman. 
District Commissioner * s permission has to be -got ahd 
children belong to the mother 1.. (iv) Support the 
Missions (difficult). They mu^t be made to work -in. 
with the Government^and.hence with the Authorities.
(v) Stop Arabian customs (e.g.’femail circumcision ... 
Arabian names. I do not allow Christian names 
either)n. 2 ■ " r ,v; ’ , "
The mbst serious indictment of Southern Policy 
came nearly a decade later when the policy itself was 
due for revision.- Once again the District Commissioner 
of Western District Equatoria •('following the amalgama­
tion, of Bahr el Ghazal and. Mongalla Provinces in 1936) 
wrote to the Governor:
’’You once wrote * *The. spread of Arabian 
influences is as insidious as soil erosion - 
and iust as difficult to- stop.’ Western
1. Handing over notes Western District Bahr el Ghazal, 
21 December 1953, WD/SCH/I6/A/I. . S.G.A. Khartoum.
2. Handing over notes Western. District Bahr el Ghazal, 
21 December 1955, WD/SCR/16/A/1. S.G.A.-Khartoum.
District people still like Northern'influences 
if left to themselves, you know only too well 
the immense amount of time, labour, money and 
patience that has gone into getting, the people 
(most unwilling at first) to abandon Arabic 
names, Arabic dress and Arabic practices. The / 
struggle is a hard one and the end is not yet 
in sight; success will be achieved only when 
active measures provide an alternative economy 
and culture which are inseparable . . . -
These carefully measured words were those of the District
.Commissioner Western District ” ... where for ten years
District Commissioners have been burning Arabian clothes
and doubling their labours by simulating ignorance of
; 2 
Arabic and recording unpronounceable names ...” - The
quote has also been especially chosen by the writer in
an attempt to dispel the illusions of Sudanese Nationalist
then, as now, that "for decades the fusion of the North
and the South was delayed" as a result of the Southern
Policy. The 'suggestion that encouraging the spread of ,
Arabic and Northern influences rather than suppressing
them would have speeded up the.fusion, of the North and
the South is not borne out by evidence. If not the
trap of an ideology then it must be a fallacy both of-Which must
be identified and avoided. All the wealth of evidence,
at least those made public by the Government of the
Republic of the Sudan so far, indicate that the Western
District of. the Bahr el Ghazal and the Wau area pre-
'.sented the only real test-case for the working of
■I. District" Commissioner Western District Equatoria to 
-■ Governor Equatoria, 9 April 1941, WD/SCR/1-C-1,. 
(Secret) S.G.A.
2.,, District Commissioner Western District Equatoria to 
: ...Governor Equatoria,* 9 April 1941, WD/SCR/l-C-1, 
(Secret) S.G.A.
Southern Policy. Although similar, measures designed to 
;shield, the South from Northern, influences were adopted 
. ih; Mpngalla, and Upper Nile rProvinces, the extent and 
intehsity of their application differed very remarkably 
from., those in. the Western Bahr el Ghazal. The reasons ■ 
are not difficult to: find.'
? The vast majority of the Southern popula­
tion composed of the Nilotic tribes.(Dinka, Shilluk and 
Nuer) were only very marginally, if at all, affected by 
Muslim influences coming from-the North. The strong 
character of the Nilotes, their war-like tradition* ■ 
uniformity of language, relative tribal cohesion, and 
their Insular position had all provided a solid-barrier 
and insulation against all foreign, including Arab and 
Muslim, influences. Except for dwellers in the border- 
areas and1 close to the Nile, these largely cattle- 
owning and semi-nomadic tribes were never conquered by 
the Azande or taken into slavery on any significant . 
scalq. Consequently, they were never subject to violent 
disintegration of their social life, customs and lan­
guage. As has been seen, the Dinka were not closely 
administered before 1924, and the,Nuer not before 1951• 
The upshot of all this had been that the task of the 
District Commissioner in any Nilotic District had been
more or. less one of defending a naturally strong posi-
' ' *'■ 1 tion, not resuscitating one that had fallen. By .
1. D i s t r i c t  Commissioner W estern D is t r i c t  E q u a to r ia  
. t o  Governor E q u a to r ia , $0 ju n e -1 9 4 1 , WD/SCR/l-C-1
(Secret), Sudan Government Archive.
dotttrast,., the Inhabitants 'of" the Westerp..Dis t r i ct'f and, 
the Wau area had undergoneall.'the human degradations 
associated; with’- -th#;- Zande conquest' and the slave trade, 
between.-iBGO^^and^i^O.':^ Their social life and'social 
/structure disrupted, thejr were also,administered by the 
new Governmeht^ a^ijriost,. from the time of conquest of the 
Bahr ,el Ghazal in 1901* The effect of the pre-"Southern 
Policy on them had been, one district Commissioner 
noted, “assimilation by methods'ranging from a forced 
and subsidised conversion to 1Islam' of’a sort in the 
Sudanese battalions to,the compulsory adoption of;
Arabic names" by al,l who -came info oontact with Govern- ; 
ment.Further, • ijhe^ Western; district of Bahr’ el Ghazal 
by-virtue of its- proximity to Dar Fur had long .tradihg 
contacts with the Worth. Both early Government policy 
and historical accident had conspired to attract Moslem 
elements and;with them Arab influences into.the Western 
District from across, the border. As a result, one 
tribe in particular became so completely assimilated
; to the. Mohammedan culture that it fpupd no- difficulty
* ■' , " ■ 2' " ' ' . 
in identifying, itself with an Arab tribe.
Under circumstances as these, Southern:Policy  ^
was of unique importance in Western District. .For
1. District Commissioner Western District:Equatoria to 
Governor Equatoria, (Strictly Confidential) 1 November 
.1941, WD/SCR/1-C-1, S.G.A. - vv
,2. These were the Feroge *Arabs* whose Sultan Ahmed Fertak 
was amongst the Ghiefs of Bdhr el Ghazal who, paid ,a 
courtesy visit to the Governor-General in 1904; see 
Sudan Intelligence Report No. 186, January 1910.
instance, the creating of larger units of administration 
was made impossible in the Western District where there 
were some 60 ,000 to 80 ,000 people divided into l4:tribes * 
and speaking 14 languages.: A native court to deal with 
inter-tribal cases could not be established because "
Arabic was the lingua, franca and the Southern Policy 
forbade its use. .The one cardinal weakness of the 
Southern Policy as the District Commissioner Western, 
District saw it, was-that the objective,was so ambitious 
that only the most. stringent-measures coupled with time 
and an abundance,of hope could realise it. This implied 
absolute devotion of the. District Commissioner's time
1and attention to Southern Policy in Western District.
In a striking metaphor, he summed up the whole 
situation:
" 1 .. it requires more -.work to pump'water up 
hill than to guide its natural flow, 'Arabian 
influence .hap breached the natural channel of 
Western Districtfs tribal.development and the 
leak has seeped to a"veritable slough of 
despond* We have set oUrselves^ no less a 
task than to pump it back, and dam the breach, p \ 
and guide the channel ton better outlet .... n "
Of the major and fundamental lines :on which Southern
Policy was to be pursued in the Southern provinces as
a whole, very-few indeed were of any significance or
relevance in the Nilotic districts. , To summarise, the
primary requirements for the furtherance of the Southern
1, District Commissioner Western District Equatoria to 
Governor Equatoria, (Secret)* 30 June 1941, WD/SCR/ 
1-C-l, Sudan Government Archive.
2. Ibid,
Policy as stated in the Civil Secretary’s Memorandum 
already alluded to were as follows :~
(1) the return to tribal law and customs;
(ii) the return to indigenous languages
, and group languages;
(iii) y- the revitalisation or recapitulation
of tribal (family) life;
, (iv) . the encouragement by every means of
' English" as a lingua franca;
(v) the attack on Arabic patois-and
^ names;
(vi) the discouragement of Northern customs
and Northern-style dress;
(vii) the removal of Northern and West
African Muslim elements and,
(viii) the provision of local staff for 
Government Service,
Except, for the last, all these measures were almost 
entirely unimportant incidents in Nilotic:administra­
tion. The first three were the fabrics of experience 
there and as for English, there was no real need for 
its adoption as a rlingua franca: in ..the Dinka dis-
tricts for instance, District Commissioners, merchants
1
and people all spoke the same language, namely Dinka.
In the Western District and the Wau area, by contrast,
1. District Commissioner^Western District Equatoria to 
Governor Equatoria, (Secret), 20 June 1941, WD/SCB/ 
1-C-l, S.G.A. . h .
all the remaining measures were cardinal'' requirements in 
realising the Southern Policy. Thus, wherea-S: in. the 
Nilotic districts the objectives of Southern Policy 
were entirely and essentially those of guiding the / 
progress of an already established and flourishing • 
system, in the Western Bahr el Ghazal the main.concern 
had been reconstruction and revitalisation.
This analysis of the Southern Policy, in terms 
of its differential application to the different socio­
logical conditions in the South squares up quite easily 
"with the official Government pronouncements in Khartoum. 
As defined by Sir G.;Symes, the Governor-General,, the 
purpose of Southern Policy wasi” 1 . jWith the minimum of
British Senior staff, to build up a system of administra­
tion on indigenous foundations and with subordinate : 
native personnel paid in accordance with the cheaper 
Southern standards of economy arid costs of living.’’
• Behind the policy lay- the assumptipn that in view of 
the relatively backward conditions of the South a.simple 
educational system involving teaching in local verna­
cular and inculcating the moral principles of an 
approved religion (i.e. Christianity) would be^  suffi­
cient to. achieve the. goal. Administration of ’ the South ; 
was to be as inexpensively as possible to avoid imposing 
additional financial burden upon, the North. To over­
come the language problem, efforts, were made to integrate
1. District’ Commissioner Western District Equatoria to 
Governor Equatoria (Strictly Confidential), 1 November 
' 1941, S.G.A. WD/SCR/l-C-1. ' • t ' r
a babel of looal languages and dialects especially in 
the southern-most districts and in the Western. Bahr el 
Ghazal.; In this regard the solidly Nilotic districts 
presented little, difficulty. The Government also recog­
nised a rough boundary between a Northern Nilotic 
pastoralist region and a southern agricultural region, 
composed almost exclusively of non-Nilotic tribes.
Administration for the two regions was organised from
1two centres, Malakal and Juba respectively. In. the 
former zone “authoritative11 tribal organisations were 
identified or implemented and regularised, “inevitably”, 
wrote Sir Stewart Symes, “the administrative outlook 
'with these pastoral folk is strongly tinged with 
.'tribalism1 and essentially paternal; it aims at the 
condition of tribal units, compact,economically self- 
contained and uncontaminated.by . 'foreign' contacts."
The Government saw little scope for economical .develop­
ment?, except for the simplest, made adaptable to a variety 
of local circumstances and to he enforced. ■ Currency 
demand was to be stimulated for a small tax payment and 
so also was trade in hides and skins.
In the . south of .the Bahr el Ghazal and Mongalla 
Province sociological conditions were different and pro­
vided better prospects. The people in this second zone 
.were equally backward but more tractable. Ivory trade
1. G, S. Symes to Sir Lampson (No. 99• Confidential)
3 July 1934, P.O. 407/217.
2, Equatorial Province Handbook.
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\had stimulated demands for cash so that people showed 
a Willingness to seek alternative jobs to agriculture; 
road communications were much improved to accommodate 
.motor transport; the land was fertile; above all, pub­
lic security: was,, good* , .When, in 1924* the whole of the 
Zande tribesmen were .compelled to live along roads as
a prebaut'iori against sleeping sickness, limited socio-
, -.i; ,.. i ; • . ■ • \i
ecpnomid measures became a practical proposition; The
accessibility relatively favourable conditions in 
•the secohd.administrative Zone naturally attracted the 
Gellaba-type and it was Government intention to restrict 
their movement for fear of possible exploitation of the 
Southerners. To win the confidence of the Southerners 
the Government found it necessary to build up a protec­
tive barrier against Northern merchants, a policy which 
later crystallised into ’’the Southern Policy?’. Govern­
ment strategy! for the South was, therefore, ”separation 
until the South is strong enough to stand upon its own
feet, and to develop in accordance,with its own ethos 
,,2 : •;:.v, ” The criticism often levelled against Southern 
Policy by the Northern educated Sudanese was itself 
questionable insofar as ’’exactly the same measures are 
in force in the ’Closed Districts1, of the North 
itself, where unsophisticated and potentially trucu­
lent tribesmen were still liable to exploitation by the
1 . G. S, Symes to Sir Lampson (No. 99 Confidential)
3 July 1934. op. cit.
2,, Ibid; the Zande Agricultural Scheme was later opened 
■ in 194.6.
' *1
clever ’Gellaba’ from the. riverain districts.” It was 
with the same considerations:in mind that the Govern­
ment at one point contemplated the creation of a semi­
independent Administration for the South organised
v -'- p  'from a single centre, say, .Malakal..
District Commissioners who-wanted to push the 
Policy of fostering tribalism-and the eradication of 
foreign influences in the South to its logical conclu-/ 
sion were dissatisfied with the performance.of the 
Missions. Objectively the enunciation of Native 
Administration Policy set the Government and the Mis- . 
sions, particularly the Italian ...Roman Catholic,, on a, 
definite collision course. Instructed by the Govern­
ment right from the time of the conquest that their 
work in the pagan areas ^nd the South in particular); 
was essentially of a.civilising nature, Missionaries 
found the policy: 6f _.encouraging a return to tribal;; 
life incomprehensible. After all, the form of 
civilisation they were propagating with vigour was none 
other than*Western.! In this respect progress of some : 
sort had been made, especially among the docile' and 'less 
turbulent tribes.: Almost of a hudd.en they were told 
../that henceforth. the: kind .of education they .were-to give, 
the natives should ■tend to foster tribalism. In pur-: 
suance !. of this policy : District Commissioner -of the Western
1. Governor Equatoria (yery Secret); 29 April 1941, to 
District Commissioner Equatoria* SvGiA. EP/SCR/l-.B. 1.
2... The Sudan.. :A record : of Progress l898-1947 * Sudan 
Government" Publication, c ; * „ f 1
District of Bahr el. Ghazal suggested that the Missions 
should be instructed to baptise with tribal, names. ”l 
do: not see why a native convert should not be just as 
good a Christian by retaining his own name as he should 
be by giving him a foreign one.” If such customs were 
allowed to continue indefinitely there was a real 
possibility of everyone in the Western District and the 
Wau area being possessed;of foreign (Italian) names in 
a not so distant future, which did not fit in at all 
well with the declared policy of Tribal Adriiihistra- 
tion. Failing to check this undesirable practice, the 
District Commissioner argued that the natives might 
lust as well be allowed to keep their Arabic names;-
His other point with reference to tribal cus­
toms was about marriage. He found deplorable the rigid 
missionary practice whereby a couple married by the 
Catholic Mission were/are not allowed divorce under 
any circumstances. .He thought this contrary to the 
principle of Tribal law of certain tribes whereby a 
divorce was invariably granted If-proof of cruelty 
against the husband was produced. He suggested 
instead that i:he people be married by their own 
.Tribal Laws and customs and thought it immaterial 
whether or not these marriages were actually carried 
out in villages or in a Church provided tribal rites 
only were adhered to. Finally, he proposed the aboli­
tion of Marriage Certificates issued by the Italian 1
1. District Commissioner Western District to Governor 
Bahr el Ghazal, 17 January.■■■1932 (Confidential),
B.G.P./WD/SCR/l/C-l S.G.A. Khartoum.
Catholic Missions as he was doubtful if this was the
standard practice in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* Egypt
1 ■ or Great Britain-. •
Southern Policy, is better seen and adequately 
.explained in the context.'of native administration policy 
and its corrolary of educational development in the 
Southern Sudan. By indirect rule strategy the Govern­
ment hoped to rule the country.through indigenous 
.institutions (natural or artificially created for the 
'purpose) under the supervision of a British District 
Commissioner. In the Southern Sudan this implied not 
only the preservation of traditional customs, usage and 
'beliefs of the people but also the,elimination of : 
foreign Arab.influences coming from the North* As , 
these Northern influences were widespread and endemic 
in certain areas of the South, the adoption of a 
definite line of policy was necessary to check their 
further advance or to eliminate them altogether. The 
need for trained local personnel for minimum administra­
tive requirements necessitated cooperation between 
Government and Missions in the educational field.
This in turn forced the question of language into 
prominence and led the Sudan Government to ask them­
selves whether Arabic should continue to be used as 
the linga franca of the South.
1. District Commissioner Western District to Governor 
Bahr el Ghazal, 17 January 1952, (Confidential)
S.G.A. BGP/WD/SCR/l/C-1.
The issue as regards languages was dealt with 
by the Civil Secretary and the Secretary for Education 
^respectively, in 1928. Mr. MacMichael argued very 
forcibly that to encourage* or permit, the spread of 
Arabic in the South would, serve to promote the spread 
of Islam, ” ... the spread of Arabic among the negroes 
: of the South means the spread of Arab thought, Arab 
culture, and, Arab religion ... n If that were to 
;happen, he reasoned, then the zone in which Moslem 
fanaticism with its attendant dangers was endemic 
iWould tend to increase with the addition of an 
equaily large and populous area which was originally 
non^Moslenh It was his unswerving belief that such 
;a development rendered the poorest of services to the 
Southerners themselves. Admittedly, Islam was on a 
higher plane than the corresponding cultures. Never­
theless; Mohammedanism was, in his opinion, a stereo-
{typed; it was stationary and therefore retrograde in
k/\
tendency. More serious still, Islamic religion and 
Its attendant culture were intellectually crippling 
to, the mind and if Southern Sudanese were to be pro­
vided with a direct window to the wider world Western .
; and Christian, .rather, than Oriental and Islamic, 
civilisation offered a better prospect for the moral, 
cultural and intellectual advancement of these pagan 
peoples./ MacMichael also believed that the negro in 
general adopted Islam only as a potent form of ju-ju 
well worth acquiring. The Secretary for Education,
1. Civil Seeretary/s Memorandum on nArabic and the
Southern Sudan’’, 10th August 1928 (Secret), P.0071/13865*
having traced the reasons-which had led the Arabic "
language to occupy the position it had come to hold
i.e. as a lingua franca of the South, concluded,that
in, any case the idiom in vogue was ,,"a vile jargon”,
almost unintelligible ■ toj^a^ p.ersori'i;wi%h a 'knowledger of
the .true language. By way^ of illustration he,cited
the following example taken 'from<a blackboard-ih3a
little police -station schoqh:in Amadi, -Mongalla i *
Province-:- ‘,r- -/" - ..1. -v
"Matar fi sanada katir kalashi;:nas bita 
;Beledi Morn iso Duru katir kalashii Kamafti . 
Bara Yei ma.mile katir % Lakini sana ; ■«:
alifato Zamani matar bita Uwa ma ahzili: 
katir--ze matar fi sanada;.kani Bara Yel ma 
m i1 a, A1 i shani mat ar ma: ahz e 11 >- kat ir•. ■ , r. 
Kabiri bita Mudiria Mongalla egi Ombari ; 
fi Amadi alashani sof^Beledi/bit Uwa, kolo „ 
ma nas, bita Uwa-ma Markaze, bit Uwa.":,‘
This Nilotic Arabic;, Mr. Mathews, argued, represented a
bastard form4of Arabic and being:neither: the language
of the administrator hop of those whom:he governed; it
would tend to deteriorate still further. Unless it /
was unlearned by all parties concerned and a freSh
start made, he summed upv it could,not.afford a suit-;
able means of commimication. He- suggested instead
that every encouragement should be given to the
officials to learn the local vernaculars and where
the. use of vernacular was‘ impossible,.-English should.
take the place of Arabic. . "Then",?he concluded, - "one
party would always be speaking his own language (and
one hopes that it would usually be the native) and
there would be some hope.of a standard being maintained
, ■ " ‘I
instead of a language which is foreign to both ... "
• Thev general conclusion to be drawn from, these memoranda 
was that on political, educational religious and admini- 1 
strative grounds it was felt desirable that Arabic as.a 
- general language or language of.intercommunication 
should disappear from ;the Southern provinces. Southern 
..Policy was the strategy adopted for the realisation of 
this. goal.
The Administrationf s fear of what it regarded 
. as disruptive effects of Northern Islamic influences on 
the pagan population was greatly reinforced by 
experiences in the Nuba Mountains which was in many res­
pects similar to the Southern Sudan. Owing to the:' 
proximity of the Nuba Mountains, to the North, but 
largely due to the success of cotton-growing,
: "civilisation” was rapidly spreading in these mainly 
pagan areas. There had been a cotton ginnery at 
Kadugli in early; ,1930 s and by 1937 another one: was 
completed at Dilling, a Government post thirteen miles 
from the nearest mission station. Money was gradually 
taking the place of sheep and cattle as a means of 
exchange. The young.men drifted north to large urban 
centres such as El Obeid.and Omdurman in search of job 
opportunities^or driven there by the :spirit of adven­
ture. As a result "They returned sophisticated, spoiled, 
and contemptuous of anything, but money-making,, clothes,
1. Memorandum by Secretary for Education and Health on 
nArabic and the Southern Sudan" (Confidential), .
24th June 1928 (En Route to Cairo), E.0.371/13865.
and the longing . .to read and-write; they are fascinated 
by all the. novelties they see." It was against the. 
disruptive effect contacts with the Northern Sudan 
might have upon tribal life in the South that the Sudan 
Government attempted to erect a barrier
between the two sectors of the country by the device 
of Southern Policy.
Southern Policy was launched with the.know­
ledge and full backing of H.B.M's Government in London. 
The view the Foreign Office shared with the authorities 
in Khartoum was * that the containment of the Southward 
.Spread of Islam was necessary. To encourage or permit, 
the spread of Arabic in the South did not only involve 
the spread ofIslam but that it had a further, political 
implication already alluded to by Mr. MacMichael. "As 
a result", the Foreign Office maintained,
"the cleavage between the negroid areas of 
the Southern Sudan and the Arab regions in the 
North of the country will tend to diminish.
' * The Northern Sudan already has a certain cul­
tural and religious connexion with Egypt oh 
its northern frontier, and it is not altogether 
fantastic to suggest that the extension of 
s. Islam and the Arabic language might ultimately,
perhaps generations hence, make an inevitable 
fusion of the whole area from the Mediterranean 
to the Great Lakes into a single political
unit.
1. "The Open Door of Nuba: Mountain", part II, In The 
Church Missionary Outlook, vol.-64, No. 755> Feb. 1937*
pp. 27-2 9.
2. F.O. Minutes (by Mr. Patrick) on Lord Lloyd's Memorandum 
on "Education and Language in the.Southern Sudan",- 
1st-July 1929, F.O. 371/13865. . • ■
There was, however, one dissenting voice who thought
that Islam.represented to the negroid races 'some
measure of ethical culture, perhaps, ”the highest type
of culture they Will ever be capable of assimilating.”^
He did not think Christianity would ever be susceptible
of effective assimilation by the Nilotic tribes. This
is:because for the Nilotics, neither Christianity nor
Mohammedanism appeared superior and therefore more
attractive than their pagan beliefs.
In taking stock of Southern Policy it is
most appropriate to quote once more the observation
of District Commissioner Western District, Equatorial
Province who wrote:
” . the. most disappointing aspect of the
workings of Southern Policy is the failure 
to produce in ten years any Southern staff 
trained for executive work. That Southerners 
are fitted for such work may not be doubted
• • •  2
The annual (later biennial) progress report submitted 
to the Foreign Office by the Governor-General goes a 
long way to substantiate this charge. The following 
table^ gives the percentage of non-Muslims to the 
total Government staff :-
1. Mr. Patbick of the Foreign Office was the lonely 
voice.
2. District Commissioner Western District to Governor 
Equatoria (Secret), 30th June 19^1* S.G.A.
. "EP/WD/SCR/l-a-l. '
-3. Seventh Progress Report by the Governor-General on
educational and Administrative policy for the Southern 
Sudan (Secret), 10th March 1938, "Despatch No. 3l/l"C-l. 
F.0'.3ti/21999‘
(aV Administrative 19^0 1932 . 1934 1956 1958
Total Government staff 64 57 54 , 52 ,50
, Non-Muslims 48 43 . 44. 4?, : 41
Percentage of.Non-Muslims 15%
 ^
■
CMCO 53%
m 
■
OJCO 75$ ,
(b) Clerical.,
Total Government staff ill 160 147 148 159
Non-Muslims , . ' ' 36 . 72 78 85 100
Percentage of Non-Muslims 3 2.% 45$ 54$ ■ 31% 65$ =
(c) Technical
Total Government staff ■ „ 24-5 175 22 6 228
Non-Muslims r 118 •77 94 106
PercentageLof Non-Muslims - 48$ 44$ 41$ 46.5$
The Governor-General observed that even.the apparent’ 
increase in the proportion of Aon-Muslim Administrative 
and technical staff is misleading due to the replacement 
where possible of Northern Muslim staff by such northerners 
as Copts and Syrians as Southern-born and Southern trained 
men were still hard to come by,, To account for the 
slight decrease in the percentage of non-Mohammedan 
technical officials to the total employed he pointed 
to the fact that~medical officers* for instance," were, 
all natives of the Northern Sudan and that there was 
no chance of their quick" replacement; the necessity to 
employ them in the Southern provinces would have to
157.
1continue almost indefinitely.
The number of northern Sudanese traders 
operating in the South was given as follows :-
1932 1934 1936 1938
466 435' 411 394 ,
The Governor-General reported that the liquidation of 
the- Northern Gellaba merchant could only proceed by 
gradual stages. Most of them had been long established 
in the. South and many were of irreproachable character 
and ."dictates of, equity and just administration forbid 
anything like a wholesale eviction”. Individual mer­
chants were evicted only on conviction of bankruptcy
V''i"
or misdemeanour. The Civil Secretary himself had 
warned his Field Administrators that adequate ground 
for eviction of Northern traders was necessary in case
they were required to answer any complaints or
11 : ' 2 inquiries from interested quarters in Khartoum.
The use of English as a lingua franca for the 
Southern Sudan made only a limited progress. By con­
trast, the use of Arabic, particularly in the Upper 
Nile Province and at Juba, tended to spread mainly 
' through the"medium of Northern merchants and of Arabic- 
speaking officers and Northern officials, particularly
1. Sixth Progress Report by Governor-General on educational 
policy for the Southern Sudan, Enclosure in Sir Lampson 
to Mr. Eden, l8th April 1956, (No. 432. Secret), F.O. 
407/219.
2. Seventh Progress Report by Governor-General, op. cit.
of the Medical and Public Works Departments, who were , 
in daily contacts with native labourers and hospital 
patients. Although a "barbarous patois and a debased 
coinage,” this form of Arabic was1 in currency, i Like 
pidgin English, it was of doubtful educational value 
and had little religious,; or cultural, significance".
.However, the fact that it waS still making rapid 
.progress despite official sanction was adequate 
reflection of the failure of Southern Policy.
Progress was also -slow in the use of English as the 
language of education and for the .police and mili­
tary forces so that words of command in the forces
1 ' * were still given in Arabic. ; ,
In summary, Southern Policy may1 have 
strengthened or reinforced Southern:resistance to 
Moslem influences but it failed to instil in the 
Southerner a feeling of belonging to something bigger 
and higher than the tribe. If this was the set objec­
tive of the Administration,.-it was not necessarily in 
the best interest of the South. Down to the end’ .of 
,the Second World War the Southern Sudan acquired no .. 
.constructive personality of its own, nor had there 
been any progress made. It had all been for thelSouth 
a period of mark.time in the fields of. both education 
and economic development.
In its application, Southern Policy sounded 
• implausible indeed. In order to block the South from
1.. Sixth Progress Report by GovernOrrGeneral on educational 
: policy^for the Southern Sudan,• Enclosure in Sir Lampson
to Mr. Eden, 18th April 193&? ( N o 4^2. Secret), "E.G. 
407/219. '
Northern (Islamic),influences would have necessitated 
administrative scope that was out of the question In 
context: it would have cost a lot of money (which was 
not available) and could only have, been implemented 
by a huge administrative staff (which was not there 
either). Politically, Southern Policy had left a big 
question mark over, the relation between the North and 
the South by the time it was revoked in 1946,. .
CHAPTER V
' MISSIONARY EDUCATION AND
ADMINISTRATION POLICY 1926-46
... tiny.creatures in a remote bush school 
growing up with the idea that reading and 
writing and arithmetic are, part of the 
normal human heritage, not esoteric, nor 
alien, to their African life;, girls imbibing 
the ideas of cleanliness and hygiene, venti­
lation and.healthy diet, at a mission school; 
technical apprentices learning trades that 
will enable them to hold their own in the 
economic life of the world
The history of education in the Southern Sudan 
is closely bound up with that of the Missionary Societies 
who were permitted to carry out evangelical work in the 
non-Muslim areas of the Sudan following the establishment 
of the Condominium, Missionary education was, however, 
greatly influenced by .Government Administrative policy.
. Until 1926. no definite policy for the South was devised.
, The strategic need to control the Nile Valley had neces­
sitated the pacification of the Nilotic tribes, a task 
which was not fully accomplsihed until the Nuer Settle­
ment of 1929-51•• Financially the South was more of a 
liability than an asset to its British conquerors. The 
account of the Sudan Government itself did not balance
"until 1913 during which period it was subsidized from 
2.Egypt.' In the meantime Government educational, policy
. i. Julian Huxley, Africa View (London 1932), p. 318.
2. The amount of the annual subsidy frbm 1925 was 
£.E.750,000 and remained so up to the 1940s.
for the South assumed a more or less negative character 
and missionary societies were left to experiment with 
the most elementary form of education.
Chapter eighteen of Administrative Regula­
tions of 1,93 3' sets .out,in stringent terms the rules1 
governing the; work'of missionary societies operating 
in the Southern; Sudan. The missionary societies 
involved in educational work in the Southern Sudan 
were: the Verona Fathers Mission (Austrian and later, 
Italian Roman Catholic); the Anglican Church Missionary 
Society; the United^Presbyterian Mission; and-the 
Australian and New Zealand Sudan United Mission. To 
avoid; possible, competition and conflict arising, each 
:missionary society was allotted a "sphere” of influence 
within which"to operate. At first the Americans were 
given the Abyssinian border, the Roman Catholics the 
Bahr el; Ghazal province, and ..the Church Missionary 
Society, Upper Nile. Mongalla province also went to the 
C;,M.S. save for the western portion of the Zande district 
based on Wau which.Was part of the Roman Catholic sphere. 
The piece of territory on the east bank which ceded to 
the Sudan from Uganda in 1914 was declared an open 
sphere where both the C.M.S. and the V.F.M. had equal 
rights. / Later, considerable changes were made to 
this division. The Roman Catholic Mission was not 
new to the Southern Sudan. The first Roman Catholic 
Mission had, been founded,nearly half a century before
1. See Appendix IV.
2. See Appendix.IV.
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.the-Condominium period at londokoro in 1S49 but 
closed because of ill-health in 18.65* After the 
conquest the earliest Homan Catholic Mission stations 
were established at Kayango and Mbili (1904) and Wau 
(1909) in the Bahr el Ghazal and in Equatoria at Rejaf 
(1919)- Protestant Missions were also founded by the 
Church Missionary' Society in Upper Wile at Malakal in 
1906 and in Mongalla at Yambio in 1913* Yei 1917* at 
Juba 1920, in Maridi and Yambio in 1924. The American 
Mission started work in the Sobat river area of Upper 
Wile province in 1902 and the Sudan United Mission 
also commenced work in the same province among the 
Dinka in 1912*' The Roman Catholic Mission were also
. able to open stations in the ,fopen -sphere M at Torit
L o . ► * • . *
and In 1920; Nagichot and Topotha in 1924; Lerus
in 1925* Isoke and Okaru in 1926 and 1929 .^  Thence­
forth whenever peace and security prevailed and human 
resources forthcoming* fresh stations were added here 
and there by the Missionary bodies. The point to 
remember is, however, that Missionary Societies in
. the South were often branches cf their Northern head­
quarters . The ..RevL, H. Gwyhne for instance super­
vised- the work in the Southern Sudan as well-as at 
Khartoum.
in the Southern Sudan wherever a mission 
station was f ounded an elementary - school sprang up at 
the same site-.. This was the f oundation of the Southern 
education system. Whereas in the Northern Sudan the
1 7 Sudan Government, Equatoria Province Handbook, Vo1. 1, 
Mongalla (cOmpiled ‘by L'.', F . Nalder, 1 9 3 6 ) p7 97.
Government took the initiative to set up schools for 
the education of the "sons of leading men, the heads of 
villages'and heads of districts, 11 in the Southern Sudan 
the teaching and learning of the Gospel constituted the 
principal motive for the inception of a most rudimen­
tary type of education. Lord Kitchener had intended 
Khartoum to be the centre, of the education system the 
Government was to. launch. When, therefore, on 8 
November 1902, the Gordon Memorial College was . 
inaugurated the foundation for a steady expansion of 
education in the Northern Sudan was safely laid. For 
an indefinite period.the Southern Sudan was hot to 
partake■in the Government scheme, Government educa­
tional efforts were.also supplemented by those of the 
missionary bodies. . In keeping with Lord Cromer's 
religious, policy of 1904 as reaffirmed by Kitchener in 
1911* missionary work in the Northern Sudan was confined . 
to social services namely medical and educational.^ The 
effect,of the dual system of Government as well as non- 
Government schools had been the enhancement'of educa­
tional progress in the North vis a vis the South.
In the Southern Sudan itself missionary educa­
tional endeavours.ran into innumerable difficulties 
almost\ froit the start. 1 To begin with the intolerable 
climatic conditions,; the absence of roads coupled with’ 
the extremely poor,state of communication exercised- 
Inhibiting factors to missionary enterprise as a whole.
.1. The Anglo-Egyptlan Sudan from within, edited by 
j'.‘ A'.' de C. Hamilton,' (London,' 1935) PP• 34l-42.
Endemic tropical diseases, notably malaria and black 
water fever > took their toll of missionaries1 lives. 
Linguistic,,;difersitSr'ithe absence of cultural homo­
geneity and lack of, a literary tradition all consti­
tuted a formidable enough task to any educational 
efforts. The nature of the Southern Sudanese them- 
1 seiyes.raised,Up.another wall against educational 
. endeavours., "Most; of the Southern tribes were trans- 
humant pastoralists or practioners of shifting culti­
vation. ih: either cas^ they were only barely touched 
by foreign.;external influences. The Dinka and Nuer in 
; particular appeared well contented with their self- 
contained* cattle economy; The cow was in fact the 
;be-all apd '-end-ali/'spf existence. Thus when urged to 
Send7their children to school their reply was, not
: .unexpectedly,, "who will look after the sheep and
' • 1  J - •, goats. 11 Predictably, missionary education took
roots among the sedentary agriculturalists where law
and, order was first established and.where the people
were more receptive to foreign ideas and influences.
It seemed a lot easier to capture the mind of someone
rooted to the soil than one on the move. Nevertheless,
it. took the missionary societies a great"deal of time
and effort to convince the Southern Sudanese of the
. value of Western education. Except in the Western
District of Bahr el Ghazal where the majority of the
' Chiefs were Mohammedans and where private individuals
were rtmning Koranic schools the-majority of the natives
1. L. M. Sanderson, Education in the Southern Sudan, 1900-
1948, Ph.D. thesis', (London 195b). """
■j
had little enthusiasm for education. Not until 
tangible material benefits could be shown to accrue 
directly from education did.sending, one 1s children 
to school become an attractive proposition.
The type of schools provided by the mis­
sionary societies were village or "bush" schools, 
elementary, intermediate and trade school. The schools 
were primarily for boys to which a:limited number of 
gir,ls could be admitted but if there was a sufficient 
number of girls wishing to attend they usually worked 
,separately in a single enclosure pending the provision 
of a permanent building. By 1926 there were 22 boys' 
elementary schools, 9 girls' elementary, 2 boys' inter­
mediate and 1.boys' trade school in the Southern Sudah. 
The bush schools or "out-schools", as the name implies, 
were usually located far from the mission stations and 
varied greatly in, size and standards. The better ones 
taught:the first' two years' syllabus of elementary 
school course, leading to an examination for entry 
into the third class, of the elementary school. These 
out-schools were on the whole'similar to the northern 
type of sub-grade school but employed various local 
vernaculars as the media of instruction. But unlike 
the sub-grade schools in the Northern Sudan every 
pupil; in a bush school could, if qualified, enter ah 
elementary school although many had not the inclination
1. Sudan Government, Anglo.-Egyptian Sudan Handbook Series,
1 - Bahr. el Ghazal' Provine e,' December' 1911, p. 45* "*
There-was at this time 27 sons of prominent Chiefs 
in the mission, school at Wau.
to do so at first. For the most part* however, the. 
bush schools were little;more than centres for instruc­
tion in reading the Bible in the local vernacular and.,
; ‘ 1 ... ' -r 
some form of rudimentary hygiene.
The elementary,schools ran a,four-year course 
similar to that in the North.but-English was often the " 
medium of instruction at least- in the higher classes.
The curricula, syllabuses and teaching methods varied 
depending upon -the organisation;of the individual 
mission concerned. In some cases the standard of 
English and arithmetic attained was higher than that ‘ 
of the Arabic and arithmetic of many Northern schools 
but the extent of general knowledge was appreciably 
less. A considerable amount of time was devoted to the 
teaching of the Christian religion.
The intermediate course for boys lasted sixl-Wu) 
years. English was the medium of, instruction for all 
subjects save religion, which was taught in the verna­
cular. Graduates from elementary and intermediate. ■,
schools taught in bush.schools and elementary schools 
respectively. As for the catechists the Roman 
Catholic Mission provided some training. The C.M.S. 
did not do so until a later date. There were for . 
girls village and.elementary schools only,' as there 
was little demand for girls' education during this 
early period. In view of the long, distances between 
the mission stations and the homes of the scattered
1. L. M. Sanderson, '’Educational Development in the 
Southern Sudan.1900-1948",: Sudan Notes and Records,;
* Vol. XLIII (1962), pp. 105-Irn ~  “
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population most or all pupils of both sexes, were 
boarders. The approach of missions to education in 
the Southern Sudan made considerable sense. The boys 
received instruction in the acquisition of simple 
technical skills such as elementary carpentry, brick­
laying and tailoring. The girls were taught health 
education, needlework and housecraft. In either case 
the missions were aiming at improving the general con­
ditions of the Southerners and helping them to fit into 
their changing environment. The Government was pleased 
with the mission approach on realising that they were
not after all concentrating all their time and efforts 
1on evangelism. The ground was now prepared for 
Government intervention.
Despite shortage of cash and trained teachers 
some progress was made. The Government recognised the 
achievement of the Missions in the field of education 
and especially in reducing the multiplicity of the 
Southern tongues into literary media using the Roman 
script. In January 1926 Mr. Crowfoot, then Director of 
Education, wrote a memorandum containing definite pro­
posals for subventions to. missions. An Inspector of 
Education for the Southern provinces was appointed and 
in the following year 18 elementary vernacular schools,
3 intermediate and 1 trade school were considered worthy 
of grants. The actual total grant in that year was 
£.E.3 ,650 and a second Inspector for Southern Education 
was appointed. The subventions to missions were given
1. Sudan Government, Memorandum on Educational Policy in 
the Southern Sudani (Khartoum, 30th May 1929)* F.O.371/
13865. “
subject to the 4 ollpwIngi<;geherai^ h-priclitions:
(a) that a European exercise uninterrupted • 
supervision over the school, and be with­
drawn from the station only in cases of 
sickness and home leave.
(b) that the syllabuses as laid down be 
adhered to.
(c) that,.the Resident. Inspector is satisfied 
with thelprogress'and efficiency of,the
, school .• '
/ (d) that If any of the conditions are unful­
filled the Resident Inspector may reduce 
or withdraw the grant for the following 
year. :
The establishment-of a system of annual subventions to 
mission schools opened up.a whole area of cooperation 
between Government'and Missions. At the same time the 
Government became directly concerned with the type and 
standard of education given in the schools. In return 
•for a small Government subsidy the missions undertook 
to train a limited number of Southern Sudanese to fill 
Government posts as clerks, accountants, and Chiefs 
Courts clerks. According to Sir John Maffey the 
Governor-General in 1929 the intermediate schools 
which had English as the language of instruction were 
s,primarily designed to meet the demands of Government 
employment and to train teachers for the elementary 
schools.n The system of regular inspection and
,1. Memorandum on Educational Policy, (1929)# op. cit.
supervision ensured that the, schools lived up to the ; 
standard required by the. Government.
‘ The Re jaf Languages Conference held in • 1.928 in
Mongalla province represented the’high water-mark of 
cooperation between; Governihent; and. Missions. Chaired
by the-’Secretary ;for Education' and Health, Mr.' Mathew,
' by the Missions
the conference was strongly represented The diffi­
cult question of which languages should be adopted as 
group languages1 for educational purposes was settled 
and a :uniform"orthography adopted. Proposals were 
also made for cooperation in the production of text­
books /and the adoption i)f a skeletal grammar, reading 
books-and primers for general use. Intimately.bound 
up with the issue of educational policy in the . 
Southern Sudan was,, the largely, political question of 
checking the southward spread of Islam from" the 
Mohammedan North involving as ;it did, the further 
question of what should be the lingua franca in the 
South. .Some form of. pidgin Arabic had served this 
purpose in the past. But' it was observed that Arabic 
was a, vehicle for Islam, the spreading of, which .was 
undesirable from, the points of view of both Govern­
ment and the Missions. , The Conference felt that as 
there were two-languages) to teach already, the local 
vernaculars and English* it was superfluous to add a ‘ -
1. The: languages eventually adopted were: Dinka,; Nuer,
Shi.lluk, Bari, Latuka and Zande.
2. Report of Proceedings^ Rejaf Language Conference, - 
1928 S.G.A. Khartoum1 ~
third. The Governor--General noted later with approval 
that "these results /the achievements of the Conference/ 
would not have been obtkined in the days when Government 
and Missions were as things apart. 1,1 '
He was right because it looked, as though at that 
point in time the two organisation ;shared a common interest. 
The Government educational policy for the Southern Sudan 
crystallised in the late nineteen twenties. Briefly, 
the policy aimed to utilise the existing Christian 
missions for educational purposes, to subsidise them 
in order to increase their efficiency; and to secure 
control over them, and, perhaps, later on, to found a 
Government secondary school. The alternative system 
of Government schools was ruled out as prohibitive of 
cost and therefore practically impossible at that time.
"Our subsidies," the Government maintained, "make an 
existing arrangement more efficient by enabling the 
Missions to procure better and more numerous staff and 
give us a control which it-would be almost impossible
o -
to exercise’without them." BUrthermore, the intro­
duction of another system even if it were practicable, 
it was argued, would not mean the disappearance of 
Missions from the Southern Sudan. They would still 
exist and would devote their energies to rapid prose­
lytising and to such education as they might think 
necessary to that end. The reduction or withdrawal of
1. Memorandum on Educational Policy, (1929)* op. clt.
2, Ibid.
Government subsidy would result in. a deterioration of 
staff and the introduction of other nationalities to
whom education and knowledge of the Southerners, let
* 1 alone Government aims, were secondary considerations.
The policy of subsidized misdion schools, 
however, caused Lord Lloyd (then British High Commis­
sioner in Cairo).considerable misgivings. Experiences
"I'. ’ - ' ,
in other African territories had shown that missionary 
education was generally ineffective and Government 
intervention with schools of its own became necessary. 
In Kenya, for instance, the Government, was compelled to 
open schools in certain districts. Similarly, in 
neighbouring Uganda where missionaries had had a free 
hand for some fifty years or so the results were no 
less unsatisfactory and the.Government had to assume 
control of education and open schools of their own.
The system of control by inspection and grants devised 
by the Sudan Government,he found equally insufficient. 
While appreciating the difficulties in the way of 
alternative policy of non-Mission schools, Lord Lloyd, 
was emphatic that these difficulties should be faced. 
Accordingly, he recommended.that officials in the 
Southern Sudan should be required, and encouraged, to 
learn the local languages and dialects; that every 
effort should be made by the. adoption of group lan­
guages to simplify the language problem; that the use 
of Arabic should be discouraged.and English gradually
1. Memorandum on Educational Policy, (1929)* op. cit.
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substituted for it as the language to be used where 
communication in the local vernacular-was impossible; 
and finally, he was insistent that one or two Govern™ 
ment schools should be established in selected 
localities to cope with the rising educational needs 
of the Southerners, He also warned against the 
dangers of a faulty policy in education above the ele­
mentary stage and expressed thd view that missionaries 
should not be entrusted with its direction or even be 
the chief agents of that/policy.^ His first three 
recommendations were in complete harmony with the 
views in Khartoum but not the last. In London, the 
Foreign Office were inclined to go along with the Sudan 
Government position that although the establishment of 
non-Mission schools was the ultimate objective, "for the 
time being the only thing to do is to. carry on, with 
missionary education*”
Through annual meetings and the work of the * 
Resident Inspector for Southern Provinces the Govern­
ment was able to exert pressure on missionary societies 
to improve educational standards. Occasional educational 
conferences^ also proved valuable in the approach to 
tackle common problems and in the exchange of ideas.
1. Lord Lloyd to Henderson (Residency Despatch No. 5&0,
. Confidential), June 1929* F.O. 407/209*
2. Foreign Office Minutes on Lord Lloyd's despatch, Ibid.
The first educational conference that was fully repre-:. 
sentative of the South, unlike the Annual meetings was 
held in Mongalla in 1933*
Schools were classified into sub-grade, elementary, . 
primary or intermediate, technical, agricultural and 
Industrial. Sub-grade schools were re-modelled to 
feed elementary.schools while a limited number of 
Southerners continued to go to Maker ere College, f- r'V 
Uganda, for secondary schools. English became the 
official language of the South and in 1945 an ASsis- . 
tant Director of Education was appointed to supervise 
educational work in the South with his headquarters at 
Juba in Mongalla Province. In 1955 there:were 5 inter­
mediate schools (the C ;M.S.. Loka intermediate school 
and the R.C.M. schools Okaru/and Bus sere); 55 boys' 
-elementary schools.with a total-attendance of 2,613;
11 girls''elementaryJand 5 trade schools (C.M.S. Loka 
school and R.C.M.' schools at Wau and Tor it. The Roman 
Catholic Mission were also running 2 teacher training 
colleges at Mupoi and Torit. In 1952 there were 265 
out-schools attended by 7*500 children.’*'
When a regular system of subsidies were 
first instituted, Sir John Maffey boasted that "The 
happy combination of missionary enterprise and ., 
experience, on the one hand, and of Government' aid, on 
the. other-,, should afford sure ground and opportunity 
for .the development of these-negroid and pagan "
1' • ' '■ p . -'
peoples," i.e. the Southerners. Clearly the
1 . The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, from Within, op. cit.,
. 3  \ 7 ~  ^ ““ >
2. Governor-General's Report for 1926, Sudan No. 2 
■ . 1(1927), Cmd. 2991, p. 8 .
development of education'for the following two decades 
did not bear out his prediction,. By 1938 there was 
exactly the same number of intermediate schools as in 
1928, namely 3 except that the attendance had 
increased from 130 to 300 boys. The 3 trade schools 
and-two teacher training colleges remained constant 
save for a slight increase in attendance. These 
figures were repeated in 1945* Q;f the 35-boys * elemen­
tary schools with 300 pupils only 24 i.e. 78 per cent 
were certified as efficient; and worthy of a grant.;
There were only l6;girls1 elementary schools mostly 
In Equatoria province some of which received subsi­
dies while over 600 village or sub-grade schools 1, 
received no grant at all although the, total atten- 
dance had risen to 151435* The low figure in .the 
number of schools was also reflected in the amount 
of Government subventions to missions. In 1927 the 
actual figure was £3*650 (not £3,800), in 1930 £7*925 '■*
while in 1936 there was only a slight increase bring­
ing the total to £10,035•2
During the great depression the Sudan Govern­
ment might have been excused'for,.not investing as much 
as she might have but; during the recovery years (1934-
38) which had been for the Sudan a.period of. budget
■5 ■
surplus, she had no excuse whatsoever. The ignorance
1.:; Equatorial Province ;Handbook, Vol.. II, op. cit. , p. 95 •
2. Foreign Office Memorandum on Education in the Sudan (by 
Mr. Scrivener), 4th June 1930, F.O,371/20150.
.3 . Governor-General1s Report for 1938, Sudan No. 1 (1939)
■ Cmd.6139* P* 7. '
and apathy of the Southerners during the early period 
may haveslackened, the urge to educational development. 
From:the' 1930s onwards there was a great demand-for 
education. In 1933 for,instance attendance at the 
American Presbyterian, the C.M.S. and the Roman 
Catholic Mission schools.was good and even the'
Nilotics were no longer afraid or' unwilling to send 
their children to school.. . Yet- during this period 
educational impetus had,slowed down.
Dissatisfied- with the Sudan Government !s 
educational record, the view -of the F.O,. by 1936 was 
that -the time had come to take stock of educational 
policy in the Southern Sudan.- The moment had certainly 
arrived, it was said, when the Sudan Government should 
"make a better show in facing its inevitable task by 
taling over from the Missionaries"or opening schools of 
its own. The Sudan Government was-accused of abdicating 
entirely to the missionaries, in the field of education.
In the words of one F.O. staff, "The Sudan Government 
Policy is dangerously like a moment along, the.path of 
least resistance and minimum expense”; and he warned 
that "they may have to pay heavily; one day." If the 
Sudan Government educational record was open to grave . 
criticism she was not prepared as yet to apply herself 
seriously and effectively to the problem of educational 
development in the South. The Governor-General, Sir S. 
Symes argued that the time was not as yet ripe for
1. Governor-General's Report for 1933* Sudan No. 1 (193^) 
: Cmd.4668, pp..137-8. '
2.. F.O. Memorandum. (1936), op. cit.
educational expansion although he admitted the "
, inadequacy of educational facilities in the Southern 
Sudan.^ The real danger of. allowing abdication in, 
favour of, mission; schools, ,as‘ theiP.O. . saw it>iwas . 
sthat it might:go too- far and continue too long.:'
After all, the,Italian missionaries predominated in 
the field of.education, which was politically.un­
desirable especially following the Italian invasion of 
Abyssinia and the-subsequent; expulsion: of British mis-, 
sionaries. The Sudan Government were also accused of 
violating one of;' the cardinal principles of British ■ 
Imperialism whereby the-1erritories administered by
H.M.’s Government were heldinvtrust- for the tative 
inhabitants . / ’'Unless -something ^ effective yis done in 
the near future," the' F.O.: maintained, *the Sudani 
Government will lay. themselves Open to fhe same 
criticism- as1 was ...levelled at Loird Cromer !.s "regime in 
"Egypt, namely that they have neglected the education 
of the natives .and'have,:<ihstead concentrated on jus.t 
and efficient Government. This was not, by any means, 
a far-fetched statement as there were other reasons for 
the adoption of lame duck.policy by the Sudan Govern­
ment regarding; education in the Southern Sudan.v . > "
,. The Sudan Government f s educational'policy in
1. Sudan Government, Memorandum on Educational Problems 
in the Sudan, (De spat eh No. 109, 50 th May 1936),
enc1osure in Lampson. to F. 0., F.0.371/20150
2. The F.O. was.pressing the Sudan Government to expel 
the Italian Missionaries from the Sudan in retaliation.
5. Vide the influential Foreign Office Memorandum on Educa­
tional Policy"of the Sudan Government (by Mr. Fink), 
iSth. September 195b. F.O.571/20150.
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the South is better explained if looked at in the 
light of its other, administrative, policy. "The 
dominant theme of Government policy has always been," 
said one critic (himself a former administrator): "do 
not detribalise: make each boy a better member of his 
tribe." The era of cooperation between Government 
and Mission was short-lived and many suggestions 
mostly aiming at the administration’s Ideals were not 
practised by the Missions. There was no open conflict 
as such, for it was in the interest of both parties to 
avoid one another as much as possible and the Govern­
ment confined its criticisms of Missions within the- 
covers of the secret files while it treated them in 
practice with spurious deference. The principle of 
Native Administration, as the Government saw it,
Implied that only the better class and better boys 
and not waifs and strays should be educated. Schools 
were started when there was no demand for education and 
chiefs tried out the unwanted boys. The results of 
thus educating boys with poor background had inevit­
ably been the production of detribalised elements, of 
the anti-tribal type. This had brought the schools 
especially in Nilotic areas into disrepute and better- 
class parents, notably the chiefs, refused to send 
their children to school. One snag for the Government 
was that the poorer type of boys could not be re-
1. J. B. Bowers, A Note on Mission and Education Policy in 
Upper Nile Province, (Secret) Khartoum, 14th February 19^2. 
Being a summary of educational ideals and ideas' in educa­
tional files, Malakal. The following information, unless 
otherwise stated, comes from the same source.
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absorbed into tribal life as leaders.of their people.
The findings of the Committee of the Malakal Conference 
: of 1942 had warned against this danger.
This touch of class bias; in educational prac­
tice 'was unacceptable to the Missionary Societies who, 
argued with some plausibility, that, frl. We have a 
Christian duty to waifs and orphans; 2. We cannot 
get the better boys .M The latter, point was especially 
ture of the Dinka (C.M.S.), Nuer (American Mission) and 
Shilluk (R.C.M.) where the use of schools as evangelising 
agencies to educate the children pf pagans away,, from 
their tribe aroused resentment and opposition from the 
parents. , One possible reason apart.from mere, suspicion, 
was that spiritual beliefs among these tribes were 
highly developed. 1 "
There was an inherent contradiction in the 
position adopted by Government and Missions. The 
primary; aim, of the; Education .Department in the Southern 
Sudin was defined as an attempt ”to fit the ordinary' 
individual /Southerner/ to fill a useful part in his 
environment, with happiness, to himself.” In pursuance, 
of this policy the educational conference held in Juba 
in April 1933 decided that the majority of the boys 
educated at Mission elementary schools would return to 
the tribe.- 'There was general agreement. that the system 
of education must be adapted to prepare them for this
1. C.G.d B.Z. .Seligman, Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic-Sudan 
(London 1932).
2, Quoted in the Ahglo-Egyptian Sudan from Within, op. cit.
p. 333.
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return and to enable, them to-use their acquired knowledge, 
however limited, for the benefit of themselves and their 
fellow tribesmen. •The Government also.sought- to limit 
post-elementary education to the. needs of Government trade 
. and' Mission employment on the ground /that "higher” educa­
tion encouraged detribaiisation.' ;Tha:iimited number of 
intermediate:; school-leavers was therefore dictated by 
opportunities for-absorption into Government service, 
teaching or other authorised profession. But mission 
educatibn --implied, almost, by definition, detribaiisation. 
The very practice of the-; C.M.Sand I.R.G. missions of 
giving converts or schoolboys foreign Christian names 
was in subtleieonfliet-with the ideals:of making each'" 
boy a, better member of his society and fitting him for 
tribal life... The practice necessarily set up the Church 
or Missions as an .antithesis’ of the .tribal culture;;'.
From native administration point of,view, f,Loka and'Bussere 
intermediate schools were turning, outwaste products to 
the Upper Nile.” Paralleling this development was the , 
fadt;that already* na considerable draft of half-educated 
potential: (political) malcontents had gravitated to
fMalakaliand’ other^principal Southern towns” by the early
- ■ ■ ■ : • t  ,, "  - • ■ - ' ' ' . . .
forties. : u.- .... . . '
■ . Both .Governments and Mission were, well aware
that any development of higher education in the/South
must accompany the general economic, cultural and \
' i.-Governor-General^s Report for 1933, Sudan;No. .1 (1934), 
/ Cmd.4668, pp. 137.-8 . ‘ r.
. 2. J . B. Bowers,= op * cit. ; ; .
3 . ibid. ;/; ‘ '
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educational progress of the Southern, tribes. But this 
was impossible to achieve while native administration 
policy was in vogue and Government education policy was 
. pushed to the,1 extreme of ; requiring younger age of entry 
into'elemehtary school so that boys might return to 
tribal, life ^before initiation. It was.not that the 
filssions were not doing their job prpperly either.
The Governor-General,1 Sir Stewart Symes, himself paid 
them, tribute when, in 1937.» he wrote: - f,The. Missionary 
Societies have carried on their educational work'
. stea,dily and to the best of their ability,1 and have 
continued to render valuable assistance in the produc­
tion, of, text -books and grammars in the local group 
languages.,r ‘ From this statement it may be inferred 
that the missions had-done what was within...their means 
but that' the responsibility for lack of expansion in 
education, particularly post-elementary, rested squarely 
with the'Government. As a matter of fact, with the 
educational ceiling thus fixed, the brighter boys who 
did not wish to take up Government jobs or return to 
tribal life often opted for seminary schools in prepara-
’ " ption for priesthood. If he failed or changed his mind 
at any^stage he was competent enough to. teach in mission 
-schools. The practice was fairly common, especially in 
later years, among pupils of the Roman Catholic Mission
1. Governor-Generalfs Report for 1937* Sudan No. 1 (1938), 
Cmd.5895, p. 33.
2,. The Protestant Missions had a different, recruitment 
- pattern.
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schools. The R.C. Missionaries themselves often showed 
.special interest in, and encouraged, the more intelli­
gent- of their pupils with the view to-persuade them to 
heed. the. "call" of God.
Some British.Field staff at the district level 
realised, the difficulty of total reliance on missionary - 
education to.deliver the goods of the quality and 
quantity demanded by Government employment*. Granted 
that the Missions were primarily religious institutions 
their opposition to the Government policy of native 
administration was inevitable. The Field staff were . 
in agreement with the Central.Government policy that 
frr Negroid Africa, education must be confined to. the 
few but that these few, in virtue of their training, 
were going to obtain immense-power over their unedu­
cated brethren and it was essential that they should 
be carefully selected. Unfortunately for the Adminis­
tration, it was impossible to realise this objective 
within the framework of subsidised missionary educa­
tion. "The drawback to mission schools as opposed to 
purely educational schools," it was pointed out, "is 
that the Missions are out to break the indigenous 
customs, traditional usage and beliefs of the natives 
..." The inescapable inference was that secular or 
Government schools should be opened- where future 
-administrative staff (sons of Chiefs) and clerical 
staff, could be educated without becoming detribalised.
1, District Commissioner Northern District; to Governor
Bahr el Ghazal> (n.d.?) (Strictly confidential) S.G.A./.
BGP/ND/SCR/l/C/1. • „ ; f
It-as difficult not to accept this conddusion; as,; : ;' 
apparently, one could not 'possib'ly^^eac^the •Gdj3p'el - 
(or indeed ? the Koran) ;.in! Southern Sudanese - schools at' 
that time and hope that somehow or other the outcome f 
Would he- something other, than detribaiisationf . ;.
SoutherhdjPolioy entailed, that .Southern - .
Sudanese boys should ft® >educated to' liil ’ admini‘stra-t * ;
: live, clerical'andtftechnical podts ih-the South.in 
-place.of the Northern’personnel, iet as late as 19^2 
the number of boys: passing put of the intermediate-' 
schools still,fell far short of Government target. :• In 
his 1958 progress^ report on educational .andi;-adminIstra-; 
tive policy in force in the Southern SUdan the Governor- , 
General admitted:that the difficulty; of turning products 
from the intermediate; . schools into: efficient clerks, ; 
book-keepers;, orf technicians wasta formidable- one;; that 
the percentage of Southerners among the staff could 
only increase gradually and pari passu with -increased 
results from missionleducations He also noted-'thht>: 
teaching was mainly in the hands? of Italian, missipnaries,‘ 
whose English was limited and inadequate. "Until:a . 
larger staff of better.qualified teachers is ayallable,” 
he concluded,; "progress will nqt. be rapid;. n ^  Despite'. S 
this, wise remark, v the Government made; no ..effortltp open , 
intermediate and technical schools of its-own., The 
only; Government school that ever'existed in the South 
during this period was the Stack Memorial school at Wau
1. GovernoriGeneral * s Report -for: the years 1942.,- to.:.i9^ >
Parliamentary - Papers, Sudan :No .. 2. (19501 cmd.8098, p .125.
2. Seventh Progress Report by.the Govenor-General on Education 
. and Administrative Policy in the Southern Sudanj(Secret),
10th ‘March,1938». Despatch No.. 31/1.0.11 - F .0.371/21999 * ' ,
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opened in December 1927, for the sole purpose of training 
clerks and book-keepers, but closed towards the end of 
1930. On re-opening in 1931 it was merged into the 
Roman Catholic Intermediate school situated at Bussere.
It has been suggested that during the period under 
review Government educational policy aimed at improving 
the standard rather than quantitative expansion in 
elementary and intermediate education. This may "now 
appear to have been short-sightedness on the part of 
the Sudan Government on account of its neglect of the 
education of the Southerners during,a most crucial 
period, ,
If better-class children were to be educated ’ 
for their future role of leadership it; follows logi-~ 
cally that there should have been created an exclusive 
school.designated ’for sons of chiefs’. But this 
aristocratic idea of education implied rapid advance 
towards Westernisation of some kind, a feature which . 
was inconsistent with the policy of native administra­
tion prevalent in the Southern Sudan. The ill-effect 
of•indirect rule on educational advancement in the 
Sudan came under severe criticism by Mr. (later Sir)
James Currie, a former Director of Education and. Health 
to the Sudan Government, thus:
As devised by men of the type of Cromer and 
Lugard, Wingate and Slatin, and developed’ 
by Cameron and Gowers, (indirect administra­
tion) was a fine conception. .But to utilise
1, An ’Etonian' type school existed in former Tanganyika 
at Tabora; see J. Huxley, Africa ¥lew (London, 1932-),
p. 9 6.
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it as an excuse for closing down educational 
development is; to pervert it, and this is 
-what is oc curing.-^
In fairness to the, Sudan Government it must be 
stressed that shortage of cash and the necessity to 
check Islamic penetration of the South vere the real 
hindrances to the establishment ;0f a . system of purely ' 
secular education under Government management. As a 
result of these considerations the administration 
found itself compelled "to steer a course between the 
Scylla of a possibly hostile European Nationalist ' 
penetration by Italian.personnel and the Charybdis of. 
a.pernicious and obscurantist form of Islam which 
would present itself quickly in the region if '
Christian endeavour at this stage was:seriously , 
relaxed."^ - ,
There can be little doubt that the administra­
tion felt that Mission education, dominated by Italian 
missionaries and however inadequate, was a lesser .evil, 
than Islamic propaganda.in the South; hence:the continua­
tion of Southern Policy and reliance on Mission education.
Prom the- late thirties the Sudan Government - 
became more amenable to P.O. pressure, apd to attempt , 
a closer examination of missionary education. The De 
La.Warr Report of 1937 (though not specifically con- 
cerned with, the South) underlined the urgency for
1, J. Currie, ’'The Educational Experiment in the Anglo- 
Egyptian Sudan 1900-1933” • Journal of, the African 
Society, Vol. '33* Nof 4, ■ 1934-5» P,P» m
2. S. Symes to M. Lampson, Khartoum Despatch No. 145 
(46.A.1) of 7th December 1937, F.O.371/21998.
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■  educational reform'in .the Southern Sudan. The Commis-,
■  sion attributed the disappointing results of Southern 
education to .the. following factors:
I  (i) lack of sufficient trained personnel
_ (ii) . iapk of proper organisation and plan-
■  ning
■  (ill) the absence of a common language for
vernacular education. .•
I  While recommending the development of educa­
tion within, the existing Mission framework, it also :
I  expressed the view that Mission, educators:should be
m  trained at the London'Institute of Education or. obtain . •
an, equivalent Diploma elsewhere. The Report also 
I  pointed out the insistent demand among the educated
Sudanese for the' immediate expansion of educational 
|  facilities to enable the introduction of Southerners
H  to secondary schools in the North. 1
®  In 193.7 Mr. Cox, the; Director of Education - •
■  ■ went out ‘to-the South on an inspection tour of Mission
schools. The Report he submitted to the Sudan:
I  Government on his vreturn was described by,the British
High Commissioner in Cairo as of-"considerable interest >
I  I'-: ,,P -
■  land importance* ,. It furnished increased proof of the
■  danger, both political and educational, of allowing the 
Italian Catholics to'continue to dominate Southern
I  education. It re-affirmed the.charge that the result
■  l.*Lord De-La Warh Commission Report 1937 (Sudan Govern­
ment, Khartoum) but see F.O.371/21998.
I  , 2. M. Lampson to A. Eden, Cairo Despatch No. 30 (33/3/33)
"  of 11th January 1938, P.0.371/21993.
J   ; / >  .. ...........
of missionary evangelical and educational work as a 
whole was quite, inimical to the official policy of ■ 
native administration. - "The preservation, development 
and transformation of potentially valuable native 
customs," he wrote, ’'does notappear to have a place 
among the aims "or methods of the Missions . I1 .The 
charge applied equally to aLl missionary societies, 
whether British or Italian, Protestant or Catholic.
The Report pointed out that in the particular case of 
the Italian Catholic missionaries, nationality and 
upbringing debarred them from the possibility of: 
appreciating the ideals of the Government policy. 
Illustrative of the Fathers* disregard of the dangers 
of detribaiisation was cited an article In the Bussere 
Messenger dealing with the wearing of charms and on 
tribal usage in which readers were urged' that 
"Christianity is now your: tribe."
In assessing the relative achievements of the 
leading Missions in the South, it must, be pointed out 
that the Italian Roman Catholics were, better, organised 
and better, equipped in terms of both money and man­
power. They had a better educational (and evangelical) 
record than their Protestant competitors. The explana­
tion, according to one observer lay in the fact that 
apart from shortage of cash, the C.M.S. officials were 
simply "too individualistic, too bothered by the anxieties 
of wives and children resulting in the poor education
1. Quoted in Mr. Cox's "Memorandum on Educational
Development in the Southern Sudan". S, G.
(Khartoum, 1937)* ■ 1
■ " . ''' ' ■' ' " -"V'.' 187.
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performance.” The individualisticapproach;/of the 
C.M.S. to both education and evangelisation alsb tended 
to discriminate against their boys seeking office employ­
ment. On Cox's findings, employers with experience of 
boys trained by both leading Missions appeared to. prefer 
the more disciplined and amenable Catholic boy to the 
. more independent Protestant. C.M.S,. education, with its 
emphasis upon initiative tended to develop qualities 
of conceit and unreliability in its receiver. Catholic 
education was not without its drawback either; it seemed 
to have failed to encourage the training of leaders and 
; the development of a sense of responsibility. The "
Resident Inspector' wrote that he knew of no- native who 
had ever received training for a post of even minor 
responsibi1ity in the Catholic Mission.: ,The Verona 
Fathers simply liked to have all authority concen­
trated in their hands, leaving little or.no scope for
’. , : o '■delegated responsibility to the natives.
The techniques of recruitment to Mission
; education also differed widely; the method adopted by
the Catholic-Mission being the. less fair and less
preferable from the point of view of Government policy.
In almost all Catholic Mission stations elementary , -
.education was conditional upon acceptance of the Faith.
Cate'chumenates furnished excellent recruiting centres,
, and vacancies in schools tended to be filled by promising
catechumens. In one school visited, all the; pupils were
1. J . Robertson - R. C . May all, (Private) 19 th May 19^* 
F.0OTl/4l36p. . ■ u ' . ■" . '
2. Mr.. Cox's "Memorandum on Education in the Southern 
Sudan”, op. cit.
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Catholics and in others all but a few in their first 
year. In marked contrast, the technique of the. Protes­
tant Mission often called for long schooling and ,
vigorous tests, educational and financial,, prior to 
baptism. Mr, Cox had not the slightest doubt‘.that the. 
recruitment pattern of Catholic 'education' constituted 
one principle cause of failure of that Mission with the 
Nilotics, the largest tribal group in the Southern Sudan. 
Presented with the simple choice of Catholicism or con­
tinuation in illiteracy, the- Nilote naturally opted for . 
the latter.
•The most serious side to continued Catholic 
education of the Southerners revolved around the poli­
tical implication of the almost exclusively Italian . 
personnel. \The point has been made)that the Italian U
missionaries as a whole had little sympathy with the 
Government or its officials., Granted that the majority ; 
of Government officials in the South were Protestants, 
it was felt inappropriate and undesirable that the; ;. 
natives should'be taught by their Catholic masters:that 
"the District.,Commissioners, and other authorities will 
be damned eternally in Hell fire.” According to Sir 
M. Lampson, the British Ambassador in Cairo, "it Is
1. The author was among the lucky few to escape the six- 
month routine course in catechism in preparation for 
baptism. He was.baptised in 1953 in,the third year 
elementary, having distinguished himself by leading 
prayers in Church and winning several Bishop’s 
catechism, prizes. „ , . ■
2. F.O. Minutes on Sir M. Lampson,!s Despatch No..: 30/84/3/38
of 11th January 1938., comments by Mr. Cavendish-Bentick
• who also admitted' "this Is not quite the way. to put.it”, 
F.O.571/21998. • v ' , ■/', -
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/this/ political angle which really matters .” He con­
tended that any, system which allowed the continued 
domination by potential enemy agents of the South was 
most unsound and dangerous. Hence his unshakeable 
conviction that a purely state education, despite 
practical difficulties and moral risks let alone the 
serious financial burden involved, was the real solu- 
tion to the educational problem of, the South.
Official pronouncements from Khartoum, 
however, discounted any ’’Caesarean” method of complete 
substitution of Italians by suitable non-Italians.
Such a course of action would have been feasible if an 
English Order was forthcoming immediately to replace 
the Verona Mission, but there was not. Further, the 
Sudan Government would have to treat cautiously with 
the Vatican in matters affecting Italian Missionaries. 
Against this background, therefore, Khartoum was pre­
pared to endorse the recommendations of the Director of 
Education. In a despatch to the British Foreign Office 
the Governor-General stated the position of the Sudan 
Government thus:
the best and most practical course open to us 
is to press urgently, not for the suppression 
of the Verona Mission as such, but for the 
early introduction of radical reforms on the 
lines advanced by Mr. Cox in Section IV of 
his report.g
1. M. Lampson to A. Eden (Confidential) Cairo Despatch 
No. 30/84/3/38 of 11th January 1938, F.O.371/21998.
2. S. Symes to M. Lampson (Confidential) Khartoum Despatch 
No. 145 (46.A.I.), 7th December 1937> F.O.371/21998.
Briefly* Mr. Cox's reform proposals included* among 
other things* the appointment of suitable non-Italians
i i m . w m |  ,
^British/in key positions in the Roman Catholic
Mission; the recruitment of qualified British teachers
for. educational work; and general improvements in'edu-
1cational- system.and methods.
What were 'radical1 reforms by Sudan Govern­
ment standards*, majority opinion at the British Foreign 
Office saw as mere "palliatives". At least one senior 
official at the Foreign Office* however* found himself 
in considerable sympathy with the views from Khartoum 
as they "represent the policy which (the F.O.) have
repeatedly attempted to enforce on the Sudan Govern- 
pmerit. ■ In the end it was realised that a careful
balance was necessary* hence the Foreign Office's
! ' "5acceptance of Mr. Cox s compromise proposals.
When the Mill Hill Fathers (British Order)
replaced the Verona Fathers in the Upper Nile Vicariate
in 1938* the Governor-General had three considerations
in mind:
(i) strategically it was en.route to 
Abyssinia
(ii) the British were more likely to succeed " 
with the Nilotes
1 . C. Cox's "Memorandum on Education in Southern Sudan", 
op. cit. Section ,
2. F.O. Minutes on" Sir. M. Lampson's;i Despatch No. 30/ 
.84/3/38* 11th January 1938* Comments by Mr. Pink.
3 . F.O. Minutes on Sir S. Lampson!s Despatch* op. cit.
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(ill) it was thought that the move would be
less difficult for the Vatican to accept 
and less bitter for the Verona Order to 
evacuate, as there were only four Italians 
involved.
Clearly, the limited reform affected only a fringe of 
the Italian empire. In the words of the Director of 
Education "The Bahr El Jebel /enlarged. Equatoria/ Is 
a much bigger and much more prosperous affair.’’^  The 
first Government.schools were not opened until 19^4, 
comprising a central school 'under a British headmaster
at. Abwong in the Upper Nile Province and a village.
2school at Tonj, all in the Nilotic heartland. They 
marked the beginning of a new era in-state education.
1. C. Cox to Mr. Pink (private), 20th February 1938, 
F.O.371/21998. -
2; Governor-General1s Report for 1942-44, Sudan No. 2 
(1950), cmd 8098, p. 124.
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ARAB NATIONALISM AND THE NEW SOUTHERN POLICY '
An intricate web of political entanglement enveloped 
the British during and immediately after the Second World 
War. At the centre, was the growing nationalist- sentiment 
both' in Egypt and in the Northern Sudan. While the 
Egyptian nationalists were ostensibly anxious that, the 
British might frustrate legitimate Egyptian aspirations for 
the union of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian crown 
and constitution, the Northern Sudanese were equally sus­
picious that the Sudanese Government entertained a.secret 
design for separating the Southern' Provinces and annexing 
them to East Africa. In the ensuing-political and diplomatic 
exercises, however, the- Sudan Government became progressively 
receptive to Northern Sudanese political opinion. The 
United Kingdom Government, on the other hand,1 kept its ear 
close to the. ground, of Egyptian nationalist propaganda 
expressed in the slogan of’ "Unity of the Nile Valley".
If Southern Policy had be.en^ a source of permanent embarrass­
ment to the Sudan Government vis-a-vis Northern Sudanese, 
the future of the Sudan proved to be an equally enduring 
embarrassment to the British Government‘vis-arvis Egypt.
Ip any case, both the Sudan and the United Kingdom Govern­
ments walked a tight rope. As a result of international 
political developments, the British bowed to Arab nationalist 
pressures in return'.for strategic interests in the Suez and 
the Middle East in general. In.the circumstances, however,; 
the objective interests of the as yet politically immature
Southern Sudan were submerged and lofty principles sacrificed 
or deliberately lost sight of (a grim reminder of the primacy 
of national interest in the theatre of international politics) 
History repeats itself; sometimes in a cynical manner. Just 
as Big Power rivalries had led, at the turn of the century, 
to the conquest of the South so also would Anglo-Egyptian 
competition for influence in the Sudan fifty years later 
ultimately cast the fate of the Southern. Sudan with that 
of the Arab Northern and Middle Eastern world. While the 
"Sudan Question" precipitated an Anglo-Egyptian crisis 
culminating in Egypt taking its sovereign claims over the 
Sudan to the Security Council of the United Nations, the 
fate of the Southern Sudan was hastily decided in Khartoum 
in a most controversial and unsatisfactory manner. The 
process by which the Sudan Government.moved from a variety 
of positions to the adoption of a policy of developing 
Southern Sudan not on the Southern, Negroid and African 
but on the Northern, Arab and Middle Eastern lines is the 
concern of this chapter. .
The War and Political Development in the Northern Sudan
■ r To assess the impact of the war upon the development 
of political consciousness in the Northern Sudan, it is ' 
necessary to state in the briefest"possible-terms Sudanese 
contributbns to Allied War efforts. When war broke out in 
Europe in September 1939? it seemed too distant and remote 
to cause any serious worry or concern to' the Sudanese 
people. The entry of Italy on 11th June.1940, into the war 
on the side of Germany however, constituted an immediate
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and dangerous threat both to the Sudan and to Egypt. To 
defend the 1,200 mile Sudanese frontier with Eritrea and 
Abyssinia from invasion by the Italian army of about 
300,000 men presented an ominous and formidable task.
The forces assembled to counter this threat composed of 
only the tiny Sudan Defence Force of 4,500 men and 2,500 
British Troops without armour or artillery. The Sudan 
Defence Force, which had-bee.n first raised in 1925 to replace 
Egyptian troops, fought a war of bluff and succeeded in 
staving off the projected Italian invasion until a, joint 
.-British’and Indian army reinforcements arrived and were able, 
after a brief campaign in Eritrea and Ethiopia, to compel 
the Italian surrender. Throughout, the war period the 
Sudanese gave their British masters material as well as 
moral support and some Sudanese recruits actually fought 
side by side with'Allied forces in North Africa. The Sudan 
:sold the United Kingdom about £20' million worth of cotton 
plus foodstuffs other than meat, hides and timbers in f 
considerable quantities. Large quantities of manufactured 
articles were also sold at cost prices. In addition, the 
strictest control was also kept over prices, which had 
always been far below those in neighbouring colonial 
territories. '1
T^he over-all, effect of the war on the Sudan was to 
bring Northern Sudanese into the mainstream of world events 
and to give a great stimulus'to Sudanese nationalism. The 
effect'of the upheavals and stimulus of war upon the minds
1. The Sudan 1899-1953, Foreign Office publication
(London, 1954) p.14; Governor-General's (Sir Hubert 
Huddleston) memorandum- on Financial Aid to the Sudan,
1945, F.O. 371/41365.
of the majority of the country people had been of an
educative nature: it broadened their outlook and brought
them out of the comparative isolationism or parochialism
of their domestic life. 1 Among the educated class and
more sophisticated urban dwellers (restricted mainly to
the riverain Arab districts and centred in Omdurman), however,
the effect had been much more pointed and dramatic:
nationalist sentiment had been stimulated and there arose
a natural demand for the rewards for the Sudanese efforts
2and sacrifices during the War. The Governor-General,
'Sir Hubert Huddleston, bore testimony to the accelerating 
process of Sudanese^ political awakening thrown up by the 
war when he commented in late 1945: ’’The Sudanese are be­
coming more and more politically conscious and ambitious:
they are growing towards nationhood and they, are becoming in-
4creasingly interested in their1 future.” Evidence of in­
creased political consciousness and activity, and a deep 
concern for the future is discernable from the emergence 
during the war of two major political parties in the
' Ay
Northern Sudan: the umma (nation) and the Ashigga (blood /. ’
brotherhood) parties.
1. Governor-General’s Report for 1945, Sudan No.l (1948)
p. 10.
2. Ibid.
3. Northern Sudanese Political awakening is here meant.
4. Governor-General1s Memorandum on the future of the 
Sudan (secret), 12th September 1945, F.0.371/45985•
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The Sudanese independence movement, like independence 
movements everywhere, did not and could not be expected 
to remain monolithic in structure and organisation.
Differences of opinion centred on the question of the 
:appropriate strategy to be adopted, ideological or religious 
rivalries, nationalist impatience and sheer personal am­
bitions- were some of the component elements-of potential 
rift within nationalist ranks. The nucleus of Northern 
Sudanese nationalism was the Graduates1 General Congress .rl'! 
founded in .1937 mainly for and by the Sudanese effendia.
From an elitist and exclusive intelligentsia’s social club” 
it increasingly took on the role of articulating the political 
aspirations of the Sudanese. Towards the end of the war, 
however, and as a result of Egyptian propaganda, a split 
developed within the Congress with opinions eventually 
polarised between support for union with Egypt or complete 
independence for the Sudan as soon as the Sudanese were 
■sufficiently equipped with the necessary level of maturity
- ■ n
and experience to determine the form of.that independence.
The rift became apparent towards the end of 1944 when
the pro-Egyptian party, the Ashigga, under the leadership
. 2 .of Ismail el Azhari fought and won the Congress election
of that year on a ’’union with Egypt” platform. Azhari and 
his followers deliberately exploited the sectarian Mirghanist
1. Memorandum by Mr. Penney on the Political situation In 
the Sudan (Secret). Inclosure in Robertson to Mr. Mayall 
(personal), 25th October 1945,. F**OV371/45986.
2. Azhari: President of Graduates General- Congress and later, 
Chairman of the pro-Egyptian. National Unionist Party and 
Sudan’s first Prime Minister.
3. El Sayed Sir Ali el Mirghani: Head of the Mirghania (or 
Khatmia) Sufi order based in Eastern Sudan.
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support to capture the Congress Executive Committee. The 
Azhari-Ashigga-Mirghanist victory was largely, due to the 
success of their campaign and propaganda which threatened 
the voters, if they failed to support Ashigga, with the 
return of the Mahdia and Sayed Abdel Rahman as King of the 
Sudan. Moderate patriotic opinion, opposed to any move 
that might compromise future .independence of the Sudan, 
was alarmed as were the supporters'of the Mahdist camp.
.The Umma party, of which Sayed Abdel Rahman was patron,
represented organised expression of this alarm. What
prompted the formation of this Party was, in the words of
one of its founders:
... an urgent feeling that the time had 
come for responsible indigenous Sudanese 
opinion to organise itself and make the 
real wishes of the vast majority of the 
Sudanese known to the world* so that the 
foolish and irresponsible clamour of a 
minority that had been won by propaganda 
from outside.the Sudan should not be. 
taken as an expression of genuine Sudanese 
feeling and exploited as such by Egypt...2
Gradually, Congress became a movement representing the 
Ashigga/Mirghanist interest only while a large number of 
the more moderate of the educated Sudanese refused to be 
associated with it. As the Umma party’s inspiration was 
in part Mahdist, the stage was set for a two-party contest 
between the Ashigga and the Umma. A senior Sudan Govern­
ment official noted this fact xvhen he commented, "it means
1. El Sayed Sir Abdel Rahman el Mahdia: Posthumous son of 
M.ohamed Ahmed el Mahdi and head of theAhs-ar sect. It is 
to be remembered that neither of the two Sayeds formerly 
identified himself with any political group.
2. Ahmed Othman El Qadi to Sir Stafford Cripps (a retired 
official of the Sudan Government) (private) 1st1. 
KlayJ,,1945,‘ P.0.371/45984.
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that our political adversaries have now resolved them­
selves into the old sectarian strife between Mahdists and 
Mirghanists". , This was at least apparently inconvenient
to the administration because the clarity of the main issue 
of "separatism" as against some form of union with Egypt 
was being obscured by the old Mahdist/Mirghanist rivalries. 
The Administration would have liked to damp down the 
Sayeds* rivalries or polarisation in favour of some sort 
of united front ^ which would devote its immediate energies
to the practical realisation of self-government programme,
. 2but the rift between the two notables was almost unbridgable.
The Umma Party failed to gain control of the Congress 
Executive Committee not because the Ashigga were necessarily 
popular but. because of the Umma Partyfs own tactical errors. 
Although the Party adopted as its slogan "the Sudan for the 
tSudanese", its Mahdist origins damned it in the eyes of 
many tribal leaders and educated moderates. Some of the 
supporters of Sayed Abdel.Rahman inadvisedly propagated 
the kingship idea which contributed greatly to the Umma- 
Mahdist defeat. The Sayed himself made no attempt to clear 
himself of the alleged royalist ambitions and his manner 
of living tended to lend support to the charge. The Party 
. was largely financed and staffed by the Mahdist Treasury.
The Party even, selected as its main propagandists individuals 
notorious for their extreme Mahdist views. More serious
1. Penney to Haselden (secret) CS/SCR/10,C.7. 26th November 
1945, P.O.371/45988.
2. Robertson to Fouracres (secret), 8th April 1945*
P.O.371/45984.
199.
than the Mahdist origins was an alleged Government connection. 
Having adopted as its programme what in effect was the 
Government's policy of gradual self-government for the 
Sudan, the Umma laid itself open to the obvious charge of 
being a Government Party. As a matter of fact scores of 
prominent Umma Party supporters dared to go to the extra­
ordinary length- of widely proclaiming that their party had
1the support of the Government. The fact that the Govern­
ment had encouraged the -formation of an independent news­
paper with a ,non-sectarian rural bias called "El-Umma" (be­
fore a party with the name was founded) seemed to confirm 
the Government connection. Needless to say, anti-Umma 
Party elements both in Khartoum and in Cairo capitalised 
on the alleged•Government connection to party advantage. 
Despite obvious embarrassment to the Government the 
existence of the Umma Party was of potential value to the 
Administration. Sir James Robertson who succeeded Douglas 
Newbold as Civil Secretary explained the Government dilemma: 
"If we show neglect or mishandle (the Umma Party) as to 
lose its support we may find ourselves a trifle friendless
p
when the inevitable show-down occurs..."
The Civil Secretary's warning strikes a resounding 
chord and provides a vital clue to the direction of 
Government thinking in the Sudan. The Administration's 
strategy henceforth aimed at securing the alliance of the 
more moderate Sudanese nationalists whose interests would 
necessarily be in line with those of the British. Lord
1. Robertson to Pouraces (secret), 8th April 1945.
P.O.371/45984.
2. Ibid.
Killearn, then Ambassador in Cairo, defined His Majesty’s 
Governments objectives in the Sudan towards the end of 
1945 as being."primarily, to maintain (British) preponderant 
position in a strategically important area, and, secondarily, 
to carry out our traditional policy of guiding (the Sudan­
ese) by gradual stages towards self-government. . . " 1 There 
was a widespread belief, or apparent belief, among British 
officials in. the ■. Sudan that on achieving independence the 
Sudanese would wish to associate themselves with the British 
Commonwealth. It was on this ground that Lord Killearn 
strongly urged that Egyptian influence in the Sudan should 
be kept to the minimum. ■ ■ .
In the realisation of their objectives the British 
found a natural ally in the school of thought represented 
by Sayed Abdel Rahman and the Umma Party. The latter 
was regarded as the main defence-work against.Egyptian 
’invasion’. Its programme embodied the- aspirations and 
fears- of the majority of responsible and independent-minded 
Sudanese in urban as well as in the rural areas. By
official estimation it was the strongest and most' influential
■' . 2 ■ ' ' ' of all the nationalist parties. The nationalism advocated
by this school of thought was fundamentally more indigenous
and more purely Sudanese, both in its historical derivatives
as well as long-range objectives, than the pro-Egyptian
brand. The government felt that it was more likely to
arouse the enthusiasm,of every responsible Sudanese than
the "foreign" nationalism inspired from Egypt. Sayed Abdel
1. Lord. Killearn to. Governor-General of the Sudan (secret),- 
No.44/41/22/45. .P.O. 371/45984.
2. PIC Paper No.66. "The Sudan and the Future" (secret), 
PIC/191/37/13, F.O.37I/41363.
Rahman himself made no bones of his support,for, and
gratitude to, the British for their administrative record
in the Sudan. In a characteristic manner he once declared
to a senior official of the British Foreign Office that he
thought the British should be pleased to know that he, the
son of Mahdi who was their enemy sixty years previously,
1was now their staunchest friend- and ally. He was con­
fident that the Sudan: could realise its true aspirations 
only through cooperation with the British Government and 
people. Egyptian propaganda alone seemed to present a 
serious threat to the prospects of an independent Sudan.
Sayed Abdel Rahman was therefore adamant that should the 
.British feel compelled to reward Egyptian war efforts the 
Sudan ought not to be, made to pay the price as it would be
grossly unfair to attempt to reward one party., at the expense 
pof the other. ■ The Khartoum government felt that pro- 
Egyptian Ashigga Party represented but a minor school of 
thought. Led by "a pair of clever demogogues and political 
intriguers", who exercised a ceftain amount of influence over 
the lower intelligentsia and artisan class, it had little 
standing in the country as a whole.^
A moderate school of nationalist thought in fact 
lacked both, coherence and leadership: "it merely consists
of a number of individuals who think vaguely along the same 
lines". Throughout most of the 1940s this group of ■
1. Note on Mr. Scriverner1s interview with'Sayed Abdel Rahman 
CS/SCR/91A.1, 27th February 1944, F.O.371/41363.
2. Ibid.
3. PIC Paper No. 66 "The Sudan and the Future" (secret) 
PIC/191/37/13, F.O.371/41363.
nationalists remained confused, perplexed and indecisive
about the future of the Sudan. Like the Umma Party, they . .
tod were opposed to. any form of union with Egypt. They
believed that the Sudan should have a nationality of its
own and should be allowed to develop her own indigenous
character and the institutions that would make possible
self-government, but were ambivalent in their attitudes
towards the two Co-Domini powers:
"... While they have a poor opinion of the 
Egyptiarn as statesmen and administrators 
and a healthy fear of being corrupted and 
ruined by Egyptian methods should they 
come under Egyptian.political control, yet, 
on the other hand, they are averse to 
severing their connection with Egypt 
entirely and placing themselves under 
British protection ..." 1
The reluctance to place themselves permanently under British
suzerainty stemmed from a feeling on the part of the
Sudanese nationalists of natural links with Egypt. There
was also the argument that, after all, Egypt*s share in
the Condominium served as a check on the British and a
• 2 ' . useful safeguard for the Sudanese. For this reason this
group of nationalists were■inclined to favour the continuation
of the Condominium for. another decade or more. This school
of .thought, which might be called the realist school, found
adequate expression in the-person of Sayed Ali El Mirghani.
Sayed Ali, without being at heart either pro-Egyptian or
anti-British, was described as "a timid man with a strong
■z
preference for a non-committal seat on the fence." Though
1. PIC Paper No. 66 "The Sudan and the Future" (secret), 
Pic/191/37/13, F.0.371/41363.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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his weight in the country had diminished significantly 
at the end of the war,., he was still a factor to take 
count of. He and his followers, were opposed.to Sayed 
Abdel Rahman’s separatist policy towards Egypt not 
because they were ardent advocates of union with Egypt 
but more probably because they suspected him of royalist 
ambitions. In this context it became clear to the British 
officials in the Sudan that if the issue was forced upon 
him, Sayed Ali-El Mirghani might easily come down on the 
side of the pro-Egyptian party. The late D. Newbold, 
then Civil Secretary, foresaw the;possibility of this 
happening in August 1944. He reckoned that Sayed Abdel 
Rahman’s separatist and royalist ambitions would drive 
the Mirghanists into the Egyptian camp; that Sayed Ali 
would go to any lengths to counter his rival's rather 
blatant campaign to ”cash-in” on Sudanese self-government 
and that the end product of it .all would be the emergence 
of a definite union with the Egyptian Party.'1* He was 
right.
. Unquestionably, the number of politically-minded 
Sudanese was small and all the Nationalist groups put 
together only accounted for a small minority. Despite 
their small numerical strength vis-a-vis the total 
^population, however, educated Sudanese opinion was what 
the.Government could not afford to ignore or condemn as 
unreasonable. The relative strength of the nationalists 
was measured by the extent,to which they.could influence
1. Quoted in Robertson to Fouracres (secret) CS/SCR/36.M.8, 
8t:h April 1945, P.O. 371/45984.
the non-political masses of the people, who had no l-ove
whatsoever for the Egyptians, and who had as, yet the
memory of Egyptian misrule before the Mahdia and of the ,
malpractices of Egyptian Mamurs in the early days of the 
. . 1Condominium. Yet, Newbold stated the truth when he 
wrote that many Englishmen lived in a fools Paradise, 
thinking that if a straight choice between Britain and 
Egypt was asked of the Sudanese they would, as a-.matter 
of course, opt for Britain. He thought that tribal heads­
men and tribesmen mostly would do so including m^ny oider
2officials, but not the main body of effendia. More , 
importantly, these educated Sudanese.were becoming dis­
illusioned at the pace of progress towards self-government: 
"They wish to advance at the; speed of the fastest, not of 
the slowest nor even of the a v e r a g e . T h e  Administration 
had not the slightest doubt, therefore, that "theyital 
thing on the day of the ^how-down* is not what will the ■ 
Egyptian Government do or.H.M.G. do, but what line•the 
Sudanese (Nationalists) will take."^
Meanwhile, it appeared that' the United Kingdom Govern­
ment was not responsive enough to the growing Nationalist 
agitation in the Sudan. In his most important memorandum 
on the future of the Sudan, dated- 12th September 1945, the
1. PIC Paper No.66 "The Sudan and the Future"'. (Secret)
PIC/191/37/13. - F.0.371/41363. '
2. Douglas Newbold to R.C.Mayall (secret and personal)
CS/SCR/97.4.6, ,28th November 1943., F.O.371/35576. „
3. Governor-Generalfs Memorandum on the Future of the Sudan 
(secret), 12th September 1945, F.O.371/45985.■
4. Newbold to Mayall (secret and personal) CS/SCR/97.4.6. 
28th November 1943,' F.O.371/35576.
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Governor-General warned the British Foreign Office against
the danger of keeping the Sudanese in the dark as to the
eventual intentions of the British Government. Failure to
give a quick promise of self-government to the Sudanese,
he reckoned, might prejudice beyond recovery the chance of
retaining some influence in the area. Special attention
was to be paid to the winning and retaining of the confidence
of Nationalists of the "realist" school who, though in
favour of a strong British connection, were not ready to
wait indefinitely for the promise of it. Time was definitely
running out - for them in their attempt to keep on the right
side of both Condominium Powers and "it would be only natural
if they turned rapidly to the Egyptian connection rather
:than the prolonged acquiesence in the British policy of
excluding Egyptian influence from the Sudan." The Sudan
Government’s position may be summarised thus:
If the British appear, to be delaying the 
achievement of self-government unduly, 
however worthy their motives, the 
educated Sudanese will turn increasingly 
to the Egyptians in the hope that they 
will grant it sooner and that they will 
also approve greater material aid in the 
development‘of the country. 3
Thus persuaded, the United Kingdom Government authorised
Mr. Bevin, then Foreign Secretary, to make a statement in
the House of Commons on 26th March 1946, to the effect
that "His Majesty’s Government looked forward to the day
when the Sudanese would be able finally to decide their
1. ' Governor-General’s memorandum on the future of the Sudan
(secret), 12th September 1945, F.O.371/45985.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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political future for themselves'. "*** This bold statement 
of policy, though- prejudicial to the outcome of- the Anglo- 
Egyptian negotiation scheduled for opening in Cairo late 
that year, went a long way to re-assure the Sudanese , ■
Nationalist's'. It also prepared the ground for a healthy 
cooperation between the Government and the Nationalists
2m  preparation for ah orderly transfer of power m  the Sudan.
The Sudan Government itself had not been neutral or 
indifferent but had deliberately encouraged Sudanese Nation­
alism partly in fulfillment of its obligations as trustee 
but mainly as a defence against Egyptian- aspirations in the 
Sudan. The able and competent Civil Secretary, Sir Douglas- 
Newbold, had warned his British officials of the difficulty 
-of adopting a non-possumus attitude over political advance 
after the- war to the Sudanese, "when Egypt may be dangling .a 
deed of partnership like a yellow carrot in front of their 
nose." In furtherance of the declared objective of 
self-government the Sudan Government had since 1942 
initiated measures aimed at- (i) the development of Sudanese 
local government, (ii) the progressive Sudanisation in all 
branches of the Civil Service, and, more importantly, (i'ii) 
the creation of an Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan. 
This policy of educating the Northern Sudanese up to self- 
government was viewed in Egypt with suspicion and as aiming 
at the eventual complete separation of the Sudan from Egypt
1. See The Sudan-. 1899-1953. F.O. Publication (London 1954), 
p.15.
2. The United Kingdom Government made a, grant-in-aid to the 
Sudan to the -value of £2 million pounds.
3. Newbold to G.F.R. Sanders (secret and. personal)
CS7SCR-/97.H.6 . 24th November 1943, F.O.3-71/35576.
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and, its possible inclusion in the British Commonwealth.^
The tug-of-war between Egypt and Great Britain over.
the Sudan could not have come at a worse time for either
party in the Condominium., Britain emerged from the war
tired, exhausted and militarily and economically weak.
The ultimate sanction-of force was out of the question in
the dispute with Egypt over the Sudan. Not only would
post-World War II international political climate not
permit it, but Egypt was an ally and Egyptian military'
bases had been of the utmost importance for the defence
2 -of the whole Middle East, including the Sudan. . Clearly, 
this was hard evidence that the Egyptians had 'carried out 
their:obligations under the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian. Treaty - 
of Alliance and Friendship to the full. In fact, Great 
Britain was also indebted to Egypt for her contributions 
towards Allied -War efforts. As for Egypt, cultural and 
historical links with the Sudan did not prove to be of 
a. special advantage. Sudanese political-consciousness, 
as■has been said, had developed considerably since 1936 so 
that at the end of the war the Sudanese were staking 
claim to a higher political status. For the first time 
ever in the history of the Condominium, the wishes of the 
Sudanese would be. a significant consideration, if not the 
decisive factor. The Egyptians were aware of this' develop­
ment and were clever enough to stake their whole cause
1.: Governor-General * s Memorandum on the Future of the Sudan
(secret),, 12th September 1945, F.0.371/45985.
2. Note on Mr.. Scrivener1 s ■ interviews with the two Sayeds 
CS/SCR/91.A.1 , 27thFebruary 1944, Civil Secretary's 
Office, Khartoum. F.0.371/41363.
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on-a direct appeal to the Sudanese. 1 The pro-Egyptian 
Ashigga Party was a result of this appeal.
The political and constitutional developments in the 
Sudan initiated largely by the Sudan Government were 
warning signals to Egypt that British officials were 
encouraging a separatist Sudanese movement' inimical to
Egypt *s,interests and that unless she acted swiftly' she
2 - . - 
might lose the Sudan for good.-- During the war itself,
the future of the Sudan had been the subject .of much specu-
lation m  the Egyptian Press. The Sudan Government had
anticipated possible Egyptian moves and warned the British
Government accordingly. The heart of the Egyptian claim
lay in the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.
Article Two of the Agreement stipulated that "the Primary
aim of the administration in the Sudan must be the welfare
of the Sudanese." Although Egyptian tropps and-Egyptian
officials were to return to the Sudan following the
signature of the Treaty, this did not materialise and the
question of sovereignty over the Sudan was not touched upon
either.^ In late 1945 the.United Kingdom‘Government
1. The appeal was to the effect that the Sudanese were 
Arab and Moslem brothers. This, coupled with offers 
of local autonomy had a tremendous appeal both in the ■ 
Sudan as well as in the Arab world in general.
2. Newbold to Sanders (secret.and personal) /'OS/SCR/97.H.6.7, 
24th November, 1943. .P.O. 371/35576., " ' ;
3. See "Political and Economic Weekly Report" No.11, week 
12th to 18th February 1943 (secret), and No.12, week "
19th to 24th, 19.43. P.O.371/33530.
4. Governor-General*s Memorandum on the Future of the 
Sudan (secret), 12th'September 1945, P.O.371/45985•
5. See United Kingdom Command Paper No.5360 (Treaty Series 
No.6, 1937).
accepted an Egyptian request for negotiations with a view 
to the revision of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. During 
the negotiations in Cairo’ in 1946 the Egyptian representatives 
put forward the proposal that any revision of the terms of 
the Treaty must include a recognition of the Sudan as an 
integral part of Egyptian territory and must make allowances 
for the.sovereignty of the Egyptian Crown over the Sudan.
The negotiations broke down in November-December 1946 on 
the Egyptian proposal, with the views of the two Co-Domini 
powers differing widely oh this issue." To the Egyptian 
Government the. phrase. "the unity between the. Sudan and 
Egypt1' meant a permanently unified Kingdom of Egypt and the 
Sudan' in which the Sudanese might be;granted a limited 
measure of local autonomy.^ The United Kingdom Government 
on the other hand, was opposed to any form of agreement 
prejudicial to the* right of the Sudanese to choose their 
own political status, which included the options of complete 
independence, some form of association with Egypt or even 
total merger if they so wished. However, British t^ etoric 
must be .separated from her desire to exclude Egyptian 
influence from the Sudan, hence her insistence on "the 
welfare of the Sudanese" principle. The British Government 
remaining adamant over this-point,, the Egyptians took the 
dispute to the Security Council of the United Nations in 
July 1947. The whole matter was shelved for lack of 
sufficient.affirmative votes to get through any single
1. The Sudan 1899-1953. Foreign Office Pub., (London 195*0 
p. 15. ’
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. . .  1resolution. Power politics is to blame..
In reading the situation on the ground.the Sudan 
Government were more realistic than either the British 
■Government or' the Egyptians in respect of the wishes of 
the Sudanese. The Sudanese, by the nature, of things, 
had always had certain close ties with Egypt, namelyj,-fv<^ [ , cud'-d.- 
geographical, .racial, lingual, religious'and economic 
and to that extent Great Britain started with a consider­
able handicap in the competition with Egypt for the Sudan's 
favour. The Sudan Government felt that 45 years of 
British administration had hot' turned the Sudanese into 
African Englishmen, nor would another 30 years of.it; 
that the eventual Sudanese form of self-government- and the stand­
ards of public morality were bound to be fundamentally
> poriental; and Sudanese outlook, Arab.and Middle Eastern,
Any political concessions the British made, however
generous, were not likely so to impress the Sudanese as
to cement a lasting friendship: "What appears to. the
governing power to be a cohcession is to the ruled merely
the granting, usually belatedly, of r i g h t . I n  the
absence of spiritualities, therefore, only Substantial
material aid promised a reasonable, basis for projected
Anglo-Sudanese friendship. This was regarded as the
minimum specification required df the British were to
1. For a'fuller'discussion of the Anglo-Egyptian -Dispute. over 
the Sudan see (i) Mekki Abbas> The Sudan Question 
(London 195^) and Fabunmi, Tile Sudan in- Anglo-Egyptian 
Relations: A Case Study in Power Politics (Londons1973)*
2. .Governor-General1S; Memorandum on the future of the
Sudan (secret), 12th September 19^5, P.O.37i/45985.
3. Ibid. 1 -
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retain any string of influence in the Sudan. On the other 
hand, Sudanese nationalists of all shades of opinion were 
not in the least ungrateful for the benefits conferred on 
their country by either of the Condominium Powers. The 
majority of them resolved not "to exchange one-master for 
another or one fetter for another, be the one a fetter of 
iron and the other a fetter of gold."1 Their primary 
consideration was the interest of the Sudan to the exclusion 
of anything else.
The Impact of Northern Nationalism in the South .
The rapid political and constitutional advances in
the Northern Sudan .which in part gave rise to strained
Anglo-Egyptian relations, far from obscuring the problems
of the Southern Sudan actually served to focus attention
on and to underline the, urgency for tackling them. When
the legislation for the formation of an Advisory Council
for the Northern Sudan was promulgated on 1st September
.19439 the first reactions of Sudanese public opinion
included, among other things, outright condemnation and
suspicion of an .implied intention of separating the Northern
2from the Southern provinces. The Graduates Congress 
reacted in a similar vein by condemning the whole Southern 
Policy of the Sudan Government as apparently reflected in
1. "A Frank Word on the Fundamentals of the Sudan Question" 
see El Sudan El Gedid (Khartoum, 7th July 1944)., F.O. 
371/41363.
2. Khartoum Despatch No.79 (1.A.16), 8th November 19439 
F.O.371/35576.
The .
the Legislation. / Sudanese Press was equally critical
of the Advisory Council Legislation. El Nil Daily for
instance, asked three embarrassing but crucial questions
"1. Why should not the North represent 
the South?
2. How can Government deprive the South 
of the right's and privileges now 
granted to (Northern Sudanese)?
3. Is the Advisory Council competent 
to examine matters, such as Budget, 
which concerns the whole country,
while one-third of the population
is not represented?" 2
The Egyptian Government-was also alarmed by the scale of 
changes in administration in the Sudan, including ex­
tensive legal devolution to the Tribal chiefs' without 
prior consultation with Egypt. The creation of the 
Advisory Council was the last straw which led the Egyptian 
Government to the same conclusion that the Sudan Government
intended to divide the Sudan into two parts: . a Northern
and a Southern, "keeping the Southern Division isolated 
to be a-pasture for the Christian Missionary Societies."
The Egyptian Government went on to warn the Governor- 
General of the Sudan of the tensions, among Mohammedans 
throughout the Nile Valley which would result from the 
continuance of the Southern Policy.
1. See Memorandum by Graduates General Congress to Governor- 
General of the Sudan, 6th October,1943s F.O.371/45986.
2. Press Resume, inclosure to Khai’toum Despatch; No.79
(1.A.l6), 8th November 19435 forwarded to the F.O.. by 
Lord Killearn's Despatch No.1050 of 19th November 1943. 
F.O.371/35576.
3. , Egyptian-Prime Minister to Governor-General of the Sudan
inclasure in Killearn to F.O. (secret), 3rd June 1944. 
F.O.371/41363.
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The secretive nature.of the Southern Policy, and
Government reluctance to permit the discussion .of matters'
pertaining to the South in the Advisory Council or in the
newspapers tended to reinforce Northern suspicion of
Government intentions in the Southern .Sudan. Twice on
separate occasions members.of the Advisory Council directly
raised questions on matters affecting the. South and twice
the Chairman ruled against, them. By 1945 it was evident
that the Sudan Government *s: attempts to explain to the!
Sudanese public as well as to the Egyptians that the
reasons for confining the Advisory Council to the six
Northern Provinces were practical rather than political
were ineffectual. The Sudan Government1s,sensitivity to
Northern Sudanese and Egyptian public opinion on matters
relating to the Southern Sudan is exemplified by the
following despatch to the Foreign Office:- L
The eyes of Egypt and of the Northern/. .
Sudan are’on the South, and our Southern ■ T.
Policy, (or lack of policy) has been 
■heavily criticised both in Cairo and 
Omdurman. Parts of the,policy /‘it was,
’ conceded,/ will never commend therriselves
to the Northern Sudanese, and some, of . 
the criticisms have been hard to answer.2 .
That was in August 19*15* One. month later the Administration
felt that "our present secrecy /"over the Southern Sudan?
gives rise to exaggerated suspicions in the.Northern Sudan,
and our silence or reticence on the subject to some extent
1. See Proceeding of Advisory Council for the Northern 
Sudan, 4th Session, Question paragraph .4472 of Printed ■ 
Record* Civil Secretary1s Press Conference, 12th June 
1945, Answer to Question 4 of Mohamed'Amer Beshir.,
2. Enclosure to Khartoum Despatch No,89,of 4th August 1945, 
(secret), CS/SCR/l.C.14. Appendix "B" (i), F.O.371/ 
45985*
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prejudices the all-important good relations we hope to 
maintain with responsible Northern Sudanese."1 At this ■ 
juncture the indications are that, the Sudan Government were 
not as yet prepared to give way on their Southern Policy. 
While seemingly uncompromising on essentials, i.e. that 
responsibility to the Southerners was that of the Sudan 
Government not of the Northern Sudanese or anyone else, 
they were very cautious lest Northern Sudanese opinion be 
alienated.
Meanwhile, in the Southern Sudan itself certain factors 
were imperceptibly.at work to make the reversal of Southern 
Policy a high probability. Since 1934 Mr. Martin Parr, 
Governor of Equatoria, had consistently advocated a frank 
and open statement of policy, which was accepted in 
principle by Khartoum.^ Even in Western Bahr El Ghazal 
legitimate and necessary seasonal trade was allowed. The 
pass system was relaxed and Arabs were permitted to come 
south of the grazing boundary in parties not exceeding three 
and without cattle to purchase grain. The authorities in 
Khartoum realised that "you could not put a Chinese wall 
between Darfur and Equatoria: if you tried you would defeat
your own object."^ The acute shortage of British 
manpower felt during- the first two years of the war compelled
1. Secretariat Khartoum to Chancery, Cairo, (1-C-l)
3rd September 1945, F.O.-371/45986.
2. Governor Equatoria to District Commissioner Western 
District Equatoria (very secret). '29th April 1941, 
SGA/EP/SCR/1,B*1.
3. Governor Equatoria to District Commissioner Western 
District Equatoria (very secret), 29th April 1941. 
SGA/EP/SCR/1.B.l.
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the Sudan Government to appoint Northern Sudanese officials 
for duty in the South selected from among those believed 
to be sympathetic rather than antagonistic to Southern 
culture. By 1944, however, the practice had proved to be 
a failure. It was noticed that many of these Northern 
Sudanese officials showed little sympathy with, and no 
regard for, the Southerner. The situation was complicated 
further by the fact that Southern.employees themselves 
showed, obvious discontent at the wage disparity between , 
themselves and the Northern Sudanese: the higher, rate of
pay earned by Northern officials was not always justified.1 
Similar Government embarrassments as well as.Southern dis­
content engendered by wage disparity were also■experienced 
in the attempt to recruit Southern Sudanese into -Northern 
units of the Sudan Defence Force, and occasionally their
p
subsequent transfer to service in Equatoria. To meet the 
demand for cattle to provide meat for forces in the Middle 
East a number of Northern Sudanese traders were especially 
licensed to,tap the herds of.the Nilotic Southern tribes.. 
This led to the relaxation of trading restrictions .imposed 
as a result of Southern Policy. Furthermore, the Mon- 
galla patois was permitted to be used as vehicle of. com­
munication among the rank and file of the Equatorials and
4 . . .prisoners. More serious still, some of the educated
1. ", 10th Progress Report by the Governor-General^ enclosure
to Khartoum Despatch J\fo.89 of 4th August 1945,
F.O.371/45985.
2. Ibid.
3. , Ibid'.
4. Ibid.
Southerners under Northern persuasion or motivated by
.personal ambitions, were gravitating to Northern urban
1towns m  search of higher wages and wider- opportunities.
Despite the profound changes dictated by wartime
needs the Government stand on the South remained officially
the same at the end of the war. In August 1945 the
Governor-General wrote
The approved policy is to act upon the 
fact that the peoples of the Southern 
Sudan are distinctively.African and Negroid, 
and that our obvious duty to them is 
therefore to push ahead as fast as we 
can with their economic and educational 
development on African and Negroid lines, 
and not upon the Middle Eastern and 
Arab lines of progress .which are suitable 
for the Northern Sudan, It is only by 
economic and educational development 
that these people can be equipped to '
stand up for themselves in the future, 
whether their future lot be eventually 
cast with the Northern Sudan or with ,
East Africa (or partly with each). 2
The British Government approved the. Sudan Government state­
ment but by postulating these latter three possible 
futures for the South the ice had cracked. As early as 
19’43a Mr. Beckett of the British Foreign Office suggested 
as practical alternatives before H.B.M.'s Government the 
continuation of the Condominium with increased self-govern­
ment. As a solution to the Southern question, he proposed 
the division of the.^ Sudan so that the Southern and non-Arab 
part could become a purely British responsibility and the
1. 10th Progress Report by the Governor-General, enclosure 
to Khartoum Despatch.No.89 of 4th August 1945, F.O.371/ 
45985.
2. Khartoum Despatch No.89 of 4th August 1945, F.O.371/
. 45985. .
Northern and Arab .part would go to Egypt with some guarantees 
of local autonomy. A colleague commented: "I do not
suppose that we should like this course ... I don't think 
we shall come to partition ... we shall have to have a 
balancing of accounts with E g y p t . T h e  Fabian Report found 
a great deal to be said for maintaining the policy of ad­
ministering the South almost as a separate mandate and without 
making any decision to separate it in sovereignty from the 
North. It noted that such a step would be bitterly opposed 
politically both in Egypt and in the Northern Sudan. "Time, 
education and gradual economic development may show in the 
end whether it can be more suitably attached to the Middle 
East or to Africa," Put differently, the future of the 
South was very much in the balance in 1945*
December 1946 was the most crucial and decisive month 
for the political fate of the Southern Sudan. In a 
circular to all heads of Departments, Directors and Gover­
nors of the two Southern Provinces, the Civil Secretary 
announced that since the previous year not only had further 
decisions on policy for the South been, taken but also that 
great changes had taken place in the political.outlook for 
the Sudan as a whole. Notable among these changes were: 
the rapid advance of the Northern Sudan to self-government 
involving the progressive reduction of British executive 
authority; the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty negotiations and the
1. F.O. Minutes on Newbold.to Sanders (secret and personal), 
(CS/SCR/97.H.6.), 24th November 1943. F.O.371/35576.
2. "The Sudan: the Road Ahead", Fabian Publication 
Research Series. No.99s p.26.
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postulated acceleration of public canvassing of the South 
itself. The Civil Secretary thought- it essential, therefore, 
that policy for- the Southern Sudan should be crystallised in 
a form capable of being publicly explained and defended and 
ifhich should be based on what he called "constructive social 
and economic, principles". The Sudan Government was to work 
henceforth on the assumption that the Sudan would remain one 
and indivisible country. The Southern Policy was re-stated 
thus:-
"The policy of the; Sudan Government ; 
regarding the Southern Sudan is to 
act upon the. facts that the peoples 
of the Southern Sudan are distinctively 
- African.and Negroid, but that geography 
K an  ^economics combine (so far as can
v  be foreseen a-fc present time) to
' render them inextricably bound for/'
future development to the middle-eastern 
-- ' and arabicized Northern Sudan: and
therefore to ensure that they shall, by 
educational and economic development, be 
equipped to . stand up. for themselves in 
the future as socially and economically
the equals of theirpartners of the
■ Northern Sudan in the Sudan Of the future."l
This major shift in Government policy towards the South was 
hardly thinkable in the 1930s. As late as 1938 the Governor- 
General could boastfully write that "an .immediate purpose of
our policy in the Southern Sudan is to prevent an insidious
process of * *Arabicization* of the primitive pagans who in­
habit the region." He considered that, the process of 
Arabization of the South was a dangerously easy one, for 
Southerners would probably have to look to the North rather 
than to the South for superior culture, markets and material 
development. How soon and how widely Moslem influences and
1. , Civil, Secretary to All Heads of Departments, Directors and 
Governors of the Southern Provinces (secret), 16th 
December 1946, S.G.A./CS/SCR/l.C.l.
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Arabic propaganda would spread from Egypt and the Arab 
states through the Northern Sudan into remote Southern 
regions, it was difficult to say.1 Had the situation 
changed eight years later to warrant the reversal of a 
policy of extreme parochialism? Was.the time ripe or was 
it merely a question of expediency that all efforts to 
"resist the entry into the South of debased forms of Islam 
and corrupt practices of Northern (Arab) Sudanese" should be 
halted so abruptly? The Civil Secretary admitted that 
urgency was the essence of the problem and that the Government 
no longer strived for the ideal: "We must aim at doing
what' is best for the Southern peoples in the present
p
circumstances.tT
British officials and administrators in the Southern 
Sudan were almost unanimous in their support for -the 
restated Southern Policy. Marwood, the new Governor of 
Equatoria, changed his mind and no longer regarded the 
excision of the Southern Sudan and its attachment to 
neighbours on the South as practical politics or, indeed, 
in the interest of the Southerners themselves, "for they 
would still be TCinderellasT even more than they are now."^
The Civil Secretaryfs contention that the South was bound 
up with the' North and that the two had ’(got to hang togethef'
1. Governor-General to H.E. Britannic MajestyTs Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Cairo (confidential), 
No.26 (46.A.I.), 5th March 1938. F.0.371/21998
2. Civil Secretary to all Heads of Departments, Directors 
..and Governors of the Southern Provinces (secret),
16th December 1946. S.G.A./CS/SCR/l.C.1.
3. Governor Equatoria to Deputy Governor Bahr El Ghazal 
and all D.Cs and British Staff. (Secret), 23rd December 
1946, S.G.A.EP/SCR/l.B.l.
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as one country carried the day. For the effective im­
plementation of the fusion British field staff put forward 
a number of proposals chief among which were: that every
effort should be made to stimulate political and civic 
education of the Southerners; that differences in status 
and conditions of Northern and Southern staff should be 
terminated by the adoption of the principle of equal reward 
for equal work; therlifting of restrictions imposed upon 
Northern traders in the South and Southerners themselves 
should be allowed to travel to the North in search of job 
opportunities if thdy so wished. The South should also be 
■ i able to use the Gordon College, .have its technical staff 
M trained at the Police Schodl, Kitchener School and Military
;College in Omdurman. It all, boils down to the adoption of
■ I- ? »■* =
. ^corrective measures designed to create a common outlook for
1both the South and North.
The Administration attempted to justify _ its action 
in terms of the following practical and economic consider­
ations. "The North and the South were linked by the Nile; 
Christianity was. not necessarily the^'religion most suited to 
the Southern Sudanese; the men of some Southern tribes were 
far stronger in character than the Northerners; that there 
 ^ wag no^ej.0 else- for hh'a>Southerners to go (apparently Uganda 
* would not take them); that the South needed the financial 
support of the .North, which was..promised; that the Northern 
Sudanese no more liked living in,the South than the Egyptians 
liked living in Khartoum" The only alternative, it was
1. Deputy Governor' Bahr El Ghazal, to: Governor Equatoria 
Province, 6th June 19^ 7,. S.G.A./B.G.A./SCK/l.C.1.
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feared, was to keep the Southerners living.in a zoo and that 
the real danger to the South in an independent Sudan was 
neglect.^* Implicitly, the Administration accepted Azhari's 
argument that it is not an essential condition for the unity 
of a country that all its parts should be on an equal level'
p . .
,of development. One, interesting consideration was that 
to the educated Sudanese the loss of the South was a matter 
of prestige. There was also a measure of anxiety, and the fear 
that in the South might subsequently be discovered the wealth 
which could guarantee the Sudan's independence.; Further­
more the South, like the Northern Sudan to Egypt, was a
■ X
source of cheap labour.-^  It has recently been suggested
that the North wanted the South- as a guarantee .against.
4 ■' 1absorption with Egypt. But concern for the upper sources
of the Nile must, have exercised the imagination of the
educated Sudanese.
On the theoretical level and on all other grounds,
however, the South ought not to have been united to the
Arab North. Terms such as "partnership" or "power-sharing"
are deceptive and when applied to situations 'of political
conflict, actual or potential, tend to-conceal, their.:
opposites. The perfect and most harmonious balances are
those struck between entities of equal weights or strengths.
In actual human experience, needless to say, absolute
1. J,S.R.Duncan: The Sudan, A Record of Achievement 
(London, 1952), p.213•
2. AzhariTs Memorandum to the Governor-General, 6th October, 
1943. ' F.O.371/45986.
3. "The Sudan: The Road Ahead", Fabian" Publication Research 
Series No, 99, p.. 25. 1 1 ;
4. 0.Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, (Institute of 
Race Relations,; London 1970), p. 2.7* *
social harmony or power balance is a rare commodity if not 
an ideal to strive for. In the context of the Sudan the 
prospects of a true-fusion or partnership (as against 
absorption of the South by the, North) must have been bleak -^-7 
indeed. At the risk of repetition the North and South j
■ - I
differed in their attitude to life, in language, in creed V.
and above all, in their stages -of-social and political 
development that the use of . the term ’’partnership" to describe
their amalgamation must be condemned outright as preposterous
; •. f
T.H.H. Owen, Deputy Governor of Bahr El Ghazal Area, strikes A
the nail on -the head in his criticism of the Minutes of the /  j
Sudan Administration Conference convened in Khartoum on 22nd j 1
April 1946, Having, made the point that Southerners and /
Northerners were two sharply differentiated communities and/r
that. Northern officials regarded Southern Service, as a
temporary exile, he wrote:
, To assume, without the proof of time 
or the free choice of the Southerners 
themselves, that the interests of the;
North and South are identical.and indis­
solubly bound, or that the two can, in 
their present state, be.made to fuse, is 
unjustified. You cannot.fuse iron and 
clay...1
K/
Owen’s contention was that there can possibly be no legitimate 
partnership between a boy of 12 and a man of 40. The South 
had first to go through that stage of local government and 
growing responsibility which fosters-the quality of citizen­
ship before participating in the Central Government at 
Khartoum. The North had gone past this stage while the South 
was still in statu pupillari, with a long way to go.
1. Owen,T.R.H., Deputy Governor Bahr El Ghazal to Secretary 
Sudan Administration Conference, (strictly confidential), 
6th October 1946. S.G.A./B.G.A./l.C.l. /Italics added7.
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■ Administration in the Southern Provinces was still too 
direct and such devolution as existed was confined to the 
vjudicial sphere. The South suffered from further handicaps: 
the lack of politically as well as educationally trained 
members to represent the South in Khartoum parliament; 
those who might possess half the"minimum qualifications 
would still be in a permanent numerical minority operating 
in a milieu foreign to them and dealing with agenda which 
would be beyond their comprehension. The possibility also 
existed of the Northern 87$ of the proposed Khartoum 
. Assembly fully occupying themselves with the vital affairs 
of the North to the neglect of the pressing needs of the 
South.1 ’
The child-image of the South was what the Southerners 
themselves were deeply aware of and found an. opportune 
moment to articulate their feelings at the Juba Conference 
^convened by the Civil Secretary in July 19^7 to sound 
the opinion of the South.on the proposed fusion. Several 
Southern speakers: stressed the need for a training period 
in Government before any final decision is taken on amal­
gamation. Sergeant-Major Philemon Majok stated that the 
Southerners were' like children in their relations with , 
the grown up Northern Sudanese and that, as children must 
drink milk before they could eat bread*, so . the Southerners 
, must first be.afforded an opportunity to study the art of 
self-government before participating in governing. Another 
Southern member compared the progress already made in the 
North to pupils who had been through Class I and were
1, Owen, T.Ft.H. to Secretary, Sudan Administration Con­
ference (strictly confidential), '6th October 19^6. 
S.G.A.VB.G.A./l.C.l.
being promoted to Class II. As the'South had not ,yet 
been through Class I, it would be absurd to try to put them 
straight into Class II. Chief Tete, drawing on the sanie' 
simile-metaphor,' stated that just as bringing up a child.is 
a slow and gradual process, the Southerners must first 
learn to walk before they attempt to run. 1
The Sudan Government's decision to amalgamate is open
'to further criticism based on the- principle of self-
determination. To quote T.R.H. Owen once more: "What we ask
for the South is the same as we ask for the North, namely
free choice of their future by themselves as soon as they
2have reached political maturity and are fit to choose,"
The only official public reference to.the right, of the South 
to self-determination was made in August when Northern 
Sudanese journalists were warned that in writing about the 
problem of the South they should bear in mind its right to 
self-determination,;. It is rather puzzling how the 
arguments advanced,so far had been skilfully employed by 
the Sudan Government in their attempt to damp down the 
A.shigga' s agitation for union with Egypt. ■ Against the union 
with Egypt■idea the Sudan Government argued that the principle 
of the dequality of rights could not be guaranteed while 
the Sudan was in a backward condition; that a fusion under - 
those circumstances would result in the weaker partner 
being submerged by.the stronger in every field; that if 
personal qualifications constituted the only valid title to
1. Proceedings of the Juba. Conference on the Political Develop­
ment of the Southern Sudan, June 1947. See Appendix No.VIII.
2. Owen,T.R.H. to Secretary, Sudan Administration Conference 
(strictly confidential), 6th October 1946. S .G . A ./B .G .A ./I.C . 1..
3. Record of 4th Press Conference, 6th August 1945,
F.O.371/46986. -
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senior Government posts, it was rationally impossible that 
the Sudanese, inferior as they were to their Egyptian brothers - 
in qualifications, would be able to obtain even a small 
proportion of posts. The same consideration applied to the 
fields of commerce and industry and indeed to any field in 
which there was competition between the Sudanese^ and the 
Egyptians. The same argument also applies to the question 
of numbers and parliamentary representation, so that it was 
possible the Sudanese might fail to obtain the agreement 
of the Common Parliament to any proposal in the interest of 
the Sudan if that interest happened to be in conflict with 
the interests of Egypt. If these were the arguments put 
forward ‘against fusion of Egypt with the Northern Sudan 
which were bound by racial, lingual and religious ties, they 
apply with, greater force still against the union of the 
South and North, which had none of these common characteristics.
In order to understand the U“turn in British Southern 
Policy it is essential to recapture, briefly, the political 
and constitutional advances in the Northern Sudan from 
April 19^6 to July 1947. It is advanced as a thesis that 
in April 1946 the British - or rather, the Sudan Government 
- had already made up their minds regarding the political 
future of Southern Sudan. In the wake of Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations for the revision of.the 1936 Treaty of 
Alliance and Friendship and in the face of increased 
nationalist activities both in Egypt and in the Northern 
Sudan it must have been decided that no room existed for
1. "Frank Word on the Fundamentals of the Sudan Question", 
Sudan El Gedid, (7th July 1944), F.0.371/41363.
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either isolationism or separation of the Southern Sudan.
On April 22nd, 1946, the Sudan Administration Conference 
was convened by the Governor-General to explore ways and 
means of associating the Sudanese more closely with the 
Government of their country and to make recommendations to 
that effect. This, implied the. conversion of the Advisory 
Council for the Northern Sudan into representative and 
responsible Legislative and Executive Councils. This was a 
giant leap in the progress towards self-government. Never­
theless, the South was not represented. Although its report 
was not submitted until March 1947, the Conference's minutes 
were ..made available to all Governors and District Commissioners 
as well as senior British staff. The Conference recommended 
that
"the best method of developing the Advisory 
Council so as to give greater representative 
character and more responsible functions 
is by the constitution of a Legislative 
Assembly of.elected Sudanese members for 
the whole country to exercise legislative 
functions in conjunction with a newly 
constituted Executive Council which would 
replace the Governor-Generalfs Council".1
It also stated that the 'South must • look to the rest of
the country for economic and social development.
In June 1947 the Civil Secretary called a conference 
in Juba to sound out the opinion of the Southerners on 
representation in the' proposed Legislative Assembly and 
indirectly on the proposed fusion of the North and South.
The Sudan Government treated the Conference almost as a
1. The First Report of the Sudan Administration Conference, 
Sudan Government Publication, (Khartoum,31st March 1947)*
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life in a united Sudan, attention shifted to the question 
of safeguards. When the Civil Secretary introduced to 
the Council his proposal that for better or for worse 
the Southern Sudan should be wedded to the North he 
stressed the necessity of safeguarding the cultural and 
social integrity of the South against domination and 
mismanagement by a government composed mainly of Northern 
Sudanese, Without protection, the Southerners would not 
be able to develop along indigenous lines, would be over­
whelmed and swamped by the North and would "deteriorate
•into a servile community hewing wood and drawing water for
! . ■ ■ 1 a supposedly superior aristocracy." At the Juba Confer­
ence the Southerners’ expressed fear and suspicion of 
Northern domination and demanded a number of safeguards. 
When field administrators unanimously welcomed the new 
Southern Policy as re-stated by the Civil Secretary in 
December 1946, their support; was. conditional on adequate 
safeguards for Southern identity. But what were these 
safeguards? Deputy Governor Bahr El Ghazal Area argued 
that in view of the recognition of the."distinctively 
African and negroid" character of the South, there ought 
to be granted a large measure of autonomy for the South.
The post of a Lieutenant-Governor was also proposed.
Perhaps the best suggestion was that the British should 
"stand guard here till the South can dispense- with a guard"
p. , .
to avoids domination by an Arab-civilisation. The Civil
1. "Note on situation regarding Southern Sudan, December 
1947,f, copy No.15 (Top Secret), February 1948, S.G.A./ 
SCO/1.C.l.
2. Deputy Governor Bahr El Ghazal to Governor Equatoria 
Province, (strictly confidential)y January 5th, 1947. 
S.G.A./I.C.l./SCR.
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footnote to the main events in Egypt and the Northern 
Sudan. The idea of a Southern style Administration 
Conference was not that of' the Civil Secretary but" of
" - -i • ■ •
Mar.wood, the Governor of Equatoria Province. The 
Conference lasted only two days. At the end of it, there 
were no. resolutions passed or recommendations made. The 
majority of the. Southern members were clerks and,chiefs 
all on the Government payroll. The best educated South­
erners, the Intermediate school teachers were nqt Invited.
By contrast-, the Northern Sudanese delegation was led by 
their powerful spokesman, Judge Mohammed Saleh Eh, Shingeiti, 
who so dominated the Conference, If anything,, the Con­
ference served to demonstrate to the Government that the 
semi-educated Southerners were angry and indirectly blamed 
the Sudan Government, for the backwardness of the South. 
Official arm-twisting may have been instrumental in 
.making the Southern members change their minds on the
second day of theCCohference and'acquiesce to the proposed
2fusion of the country. ‘ ;
The 559th Meeting of the Governor-General^ Council 
endorsed the Sudan ..Administration recommendation that the 
Southern Sudan should be represented In, and be subject 
to, the proposed Legislative Assembly. Once the decision 
was taken to commit the South- to the rough and tumble of
1. Governor Equatoria to Deputy Governor Wau and all
• District Commissioners (strictly confidential),
30th April 1947. S.G.A./EP/SCR/1.A.5/1.
" /YR/EP/SCR/l.B.l.
2. The educated, articulate minority in the South were 
later to charge that Southern delegates at Juba were 
bribed, blacjonailed into- accepting 'one-Sudan' policy.
Secretary himself argued that the ideal safeguard for 
Southern development along healthy lines was certainly 
the maintenance, in the Sotith for the: next fifty years of 
a British controlled administration staffed by British 
Governors and British District Commissioners and carefully 
selected Sudanese assistants. Given the urgency of the 
situation, however, such an arrangement was out of the 
question.'*' ■
Of all the safeguards proposed only one gained accept­
ance to both the Sudan Government and the Northern Sudanese 
nationalists: the suggestion that the British Governor-
General should remain head of state until the- future status
of the Sudan was decided and a satisfactory system of
. / 2 parliamentary rule established. , One cannot help feeling
that in essence the whole deal had been a betrayal as 
far as the South was concerned.,. Indeed strong views were 
felt in some British quarters against "handing over the 
South to the North." In the attempt to mediate between 
bundles .of conflicting interests the British landed them­
selves in a major contradiction on matters of principle. 
While union of the Sudan and Egypt was denied to the 
aspirants ,of "Unity of the Nile Valley", the Sudan Govern­
ment supervised the fusion of the North and South; the
1. "Note on situation regarding Southern Sudan. December 
;19^ T", copy No.15 (Top Secret), February 19^8,
S.G.A./SCO/1.C.l. .
2. This safeguard was only temporary; When independence 
came on January 1st,-. 1956 any guarantee for the South 
depended.upon Northern goodwill.
'3. "Note on situation regarding Southern SUdan, December 
19^7% Copy No.15 (Top Secret), February’1948.
S.G.A./SCO/1.C.l.
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exercise of the principle of self-determination which was
granted to the Northern Sudan was flatly denied to the
Southerners mainly to placate and win the favour of Northern
public opinion,. In every sense the Northern Sudan had
always been the favourite child .of the British. The South
was treated as a*"Cinderella". The point is better put
by a young Shilluk tribesman:
. . .We have,-been neglected. The North • \ 
v . has gone ahead but we have been .retarded. ; < vv ' 
fllf a few of, us 'are educated we can thank 
the ■missionaries, It is only in the last 
few years that the Government has shown .
any real interest in spreading learning 
among our5 people. Now we are expected to 
learn in-Arabic, because it is the 
official language of the Government in 
Khartoum. -.The introduction of Arabic is 
/ a plot to! bring us under Northern 
domination. The Arabs took our*people 
as slaves and taught us nothing. The 
British gave us protection, but still 
we are ignorant. The North is up* and •'
we are down. . . 1 .
Yet, 1 as. a result of changed policy, it seemed extremely
doubtful whether the Southern Sudan could stand on its own
as an independent unit or state, 'Intensely backward in
health, education,. and economic development it was bound .
to, be an enduring economic liability to any country which
accepted it." Only .the North/was willing to assume the
responsibility for'the South. There was also a well-
founded fear that should Southern'representation ,in the'
Legislative Assembly be delayed, or were the jurisdiction
of the Assembly to be limited to the North only, as was
that of the Advisory Council,:'"the agitation that would
be .inevitable in the North would also be echoed in-the
1. Quoted in Hyslop, J., Sudan Story (London, 1952) 
pp. 70-1.
South" The Sudan Government .would, paradoxically, lose
the trust of many Southerners and be accused of maintaining
1in the Southern Sudan, a sort of human "Whipsnade".
Waking up almost suddenly, at the eleventh-hour the British 
decided, therefore, that it was to the ultimate welfare of
the South to be opened up and to take a gamble at the
. 2
Ultimate cohesion with the North.
1. nNote on; situation regarding Southern Sudan. December 
19^7"s Copy No.15 (Top Secret), February 1948.
S.G.A./SCO/1.C.l.
2. In a recent book, Sir James Robertson re-affirmed his 
belief in the wisdom of. ^ de decision to unite the 
two halves of the country; see Transition in Africa 
/A MemoirJ, (London, 1974).
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CHAPTER VII
POST-WAR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES
Of all the problems confronting the British Admin­
istration in the Sudan, the prospects of socio-economic 
development of the South must have been the most daunting. 
When the British occupied the country at the turn of the 
century it became apparent that the tpagan* and Negroid 
South was far more backward and less developed than the 
Moslem and Arabised North. By the outbreak of the Second 
World War the development equation had further altered 
significantly and decisively in favour of the North. The 
contributing factors of Southern backwardness were primarily 
natural and historical,, but some were man-made. Indicative 
of the British attitude to Southern socio-economic develop­
ment, no serious feasibility study of the natural resources 
and development potential of the South was undertaken 
before 1954. Individual administrators and missionaries 
experimented (relying on casual labour) with anything from 
dairy farming (to meet the meat and milk requirements of 
Government officials) to Mission station orchards. And 
where possible, cotton-growing on a restricted scale was
p
encouraged among certain of the non-Nilotic tribes.
1. See (i) Southern Development Investigation Team,
"Natural Resources and Development Potential in the 
Southern Provinces of the Sudan". S.G. (Khartoum, 1954). 
(ii) Jonglei Investigation Team, "The Equatorial Nile 
Project and its Effects in the Anglo-Eguptian Sudan", 
Chairman P.P.Howell, S.G. (Khartoum, 1954).
2. Torit District in Equafcoria Province was the only one 
to produce consistently large quantities of both cotton 
and grain over the -years. For evidence of lack of 
official encouragement of cotton-cultivation among the 
Nilotics in late.19201s see: Vere; H.Fergusson, The Story 
of Fergie Bey (London 1930), pp.209-10.
It was not so much the size and sparse population of 
Southern Sudan that baffled the British administrator as 
its remoteness from the industrial and commercial centres 
of the world. Landlocked and extremely backward, the South 
offered little urge or incentive for rapid socio-economic 
and educational influence: until quite,recently the
peoples of the Southern Sudan lived a life of subsistence 
economy. In the absence of sufficient mineral and other 
wealth to attract foreign capital, agricultural improve­
ments seemed to provide the only basis* of possible future 
development of Southern Sudan. But the great distance 
from the main internal market and the country!s only 
sea-port made this task difficult to achieve. In a 
straight , line the nearest point in the Southern Sudan lay 
nearly 250 miles from Khartoum and 600 miles from Port 
Sudan. The furthest point was located over 1,000 miles 
from Khartoum and 1,200 miles from Port Sudan. Measured 
along the existing lines of copnunication (roads, rivers • 
and railway), however, the shortest distance of various 
localities in^the South from Khartoum and Port Sudan was
T
a nightmare.
■ The transport problem was further complicated by the 
existence of great natural obstacles to communication.
The upper reaches of the White Nile, the main, communi­
cation artery of the South, were far from ideal for 
navigation. The clay soils that feature largely in this 
area often became flooded or water-logged during the
1. J.J. Basinski, "Some Problems of Agricultural Develop­
ment in the Southern Sudan",‘(typescript), Development 
Branch (Khartoum, 1956); see Appendix No. 133.
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rainy seasons, making overland transport extremely diffi-
. i
cult if not impossible during the wet season;.
The costly and inefficient transport system both
within the.Southern provinces and from these to the
Northern Sudan greatly limited the economic development
prospects of the South. It effectively lowered the value
of local products,on out side.markets as well as placing
serious obstacles in the way of possible modernisation of
agricultural production methods. .For instance, costs of
imported fertilisers, implements, machinery and fuel were
bound to Increase well above the economic level. Major
C.H. Stigand, who. had had.enormous experience of the South
(as Governor of Upper Nile and Mongalla in 1915 and 1$19
respectively), was quite aware of the remoteness and
communication problem of the Southern Provinces. He,
therefore, proposed the complete separation of the Negro
Provinces of the Sudan from the Arab Provinces on economic
grounds. Having separated the administration of the Negro;
Provinces from the Arab, he wrote:
* the wage rate of the former must be kept
as low as possible ... the more the 
labour wage in a country far from the 
coast can be kept down, the greater is 
the chance of that country being able to 
enter into competition with more favourably 
situated lands. 2
Stigand was concerned that if the "exorbitant" wages .paid to
servants and artisans in Khartoum were allowed to gain
1. "Outline of-the Development Potential of the Southern 
Sudan", Development Branch, Ministry of Finance and 
Economics, S.G. (Khartoum, 1955).*
2. C.H. Stigand, Equatoria: The Lado Enclave, (London,
2nd ed. 1968) pp.201-202.
a footing in the black provinces, then all hope of 
their competing in the world market was quashed for good.
It is remarkable that this argument J carried the, day] and 
was made the cornerstone of the Government economic policy 
in the South (if ever it had one).
The sociological variable played just as much a 
role as the environmental in shaping and determining the 
course of Southern economic development or under­
development, There was, for example, the attitude to 
labour of certain of the Southern tribes, misinterpreted 
as laziness. The acute shortage of labour felt by the 
administration, particularly in the early decades, though 
not peculiar to the South alone, was not taken lightly 
by the British. In 1908 Captain Cameron, then Governor 
of Mongalla, reported that "short of putting a man to 
work under the eye of a policeman, there seems to be no 
way of getting regular steady work out of any of these 
people."'1' What was not realised was that the Southerners 
as a whole had few and simple wants which were easily 
satisfied with little labour. Some scarcely needed any , 
[clothing; the houses need not be built to keep out cold; 
the people only required a small amount of fuel for cooking 
purposes. In economic terms they had little incentive 
to work. Education could be "remedial" in this regard, 
but only after several decades. And the turbulent Dinka 
and Nuer accepted government at best as a necessary evil. . 
In the eyes of the administration "they would make fine
1. Reports of His Majesty^ Agent and Consul-General 
on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of 
Egypt and the Sudan in 1907, Rgyp. No.l (1908), Cd. 
3966/ p.235*
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soldiers, but not:desirable citizens. Could it be 
that the price for their love of freedom and independence 
was neglect. - official neglect?
The’debilitating effect of the tropical climate and 
malnutrition played4no less a role in the Southerner's 
poor, economic performance. From the view point of nutrition 
the Southerners fell into two broad categories': the tribes
inhabiting the tse-tse- infested areas of the Equatorial 
region and the cattle-owning tribes living mainly in 
Northern Bahr El Ghazal and the Upper Nile Province.
Peoples of the first category on the whole had a satisfactory 
diet quantitatively but,not qualitatively. Simply, 
starvation-was rare since cassava, other root crops, 
bananas and later, mangoes usually provided sufficient 
food reserve. However, as their diet lacked an adequate 
amount of protein, they may be described as "protein 
hungry";. The livestock-owning" peoples on. the other hand 
had a satisfactory diet in terms of quality but not
quantity. ;Some of them seldom produced enough grain for
.-. ..... p
.themselves "and were classified as "chronically hungry".
Others had alternating periods of good and lean years when
hunger conditions could be very, severe. As a rule the
livestock-owning peoples suffered annually from seasonal
food shortages. The trouble was that the 'hungry-gap1
affected crop output adversely since it occurred at( the
crucial time of cultivation, planting and early weeding of
1. Governor-General's Report for 1902, Egypt No. 1 (1903) Cd.1529,
p . 8.8 .
2.-Southern Investigation Team, op.cit.
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a new crop, when demand for labour was at'its peak.
Natural and historic factors tend,to account for
the economic and social backwardness;of the South- prior
to. the establishment of British rule; they do not
provide adequate explanation for continued Southern.
under-development during most of the Condominium period.
For that, it is best to look elsewhere; namely, to
man-made factors. Of these, lack of funds was the most
limiting. As a matter of Government policy the Northern
Sudan was provided with capital in the form of railway,
port, dam and irrigation schemes .almost from the start.
In the Southern Sudan there was no agreement on the urgent
need'for development and its method and - native
administrative practice precluded the possibility of the
social emergence of the natives. The British High
Commission for Egypt and the Sudan concealed-a contradiction
when in ,1,925 he affirmed that,
uThe development of the people 
along their own natural lines is
essential; and organised improve- ’
i ment of material conditions will 
^ v -} not be allowed to result in the ■
j loss or debasement ofthe traditional 
1 j ideas which form the basis of the
j character of the people.”
.The occasion was the opening of the Sinnar Dam, the back­
bone of the Gezira Scheme,'1' According to Civil Secretary 
Douglas Newbold, the real causes of Southern under­
development (apart from the great distances, and poor
1, Quoted in the Governor-General1s Report for 1925,
Sudan No.2 (1926), Cmd.27^2, p.6.
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communications, climatic and tribal apathy and conservatism
already enumerated) were:
a recurrent sceptism in Khartoum 
about the economic possibilities 
of the South: a natural preoccupation 
in., Khartoum with Northern problems 
of greater urgency or proximity: a
tendency in the South to interpret 
, the Southern Policy, as laid down 
in 1930, on Arcadian, lines and 
ignoring of the political time factor. 1
The last point is significant. In the hey-day of Southern.
|Policy, Mongalla and the Bahr el Ghazal Provinces were
amalgamated to form a huge administrative unit, which was
not suited to a dynamic development policy. The measure
was aimed at the reduction of all administrative work in
the Nilotic areas to the minimum possible, and only a
very strictly limited agricultural survey in the remaining 
2areas.
The Arcadian school of thought certainly attracted
some British romantics in the Southern Sudan. Admitting
the existence of some critics of schemes which involved
the social emergence of "primitive” people, Major Wyld
D.C., Zande District wrote:
No one who has known the simple African 
in his primitive state, and has seen 
the impact of ... civilisation upon 
many of them, can fail to have regrets, 
doubts and fears. The horrors of 
urbanisation, the growing pains of
1. Civil Secretary to Secretary, Governor-General1s 
Council, 3rd April 1944, Inclosure to Khartoum 
Despatch No. 89 of' 4th August 1945. App. nBn 
(Secret), P.0.371/45985.
2. Sir S. Symes had actually envisaged the disappearance 
of the District Headquarters of Aweil, Raga, Tonj 
and Yirrol, but this was found impracticable.
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semi-education, and the wrong­
headedness produced by improperly 
understood motives, are all very 
real and very distressing.!
Many years afterwards Captain Greenwood, who had served
in the Bahr el Ghazal during the difficult period of
pacification, expressed the same view:
I always did like the Dinkas.
Happy, idle, contented people, 
with few wants and no cares, 
singing to their cattle in the sun.
Stark naked and free by the river 
banks and all they wanted was to be 
left alone. 2
The Impact of War upon the South
Prom 1939 onwards, under the impact of war-needs and
demands, all arguments and doubt about the economic worth
of the South began to give way for a more forward-looking
valuation
policy. The high-administrative/of tribal apathy and
conservatism was destroyed once and for all, at least
among the non-Nilotic tribes, and the impact was felt
the most in areas closer to former Abyssinia. In the Yei
River District of Equatoria, for instance, the natives
met all the heavy man-power demands made upon the district
for essential works, particularly the construction of
Nimule-Juba and
jhighways connecting/Juba-Aba. "The response was excellent", 
the District Commissioner noted, "Yei River gangs on the 
former highways being regarded as the best." Large numbers
1. Major J.W.G. Wyld, "The Zande Scheme", in Zande Background 
(typescript) compiled by T.A.T. Leitch, S.G. (1954)7
2. H.L.I. Greenwood, "Escape in the Grass". Sudan Notes 
and Records. Vol.XXIV, Part I (1941), pp.189-196.
of natives' also joined the armed forces and travelled 
{rbv^ !:{/) i with t‘he King1 s African Rifles as far afield as India,
> Burma and Ceylon,,
In the West, Zande chiefs met all demands made upon 
them for conscript labour for. roads and other work up to 
400 miles from their homes. Like the Barf-speakers in 
Yei,- many young men enrolled- in the Equatorial Corps.
In 1942 alone Cat.the time, of the Italian invasion of
Abyssinia) 2,365 conscript labourers.were supplied and
‘ .- - - ,0
§29 men-joined the '"Pioneer Corps". , .fcSH'
In the Torit District in the East, the scene of
considerable military activity,.a large transit camp was
built and much work'was done on the main road running
from Juba out to the Abyssinian border. At least 1,200
men enlisted in the Sudan Defence Force and another 500
in the King1s African Rifles (who later saw active action
in the Buruna campaign). The district also met labour
demands for work connected with the war. Thus in 1944
labour gangs worked a total of 20,525 men-months. To
encourage war-time production of.food crops, -cotton-
growing was. slowed down. As a result: "large quantities
■ / " . X'- \ " ■ '
KtAr ,\ 0f grain were produced by the cultivators, and in 1942/ .
, j  ' -
i 43 3,200,000 rotles were purchased by the Government".
, s t . . . .
War•projects of permanent value.include the setting up
1 I of a saw-mill at Katfrein. the Imanj^ png Mountains and- •
the provision of a piped water supply in Torit. While
1. Equatorial province.;Handbook (1948) Vol.II.- Unless 
otherwise stated, the following Information is from
. . the same source.
2. Khartoum Despatch No.89 of 4th August, l-9453 APP- 
"A" (Secret), F.0.371/45985.
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Katire later established itself as a useful producer 
of timber, the piped water is said to have greatly 
contributed to "the spectacular decrease in sickness 
among officials." The war also brought vast changes 
to Juba (the present Regional Capital of the South), 
once a minor and backward townlet, "All the machines 
of war, planes, ships and lorries poured men and materials 
into Juba and bore them off to battle areas." An area 
Headquarters was created in Juba employing a vast army 
of labour ..to keep the war machine going efficiently.
The outcome of the war-time influx of people into Juba, 
was that, by 1.948, the town had grown out of all recog­
nition. It now boasted a steadily rising population of
8,000 and a large and thriving market;, buildings of a 
permanent nature multiplied steadily, and further.supply 
was limited only by the post-war shortage of materials. 
Elsewhere, the cattle-owning tribes were able to sell 
considerable numbers of cattle for the supply of meat
i
to the armed forces m  the Middle East,
At the 521st Meeting of the Governor-Genepalrs 
Council held on Saturday, 15th August 1944, the policy , 
of more intensive economic and educational development 
in the Southern Sudan was approved. jSir Douglas 
Newbold pointed out that’ the Government had a moral 
obligation to redeem the inhabitants of the South from 
ignorance, poverty and malnutrition. He argued: •
To acquiesce in the continuation of
traditional Arcadian existence of
1, Khartoum Despatch No.89 of 4th August 1945 s 
App. "A" (Secret), F .0.37.1/45985•
J
the South would be to abandon'hope of 
' ' the economic and educational progress
necessary to fit the Southerner for 
' survival in the closer contacts with
the outside world which must inevitably 
■ • . sooner or later be forced upon him.
Government cannot hold the ring for 
him for, ever. 1
This -statement reflects the changing official attitude
towards the social and educational advancement of the
South since the late thirties. One of Mr. Cox’s strongest
impressions while on a tour of inspection5was that the 7
South (1937.). was being left further and further behind
the North. . In-. his report he stressed the urgency of
' ' ‘ * ' ■ " ' 2 speeding up.developments in the'. Southern Sudan* His
impression was later confirmed in 1944 by the new Civil
Secretary, JaMes Robertson who found it incomprehensible
that a district Headquarters like Yambio, where the District
Commissioner looks after a quarter of a million people
should have no telegraph or telephone. He thought.that
roads and- rivers', could be, made more' all season* without
a great deal of expense. He reckoned that if.there were
masses of "decent” things around to buy - such as good
cooking;pots, reasonable clothes, in fact anything to
stimulate consumer desire s.] amongst the, "mass" of. people -
then-these things would become:fashionable and the natives
would have to get ..down to it and work, for them. Thus
1. Khartoum Despatch No.89 of* 4th August' 1945, App. "A”
( secret)., .371/45i98b /Italics added/. •
,2.; Mr. •C.v'Cox.1 s-.'"Memoranduii: on'Education in Southern 
. Sudan", 1937, (S.G.A. Khartoum).
31 .hT*Robertson toR.C. Mayall, 19th May 1944, P.O.371/
' . 41363. Mr. Scrivener of the P.O. commented-: "The
v 3' author /i.e. Robertson) is .the Deputy* Civil Secretary - 
- ’an extremely balanced., and able Scot." See P.O. Minutes 
8th June 1944, P.0.37i/.;4l38'3. v
on its own massive evidence the Sudan Government admitted
in 1945 that "progress Z.in-the South/ has been on the
' • 1 whole, only spasmodic, compared with the,Northern Sudan."
Apart from moral and economic reasons, there were
strong political reasons to compel the adoption of a more
positive policy in Southern Sudan. The Northern Sudanese
nationalists and Egypt had long had*their eyes on the
South. They disliked the Government educational policy ,
/use of Missions and teaching of English.instead of Arabie7
and criticized in severe terms, the backwardness of the
South:
If the Missionaries had enlightened the 
Southerners and raised their standards
to the level of Northerners, we would
not have objected to their presence 
and would have looked upon them -as ser­
vants of humanity and civilisation ... 
Unfortunately they have done nothing 
of the sort. 2
Furthermore,;funds were not only available after the war ■
;  t J u  )
,.but official opinion both in the South and Khartoum
seemed to be, more favourable to a firm development policy.
Leading Northern politicians freely advocated the use of 
Northern funds for development programmes in the South.
In the words of the President of the Graduates General 
..Congress, "We wish to see money from the Central Treasury 
spent generously on the development of the South; None of 
us would like to see his fellow-countrymen naked any 
'longeri" One other reason why the Sudan Government found
1. Civil Secretary to Secretary Governor-General *s’
Council, 3rd April 1944, op.cit.
2. Memorandum by President of the Graduates Congress to the 
Governor-General of the Sudan, 6th October 1943, F.0.371/ 
45986.
3. Ibid.
it imperative to go faster in both education and material 
development was international opinion after the War: in
particular, American opinion and the impression that the 
existing backward" state of the South would give way to (say) 
a Mandate Commission of a Regional African Council.'1' Such 
were, the .reasons that persuaded Khartoum ."to balance 
necessity of discounting the cost of transport for Southern 
produce against the inevitability and desirability of 
general- uplift, not of wages by themselves, but of health, 
education, husbandry, social standards, labour conditions,
" ■ - . p
revenues .... together with wages."
The, Development Programmes
As a first administrative step in keeping with the 
declared,policy of social, educational and economic 
advancement of. Southern Sudan, a proposal was made in. 
January '1945 for the, redivision of Equatoria into more 
manageable,units.J -Meanwhile, a profound change had also 
taken; place in colonial administrative thinking: in place
of native administr'atipn with its traditionalist and 
retrograde "tendencies, .local government councils were 
instituted with all the democratic principles ahd practice ' 
implied. Experiment in local government was especially,
1. Khartoum Despatch No.89 of 4th August 1945/ App, "B" (i)
(Secret)/P.0.371/45985.
2. . Khartoum Despatch No.89 of 4th August 1945, App. "A"
'(Secret), P.D.37I/45985.
3. "Memorandum on Proposed Re-division of Equatoria",
.1945, (Very Secret), S.G. F. 0.37.1/45985.
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popular among the Dinkas. The first successful experiment
in local, government was carried out in 1947 -at Gongrial
which became the proto-type for other areas:
Here the lack of autocratic tradition 
was not unhealthy, for it enabled the 
autocratic stage of native administration, 
through which the.Northern Sudan had to 
pass, to be skipped.and the system to  ^
have a broader and more democratic basis. .
The.new system was based on a council of members drawn
from all parts of the district and meeting several times
a.> year. The council exercised control over a permanent
executive of three men (changing by rotation periodically) who
were themselves responsible for all routine administration.
This executive committee showed "remarkable grasp of
otheir functions and responsibilities." The whole attempt 
led to the establishment of a warranted local government 
with an independent budget at Gongrial in 1949. A system 
of similar,, though not warranted administrations, was 
later extended'.to the whole of Bahr el Ghazal. In Wau 
township, a town council was set up at first without,a 
warrant or independent budget. Equatorial Province and 
Upper Nile in turn received similar treatment. Despite 
the:initial amateurish character, the device proved to 
be. useful in the training of men,in civic duties and in 
stimulating;;interest m  public affairs.^
In the sphere .of education, the Director submitted 
to the- Governor-GeneralTs Council a programme for expansion
1- .Equatorial Province Handbook 1936-48. Vol.II, p.51.
2. Governor-General*s Report for 1947, Cmd. 7835, Sudan 
Mo.1 (1949) p.214. :
3. ,• Ibid. .
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of Southern education, both sideways and upwards, employing 
both Government and Mission insituations. His proposals 
were incorporated into the general five-year programme 
for the expansion and improvement of the education system 
in the Sudan as a whole put forward in 1946. The main 
objects for the Southern Sudan were the consolidation, 
improvement and expansion of -the existing Mission framework 
coupled with the gradual introduction of Government schools 
and institutions. The specific objectives were summarised 
thus:
"(a) the lengthening of the elementary 
course from 4 to 6 years and the 
filling of classes to capacity.
Elementary schools would then become 
known as Primary schools.
(b) the extension of the village school 
course from 2 to 3 years and the 
gradual conversion of certain village 
schools into Elementary school 
proper.
(c) a steady output of teachers for village 
schools and the lower classes of Primary 
schools from the TeaQher Training 
Centres and an improvement of their 
General standard of education.
(d) the improvement of the intermediate 
schools which would become known as 
Junior Secondary schools and an in­
crease in the number of pupils 
attending them.
(e) the setting up of two Teacher Training 
Colleges for training teachers for 
the higher classes of Primary Schools, 
one at Mundri primarily for the 
Protestant schools and one at.Bussere 
primarily for the Roman Catholic 
schools.
(f) the setting up of District Education 
Councils to afford more direct partner­
ship between Government, Missions
and local people in local educational, 
responsibility.
(g) pay and conditions of service of
African teachers to he commensurate 
with those of Government employees.
Government grants to Missions were increased to cover 
three quarters of the cost of maintaining' and running the - 
schools as well as.three quarters of the capital costs of 
the new buildings necessitated by the plan.
The plan also envisaged the setting,up of certain 
Government schools. In 1943 a Primal school for the,
Dinka was started at Tonj'and two others, were opened at 
Aweil and Rumbek in 1947. A Senior Secondary School for 
the three Southern Provinces was started at Rumbek in 1949 
after a preliminary year had been run in at the Intermediate 
school at Atar in the Upper Nile. The Ministry of Education 
assumed the responsibility for training personnel for•the 
Department of Agriculture.and Forests in"1947* and the 
training of clerks and book-keepers and general education 
of Medical Assistants and Sanitary'Overseers in Juba .in 
1948. A further five-year plan for educational develop­
ment was drawn up in 1950. This dealt, primarily, with 
the introduction of the beaching of the’ Arabic language
in mission schools- and the creation of more state-owned
2 • ■ schools. But the execution of the new programme was
delayed, partly on account of intense political activity
of the early 1950s, but mainly because of outbreak of a
mutiny in Equatoria in 1955 which necessitated the closure
1. Equatoria 'Province Handbook-'1956-48, Vol. II (1950), 
p. 96 . “
2. Proposals for the Expansion and Improvement of the 
Educational System in the,Southern Provinces. 1951-1956, 
Ministry of Education, Khartoum.
of Southern schools and ..the transfer of a few to the 
North., ■-
The Zande Scheme..^
Amongst post-war development plans for the Southern 
Sudan the Zande scheme must rate as the most important. 
Conscious of the rule that economic development ought to 
accompany, and not precede or follow, educational expansion,; 
the Sudan Government decided to launch the Zande develop­
ment scheme in late 1945. The Central Government stressed 
that the scheme was intended "not to exclude-but to complement
a general campaign to increase and improve- food crops and
2 " • animal husbandry." The strategy envisaged the achieve­
ment of self-sufficiency in a balanced’range of foodstuffs 
as the first priority, with the production of exports 
taking second place. The Civil Secretary informed the 
British Foreign" Office in August 1945 -that the- scheme had 
been.approved "as an act of faith-in the innate capacity 
of the Southerners to make good, given the ‘capital with 
which t:o start: as the Northern Sudan has-; made good having,
hy geographical and other accidents, been given capital 
first.
The official responsible for initiating- the development 
scheme in Southern Sudan was Dr. j-.D. Tothill, then Director
,1. An account of -later progress: of the-Zande Scheme may 
be found in-C.C. ReiningTs book; The Zande Scheme 
(Illinois, 1966). ‘
2. Appendix "A" of Enclosure to Khartoum Despatch No.89 
of 4th August 1945, F.0.371/45985. , :
3. Ibid.
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of Agriculture. Prior to coming to the Sudan Dr. Tothill 
had held a similar post in neighbouring Uganda. His 
Experience wa,s, therefore, invaluable. In 1939 and 1940
, if
he visited the Zande areas of Yambio, Maridi and Yei. He 
appreciated their agricultural potentialities as well as 
the immense problem of developing these potentialities in 
view of the remoteness,offcthe areas concerned. Dr. Tothill*s 
plans and deliberations resulted in a ten-year economic 
development plan framed in 1940. The. war supervened to 
prevent any substantial implementation of the plan. In
i1'
1943 he put forward a further specific proposal for 
development in a limited area; he chose Zande land as the 
area most likely to produce results. He called his scheme 
,fa proposal for the social emergence of a remote and back­
ward p e o p l e . O n  the recommendation of the Board of 
Economics and Trade in December 1^ .44, the Governor-General - 
agreed to the setting up of an Equatoria-Planning Committee 
with the following-terms of reference:
to consider and to co-ordinate plans 
Hfor all economic development in '
- Equatoria Province on its own initiative 
or on submission from any outside 
source and to make recommendations to 
the Board of Economics and Trade.
The Board also agreed the creation.of an ad hoc Committee 
to visit the site of the proposed Zande scheme, "investigate 
the details of the scheme, consider the establishment of 
a trading unit and, by maintaining, close contact with the 
Equatoria,Planning Committee, facilitate the early sub­
mission of considered plans to the Board of Economics
1. See Dr. TothillTs Memorandum on Zande Development 
scheme dated 16th December 1943, S.G.A. Khartoum.
and Trade."^ u ' . .
The ad hoc Committee modified'Dr. Tothill’s plan in ' 
one significant respect. ■ The policy of self-sufficiency 
was defective because total prohibition of all imports 
recommended by-Tothill was not only undesirable but also 
impossible to achieve.- Not only would .the machinery 
required to enforce a policy of that kind be colossal - . ■
but smuggling would increase and "there would be general 
dissatisfaction if cheap and otherwise desirable- articles 
available elsewhere in the Sudan or just over the border 
were denied to the Azande." Moreover, local- building 
materials were.not always satisfactory for all purposes
and their exclusive use might prove to be expensive, thus
o -
delaying construction,- In 1946 the combined, efforts
of the two Committees backed by the recommendations of the
Board oi* Economics and Trade resulted in: - the creation
of ah Agricultural Projects Board, for Equatoria (E.P.B,) , ^ \ .
. , ; ^ It***-
the acceptance of a modified Zande scheme under the over--
'■ *- '■ " , ..* •<
- 1 '  .  t -,/vall management of the E.P.B. and the establishment of a.
Trading Unit to. operate throughout Equatoria under the 
auspices, of- the ’Equatoria Projects Board. The E.P.B. had 
an Initial capital of £E.500,000 later increased to- 
£E. 1,000,000. The.-Board was . charged with responsibility
1. Financial Secretary to Secretary Governor-GeneralTs
’ Council, (FDF/341-1) 22nd June 1945* App:. ,?C"
(ii) (Secret) of Enclosure to .Khartoum Despatch 
, No. 89 of 4th August 1945, P.O.371/45985.
2. Record- of Meetings held at Yambio between 22nd. and
28th‘February 1945 by ad hoc Committee for Zande 
Development Project:,-'see A TI. "C" (i) (Strictly 
Confidential) of Enclosure:to Khartoum Despatch No.89 
op.cit. • ■
for. creating industries whereby peasant-grown crops pould 
be processed on the spot into tradeable goods, thereby 
saving transportation costs and at the same time providing 
the Azande with a cash crop.
The Financial Secretary, J.W.E. '.Miller, felt that the 
scheme as a whole was not one that a sound,.commercial 
body would undertake. Nevertheless,. it.had tremendous 
advantages from the point of view of the South: "it does offer
employment to over 450 Southerners as clerks, artisans 
dr shopkeepers,, a remunerative market for the produce of 
.several..thousand cultivators*" When linked 1 with.the pro­
gramme for educational development already formulated, 
the .scheme should be capable of providing the means for 
a general rise in the standards of living and social well­
being in a part of Equatoria. 1 This was sound' observation.
In 1949 when the^nojects were completed Nzara, some 12 / 
miles west of Yambio had become the industrial centre 
of the project with ginning factories, spinning and 
weaving mills, oil presses,, a soap factory, workshops 
arid stores. Sakure on the frontier, with the former Belgian 
Congo became the centre of a jaggery sugar industry.
The fruits of the Zande scheme were also supposed 
to filter out.to the remaining Southern communities 
through the agency of^the Trading Unit of the E.P.B. The 
.structure of the' Trading Unit itself was designed to 
enhance this' purpose.. Based, on fixed points or base, shops
1. Financial Secretary to Secretary Governor-General1s 
Council, op.cit.
2. Equatoria Province Handbook. 1936-48, Vol.II, p.33.
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where wholesale stores were situated* a network of smaller 
townships and bush shops radiated. Thus as the.Zande 
scheme progressed and matured, base shops with garages and 
stores were established at Wau, Yambio and Juba with' the 
primary functions of supervising and stocking small townships 
shops■at Aweil, Tonj, Rumbek, Maridi, Tambura, Amadi, Yei, 
Torit in addition to 30 bush shops and stores. .A travelling 
shop or "Canteen Lorry" was also provided to cover areas 
where the population, although plentiful, was scattered 
and to cater for the needs of semi-nomadic tribes. In 
establishing a Trading Concern as a subsidiary of the E.P.B., 
the Government hoped to achieve the following objectives:
(i) to instill into the minds of Southern 
Sudanese an idea of value, uses and 
conscience of money as a medium of 
exchange, and to eliminate bartering;
(ii) to stimulate the desire for simple and 
useful goods with the view to gener­
ating and sustaining trade and voluntary 
labour;
(ii.i) to provide basic commercial and trading 
services at an official standard of 
price and quality "without the danger 
of being exploited or deceived by 
rapacious merchants and the unnecessary 
but inevitable incidence of numerous 
middlemen;"
(iv) to provide opportunities in commercial 
education to suitable Southerners to 
enable some of them ,to open up' trading 
ventures of their,own. 1
.Why was an area so remote from either Northern Sudan 
or East Africa selected'as the site of an important agro­
industrial. complex? Zande land, located on the Nile-Congo 
Divide, is.very near the centre of Africa. It is remote
1. "Zande Development Project" by J.W.E. Miller Financial 
Secretary, App. Ill, (to "C" (ii)) of Enclosure to 
Khartoum Despatch No.89, op.cit.
from natural communications arteries of the South defined 
in terms of. navigable waterways. It is equidistant from 
Juba and Wau by about 330 miles. The former is the 
most Southerly navigable point on the Nile within the Sudan 
and the latter is also the Southernmost navigable point 
on the Jur River, open for only two or three months in
( t
the year: during high flood. Juba is approximately 1,700 
miles from Port Sudan and 1,800 miles from Wadi Haifa, a 
border post on the Egyptian frontier. There was an im­
portant road linking Juba with Uganda but the distance from 
Yambio (the headquarters of the E.P.B.) to Soroti which 
was the terminus of the Kenya and Uganda Railway was 
about 700 miles. Soroti itself was about 800 miles from 
Mombasa. ■ The other important road from Juba westward to 
former Belgian Congo had its shortcomings too: the distances
to any.main navigable waterway or railway were equally 
immense. There can be little doubt that this remoteness
r
had direct bearing on the conception of the Zande scheme, 
but this does demand further explanation.
When Dr. Tothill picked the Zande as the area most 
likely to yield quick results he had very good reasons to 
do so. Ecological factors as well as ideal sociological 
conditions combined with historical accident to outweigh 
the fact of inaccessibility. A vital ecological survey 
had been undertaken by Dr. Myers, appointed in 1937., of 
the area around Yei, Maridi and Yambio. Until his untimely 
death in 19^2, Myers devoted himself to the task of teaching 
the natives new agricultural techniques and introducing new 
varieties,of crops to the area. Dr. Tothill paid him
tribute when he recorded that the Zande scheme could 
never' have been dreamed of but for the pioneer work so 
enthusiastically and intelligently carried out by Myers.
The South he said, owed to Myers a great debt of gratitude. 1 
The region coyered by the scheme is about 360 miles wide.
It'is best described as "grassy woodland" and has an 
average of 55 Inches a year of rainfall and frequently 
gets 60 or even 70 inches a year. Its altitude is nowhere 
below 2,000 feet, and rises to 3,000 feet in a plateau 
south of Yei. The region is well watered and well drained, 
unlike the flood region in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and 
Upper Nile Province, and there are no swamps of any size. 
Between the rivers the country is generally undulating.
■The agricultural soil occurs as reddish clays and clay
2 ' . .loams. . Cotton was the' most immediately practicable cash-
crop and Myers reckoned that it could be grown profitably
in the Zande country..
The great advantage, of Zande districts over all other
areas in:terms of agricultural potential lay in the sphere
of the traditional occupation of the people:-
"Agricultural development requires, not 
only suitable land but also suitable 
cultivators; and, fortunately,, the 
Western half of the area is peopled by 
Azande, who are pre-eminently agricultural 
and - amenable to administration. They -:
1. J.D.Tothill ,(ed.) Agriculture in the Sudan (2nd
Impression, London 1952), p.592.
2. Detailed descriptions of the soils of Zande country
may be found In Tothill (ed.) Agriculture in the Sudan„ 
,op.cit. at pp.120, 140 and 156.
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have, few domestic animals, but produce .
very, diversified crops, many with 
. numerous varieties." 1
Major J.W.G.Wyld who had been District Commissioner.for the
Zande district of Yambio for over sixteen years wrote
that the variety of cultivated and edible plants and crops
in Zande country was prodigious:
The grain is elusine or finger-millet,
Other grains, grown are maize, a little 
ordinary millet, bulrush millet and 
rice. The main root crops are cassava 
and sweet potatoes. Ground nuts are 
universally grown in large quantities 
and form one of the most important
articles of diet. There are at least
half a dozen varieties of beans; sesame 
thrives ... the commonest fruits are 
mangoes, bananas, pineapples and limes.
All forms of, citrus grow readily. The 
oil palm thrives in the 1 green belt1, 
though it is not indigenous. Robusta - 
coffee can\be grown With success. - There 
\  are many forms of native vegetable in-
, , eluding pumpkins, marrows, yarns ' and
various kinds of spinach. 2
The .catalogue of food-crops is evidence of the fact that
a' number of foreign plants had been successfully introduced.
^  \ Cassava, maize, sweet potatoes, and ground-nuts with
wide distribution in Equatoria Province, are all originally
non-African plants. But cassava, ground-nuts and oil
• ■ palm warrant.special attention for quite different reasons.
Cassava was a favourite food-crop with the Azande and
an insurance against famine,.since it is not eaten by
locusts and involves no storage problems: it can remain
1.. Tothill, Agriculture in the Sudan, op.cit. 8 p.589.
2. Zande Background (compiled and edited by T.A.T. Leitch,., 
S. C . 1954?) type script, p. 71. ‘
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in the ground in satisfactory condition till required* 
for up to 4 years. As for groundnuts, so important in 
the diet on account of their protein content, they could 
yield two crops in a year. The newly introduced oil 
palms were equally essential in the diet for their high •
content of vitamin 'A*. There was, however, one great
ir
i deficiency in the Zande diet, and that was meat. The1 ’
I only domestic animals, chickens and dogs, were not eaten.i • .
;The former, of the poor and stringy type, were mainly used 
for consulting oracles, while the latter were greatly 
valued and used- for hunting. This explains why the Azande 
craving for meat was almost pathological. 1 Nevertheless 
it was quite prudent and appropriate that the scheme 
should be located in an area free from famine or threat 
of it. Zande land was selected for the agricultural ex­
periment because it was where the food problem did not 
cause anxiety. "Unfortunately", said Major WyId again,
"there are areas in the Southern Sudan where crops and 
food supplies are produced on a meagre subsistence basis 
only."^
The receptiveness and amenability of the Azande to 
foreign or, external' influences may have also influenced 
the choice of the. Zande as the site of first major economic 
development project. Way back in 1902 the first officer-
■ administrators of Zande country noted that the Azande were 
•prosperous people and anxious to progress. "The Niam
1. Tothill, Agriculture in the Sudan, op.cit. pp.590-1,
■2. Zande Background (typescript), op.cit. p.74.
257.
jNiams /JAzande7 are well-disposed to Government and anxious
to trade generally.” A eouple of years, later Major
Boulnois, the jMoudir\of the Bahr el Ghazal reported that
there was a great demand for clothing and civilised com-
2modities among the Azande and related tribes. This 
was in sharp contrast to. the "deep-rooted mistrust of Govern­
ment- motives ... by the Dinkas and Nuers."*^  .On,the whole, 
then, the AzandeTs propensity to appear to be civilised 
was well-established,fact even in the; early decades of 
Condominium rule.
Five years after/its launching the Zande scheme 
.proved beyond any doubt that if properly equipped and 
given sufficient incentive, the Southerner was capable of 
fending for himself. The implementation of the scheme 
had called for the resettlement of population in accessible 
groups of homesteads, taking due. regard to the best soil 
and the availability of water supplies. The- operation, 
conducted piecemeal, involved'the erection of nearly
1,000 villages to accommodate nearly 51,000 families that 
made up the population of Yambio district. The District 
Commissioner reported th‘a.t the Azande partook in their 
resettlement "with the utmost cheerfulness and have grown 
crops in a reasonably.methodical and efficient manner."
In 1948 the cotton yield was only 'a little short of
1. Governor-General*s Report for 1902, Egypt No.l (1903),
Cd. 1529, p.8.8,
2. Report by Major Boulnois, the Moudir« of the Bahr el 
Ghazal quoted in Governor-General’s Report for 1904, 
Egypt. No.l (1905) Cd, 2409: p.1^ 2.,
3. RepDrt by Major Mathews, the Moudir of Upper Nile Pro­
vinces, quoted in Governor-General1s Report for"1904, 
Egypt. No.l (1905) Cd. 2409 p.149.-
50,000 kantars which was the target set for the spinning
.j i ,
and weaving industry. The Azande cheerfully met all' the , 
labour demand for road construction and building both at 
Yambio' and Nzara.. • The estimate for 1948 of adult males 
who' supplied the labour market was 80$, by far the highest 
by Southern Sudan standards. Nevertheless, the Azande 
were not industrialized, as peasant agriculture still 
provided the most5 important occupation for the vast 
majority of Zande tribesmen. Indeed, it was estimated that 
industrial" occupations would absorb about 2% of the total 
population only.'*'
All the achievements of the Zande scheme were made 
without incurring the terrible disruption in the tribal 
life that was.greatly feared in the pre-war. years. 'Per­
haps, the British, in the Sudan, realised belatedly., "that 
no area, in the world can be segregated or, if you like,
preserved, from the onflowing'tide of sophistication and
■ ■ p
the upheaval of progress.” For this reason it is . 
appropriate to conclude this chapter by repeating, the 
familiar nationalist charge that the British provided 
"too little too late."
1. Eg u at or ia; Pro y in c e Handb o.o k (1936-48), Vol. II-, p.34.
2. Zande Background, op.cit-., p. 7 7.
CHAPTER VIII
THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN 
THE SOUTH 1.947 " 1955.
The persistent theme of neglect, stagnation and 
underdevelopment which dominated official thinking in the 
South prior to 1947 could hardly escape nemesis of some . 
kind. Inevitably, either the Sudan Government or a suc­
ceeding administration would, have to pay heavily at the 
end of the day. The Southerners, inexperienced in the 
techniques of local government (administration was still 
very direct) had no Advisory Council of their own to function 
as preparatory school of political education leading to 
self-government. Needless to say it cost the South valuable 
time and lives before recognising and utilising legal 
and constitutional channels as means by which political 
grievances might be vented and, redressed. The South's 
first impulses were thus to resort to direct action as a 
rational and practicable,alternative.
Rapid Sudanisation of Administration and the Military 
establishment in fulfilment of the self-rule pledge scarcely 
brought the South immediate material benefits. Political 
immaturity, combined with inadequate preparation both 
educationally and economically, led to predictably violent 
outbursts in the South. Jealous, frustrated and highly 
suspicious of Northern intentions, the Southerners could 
visualise but little prospects for themselves in an in­
dependent Sudan. The upshot of this fissiparous tendency 
had been to deny. Southern Sudan a peaceful transition to
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self-rule and independence and to plunge the country into 
a bloody, protracted, and costly civil war. As for the 
British colonial masters, the outbreak of mutiny in the 
South in 1955 which marked the beginning of the civil 
war was but a painful reminder of their,failures in the 
South.
A - The Juba Effendia Strike.
On 1st October 19^7:the town of Juba was hit by a 
wave of strike which involved both skilled and unskilled 
labour, hospital dressers and unclassified staff.
Government workshops and the Post and Telegraphs services 
came to a halt but essential services were maintained.
On the second day, the strike continued and spread to 
Southern classified staff (Article II), to the sanitary 
services and house-servants most'of whom withdrew to 
-the Native Lodging Area (N.L.A.). Strike pickets at 
t,imes numbering a hundred men blocked' ,the road from the 
Native Lodging Area to Juba,town. The authorities could 
neither pin down the ringleaders, the prime movers, nor
identify the cause of the"strike and,the strike itself
. 1  ' appeared well organised.
The extent and seriousness of the strike was indicated 
by the instances of intimidation and molestation which
1. Governor Juba to Civil Secretary (telegraphic, urgent), 
CS/SCR/36. M.15, 1st October 1947; "Diary of Juba 
Strike" in Governor Equatoria to Civii Secretary, 
(Secret), CS/SCR/36. M.15, 3rd October 1947, 2 Dakhtia 
1/5/24, S.G.A. Khartoum. The following sources.unless 
otherwise given are from the same file.
occurred'on the third day of the strike, 3rd October 1947.
Gars and commercial vehicles were stoned and their wind­
screens smashed. Not only was his own car stoned but the 
District Commissioner himself was shouted down by the 
strikers. The contractors1 mail lorry from Yei was inter­
cepted and its contents confiscated. House servants and 
labourers.who attempted to break the picket line were 
stopped and.beaten up. One, houseboy who continued
to work in. defiance of the strike was molested inside the 
house of his master, a Northern Effendia. A Southern 
tribesman found bargaining with a Northern merchant over 
a sheep was stopped and.prevented from completing the sale.
A hotel barman was attacked and beaten on his way to work.
In another incident one or two; Northern clerks of the 
•Province Headquarters were accosted on their way to work.
Even the GovernorTs own driver was prevented from attending 
his duties. Intimidators also entered the Mission premises 
and deterred Southern employees from continuing with.their 
work. Because the strikers had the sympathy of the police, 
the pickets were a hundred per cent effective.^ The 
Assistant Governor reported that "The atmosphere was one 
of emergency and considerable tension. Main roads were 
completely empty ... cessation of petrol supply." In 
fact so grave was the situation that the District Commissioner 
established a small emergency Police post in the heart of
1. "Diary of Juba Strike", A.C. Beaton to Civil Secretary 
(Secret) EP/SCR/36.B.5/I.
2. "A Short Diary on Juba Strike for Press handout" Beaton 
to Public Relations Officer (Strictly confidential) 
EP/SCR/36.B.5/I. , 7th October. 1947.
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the Native Lodging Area where the strikers were concentrated.^ 
The Juba strike was hardly over when fresh outbreaks 
of sympathetic strikes hit the districts and other Southern 
townships . - .Three days after the eruption in 'Juba, • Article
II clerical staff and Southern employees in Torit in Eastern
■ 2 Equatoria threatened a sympathetic strike. At Loka and
Kagelu forest camps on the 7th October, reluctant labourers
. , . . * . 3joined Articles II and III m  a sympathetic strike action.
Similar strike actions were also reported at Tonj and Nyinakoke 
in the Bahr el Ghazal on the 9th October. This wave of 
strikes was soon terminated but clerical staff at Rumbak 
went on a belated strike on' the morning of the 13th October 
which soon fizzled out.
More ruffling to the Administration than the scuffles 
and lootings was the initial lassitude of the local chiefs 
and headmen; the fact that the strike had the sympathy
0.f the- Southern' Welfare Committee (a pseudo-political 
organisation); that no prior warning was given of the 
impending strike nor constitutional approach followed (i.e.- 
no formal complaints had been filed through Heads of 
Departments or the District Commissioner).' Mpst upsetting 
and the grimmest of all, the police themselves were alleged 
to have participated in turning, back people on their way to
1. "Diary of Juba Strike", A.C. Beaton to Civil Secretary 
(Secret), EP/SCR/36.B.5/1. 6th October 1947*
2. Ibid.
3. Governor of Juba to Civil S.ecretary, (telegraphic) 
CS/SCR/36.M.-15, 9th October 1947.
4. Ibid.
5. Governor Juba to Civil Secretary (Urgent) EP/SCR/3 6.M.15, 
13th October 1947* ' .
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work, and at least one police driver was reported to have 
taken part in car stoning,1
The immediate cause of the strike was the fpernicious
rumourT that grain in Jitba market had suddenly risen in
2 3price by forty per eent, In a region where newspapers
of any sort were non-existent,, let alone a wireless 
h
station, it is no.wonder that "rumours were rife and 
spread uncontrollably". Because this particular piece of 
rumour concerned matters of livelihood it/was "the most 
difficult ... to scotch.Initially, it was presumed, 
that Juba's Native Lodging Area was infested with unemployed 
elements who were themselves trouble makers and that by 
!' living parasitically on their employed kinsmen' the -idlers
\ brought the living standards of the employed to below
1 ■ .| normal. The assumption was that Government officials and
! •_ '
other Southern employees were being paid a normal living
^-wage. Thus the authorities resolved to purge the N.L.A.
1' ■ ■ - 6
! regularly of "parasites" as soon as the strike was over.
As the.dust settled, however, it became apparent that
1. Governor Juba to Civil Secretary (Secret) CS/SCR/36,M.15, 
3rd October 1947; "Diary of Juba' Strike" A.C. Beaton
to Civil Secretary (Secret) EP/SCR/36.B.5/1.
2. "A Short Diary oh Juba Strike for Press handouts",
Enclosure in A.C. Beaton to Public Relations Officer 
('strictly confidential), EP/SCR/36.B,5/1, 7th October 1947.
3. The Messenger and Light■owned by the Roman Catholic and 
Prote.stand Missions respectively, were often packed with 
Church news. Missionaries were forbidden to meddle in 
'political' matters.
4. The only Government wireless service which broadcast in 
Arabic was located at Omdurman- in the North, over a 
thousand miles from Juba.
5. "A Short Diary on Juba. Strike for Press handouts" A.C, 
Beaton to Public Relations Officer (strictly confidential) 
EP/SCR/36.B,5/1,7th October 1947.
6. A.C.Beaton to Civil Secretary (Secret) EP/SCR/36.5/1 ,
‘ 6th'October 1947.
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unemployed elements were merely the tip of the iceberg.
The1 strike was' actually organised by Southern Article t
II and Article' III staff to draw attention to the high cost' x„
At
of living In Juba where Southern pay packets hardly kept 5 ' Af;:
pace with the ever-rising prices of foodstuffs and essential 
consumer goods.' Juba (like Omdurman), it was pointed' out, 
was an artificial town in an area which contributed little 
or nothing to its sustenance, for, the surrounding inhabi­
tants not only did not sell surplus produce in Juba but 
would even import grain in the Juba'market to supplement 
| their own. As nearly all grain needed in Juba -had to be .■
.imported from the North, factors, such as transport costs,
several middlemenT s pickings and the much lower. Southern vt
rates of pay and wages (than they were in the North) \ f/f
contributed a great deal to the high cost of living. In
brief, all prices in JUba were "Northern prices' plus".^  - f
; " , v  . . . "  ‘7
Evidence of Government inattention to the'immediate ' ‘ t
■’ ■ ' ' 1 - V * -v.
post-war needs of the South as a whole abounds. Scarcity 
of meat in Juba1 as in many other townships in Equhtoria, c
for instance,■was a fact of life. Meat had to be bought 
from reluctant Dinka and tribesmen and transported over 
difficult terrain on the hoof, so that it was both diffi­
cult and expensive to obtain while- demand ■ was about ten
1. "Record of Meeting held in the Deputy Civil Secretary’s
Office on 12th October 1947 to discuss the'implications
■ of Juba Strike". Attendance included,Sanders (Acting 
Ciyil Secretary), Marwood (Governor Equatoria Province) 
Chick (Acting Finahcial Secretary)* Les (Acting Director 
of Establishment), Disney (Acting Director, Economics
and Trade), Beaton (Deputy Governor, Equatorial Province),
■ ' Keen (Assistant Civil Secretary (bo)), Abdel Garder Yusuf.
'(Acting Labour Officer),•see 2, Dakhlia, 1/5/24. •
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- 1 times more than before, the war. Yet pressure by Govern­
ment for labour for roads and buildings and development
. , .an
generally was very great. In view of/equal pressure
to supply schools, hospital staff, army and the police
with local grain it must be realised that every labourer
and employee in Juba was a man taken from agricultural ■
production. While the Government had piles of grain at
Khartoum North as a matter of policy to break any attempt
at undue price raising under "free trade", there were
no such piles anywhere in the South and no precaution
; 2taken against undue price raising by Northern merchants.
War-time needs and post-war developments had not
only greatly increased the labouring population in Juba
in particular and the South in general, but the decision
to amalgamate (which also entailed integration of the
Southern and Northern economies) negated all arguments
for maintaining separate and lower scales of pay for
Southern officials and employees. The point is better
stated by one Field officer thus:
... why should a Southerner working at 
Juba whose home.is 5 miles away .have 
his pay reduced for that reason as 
compared with his colleagues whose 
homes are further away. A scale fJ ?
Northern native of Tuti Island (located 
at the confluence of the Blue and White 
Niles) gets the same pay whether he 
works in Khartoum or' in Umkedada. The 
1 working at home1 argument for lower 
pay has long been nonsense. 3
1. "Notes on Grain Supply" (Intld) D.M.H.E. Enclosure III 
in Beaton to Civil Secretary (Secret) EP/SCR/36.B.5/1, 
6th October 19^7.
2. Ibid.
3. "Note on Grain Supply (Intld): D.M.H.E. Enclosure III, 
Summary. Ibid.
Southern, officials and employees in these "circumstances 
perhaps heeded to- demonstrate a- degree not so mu:ch of 
political sophistication as of minimum political conscious­
ness if their grievances were to:be redressed. After 
all,.. interest adjudication . follows interest articulation 
as demand is antecedent ..to supply.,
■ , . On studying the ■ implications, of the Juba strike 
the Central Government concluded that "just grievances 
must be fully met and a .general minimum (of rate of pay) 
fixed which must enable a worker.to support himself and
i  .
his family at a reasonable level." Sample personal 
budgetshad indicated that, a worker just could not keep 
himself on existing wages. As interim measures it was 
proposed to raise the basic daily rate of unskilled labour 
in Juba by thirty per cent (from 30-35m/ms to 45m/ms). 
Similarly, rates paid to-. Article II staff were to be 
scaled up by the same amount. The idea was that no adult 
worker.in Juba should be paid less than 125 P.T. per 
month (inclusive of cost of living allowance)* The rises 
were to take effect retrospectively from 1st October 1947.
It was also absolutely essential'-that urgent steps ..be 
taken to ensure the reliability of the police. A proposal 
was made to-pay a station allowance of 50 P.T. for Juba and 
30 P.T. for Wau and Toriir police forthwith, again,- retro­
spectively from the date the strike’first broke -out. A
1. Record of a meeting held in the Deputy Civil Secretary's 
office on 12th October 1947, to discuss, the-implication - 
of the Juba Strike, Pile 2 Dakhlia 1/5/24.
2. Ten milliemmes equals 1 piastre (P.T.); IP.T.- is only 
slightly over one benny in value.
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firm promise was also given to the effect that a Committee 
would be.appointed toreview Southern scales as a whole. 
The station- allowance■of 50 P.T. normally paid to Article
- . l
II clerks was extended,to cover the trainees as well.
Seen,from the. Southern angle the strike had paid off.
Apart from loss of pay for the days absent no further
- ? disciplinary action was taken 'against the strikers.
The-Governor-General admitted that while 'genuine hardship
experienced by the labourers and Tower paid employees was
the occasion of the strike, the participation by the
Southern Government officials was political rather than
economic:
It was the culmination of a feeling .of 
dissatisfaction which had been growing 
over the past two years, in,a hot-house 
atmosphere of political propaganda and 
unrest, at the allegedly Inferior : 
position 'of Southern Government servant 
• vis-a-vis his Northern confrere and 
his disappointment at the lack of any
visible step taken as the result of the
Juba conference towards the unification 
of establishments with the North.3
The quote is significant as it provides a hint to the
origins and development of political consciousness In
Southern Sudan. The withdrawal of the patronising hand
of the British meant that the South had but to feel the
full impact of unification with the North. Shielded from
externa].,, pressures and influences by natural' as well as
man-made barriers for far too long, the Southerners soon
1. Civil.Secretary to Financial Secretary (Implications
, of Juba Strike) (Strictly Confidential)' CS/SCR/3 6.M.15, 
14th October 19^7.
2. Beaton to.1 Sanders (Strictly confidential) EP/SCR/36.B. 
5/1, 6th October 1947.
3. Governor-General,!s Report for 1947, Cmd.7835, Sudan No.l 
(1949b p.213.
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experienced the shock wave of* sudden exposure to the wider 
world in general and the Northern Sudan in particular.
The key to comprehending political awakening in the South 
is thus to be sought in its continuous contacts with the 
North at all levels of human activity since amalgamation.
| For political consciousness (like knowledge) does not 
come all at once or dramatically but gradually and by .
stages each time adding a spark of enlightenment. The /
i
Juba Strike was a manifestation as well as the initial f
stage of the development of the Southern consciousness.
B - The Transition to Self-rule.1948-52.
"The, All-Sudan Legislative Assembly with 
13 Southern members present opened on 
15th December 1948, and until the sigring 
of- the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 12th 
February 1953* this period witnessed 
great economic, educational, and 
administrative advancement in the Southern 
Sudan; the Zande scheme,with all its \
branches, became a going concern; saw--<• ->/: •K'f*■*)
mills were established in Kate.ri, OLilo i
and Loka, and communications improved; L  
a unified system of education introduced 
including the teaching of Arabic; local 
government was"established in practically 
all district's; permits to trade licences 
were freely given- for Sudanese whether 
Southerners or Northerners, and free 
movements between the two parts of the", 
country were relaxed.” 1
Despite ..initial difficulties of language and working in
1. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances 
in the Southern Sudan, During August , 1955 (Chairman. “ 
Justice Tawfik Cotrah), 10 October 1956, Ministry of 
the Interior, Khartoum. The impartiality of the 
proceedings and- findings of this report has never been 
questioned, hence it is quoted extensively in the 
remaining part of this chapter.
„ . A
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a foreign milieu the hand-picked Southern .members by their ,.., 
Provincial Governors, reportedly showed a keen interest and 
an understanding of the proceedings of the,,Assembly. Between 
sessions the more prominent among them took the opportunity 
to talk to their respective communities about the Assembly
in Khartoum, but"the masses of the people remained un-
1 ■ ' ■ concerned." Increasing signs of awakening political con­
sciousness were nonetheless discernible among Southern 
officials and employees and some Chiefs. To this very 
small class of politically motivated beings the members 
of the Assembly explained the meaning of "self-government" 
and "independence". The Governor of Upper Nile Province 
was able to report that it would have been incorrect 
in previous years to say that "t of many Chiefs the Legis­
lative Assembly and the Sudan politics meant something but 
this is now certainly a fact."
Meantime the members, despite continuing tribal 
loyalties, clearly■viewed themselves as "Southern" 
representatives and quickly formed the personal.loyalties 
(arid sometimes animosities) which facilitated the formation - 
of later parliamentary,bloc politics. Thus between 1949 
and 19-50 when the Umma Party was vigorously pressing for 
immediate self-government, the Southern members were solidly 
opposed to the idea. The granting' of early self-rule and
1. Governor-Generalfs Report for 1949, Sudan No. 1 
(1952), Cmd. 8434,• p.219. .
2. Governor-General^ Report for 1951-52, Sudan No.2 
(1956) Cmd. 9841, p.17:5.
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independence was seen as not being in the special interest 
of the Southern Sudan* Not that they were unpatriotic or 
anti-nationalist; far from it* They would genuinely 
welcome self-government and independence but only when'
’’backward areas ... which had been neglected in the last 
fifty years ... reach the same standard of the North in - 
civilisation.”■* Like their predecessors at the Juba Con­
ference in 1947, the thirteen Southern members of the 
Legislative Assembly insisted on the attainment of economic 
and educational parity with the North as an essential pre­
condition of full union and independence. Towards the end 
of the life of the Assembly a Political Committee was formed 
in Juba. On 13th December 1952 it issued a memorandum over 
the signature of its President, jPaulo Logaalij when it 
became clear that self-government was just around the 
corner. The memorandum was not opposed to the principle 
of self-government as such, but to the question of timing:
The people of the South are anxious to 
co-operate with their brothers in the 
North in the self-government of the Sudan.
They differ strongly however from the 
northern view that self-determination should 
take place in three years. The south con­
sider that it is not., yet in a position to
enter into an .entirely free and democratic
union with the northern Sudan.2
Once again the memorandum pointed out the extremely back­
ward condition of the South vis-a-vis the Northern Sudan*
The demand by the Southern members that self-determination
1. Sayed Benjamin Lwoki (Equatoria) in a debate on self- 
government in December 1950* see Proceedings of the 
First Assembly, Second Session, No.14, 6-16 December 
1950, p.610, (S.G.A. Khartoum).
,2. :K.D,D. Henderson, Sudan Republic (London, 1965), 
pp.201-202.
be delayed to enable.the South to "catch up" with the 
North in the.vital spheres of economic and educational 
development, though understandable, was obviously un­
realistic. It was political naivete to suppose that the 
South, despite its numerical inferiority whetherin the 
Assembly or outside it, could possibly hope to block or 
arrest rapid constitutional advance of the Sudan for the 
furtherance of its own interest. Nor, to take the other 
possibility, could the Southerners count on the traditional 
British paternalism any more. The fact of the matter was 
that in the struggle! of the major Northern political 
parties for the power-legacy of the British,, there was 
little disposition to attend to the special need of the 
South. As a result of this internal power-contest the 
Sudan Government itself found it necessary to enter into 
alliance with Sayed,Abdel Rahman and the Umma Party.
Indeed, after the hearing of theAnglo-Egyptian dispute 
at the United Nations Sudanese support became absolutely 
indispensable. Britain's presence in the Sudan was 
tenable only on the ground that she was preparing the 
Sudanese for self-goVernment, which the Egyptian claim 
tended to negate. To gain a measure of credibility this ■ 
argument had to be backed by demonstrable Sudanese support 
for the British policy of gradual "constitutional advance" 
towards self-rule and independence. In the circumstances 
the Sudan Government ceased to be the arbiter and manipulator
1. The composition of the Assembly was as follows:- 
13 nominated members from the South, 76 members 
(elected and nominated) from the North and 6 
British.
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of Sudanese politics; it became just another, participant
. . . im  the struggle for political influence m  the Sudan.
The British strategy worked out well. The seventy- 
six Northern members of the Legislative Assembly were all 
from the, Umma-Ansar bloc or rural Chiefs and notables 
(and their urban equivalents).. Despite internal differences 
these were all more or less on the same side of the 
political fence in that they rejected any form of union 
with Egypt. Furthermore, all the Ministers (members of the 
Executive Council) and some Under-Secretaries belonged 
'to the Umma Party and-the Ansar and were able, therefore, 
to, speak within the Assembly as "the Government." Sayed 
Abdel Rahman and the Sudan Government needed, and cherished, 
the continuing support of each other. Pitted against the 
Ansar and the. Independence Front were the,Khatmiya and 
the Unionist parties supported by Egypt. -This pro-Egyptian 
bloc boycotted the Legislative Assembly and the Executive 
Council as a means of progressively restricting the room 
for manoevre of the Sudan Government in the diplomatic 
"power-game". In this realignment of political forces the 
.Southerners found very little or no room for accommodation 
and the closer the Sudan seemed to self-determination, the 
higher grew the stakes in this internal conflict. The 
point worth remembering is that■"nationalist struggle" 
in the Northern Sudan was conducted largely by the,wise 
instrument of diplomacy and the process of liquidation of
1. A lengthy examination of the struggle for the power-legacy 
of. the British may be found in Muddathir "Abd Al- 
Rahim's Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan.
(London, 1969), Part Two.
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British power was carried out as a game of chess. Sayed 
Abdel Rahman and Sayed Ali al-Mirghani were old.masters 
at the diplomatic game. They had--learned the rules and 
tricks of the game between the wars when the Sudan Govern­
ment, by use of sophisticated techniques, was able to 
play one faction against the other while retaining firm :
control over the affairs of the country. The little 
educated'and less .experienced "Southern members of the 
Legislative Assembly had not had the same.training in 
the northern school of diplomacy. Their appearance as' 
stark novices at a game which was already well-advanced 
and well-developed put them at once,at an incalculable 
disadvantage.
If the Northern politicians, locked up in a power- 
contest, showed lack of sympathy or insensibility to 
Southern demands one should not feel surprised. After 
all,' had not the British opponents of amalgamation long 
warned of the danger of inevitable preoccupation,of - 
Khartoum with Northern problems of greater urgency or' 
proximity, or, of the South being swamped by the North?
The first indication of fulfillment of this prophecy, • 
came in early 1951 when a Constitution Commission was 
created to study and make recommendations for the next •
step to be taken in realisation of full self-government.
The Chairman and Secretary were British but the seventeen
members were all Sudanese inclusive of only one Southerner.
1The report of the Chairman recommended the establishment
1. The Commission was dissolved on 26th November 1951 
before completion of its work because of deadlock 
over the issue of sovereignty following Egyptian 
abrogation of the Treaty and the Agreement.
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of a fully seIf-governing Parliament based on the "Cabinet >
system'of government." To ailay Southern fears and sus- 
picion there was to'be instituted a "Minister for Southern 
Affairs who should himself be ,a . Southerner selected by f-
the1 Prime Minister in consultation with the Governor- , f.,;
General and with the Southern Members of Parliament." g';
The Minister of Southern Affairs himself would be assisted 
by an "Advisory Board" for Southern Affairs selected by, p
the Minister in consultation with ’the Governors of the
. 1 ' ' '■ Dthree Southern Provinces. •li :i \"
‘
•In ,the lengthy and protracted debate that followed 
(January-April 1,95.2) the Northern members of the' Assembly
severely criticised the recommendations on the South.
• ■ f f! -
In, particular it was stressed that the proposal for , ‘ i
the establishment of a Southern Ministry and an Advisory v , :
-Board not only weakened the position of the Prime Minister ■>,< 1
► ' •= ■. -V
but that it amounted to the creation of two cabinets. . • ? ■
- s- • a
in the country., Behind the .proposal Northern representatives \-
.: • -  ^ •' /   ^ * . y
suspected the hands of British administrators in the South >^  A
• - . J vv A
some of whom • were, still opposed to "the‘new Southern g
Policy", . The Northern Sudanese also pointed to- r , . -A
Darfur, the Beja area and the Nuba Mountains which made* ' 
no demand for special treatment although these were . , • ’ v-
in no less backward conditions than the Southern Provinces.
On his personal initiative, the Governor-General Sir - ;
Robert Howe, was .able to . extract concessions from - '
the ..Northern representatives for the backward areas L • A;
in general and the South in particular., Under the Draft , . ,A r
....................  • ■ . . ■ a
1. .Report of -the Work of the Constitution Commission \A,;.
pp .14-12. '(S.G. A. Khartourn) . —
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Self-Government Statute passed into law in May 1952 
the Governor-General retained the power of veto over any 
bill which he deemed affected in'adverse manner the;"special 
interests" of the South.
A Sudan Government report, later charged that some■ 
British Southern administrators were responsible for. 
instilling into the Southerners the fear of northern 
domination. The fact of the matter is that at the close 
of the life of the Legislative Assembly fear.and suspicion 
reigned in the minds' of. the Southerners,•as they did 
afterwards. "The most important feature of this period", 
continued the report,* "is that through more political 
contact with Khartoum, increase in education and the 
expansion of social services, the Southern people have 
become more politically conscious than they ever were 
before. *.
C The Period of 1953 - 1955.
The period of self-government proved yet more thorny 
and turbulent for the Southern Sudan than the,first 
democratic experiment. It was a period dominated*by North- 
South relations in which the Sudan Government in the person 
of the Governor-General was consigned to, the back-seat, 
playing the role of the spectator. The grievous errors 
committed by the Northern politicians and Government could 
have been avoided and thus averted* bloodshed while also
1. Governor-General to Civil Secretary (SCO/1.A.2G/9), 
2nd March 1952 (S.G.A. Khartoum).
2. Report of the Commission of Enquiry» op.cit., p.19.
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regaining the confidence of the 'Southerners. The inevitable 
spill-over to the South of the struggle for control of the 
Government in Khartoum was partly to blame for the gradual 
deterioration in the relations between the North and South.
In the political virgin land of the South, Northern politi­
cians courted Southern voters as one courts an inexperienced 
lover'; they sponsored Southern candidates and above all, 
made wild promises the fulfillment 'of which was immediately 
impossible to achieve. These empty promisessmade in an 
attempt to capture votes, were regrettable. Great damage 
was also caused to North-South relations when Northern 
administators sympathetic to one or either of,the rival 
Northern political' parties abused their official position 
to promote partisan interests while denying the Southerners 
minimum privileges. The clamour for Southern voters, may 
have generated intense political activity resulting in 
increased political awareness in the South, but the 
cumulative effect was evidently undesirable: it was
responsible for the progressive loss of Southern confidence, 
fear, suspicion and mistrust which led directly" to the 
tragic events of August 1955*
As a standard practice events in the Southern Sudan . 
must be related to the mainstream.of political development 
in the North in an'attempt to. render them comprehensible.
This has to be dealt with, perforce, summarily. Once 
again, outside developments exercised a profound influence 
on the course of events inside the country. Already, the 
Wafd government in Egypt was annoyed that the Sudan 
Government had allowed the discussion of the motion on 
self-government in the Legislative Assembly without the
prior consent or consultation with Egypt as.a co-domini 
power. On 8th October 1951the Egyptian Government 
denounced the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the 1899 
Condominium Agreement. This precipitated a constitutional 
crisis for the Sudan Government, but it was a bonus to 
the Sudanese, nationalists. The Egyptian abrogation of the 
Treaty and the'. Agreement caused, extreme embarrassment to 
the British in the Sudan. -The Sudanese nationalists 
argued, .rightly, tliat there'was no legal basis for the 
continued existence of the Governor-General. The British 
Government in turn denounced the Egyptian announcement as 
an unilateral, action and therefore utterly invalid. The 
truth of the matter was that "however much legal pundits
might argue, the- Treaty, and Agreement had in fact been
- 1torn up by Egypt-and the Sudan was free."
Meanwhile, there 'was .a growing rapprochment between 
Ansar and the Khatmiya, though not. the Ashigga. On 
January 1952 they called f,for the right of the Sudanese 
people to exercise self-determination by means- of a 
plebiscite to be held under the auspices of the United 
Nations backed by the Ashigga and the majority of Sudanese 
parties.* They sent a delegation to- the United Nations 
for this purpose, but nothing came out of it. At the same 
time the Egyptian Government persisted in its campaign to 
discredit the continued presence of the British in the Sudan 
despite the abrogation ofthe Treaty and the Agreement and
1. ' J.S.R. Duncan, The Sudan. A Record of Achievement, 
(London, 1952), p". 249".
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against the wishes of thef Sudanese .people. But Great 
Britain was the de facto Power and power politics pre-r 
clu<ied any hasty of panic measures. So the British 
stuck to their programme of gradual constitutional advanee 
toward self-rule and self-determination. Privately, 
however, the changed circumstances had compelled the Sudan 
Government "to hasten along with - f t p l a n s  for self- .
government and to explain carefully to the people £the/
' '■ ^ 1 reasons for doing so."
The Sudanese nationalist received* a further surprise 
bonus on 23rd July 1952 when General Najib seised power 
in Egypt, in a military coup that toppled the monarchy.
Born of a Sudanese mother and a former student of the 
Gordon Memorial College, Najib was naturally sympathetic 
to Sudanese nationalism. His first diplomatic success 
was to reach an agreement with the Umma or the Independence 
Front which paved the way for self-government. In the 
meantime; the Sudanese, nationalists had closed their 
ranks. The Ashigga were?now joined by seven other union­
ist parties into a single Nationalist Unionist Party • 
headed by Azharl. Together with the representatives of 
the Socialist Republicans and- the Umma, they went to Cairo 
for further negotiations with the’revolutionary Government. 
On 10th January 1953, the Political Pafties Agreement was 
concluded which effectively denied cooperation with the 
Sudan Government save for the implementation of self-
1. J.W. Robertson to all Governors*with copies to District
Commissioners (CS/SCQ/1 .A..20/9) 12th February 1952,
(S.G.A. Khartoum). ,
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government and self-determination. The British Giovernment , ■ " 
which had professed the right.of the Sudanese to self- 
government and self-determination as against Union with 
Egypt, had ,no choice but to concede the unanimously reached 
Egyptian-Sudanese Agreement. The result was the signing,
on 12th February 195.3* of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement 
concerning self-government and self-determination; The 
transitional period to self-determination was not to exceed 
three years.1 On 19th December 1955 Parliament passed the 
Independence motion and on 31st.December the Transitional 
Constitution of the Sudan was approved. On 1st January 1956 
the. Sudanese people celebrated the Independence of their country. 
The. Union Jack and the Egyptian flag were lowered for the 
last- time.- . ‘
The list of Southern grievances provoked by .this some- 
what hectic.decolonisation began with the exclusion of 
the Southerners from the Political Parties delegation to - ;
To.argue that the Southerners- did not have a party of their 
own to represent- them in the .talks was to -commit an error
" 'T-
Cairo in 1953:-
When major Northern parties went to 
Egypt shortly before the signing, of 
the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 12th 1 
February 1953 to negotiate with the 
Egyptians re the Agreement, none of 
the .Southerners were'represented in -
any of the parties. 'The Southerners 
considered that they had been belittled, 
because their views were not asked for.2
. :-V
 . .          ----
1,. HAgreement . *.,.\-'Con6ernirig Self-Government and Self- ri
Determination in the Sudan'1, U.K; Government White k ‘r
Paper Cmd.8767 (Egypt No.2, 1952). •
2. Commisslon of Enquiry, p . 20.
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of judgement. As has been seen,a Political Committee was 
already in existence ■ in,Juba which: issued a memorandum 
stating the position of the .South prior to the pairo 
negotiations* Its. founders Were prominent Southern 
politicians such as Abdel Rahman Sule (a Muslim and staunch
Southern Sudanese- nationalist), Stanslaus Paysama, Buth
- ” 1 ./'■ 'Diu and Paul Logaali... Though ript formally registered as
a political party its members were competent enough to, be 
consulted by Northern 'politicians. The real motive for 
the exclusion offthe Southerners from the Sudanese dele­
gation was that the Southern/demand for the slowing down 
of constitutional pace might frustrate the Northern 
(particularly the Umma) desire for early independence.
Be that, as it may, the action of the Northern parties,, 
who had agreed in the Legislative Assembly to the Governor- 
General 1 s special powers, in cutting them out when:they 
made their agreement, did cause a rebirth of suspicion 
and. distrust,. As the Civil Secretary Sir James Robertson
later> put it; MHow could the Southerners trust' the promises
' ■ 7 ’ ■ ’ . X
of those who speedily* went back on what they'had agreed."
The Southerners -reacted to the 1953 Calro>episode 
with the formation of the Southern Party. The Party 
enjoyed the support, of majority Southern intelligentsia 
and "it can safely he said that the Southern Party has
1.- .Oliver Albino,. The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint
(London 1970) p.31.
2. M.O. Beshir. The Southern Sudan: Background to'Conflict 
(London 1968), p. 71.,
3. Sir James Robertson, "The Sudan in Transition" (abridged) 
The Colonial Review, Vol.8, No. J>9: September 1953a
pp.73-74. , ”  :■
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„  1also the support of the great bulk of Southerners .
The Southern Party changed its name in 1954 to the Liberal 
Party in an'attempt to attract Northern members but as 
none were forthcoming both names were used interchangeably.
The South also needed a political party of its own to 
contest the elections of November and December 1953.
During the elections each of the major political parties 
tried to gain the votes of the- Southerners. The Southern 
Party stood for complete independence as did the Umma 
Party, and little canvassing was done by the latter party 
in the South. ‘The leaders of the National Unionist Party 
(N.U.P.) and the, Egyptian Government representative Major 
Salah Salem paid a visit-during the elections to the 
Southern Sudan. "Rash and irresponsible promises were 
made to the Southerners by N.U.P, politicians." The 
Egyptian representative even went to the extent of promising 
, 1 ! I the Southerners forty posts as Governors, District Com-
•kvb*VNT> I ■■
missioners and Assistant District Commissioners when the
eC AL u  ^  v  I . _ o
^  j British left. ,
On 1st January 195^ the first Parliament met and the
N.U.P. was returned to power with a slight' overall-majority.
Of the twenty-two Southern members (roughly a quarter of
the’House of Representatives) twelve were Southern Party,
six were N.U.P. -and the remaining four were Independents.
One important decision of Parliament was the appointment
of a Sudanisation Committee on 20th February to consider
1. . Commission- of Enquiry, p.Sl.
2* Commissi’on of,.Enquiry, p. 113.,
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posts in the Civil Service which,should be Sudanised, with 
the Public Service Commission to advise on the promotion of 
Sudanese. Outside of Parliament the relations between 
Government and Opposition began to take on an ugly look. In 
August Umma-Liberal politicians led by Buth Diu, M.P., 
visited the Southern Sudan where during the course of 
several meetings disparaging remarks to discredit the 
Government were made. N.U.P. supporters in Equatoria, 
mostly northern trades (Jallaba)., hurled charges against 
the Umma Party, while- reminding the Southerners that the 
leader of the Umma Party (Abdullah Bey Khalil) and his 
followers'were the descendants of their bitter enemies 
the slave-traders. They warned the Southerners of Mahdist 
oppression if they supported the Umma Party. The Umma- 
Liberal speakers in turn charged the northern merchants 
with exploitation of the Southerners. The Jallaba inter­
rupted the Umma-Liberal meetings and the result was a 
deterioration in relationship between the Southern and 
Northern Sudanese.• When some Southerners demanded that 
their M.P.s who had joined the N.U.P. should resign from 
it, the Government reacted by issuing a warning on 15th 
August 195^3 that "they were fully aware of the conspiracies 
that are being worked out in the South” and threatened the 
Southerners that "they shall use the force of iron in 
dealing with any Southerners that will dare attempt to 
divide the nation.” "This", continued the Commission 
report, "angered all Southerners irrespective of party; 
and ’Our Northern brothers will use force.against us1 
slogan by agitators started.”
1. Commission of Enquiry, p.21.
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The results of the Sudanisation Commission announced 
in October 195^ came as a further disappointment for the 
Southerners. Out of an estimated 800 senior administrative 
. posts Sudanised the Southerners were given only a handful 
of posts, four as- Assistant District Commissioners and 
^wo as mamurs'. This was in serious default of the election 
promises and fell far short of the expectations of the 
Southerners. A month before the. Commission';-s announcement 
the Southern N.U.P. members in a memorandum to the Prime 
Minister dated 25th September;, had demanded three Governor 
posts, eight Assistant District Commissioner, and twelve 
1 fu.ll mamur. Peeling cheated and let down, some Southern 
N.U.P. members resigned membership and joined the Liberal 
Party... Pears of domination became widespread among the 
educated Southerners: "The educated Southerners feared •
that, once the Northerners come South and occupy the 
administrative posts, they themselves'will'find their future 
prospects blocked.""1' This, feeling of frustration and 
resentment was not confined to the few disgruntled Government 
officials; the feeling was general and found expression 
in. the' exaggerated fear of a Gongrial Dinka who, wrote to 
j his MP. thus: "/the Report of the Commisslony means
i
| that our fellow Northerners want to colonise us for
s p
| another hundred years." Cashing in on Southern fears 
and career resentments the Southern Liberal Party grew
1. Sir James Robertson (formerly Civil Secretary to the
S.G.), "The Sudan in Transition" in The Colonial Review. 
Vol.8, No. 3; September.1953• ■
2. Commission- of Enquiry. p.ll4. .
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from strength to strength and its activities also increased.
Meanwhile, a Conference of the Liberal Party was t 
held in Juba in October 195^ where-the effect of, Sudanisation 
was debated and a resolution was passed to demand federal 
status with the North, "with a call to,all Southerners to 
be ready for sacrifices." Against the background of the 
Liberal Party Conference and amidst'reports of a successful 
Umma-Liberal' Party tour in the South coupled with dis­
satisfaction by the Southern members from within his own 
party, the Prime, Minister (Ismail el- Azhari) accompanied 
by.some prominent N.U.P. politicians.undertook ‘a tour of 
the Southern Sudan. ■ Except'for Government officials and 
the Northern merchants, who staged a welcome at Juba Air­
port, -a few Southerners- turned up
They were booed and, ill-received every- .
where. Peelings were running high and
to counter-effect the success of the
Liberal Conference a rise in the salaries ; . v
of the prison warders, police,* and clerks. •-
to accord with Northern scales were at
once announced. This was regarded by ■ .•
Southerners as a bribe and in any case
created discontent as it did not include;
Article III Clerical:Category, who form 
the great majority, of clerks In the ’
South ... 1 *» ■ s
The visit of the Prime Minister and his colleagues 
was followed by. a series of blunders in the. administrative,, 
political and industrial fields. For-instance., a Governor 
who seemed to'have gained a limited confidence,, of the 
Southerners was transferred and the activities of the Liberal 
Party (to which practically all Southerners belonged:) In­
creased. In'May 1955 two Southern N.U.P. Ministers, left
1. Commission of ■ Enquiryp.21.
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the Cabinet (one resigned and' the other dismissed) 
apparently because of disagreement with the Prime Minister 
on his handling of Southern affairs. ' The Liberal Party 
welcomed them in its fold and extended invitations-to all 
Southern M.P.s irrespective,of parties, to join in a 
Southern bloc to pursue the demands of the Southerners.
: Another Liberal Party' Conference was planned for Jpne in 
Juba to discuss the main issue of federation. The Prime 
Minister responded with .further threats. To frustrate 
the proposed Liberal Party Conference,the Government sought 
to employ politically minded administrators in Equatoria 
to1 arrange telegrams to be despatched to Khartoum depre­
cating the aims of the Conference, and in support of the 
-Government. For this purpose the District Commissioner of 
Yambio and his.Assistant toured the district, obtained/¥ • f. ' *
j. signatures of the Chiefs, (who for all practical purposes ■ ■
(U% i '
| were Government Officials), by both fraud and compulsion
.. j
ih | and arranged for a telegram in the name of his Assistant
(  A / a / J J  *  \
1 supporting the Government against the Juba Conference.
The Report of the Commission of Enquiry commented:
The fact that the Assistant Commissioner 
himself interfered in politics in such :
a way is deplorable both in a moral sense 
and in an administrative- sense ... It is, 
manifestly wrong for an administrator to, 
allow his party loyalties to,carry him 
beyond his-duty to his people and the 
Public Service.. 1
It will be remembered- that following the departure' of two
Southern Ministers from the Cabinet the Prime Minister
issued, a blunt warning that any S’outhern official who actively
1. Commission of Enquiry, p.90."
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participated in politics would be dismissed.
, The telegram from Yambio wa's used for propaganda pur-
posesrby the State wireless station in Omdurman. ' A- Zande
M.P. called Elyas Kuze elected on the Independence ticket
was campaigning on behalf of union with Egyptj but without
success. He decided to exploit the telegram to his ad-
'vantage. He called a meeting in Yambio on 7th July at which
he demanded the removal of the signatories from office:
The motion was passed with enthusiasm, 
excitement ran high, and the offended 
Chiefs demanded his arrest. He was- 
\J brought, back from Juba, tried with four 
others by a court of the Chiefs he had 
■ denounced, and sentenced-on 25th July to 
twenty.years imprisonment on a charge 
of criminal intimidation.1
Iri the opinion of the Commission the trial was a farce 
and a usurpation of the machinery of Justice; its intention 
was wrong as members were judging their own ease, it was 
a Chiefs Court, quite incompetent to stage the trial of an - 
M.P.; the’sentence imposed was illegal and vindictive in.. 
nature; and it, violated the often-repeated golden rule 
that Justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be 
done. As expected the conviction was quashed by higher 
legal- authorities, but great harm had.been caused to the 
public image of the, (northern) administration. The incident 
which followed the announcement of the sentence is signifi­
cant, for a crowd of about 700 staged a demonstration. Police 
and S.D.F. troops were called in who used tear gas against 
the crowd. The latter dispersed but small bands raided a
Id K.D.D. Henderson, Sudan Republic (Ldnddn, 1965)® p.174.
2. Commission of Enquiry, pp.95"96.
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shop belonging to a Northern trader. Some Northerners
' ‘ 1 were also assaulted and about 6 p.m. order, was restored.
In order to assess the significance of the blunder 
committed in the industrial field it is necessary first 
to consider the activities of the Anti-Imperialist Front 
in Equatoria Province. ’’Communist propaganda” seemed 
to have been diffused in the semi-industrial zone of the 
Zande Scheme by,Northern officials and Egyptian expatriates. 
Towards the end of December 1954, these activities increased. 
In the Zande and Moru districts of Equatoria, where there 
was a concentration of labour in the cotton industry, there 
were a few Trade Unions established Including one at Nzara. 
Propaganda literature had been translated into Zande. 
language and distributed to-many Chiefs, Government officials 
and natives alike. The theme of these leaflets differed 
widely. Some emphasized the: strength and efficacy of, 
collective industrial strikes in pressing wage demands; a 
few were devoted to explaining the causes of Southern 
poverty and the method to combat It., but more, importantly, 
other leaflets advocated local autonomy for.the South . 
within the framework of a united Sudan. In January and 
February 1955® such propaganda received a further boost 
when prominent Northern politicians from the Front.toured 
Nzara and other parts.of Equatoria. Despite.these 
activities there was little evidence, to suggest that 
Southern intelligentsia and the Southern community as a 
whole cared much about abstract theories, but extracts 
about ’’equal pay for equal work” and ”three little
1. Commission, of. Enquiry, p.96.
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Parliaments in Juba,. Wau and Malakal” interested them, and
1
those anti-Northern passages stuck to their mind. Against 
the background of growing Southern political (and industrial) 
awareness the management of Equatoria Projects Board dis­
missed en masse,some three hundred workers in July 1955. The 
dismissals occurred at a time when the number of Northern 
technical staff had comparatively risen as a result of 
Sudanisation. The Southerners interpreted the mass dismissals 
as.an attempt by the Northern-dominated management to de­
prive Southerners of a means of livelihood and to substitute 
Northerners for Southern workmen.
On 26th July indications of ill-feelings against the 
•..Northern officials were manifest, at Nzara, the industrial 
centre of the Zande Scheme. This.was followed by a demon­
stration for higher wages under threat of .strikes. The 
demonstration got out of hand and three shops belonging to 
Northern merchant's were looted. Reinforcements consisting 
of five policemen, each with a tear gas bomb and eleven 
Equatorial Corps .soldiers, from Yambio, proved inadequate 
to contain the crowd and had finally to open fire, killing 
four and fatally wounding two. Two others died when 
trampled upon by the fleeing crowd. The Assistant District 
Commissioner (a Northerner) personally participated in 
tear-gas bomb throwing. The effect on the morale of the 
troops of having to fire on their fellow-Southerners must 
have been considerable. Nonetheless, ”No enquiry was made, 
and instead a further threatening ultimatum:from Khartoum 
was circulated and broadcast.”
1* Commission of Enquiry, p.,53.
2. Commission of Enquiry, p.22.
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On 7th August 1955, & conspiracy to,mutiny in the 
Equatorial Corps involving most of the N.C.O.s was dis­
covered. The authorities were too weak to make any 
arrests in the Army, as the Southern Corps was the only 
force they could rely on. However, two civilians who 
appeared to have been implicated in the mutiny were 
arrested in Juba. Once again a demonstration took place 
and the mob demanded the release of the accused. The mob 
was dispersed by the use of tear-gas bombs. The report 
of the Commission -continues:
When the administration lost the 
confidence of every shade of opinion . 
in the South,frantic calls to Khartoum 
to send in Northern troops were made.
Khartoum, neither understanding nor 
appreciating the situation, was reluctant, 
but finally :sent a company by air, whose 
equipment and support had not yet arrived. 
Rumours started flying about ... and the 
last straw came about when the Army 
Command in Equatoria decided "for its 
prestige and dignity" to persist in 
their order that No. 2 Company Southern 
Corps should move to Khartoum when 
they and everybody else in Equatoria knew 
that the Company would refuse to obey 
orders and mutiny, and when the only 
reliable force left to preserve law and 
order and protect life and property was 
\ a Company of 200 Camel Corps Nubas,
| crippled by lack of equipment*, transport 
; and mortar support in a Province as large 
as Italy! 1
A mutiny actually broke-out In Torit, the Headquarters 
of the Equatorial Corps on 18th August 1955* The 
mutineers shot their Northern officers and killed Northern 
civilians including women and children. The total 
casualty in Torit itself was seventy-eight souls. The 
property and shops of Northern Sudanese were also looted..
1. Commission of Enquiry, p.22.
All communications with the outside world were .completely
cut save the’Southern Corps signals which the mutineers
used for sending out messages-to the Prime Minister, the
Kaid, British Troops in Sudan and British Troops in Nairobi.
■The mutineers also communicated with Sir Knox Helm, the ,
Governor-General, on his return from England. Prom,British
troops both in Nairobi and the Sudan the rebellious troops in
Torit expected moral and material support, but this.Was
1not forthcoming. Prom the Prime Minister and the Kaid 
in Khartoum, they demanded the evacuation of Northern 
troops stationed•in. Juba and their,replacement by British 
contingents. These■ demands were rejected’.;-‘ When the 
mutineers could not solicit any external support they 1 
agreed to surrender on the Governor-General1s personal 
guarantee of fair trial. On 31st August ,*■ Northern troops 
re-occupied Torit but found the town deserted. Pear of 
■ possible revenge at the. hands of Northern troops had
driven both the mutineers and civilians into the bush, some
of whom, were, later to form the nucleus of Southern Sudanese 
guerrilla forces.
The mutiny in Torit quickly engulfed the whole of 
,Equatoria. All over the Province Northern residents 
were killed, usually as a direct result of the rumour . 
that Southerners, in Juba had- been massacred. There were, 
■however, isolated cases of loyal. N.G.O. or Chief or
Missionary who managed, to save ..a few individuals and some
Northerners were able to escape to Uganda or to. the Congo.
The majority of. those in Maridi and Yambio\made their
I.- Commission of .Enquiry, pp. 37-^1*
way to the relative safety of Wau, but. left behind 45 
dead in Yambio and Nzara^ the scene.of earlier political 
and industrial unrest.
At Wau in the Bahr-el-Ghazal the Dinka played a role
in defusing a potentially explosive .situation. Of. the
j 276 men at Wau garrison two-thirds were Equatorial tribes-
I men and one-third Dinka, but the senior N.C.O. was himself 
I . - v  *• ■ ' .
a Dinka. On,receiving the news of the disturbances in
\ - t '
) Equatoria the Governor, Daud Abdel Latif, thought it approp­
riate to request Khartoum to send in a Dinka Minister, 
Santino Deng, who arrived by air on 20th August accompanied 
by another Dinka M.P., Philemon Majdk. The Senior N.C.O. 
had guaranteed Dinka loyalty but not that of the Non-Dinka. 
Thus.when it became known that Northern troops might be 
flown in from Khartoum excitement and tension increased 
among the non-Dinka.soldiers and police. Things went 
out of hand; there were some desertions while' others took 
control of the Wau airstrip. At this point.the Governor 
reckoned that the Southern Minister stood; a better chance 
of saving the lives and property of Northern residents 
if he and his senior4 staff handed over power to the Dinka 
politician and with drew to Khartoum. On 21st August the 
Governor and his staff left Wau at night,, by the steamer 
Dal for Khartoum. In retrospect this was a very wise 
decision for, the following morning, When it became publicly 
known that the Governor had left, "everybody was immensely 
relieved." While the Governor and other senior Northern 
officials maintained a presence in Wau the possibility of 
a relief force from Khartoum loomed large, and the "greatest 
amount of goodwill could never, in those days, convince
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■ the Southerners in Bahr-el-Ghazal that the Northern troops 
;were only coming to preserve law. and o r d e r . T h e  sudden 
departure of the Governor and senior Government officials 
had a cooling down effect and the two M.P.s, assisted 
by a Dinka officer,' the Senior. N.C.O., and other Southern 
officials restored order without any loss of life until a 
new Northern Governor arrived on 9th September.
In the Upper Nile Province, the news of the mutiny 
became publicly known in Malakal township on the morning 
of 19th August 1955. The authorities had managed to disarm 
No. 4 Company, Southern Corps, on realising that one of 
the N.C.O.s was implicated in the abortive plot of 7th 
August .in Equatoria. The ammunition was then stored 
away in a safe location/ On 18th August.the Company was
/eventually persuaded to board a: steamboat for Khartoum
/ 1 '
j a day of schedule, while a force of Nuba mounted police 
j provided a stabilising.influence.. A Company of Northern 
; troops destined for Juba arrived at Malakal on 21st August 
and as a precautionary measure it was resolved to disarm 
the Southern police and warders the next day. This led 
to a. shooting incident in which,five Southerners and one 
Northerner were killed. Efforts to stir up troubles else- ■ 
where in the,Province were easily contained because the 
majority of the.police and the Nilotic tribesmen remained 
loyal. The official'known fatal,casualties of the whole 
revolt were 336 Northerners and 77 Southerners, excluding 
those killed at Nzara in July. -
On the Commission's findings the revolt was political,.
1. Commission of Enquiry, p.76.
not religious; the great Nilotic tribes were barely 
involved; the crisis was provokedvby irresponsible . 
political propaganda* Northern as well as Egyptian, making 
extravagant, promises which could not be fulfilled. Among 
the non-Nilotics influence had shifted in five years 
from the' Chiefs to the educated,- few. The Northern admini­
strator had failed to realise that the Southerner regarded 
him, as much,as- he regarded the former British District 
Commissioner, as a "coloniser". For a harmonious/future 
relationship between, the two parts of the country the 
Report recommended a complete change of attitude towards 
the South by the Northerner, both administrator and 
merchant.
CONCLUSION
The intimation of British colonial neglect of Southern • 
Sudan made in this thesis call's for some clarification.
It is worth noting at this point that whatever might be the 
nature and extent of that neglect, it certainly cannot be 
presumed to be total or uniform in its effects. One cannot, 
for instance, underestimate the administrative difficulties 
and problems of the early decades, which precluded the v" 
possibility of any; form of initiative for development.
Nor can there be any question of downgrading the efforts and 
concerrij, however belated, showed by the Administration 
during the hectic period prior to independence. In either- 
case, the various opposing forces (political, diplomatic 
or otherwise) presented a redoubtable enough barrier; the 
administrator's predicament may merit even sympathy. Yet* 
these reservations aside, it is equally impossible to avoid 
the impression that the.South was treated by its colonial mas 
ters more or less as a 'Cinderella' vis-a-vis the Northern 
Sudan.
British conquest of the Southern Sudan was-undertaken 
with the primary aim of securing the sources of the Nile.
This involved efforts by the Sudan Government to keep out 
the French and Belgians who threatened territorial encroach­
ments in the Upper Nile valley. To.this end, everything else 
was.subordinated. There was not, for instance, the attempt 
to institute close administration in the early/years* even 
in areas-alread,y pacified. Apart from , opening the South to 
a trickle of missionary personnel.and raising the Equatorial 
Corps to act as bulwark against further Islamic- penetration
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of the South* Khartoum urged peace and.economy. The two 
proved to some extent incompatible, however, and the one could 
obtain only at the expense of the other. The preservation 
of law and order entailed close or thorough administration, 
but the Sudan Government lacked financial as well as 
manpower resources to impose its will throughout the 
Southern Sudan. Consequently, only the, very minimum of 
administration was attempted especially in the period prior 
to World War I. The few duties of the field officials 
included the collection of taxes in administered areas, the 
construction of roads and keeping open lines of communications.
The British presence itself and the ..demands made on 
the natives were nonetheless unacceptable to many Southern 
tribesmen, who revolted against the Government. The. official 
standard response in such cases was punitive expedition 
which burned villages and confiscated cattle. The result" 
was the alienation of the natives, particularly the Nilotics 
who led the majority of the uprisings. When after the war
the efficacy of 'government by routine patrol' became
questionable, the Administration resorted to full scale 
warfare but at the cost of total loss of confidence of the 
Southern Sudanese. Nevertheless, the point was driven home 
to them that continued resistance could only bring des­
truction to both lives and property. Even when the majority 
of Ihe Southern peoples had succumbed to British authority,
very little was done by way of close administration.
British officials in Khartoum had neither the will nor the 
incentive to initiate concrete development programmes for 
the South and were almost completely- absorbed in events in 
the Northern Sudan.
2 96
The first twenty years or so of British government in 
the North witnessed the foundations of modern education, 
of health and development schemes, the construction of 
roads and railways, and the raising of the general standard 
of living. Every effort was, also made to'gain the con­
fidence of the people, particularly Muslim notables, and 
the respect paid to Orthodox1 Islamic leaders almost 
amounted to appeasement.
It has been advanced that,-there obviously were not 
enough funds to. go round.. The British knew very little 
about the peoples of the Southern Sudan - their languages, 
customs and tribal institutions. ; The difficult terrain, 
the long distances and poor communications made even the 
exploration of: Southern Sudan a hard task indeed. True, 
the Southerners had learnt to ;mistrust foreign domination 
and some had raised a blank wall against all forms of 
external influence. Composed of different tribal groups 
with sub-divisions, the Southerners had frequently been 
at war with each other and among themselves. The superior 
technology of their British conquerors, they saw as 
something to.be harnessed to one's advantagedn the 
perpetual war against traditional enemies. More importantly, 
they valued their independence above everything else. The 
majority of these arguments applied with cogency, but not 
without reservations,, to the first two decades of the 
Condominium rule and of course before it. In the inter-war 
period, which had been an era of settled administration, 
some of these arguments had lost their force or validity.
The Sudan Government had no excuse whatsoever1' for delaying 
or denying the South proper attention. Yet, down to.about ,
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19^5 the Sudan Government's chosen path for the adminis­
tration of Southern Sudan followed the course of least 
resistance and minimum expense.
The principle that Southern Sudan should be administered 
with as little money and few men as possible found abundant 
expression in the policy of indirect administration formally 
adopted in 1921. There is nothing intrinsically immoral 
or inhuman in native administrative policy if conceived 
in,the.right spirit and executed*to the best of one’s 
ability. Only when its application tends to hold, up 
economic and social development df'a people, to arrest 
educational expansion whether sideways.or upwards, to 
preserve a people in a kind of "Whipsnade" does indirect 
rule policy call for a second thought.’' -. In the Southern 
, Sudan there was not, once again, a.strongly felt interest 
to develop native rule beyond judicial devolution, such 
as did by comparison pertain in the North.
;The small experiments in native courts which were tried 
here and there, in the South achieved only marginal success. 
Very often the District Commissioner had to.review all 
the decisions of the courts. He was the Paramount Chief 
himself, without much check from above, and his extensive 
power was only slighly modified by his dependence upon 
interpreters and other intermediaries. The truly auto­
cratic (and aristocratic) chieftaincies were already 
destroyed or weakened in the course of pacification, and 
the appointed Chiefs (particularly among the Nilotics) 
were more or less figureheads.
Another .conspicuous aspect of Southern native admini­
strative practice consisted in.the lack of trained
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indigenous executive officers to act as supporting: 
bureaucracy. For a long time in the South, there were not 
even enough mission-educated .'boys' to act as Chiefs 
court clerks. This need was especially felt in the Nilotic, 
areas, where the District Commissioner supervised minute 
administrative details, often typing all correspondence for 
want of a clerk to help him. . In his District Headquarters, 
everything was on a small scale, his office was probably a' 
hamlet conveniently located in the centre of the district.
He spent most of the time settling cattle-disputes in a 
leisurely manner' under a tree, or trekking from one ,f 
administrative post to another.
It is the unbroken theme of administration on the cheap 
that also dictated Government policy on education. Whereas 
a two-tier educational system applied in the North, Southern 
education was entrusted almost in its entirety to Christian 
missionary societies. The aims of Southern education-were 
very restricted indeed. Elementary education was ideal 
recruiting ground for Christian converts while the three 
intermediate schools turned out clerks and accountants for 
government offices. As an appreciation of missions' 
services, the1 Government made subventions to mission 
education, but- on a scale which did not encourage educational 
expansion. As a matter of fact, 'there was no higher 
education and pupils were supposed to return to tribal life 
as required by indirect rule policy. But mission education 
, itself tended to be disruptive of tribal order and the. pre­
dominance of Italian Roman Catholics, in Southern education 
was a permanent source of anxiety to the Administration.
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One of the cardinal principles of the colonial ad­
ministration was a refusal to expand educational facilities 
beyond the elementary and intermediate stages. Not only 
did the Sudan Government fail to open schools of its own 
throughout the inter-war period, but Martin Parr (the 
Governor of Equatoria in 193b) actually frustrated efforts 
by the C.M.S. mission to raise the status of Loka inter­
mediate to that of a secondary school. The South had a 
dire need for higher education of one kind or another, 
such as was readily available in the.Northern Sudan. In _ 
retrospect enlightenment from whichever source, whether 
through the agency of a Christian organisation or the state, 
was definitely in the long term interest of the Southerners. 
This would have avoided creating the impression of native 
ignorance, colonial neglect and general backwardness, the 
cause of subsequent bitterness and resentment in the 'South.
The claim to protect the Southern Sudan from marauders, 
which crystallised in the form of Southern Policy had mixed 
motives. Between the predominantly-Arabized and1Muslim ,
North and the almost exclusively black African and 'pagan' 
South, British administrators in the Sudan could hardly 
discern any bond or thread of unity. Both geography .and 
history provided additional grounds for the application of 
separate regional policies to the South and North. In the 
context, of the South this meant the exclusion of Islamic and 
Arabic influences south of the twelfth parallel of latitude. 
The political motive here aimed at forestalling neo-Mahdist 
uprisings in which, a lately Islamized Southern Sudan might 
be involved. As a rule, no imperial or colonising power 
may be expected to assume responsibility for integrating
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communities which were socially, culturally, racially, 
linguistically, and geographically.distinct., Such an 
enterprise would have been so demanding-and exacting as to repel 
the would-be'enthusiast of integration. It would also have 
tended to generate local response that went counter to the 
imperial interest itself. Not surprisingly, the ..aphorism 
fdivide and rule* was the golden rule in imperial strategy.
British administrators in the South did not really wish 
to Christianise the natives. On the contrary the *bog 
baron* (as Southern administrators of the /twenties and 
‘ * thirties were then nicknamed after the sudd or sWamps ) 
sought to-preserve the natives in lovable primitive state.
As for the missionary, Southern Sudan was something of a vir- , 
gin land - poor, backward, *primitive*, and uncontaminated - 
ideally suited to experimenting in Christian acculturation.
The British Foreign Office and Khartoum on the other hand, ' -
regarded the Christianization of the ’ South, as a necessary 
(and a lesser) evil. It was felt that England^ as a Christian 
country could not rightfully be expected to supervise the 
conversion to Islam of the pagan and black African Southern 
■Sudan whose cultures and religion were different from those 
prevailing in the Northern Sudan. In a characteristic 
paternal fashion it was reasoned that should necessity arise 
for the South to abandon some of its cultural values, then 
it must not do so in return for a second best. The Arabic , 
and Islamic civilization, the British naturally assumed:, 
was not the most appropriate cultural species to offer to 
the Southerners.' ■ *
Administrative indifference in other fields paralleled = 
inattention in the economic development sphere. Despite
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innumerable hindrances in the way of the socio-economic 
emergence of the South, favourable conditions existed in some 
parts- of the region to merit early and serious experiments 
in development projects. Expressed differently, if the South 
was neglected during the period up to the end of World War 
II, hot all of it was necessarily negligible. The peoples 
of the Western, district oftBahr el-Ghazal province ahd 
most parts of Equatoria were, by 1920, ready to accept 
major changes in their traditional way of life. The,
Azande and related peoples, for instance,, were more or less 
peaceful, docile,, amenable, and ready to offer their labour 
for money or in return for trade goods which were in great 
demand. What is more, good agricultural soil was available 
in Zande-land, at that time regarded as the cream of the , 
Bahr el Ghazal.
To overcome the problem of remoteness, communications 
could have been improved, trade stimulated and. local markets 
developed. Also, given;improved communications and a better 
transportation- system, sound export trade in timber, oil 
seeds, beeswax, rubber and even rain-grown cotton would 
have produced import of useful and valuable consumers' goods 
in a manner which could have only raised the general standard 
of living in the South. The material betterment of Southern 
Sudan seemed to hinge on the introduction' of a railroad, 
which was out of the question for lack of funds but also 
because it would, not have paid its way. A possible con­
sideration is that the Government in Khartoum suspected 
Islam would come to the South by rail, which it was,official 
policy to restrict. For this same reason, the. activity of 
Northern merchants and traders who were prepared to do
business anywhere in the South wds curbed. In the meantime, ■ 
the- few Syrian and Greek merchants who had official backing 
confined most, of their commercial activity to the very few 
provincial townships.
A key feature of the post-19^5 period consisted of 
the forces of nationalism unleased by the war both in the 
Northern Sudan and Egypt. The British had the difficult 
task to strike a delicate balance--between opposing interests, 
without offending one party or the1 other. . The consideration 
of British interests in the Suez Canal zone, combined with 
nationalist pressure in the Northern Sudan forced a review 
of 'Southern Policy. The Southern Sudanese, yet inexperienced 
less sophisticated than the nationalist agitators in the • 
North and holding a blind faith in the myth of British 
justice and fair play, hesitantly accepted the principle
f'T
of unity with the North in 19^7* A 'representative' 
element was then'brought into the administration.above 
tribal level and the South was thrown open to Northern, 
traders.
The South was now exposed not just to the external 
influences of Islam and Arabic education, but also to the \ 
forces of the modern market economy. The Southerner began 
to experience, almost for the first time, the pangs of 
ever-rising prices and inflation which appeared to go on 
unchecked. Unity with the North also meant that.Northern 
Sudanese could now take up jobs and positions of responsi­
bility in the South in ever-increasing numbers. :The 
Southerner soon .discovered he was not sufficiently equipped, 
educationally or otherwise, to compete on equal terms with 
his Northern compatriot for jobs and positions of authority.
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His outlook differed markedly from that of the majority : 
of the people he encountered in Parliament, the'Civil 
Service or the Army. Moreover, Northern Sudanese' tended 
to look down upon their■fellow .countrymen from the South, 
regarding them as ’half-educated'. The first generation 
of educated Southerners and politicians naturally began 
to perceive the. extent of the backwardness of the South; 
they were indignant, felt cheated and swamped by the North. 
The storm that had been gathering strength for years past 
came in the form of the Southern disturbances of August 
1955* The outburst marked the beginning of a civil war, 
which went on intermittently long after the British had 
left the Sudan.
Meanwhile, tendencies had been afoot during the war 
period itself which shook the trad&tional administrative 
attitude towards Southern development* In 19^6 something 
of a 'crash' programme of economic and social development 
of the South was initiated. These proposals included 
state intervention in Southern education, the development 
of local government councils in the South and the launching 
of Zande development scheme. Dinka cattle trade was 
encouraged, but progress was slow. A rice scheme was 
started at Aweil in the Bahr el-Ghazal, this too' did not 
fully mature till after independence. By and large, 
these development efforts had little time to correct 
the existing social, economic and political imbalance 
between the North and South and' were overtaken by events , 
in Khartoum.
At independence, therefore, only a small strip of 
territory in the far south and south-west, together with
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the provincial centres had had any serious contact with the 
money economy. Western Bahr el-Ghazal and most parts of 
Equatoria were also considerably detribalised due, largely, 
to the influence of the missions. Outside the very few towns, 
mission stations were very much the civilising centres in 
the South, For this reason Equatoria Province became the 
most 'developed' of the three Southern provinces. Elsewhere, 
in the Nilotic heartland, ostensible improvement or progress 
of any sort was hard to identify.
The Sudan Government's discriminatory tendency against 
the South (and in favour of the -North) was reflected in the 
calibre of Southern administrators. It has been claimed,
rightly, that the Sudan was ruled by an elite of the British
*} • . 
colonial service. The point is illustrated by the fact
that down to about 1951, members of the Sudan Political
Service were recruited' mainly from honours graduates of
the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Between 1915
and 1933, for instance, about 85 per cent of the University
2 •recruits came from Oxbridge. The essential fact is that 
the South, as a rule, received none of these graduates 
until the 1940's. With very.few exceptions, Southern 
administrators were drawn from British Officers, of the 
Egyptian Army and were subject to recall at short notice. 
Administrative personnel engaged in the North were, on the 
whole, skilled diplomatists on pensionable terms and subject
1.,. R.O.Gollins,. "The Sudan Political Service: A Portrait of 
the 'Imperialist'", African Affairs, Vol.71 (1972), 
pp.293-303; Collins* precise .suggestion is that the 
Sudan was a country of 'blacks' ruled by 'blues'.
2. Sir Harold MacMichael, The Sudan Political Service. 1899- 
1956, (Oxonian Press, 1951 ), also known as 'the Book of 
.Snobs', is very informative on the careers of the members 
of the Sudan Political Service.
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to frequent transfers from one district to another to
gain experience for promotion. By contrast, the officers-
administrator employed in the South were TcontractVmen,
who were not eligible for promotion above the* rank of .
District Commissioner. The few exceptions were provincial
Governors who tended to be seconded from the Sudan Political
Service. ' , '■
These Southern District Commissioners, sometimes.
known as the bog barons, were renowned for, their defiance
of superior authority. As "Fergie Bey" once recorded in ,
his diary: "I never obey any orders that I consider
detrimental to my work . ,."1 A chief characteristic of
the 'bog barons' entailed a strong propensity, to identify
themselves with their 'peoples'. Indeed, so strong was
this tendency to identify with the local population that
they were thought to have 'gone native'. As a matter of
fact the Nilotics quite often attempted to assimilate; the
District Commissioner into their cattle culture. , As late
as 1942 the District Commissioner ,of central Nuer felt
that it was he who had to struggle to maintain' at least ,a
2vestige of his European, culture.
The British Southern1administrators of the 'twenties 
and.'thirties felt themselves to be "foreign" to. the North 
not only by virtue of their educational background and 
training, but also because they were geographically remote
1. V.H.Fergusson, The Story of Fergie Bey. (London, 1930),
p.206. ' ►
2. P.P.Howell, A Manual, of Nuer Law (London, 1954), p.3.
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from their counterparts in the. Northern Sudan. This critical 
status difference between Northern and Southern administrators 
contributed a great deal to the general picture of colonial 
neglect of the Southern Sudan. This is not to say the 
!bog barons1 were necessarily bad or poor administrators.
The fact that the Southern administrators, stayed,,in one 
province (and sometimes the same, district) for long periods 
meant that they had ample opportunities, to learn the language 
and customs of-their subjects, which could have only made 
them better administrators. The crux of the matter is, .. 
provided they were posted to the North or South, British 
officials felt themselves to be Arabists or. Africanists 
accordingly. In 19^4 Sir Douglas Newbold (then Civil 
Secretary) on being impressed by a Southern student at 
Makerere College, East Africa, could still remark: "I do
not think I shall ever be a good 1African1 - though I like these 
blacks - my heart has been too long-with Arabs in Kordofan and
I
Kassala”. On the other hand, the typical Southern D.C. 
preferred to make passage arrangements to England for a 
holiday via East Africa to avoid contact with 'Arab1 
administrators in the North and Khartoum.
This scheme of things was not, in the least., healthy to 
the progress and development of Southern Sudan. After all, 
the seat of the Government was in Khartoum and the Governor- 
General and the 1 three secretaries * might be presumed to be 
Arabists. In 1936 Sir Stewart Symes, the Governor-General, 
ordered the amalgamation of Mongalla and Bahr el-Ghazal
1. K.D.D.Henderson, The Making of the Modern Sudan: The Life 
and Letters of Sir Douglas Newbold (London. 1953).
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provinces against the better judgements and opposition from
the Southern provincial governors. Was he an Arabist?
Six, years later Mr. Martin Parr, the Governor of the
amalgamated province reported:1
My; six year s experience of - Equat'oi?ia 
; has convinced me that so large an area .
(150,000 sq.' miles) with five international 
frontiers, 10 'District Headquarters, three 
.separate and independent mission bodies,
25 political officers, some 15 major *
languages ... cannot be satisfactorily 
administered by an officer of the status 
and with the staff of a Provincial Com­
missioner, who must be subordinate in so 
many details to departmental heads and to 
the Central Government in Khartoum.1
Khartoum wielded the ultimate power of the purse and if
the 'diplomatists1 in the North were contemptuous of the
..Southern administrator, holding him to ridicule, they
could not take him seriously either. , V.H. Fergusson who.
first served amongst the Dinka before becoming District
Commissioner of western Nuer in the 1920's, could be
regarded as the archetype of the 'bog baron'.. He> initiated
a programme '.of forced labour on cotton-cultivation, roads,
landing stages and causeways with the prospect of a hut
tax to follow. It all sounded too good to be true and
he wrote: "I am going to lie low .and say nothing at all
about it, because no one would believe me. But the sick,
the cotton, and the financial return's will make people sit
up and take notice." On another occasion, the estimates
of his cotton crop and the lists of requirements headed by
1, Douglas.Newbold, "Memorandum on Proposed Re-Division of 
Equatoria, 1945" (very secret), Appendix "F"(i), En- 
closure'to Khartoum Despatch No. 89^ of. 4th August 1945. 
F.O. 371/45984.
2. V.H.Fergusson, The story of Fergie:Bey (London;1930).p.249.
a demand for £20,000 cash to. pay out to the natives almost 
shocked his superiors."**
It is difficult to state precisely who was or was not 
against - development in the South and there clearly were 
limits to what a District Commissioner could,do without 
money. It can be asserted, however,, that when money did 
become available in a limited way after 1945* it was * bog 
barons* like Major Wyld who executed quite energetically 
the Zande Scheme,
In summary, the separation of the South (on top of the 
obvious geographical,,, racial, social, economic, and 
historical factors) was the reflection of a division within 
the colonial administration itself. Colonial, officials 
obviously did not create the divisions of the Sudan, but 
their attitudes, to the peoples they governed, and to each 
other, did.nothing to alleviate the situation.
1. V.S.Fergusson, The Story of Fergie^  Bey (London, 1930), 
P.210.
APPENDIX NO. 1 
Governors~General of the.Sudan
1. . Lord Kitchener
2. General Sir^F. Wingate
3. Major-General Sir Lee Stack
4. . Sir Geofrey Arc.her
5. Sir John. L. Maffey
6. Sir Stewart Symes
7. Sir Hubert Huddleston
8. Sir, Robert Howe
9. Sir A. Knox Helm
19 Jan.1898 - 22 December 1899
23 Dec.1899 - 31 December 1916
I Jan. 1917 - 20 November 1924- 
4 Dec. 1924 - 17 October 1926.
24 Oct.1926 - 13 November 1933 
10 Jan.1934 - 14 October 1940. 
15 Oct.1940 - 7.April 1947.
8 Apr. 1947 ~ ' 1955
II Mar.1955 - 1 January 1956.
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APPENDIX NO. 2
Provincial Governors
Fashoda:
Jackson, H.W. 1898-1899.
Sparkes, W.S. 1899-1900.
Blewitt, A. 1900-1902.
Mathews, G.E.' 1902-1903.
Upper Nile"*'
Mathewsj G.E. 1904-1908.
O'Sullivan, H.0.E. , 1909-1911.
Woodward, F.W. 1912-1916,
Bassett, J..R. 1916-
Stigand, C.S. 1917-1919.
Struve, K.C.P. . 1919-1926.
Willis, C.A. 1926-1930.
Pawson,'A.G. ' ■ 1931-1934.
Parr,, M.W. 1934-1935.
Coryton, E.G. 1935-1939.
Armstrong, C.L. 1939-1941.
Davis, G.G. 1941-1945.
Kingdon, F.D. 1945-1948.
1. Galled Fashoda down to 1903;, its capital was moved in
May 1914 from Kodbk (or Fashoda) to Malakal. Its southern 
portion became Mongalla in 1906..
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Corfield,F.D. - 1 1948-1950.
Longe, J. 1950-1953.
Winder., J. 1953-1955.
Bahr el-Ghazal^
Sparkes, W.S. ' - 1901-1904.
Boulnois, W.A. . 1904-1905.
Sutherland, A. 1905-1907'.
Hill, I-I.B. 1907-1908..
Saville, R.V. ' 1908-1909..
Gordon, H. 1909-1910.
Fielden, R.M. *'*1910-1917.
.Lord Hawarden, E.W. 1917-1921.
Wheatley, M.J. - 1921-1928.
Brock, R.G.C. 1928-1934.
IngleSon,P. ' 1934-1936.
Owen, T.R.Ii. , 1948-1953.
Colborne-Mackrell,.J.E. 1953-1955*
2Mongalla Province.
Cameron, A . 1906-1907.
Owen, R .■ C .R. ' , 1908-1918.
Northcote, C..S. 1918-1919.
Stigand, C .11. 1919-1920.
Woodland, V.R. ,. 1920-1924.
Bence-Penibroke, R.A. 1924-1925.
1*. The Egyptian flag was hoisted at Meshra-al-Raik in September 
1898, but a military force .first reached the place on 
December 13, 1900,
2. Created in 1906 and the frontier readjustment with Uganda 
dated January 1, 1914. , , ■
Skrine, A.W. . 1925-I9.29.
Balfour, F.C.C. 1929-1930.
Nalder, L.F. 1930-1936.
Equatoria Province.^
Parr,' M.W. " 1936-1942.
Skeet, C.H.E. 1942-1945/
Marwood, B.V. 1945-1948.
Nicholson, H.A. 1948-1949.
Tiernay, J.F. ' 1949-1952.
Nightingale, E.H. 1952-1954.
1. Created on 1st’ January, 1936 as a result of the
amalgamation'of Bahr-el-Ghazal and Mongalla provinces. 
It was 'split into two again in 1948, but the name 
was retained.
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APPENDIX-NO. III.
Distance of various points in the Southern.'Sudan from 
Khartoum and,Port Sudan along the 1956 lines of communication 
in miles. (Distance by rail Kosti-Khartoum; 238.miles).
Locality .1
Road
Khartoum
River
. Port
Total
Sudan
Itenk - 108 , 364 ' : 807
Malakal - 311 549 1,011 ,-j
Nasir 130 311 679 . 1,140
Boma via Bor .. 253 787 1,278 1,749
Rumbek via Shambe 115 457 ■ 810 . 1,271
Wau - 708 946 1,407 . . v
Raga 207 708 1,153 1,614
Juba - 892 1,130 . 1,591
Kapoeta 194 ’ 892 1,3.24. 1,785
Yambio 323 j 892 1,453 . 1,914
Source Yobu 464 892 e 1^594 2,055 -
N.B. The extension of rail road in recent years to Wau
(the Provincial Capital of the Bahr el-Cha^al) has shortened 
its distance from Khartoum - and Port Sudan- to some extent. 
Otherwise, the figures quoted .above speak for themselves.
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v APPENDIX NO. IV.
Regulations and Conditions'under Which Missionary ■
Work is Permitted'in the Sudan
No Mission station is allowed to be formed north of 
the 10th parallel of latitude in any part or district ■ 
of the Sudan which is recognised by the Government 
as Moslem.
South of the 10th parallel definite spheres of action
are allotted as follows
British Missionary, Societies Sphere
It is bounded on the north by the Bahr el-Ghazal.
On the east by the line drawn south from a point
on the White Nile. About half way between the mouths •.
of the Bahr-el-Zeraf and the .Bahr-el-Jebel to
Ajiung, and thence southwards to Kabaij. Prom Kabaij
the line proceeds ;due east until it meets the Abyssinian 
frontier to the Uganda border on the 5th parallel of the 
North Latitude,
On the south it is bounded by" the northern border 
of the Congo Free State, the Lado Enclave,and the 
Uganda Province (N.B. The terry, formerly known as the 
Lado Enclave, having reverted to the Stidan in 1910, 
was declared an open sphere). On the.west by a line
drawn from Meshra-el-Rek to ,a point near -N'doruma
,  • _ .
( M'vuto) where the frontiers of the Congo Free State, 
French Congo and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan meet,
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The Austrian Catholic Mission Sphere 
The left bank of the White Nile south-of Kadok into 
the. Bahr.el-Ghazal, their eastern limit being defined 
by a line drawn from Meshra-el-Rek'to N ’dor.umas on 
the CongO-Nile watershed.
The American Missinn Sphere:-
The valleys of the Sobat and the Zeraf up to the 
Abyssinian frontier.
3. Each Mission must be.a separate body under the sole 
control of its local head resident in the country.- :
4. .The members of each Mission are unreservedly subject •'
to all the laws and regulations of the Government..
5. The heads and all,the,members of Missions will act
only with the approval and permission of the Governor- . 
General of the Sudan and with the concurrence of . 
the local authorities of the Government in the stations 
and provinces.in which they work. -
6.. Missionaries are not permitted to act as- intermediaries
between natives and the Government. Complaints etc., 
requiring action by the Government must be' taken by the 
complainant direct to the nearest Government post,.in 
the ordinary way', and Missionaries must avoid any 
suggestion of being concerned in., such caaes.
7. Trading is,forbidden in any' form-. Missionaries may possess
such trade goods as are necessary with which to purchase
' by exchange articles’for their owh'use or with which to 
pay tribesmen who are labouring for.them. On occasions 
of famine, Missionaries,, whose stations are never far 
from a Government post, should at once ’Inform1' the nearest 
official, who will make the necessary'arrangements for
the supply of grain to the famine district, thus 
obviating any suggestion of trading on the part of 
the Missions. ■
.. Bartering for personal necessaries only is not 
included in the prohibition of trade, but it must be 
distinctly understood that this permission does not . 
authorise any transaction affected with the object 
of subsequently selling at a profit whatever has been 
obtained by such barter.
Missionary Societies may be; permitted to occupy land 
for the purpose of a Mission station on .the, following 
terms:-
A lease will be granted for 80 (eighty) years at 
a nominal annual rental of P.T. 10, and will be renew­
able at the option of the Lessees and determinable 
on breach of the conditions under which it.' is granted, 
or in the event of Government withdrawing the permission 
for missionary work to be carried out in the particular 
district concerned. In the case of■renewal of a lease 
the annual rental shall be re-assessed. ,
The lease further provides that the land shall be , 
used solely for the purpose of carrying on the 
authorized Missionary work, and that the Lessees may 
not part with.any portion thereof except with the 
previous consent in writing of the Government.
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APPENDIX V . ' ' , . .
Sudan Government Memorandum-,
• On General Administrative Policy. ,1-921.
The Administrative Policy of,the Sudan Government 
towards the native population is one of.decentralized 
control.
..The Milner Report of 1920 said of the Sudan:
"Having regard to its vast extent and ‘ - ■'
the varied character' of its' inhabitants,, the ■ •
administration of its different.parts'should 
be left, as far as possible,- in the hands 
of the native authorities., wherever they 
exist, under British supervision, be- 
centralization and,the employment, wherever 
possible,., of native agencies for the 
simple', administration needs of the country, 
in its present stage of development, would, ■ 
make both for economy and efficiency."
These words embody the ideals which the;; Sudan .Government 
has long had in rriind and to which it has already been able 
to give some degree of practical effect. It remains .to 
consider what native authorities and agencies there, are, 
and to what extent theee are at present fitted for the ■ 
work required of them or capable of- adaption to the purpose.
They fall into two groups. The first and most important 
consists of the tribal Chiefs and Sheikhs as such', 'that, is 
as administering their own tribes. The second are executive 
officials selected for the public service from the panks 
of the native population.
Experiments, have already been- made with the second, 
group. A number of Sudanese Civilian Sub-Mamurs, chosen 
for their qualities of character, andrfor preference - drawn
-from good families, have-been appointed, and a training 
course for candidates is held yearly. • The result has 
been satisfactory and the process will be continued and 
extended. >.(
A.number of native Sheikhs, again, have been given 
magisterial powers as members of'courts held under the 
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedureand have"
■ proved themselves of considerable assistance.
In Khartoum a fresh field has been opened to the 
influential native by the institution of a Municipal Council.
In certain Southern Provinces, too, courts of Chiefs 
have been employed in advisory and consultative capacities • 
and for the settlement of disputes, in which questions of 
native rights and customs are involved; and it -is proposed 
to develop the system in the light of experience gained.
As regards the first group -.the tribal Chiefs and" 
Sheikhs considered as such - a few preliminary remarks 
may not be out of place.
■ In the days before the Turkish conquest of .1821 tribal 
organization was highly developed and universal, though 
subject in many districts, to the central authority of the 
•Fung kingdom. The Turks obliterated the rule of the Fung 
and substituted their own over a greatly extended sphere, 
but they interfered as little as.'possible with tribal 
organizations and left to the local chieftains most, if not 
all, .of the powers of which they found them possessed. 
Provided the latter were amenable and collected the taxes 
assessed upon their people and restrainedithem from any 
action prejudicial to the interests of the Government, they 
were left to their own devices and their authority was upheld
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Sixty years later the discontent bred by the continuous 
extortion and injustice on the population at the instance 
of, or owing to t,he neglect of, the Government, found vent 
in the Dervish plot. •
. The period which followed was-one of autocratic despot- 
ism, terrorism-and internecine conflict, and the patriarchal 
ideal of administration which had to some considerable 
extent obtained in pre^Dervish times was perforce,".replaced 
in all but a few outlying districts by militarism, in.its " 
worse form." In' other , words the tribal Sheikh generally. . ;
gave way to, or himself^became, the commander of an unruly 
contingent of freebooters instead of being the leader and 
arbiter of a peaceful community. If, as Sheikh,•he was 
unfitted for this regime he was replaced by another more 
virile and ruthless than himself.
This was the state of affairs when we're-occupied the 
Sudan in .1898. The problem before us. fell, under two 
heads. First, as regards personnel, to divide the sheep 
from the goats, to eliminate the mere free-booters> and to 
retain and support;such men as had" commanded-general 
respect, whether as Sheikhs of tribes, as Councillors, as 
Kadis dr otherwise. Secondly, as regards administration, . 
to adopt or adapt whatever was found good and to reject or 
modify whatever was found bad. The two aims are of course 
interconnected, and the second was very cogently.expressed 
by Sir C.J. Brooke, Rajah of Sarawak, in 1871:” .'
The common mistake .Europeans make in ' . : ,
the East is to exalt western civilisation’'
— almost to the exclusion of the native
system, instead of using them, as mutually 
corrective. There are two ways in which 
a Government can act. The first is to .start
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from things as., it finds'them, putting 
its veto on what is dangerous or 
unjust', and supporting,, what is fair 
and'equitable in the usage of the 
nativesa and letting system and legislative 
wait upon occasion. , When new wants are 
felt it examines and provides for them 
by measures rather made on the spot than 
imported from abroad; and to ensure that 
these shall not be contrary to native 
customs, the consent of the people is 
gained for them before, they are put in 
force. .
Progress in this,, way is usually slow, 
and the system is not altogether popular •.
from our poiftt of view; but it is'both 
quiet and -steady, confidence is increased, ; 
and no vision of foreign .yoke to be laid 
heavily bn their shoulders, when 
• I, opportunity' offers, is present to the . /
native, mind. .. -
"The other plan is to make there‘ and > . 
here a, c.leah: sweep and to introduce ’
• something that Europeans;,,like'' better in the 
gap. k criminal code of.’the latest type ’ , . ' 
... or.a system of taxation and police 
introduced bodily from the west is imposed 
. with the full assurance of -its 'intrinsic 
excellence, but with too little thought 
.how' far it is likely totsuit- the•circum- 
stances it has to meet-.' • ' "
To expatiate on this thesis is unnecessary, and it is 
almost superfluous to direct attention to the obvious 
fact that the practical application of the principle must 
vary in .kind and in degree with local conditions.
-In ..the Southern Sudan it. is negro tribes that are 
concerned- and much depends on the'’ existence and efficacy 
of their local or tribal organization. Where such exists 
it can be fostered and guided along the right channels; 
where it has ceased to exist it-may still be possible 
gradually to re-create it.
Among the sedentary semi-Arab population living further 
north there is little, organization that has survived their 
settlement in permanent-villages -and the consequent
removal of any need for tribal cohesion and co-operation.
In proportion, as they have become individualistic it is
unavoidable for the Government ,to deal direct with the
individual, but something can still be done' to maintain
such minor powers as pertain by custom to the village
1
Sheikhs and Omdas.
The case of the nomads is very different, but presents 
no great inherent difficulties. With one or two exceptions 
the power of the headman of these tribes is far less at the 
present day than it was in pre-Dervish times. Between,1882 
and 1898 the nomad tribes disintegrated. Some sections 
joined the Dervishes; others resisted their authority; all 
alike were decimated by continuous punitive expeditions and 
internecine quarrels. As a natural consequence the 
traditional, authority of the Sheikhs greatly diminished and 
the settled conditions of the last twenty years have not 
sufficed altogether to restore it. Fortunately, however, 
the theory of the paramount authority of the Sheikh is as 
old as the nomad habit itself and is so deeply implanted 
as to have the force of an instinct. In so far, therefore,, 
as we support or revive the authority of the Sheikhs we 
have public opinion very strongly on our side.
By immemorial custom it is for the nomad Sheikh to 
decide all disputes as between his own people and to hear 
complaints by men-of other tribes against them and to 
enforce any satisfaction that he deems to be due. He also
1. N.B. An Ordinance entitled "The Village Courts Ordinance 
1925" has now been passed by the Governor-General*s 
Council.
expects and prefers to be responsible for the collection of 
all taxes due to Government from members of his tribe.
This procedure is of course' necessarily modified by 
the insistence of the Government that certain more serious 
offences must be., referred to it for trial or for approval 
of any settlement agreed upon; -but, generally speaking, 
it works satisfactorily. ■ It, has the great incidental advantag 
of reducing the number of’-officials that would'be needed 
under a system of direct control, but its greatest merit is 
that, subject to reasonable safeguards, it leaves the work 
of internal administration in the hands.of those best fitted 
to perform it,
An intensive system of direct Governmental control in 
the case of nomads has indeed singularly little.to recommend 
it. Remarkable qualities of insight, -gympathy, imagination, 
firmness, patience and knowledge are needed in the senior 
staff to make it successful, and a large junior staff, is- 
unavoidable if records are to be kept. But, on the other 
hand, the nomad is'more contented in proportion as he is 
left without alien interference, and no foreigner has the 
knowledge and Insight, and few the patience and power of 
restraint which a good Sheikh possesses.
The crux of the matter lies' in the character of„the 
individual Sheikh, and here our policy is clearly defined.
So long as the Sheikh remains loyal to the Government, :■ 
carries out its orders with reasonable 'expedition and 
efficiency, and retains the respect of his people, he is 
supported. If he proves .himself disloyal or if from moral , - 
failure he ceases to retain the respect of his people, he 
is replaced. If he is merely inefficient he is given
every chance and is only deposed if his failure is complete. - 
in which case he would almost certainly have also lost the 
respect of his people. ' .
It is realized that there are two pitfalls of which 
we must beware:- oh the one side, if we leave the Sheikh too 
free a hand he may abuse his powers r- but let it be remembered 
that a native prefers to submit to a few abuses at the hands 
of his own Sheikh rather than to be pestered with rules.and 
regulations of alien origin, and that to the native his own 
standards of conduct are at least as reasonable as our own.
On the other 'aide, if we too often interfere the people ' ■ 
not only give us little, thanks fop'it, but they cease to look
to the Sheikh for their redress or to obey him. They play
him and the Government off the'one against the other, and ■'
consequently the Sheikh has no effective power, finds him- .
self in an impossible position, and is tempted to make, a 
catspaw of the Government.^
To sum up:- -
Decentralization is the keynote of our administrative 
policy. In the case of the nomad and the negro alike the 
system is, as a general rule, rendered easier of application 
by its familiarity and acceptability to the parties chiefly 
concerned. The main requisites for its success are, first, 
the choice of the right men. as;'Chief s or Sheikhs and, 
secondly, firmness and insight in the administrator, coupled 
with a, determination to interfere"* as • little as possible.
1. N.B. Subsequently to this Memorandum, being written
Ordinance entitled ’’The Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance"' 
and "The Village Courts Ordinance" have been passed by 
the Governor-General’s Council.
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In the case of the sedentary agricultural,..population 
a certain amount of latitude can be accorded to village 
Sheikhs and Omdas, but not to an extent comparable with 
that allowed in the case of communities organized on a tribal 
basis. -
APPENDIX VI 
1930 Memorandum on Southern Policy
Civil Secretaryfs Office, 
Khartoum, January 25th,1930. 
The Governor, Upper Nile Province,- Malakal.
The Governor, Mongalla Province, Mongalla.
The Governor, Bahr al Ghazal Province, Wau.
His Excellency the Governor General directs that the main 
features of the approved policy of the Government for the 
administration of the Southern Provinces' should be re-stated 
in simple terms.
In the strictly confidential memorandum which accompanies 
this letter an attempt has been made to do this, though it 
will of course be seen that innumerable points of detail 
arising.are not dealt with seriatim.
2. Your attention is directed to Part II of the memorandum, 
and I' should be obliged if you would forward, as soon as 
possible, your comments on the criteria suggested and any 
suggestions you may wish to make for additions to the list.
3. The carrying out of the policy as described may lead 
from time to time.to various financial implications or 
commitments though it is hoped that these will not be great.
It will be convenient that any'such foreseen should be notified 
to the relevant authority without delay for consideration.
4. Application of the policy will obviously vary in detail 
and in intensity according to locality. It" is essential 
however, that the ultimate aim should be made clear to all 
who are responsible for the execution of the policy, and
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the memorandum should therefore be circulated to and studied 
by all your District Commissioners. Sufficient copies for this 
purpose are sent herewith. Copies are also-being sent to :r 
such Heads of Departments in Khartoum as are concerned.
' ' * CIVIL SECRETARY
C-S/I.e. I. . . ,
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL ' - .
Memorandum 
Part I -
The policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to 
build up a series of self contained racial or tribal units 
with structure and' organisation based, to what ever;extent 
the requirements of equity and good government permit, upon 
indigenous' customs, traditional usage, and beliefs.
The measures already taken or to be taken to promote " 
the above policy are re-stated below. ,
A. Provision of non-Arabic-Speaking Staff (Administrative. 
Clerical and Technical)
a). Administrative Staff.
The gradual elimination of the Mamur, whether Arab 'or 
black. This'1 has already begun, and it is intended that the 
process of reduction shall continue as opportunity offers,
b). Clerical.
It has been recognized policy for some years that locally 
recruited staff should take the place of clerks and 
accountants drawn from;the North and that the language of 
Government offices should be English.
In the Bahr al Ghagal Province the change to English 
has already been made and a large number of local boys are 
employed.
The process has to be gradual. It is recognized that 
local boys are not fit at present to fill the higher posts 
in Government offices, and the supply of educated English- 
speaking boys depends on the speed with which the two 
missionary Intermediate Schools in Mongalla Province and 
the Intermediate and Stack Schools at Wau can .produce them.
The missions must retain a certain number of these boys as 
teachers for their Elementary schools (which are an integral 
part of the educational system) but since the employment of 
local boys in Government offices is a vital feature of the 
general policy every encouragement should be given to those in 
charge of mission schools to cooperate in that policy by 
sending boys into Government service. Province officials must 
aim at maintaining a steady supply of boys for the Elementary 
Vernacular schools which feed the‘Intermediate schools,
c). Technical
Generally speaking, the considerations mentioned above apply 
also to the supply of boys for the technical departments - 
Agriculture, Medical, Public Works, etc.; but,.in certain 
cases it may not be essential that boys going to these depart­
ments should complete the Intermediate school course.
B. Control of Immigrant Traders from the North 
It is the aim of the Government to encourage, as far as is 
possible, Greek and Syrian traders rather than the Gellaba type 
Permits to the latter should be decreased unobtrusively but 
progressively, and only the best-type of Gellaba, whose 
interests are purely commercial and pursued in a legitimate 
manner should be admitted. The limitation of Gellaba trade 
to towns or established routes is essential*
C. Fundamental,. Necessity • for British Staff to Familiarize
themselves 'with the Beliefs and Customs and the Languages 
of the Trib,es; they Administer. ■
a). Beliefs and Customs.. . - , ;
The policy of Government requires that officials in the South, 
especially administrative officials, should be fully in­
formed as to the social structure, beliefs, customs and
mental processes of pagan tribes. Study on these lines-is
of vital importance to.the solution"of administrative 
problems, and it. is with this fact in view, that a highly ,
qualified expert has been detailed to work in the. South.
b).' Language.' : ■'
The Rejaf Language Conference recommended the adoption of 
certain ’group languages’ for use. in schools. If is clearly 
impossible to develop all the. languages and.,.dialects of the - 
Southern Sudan and the development of a limited number of them 
may tend to cause the; smaller languages one by,one to 
disappear,. arid be. supplanted by ’ group1 languages' .
Tt is, of course, true that ..the adoption- Of ;this 'system • 
carries with it the implication of the gradual adoption of 
a new, or partly new, language by the population of the areas . 
in which the ’smaller languages’ are used at present. . Such 
a result is, indeed,, inevitable in. the course of, time, for 
'smaller languages’ must always tend to disappear.
It is. also recognised that in such places as Wau itself, 
Arabic is so' commonly, used that the local languages have 
been almost completely excluded. Special concessions may 
be necessary in the'se places..
The Relaf Conference did not regard these factors as 
seriously affecting the policy of ’group languages’, and it
was held to be a-matter of first importance that books for 
the study of the 'group languages' should be available for 
missionaries and officials and that a specialist should be 
appointed to study the question* A linguistic expert,
Dr. Tucker, has therefore been appointed for a period of 
two years, and his chief function will be fo advise as to the 
production of suitable books. The Secretary for Education 
and Health has already circulated a memorandum on his duties.
The production'Of grammars'and vocabularies will 
facilitate the study of the local vernaculars. But'this 
will take time and meanwhile it is the duty of our officers fo 
further the policy' of the Government without delay. ■It 
cannot be stressed too strongly that to speak the natural 
language of the people whom he controls is the first duty of 
the administrator. Arabic is not that language, and indeed 
to the bulk of the population of the South it is a new, 
or partly new, tongue. Officials should avoid .the error 
of thinking that by speaking Arabic they are in some way 
conforming to the principle that the administrator should 
converse with his people in their own language.
D. The Use of English Where Communication in the Local 
Vernacular is Impossible
The time has not yet come for the adoption of a general lingua 
franca for the Southern -Sudan, and it is impossible to foretell 
what, if ever that time comes, the language would be.
•At the same time there are, without doubt, occasions 
when'the use of a local vernacular is impossible, as, for 
instance in the case of heterogeneous groupings such as 
the Sudan Defence Force or the Police.
The recent■introduction'of. English wOrds^ of command 
in the Equatoria Corps of the Sudan Defence and their use 
in the Police Forces in the Provinces concerned is a step 
in the right direction, but more is required.. Every 
effort should be made to make English the means of communi­
cation among the men themselves to the complete exclusion 
of Arabic. This will entail in the various units the opening 
of classes in which the men would receive instruction in 
English, and a concentrated effort on the- part of those in 
authority to ensure that English is Used by the men when 
local vernaculars cannot be. It is believed that in a 
comparatively short time men of these forces could learn as 
much English as they now know of Arabic.
It' is hoped that those in charge of mission schools 
will assist in providing instructors for the classes referred 
to above.
Similarly, an .official unable to speak the local vernacular 
should try to use English when speaking to Government 
employees and servants, and even, if in any way possible, to 
chiefs and natives. In any, case, the use of an interpreter 
is preferable to the use1 of Arabic, until the local language 
can be used.
The initial difficulties are not minimized. Inability 
to converse freely,at first will no doubt result in some loss 
of efficiency, and the dislike of almost every Englishman 
to using his own .language in conversing with natives is 
fully recognized'; but. difficulties and dislikes must be 
subordinates to the main policy.
Apart from the fact that the restriction of Arabic is 
an essential feature ofj the general'scheme it must not be
forgotten that Arabic, being neither the language of the , 
governing nor.the governed, will progressively deteriorate.
The type of Arabic at present spoken provides signal proof 
of this. It cannot be used as a means of communication oh 
anything but: the most simple matters, and only if it were 
first unlearned and then relearned in a less crude form and 
adopted as the language of instruction in the schools could 
it fulfil the growing requirements of the future. The local 
vernaculars and English, on the other hand, will in every- 
- case.be the language of one of the two parties conversing 
and one party will therefore always be improving1 the other.
'Incidentally it .may be argued that if a District 
Commissioner serving in the South is transferred to the 
North, a knowledge.of■Nilotic Arabic is more of a hindrance 
than a help to him in learning the.Arabic of the Northern 
. Sudan.
In short, whereas at present Arabic is considered by 
many natives of the South as the official and, as it were, the- 
fashionable language, the object of all should be to counter-’ 
act this idea by every practical means.
PART II ■' '
Progress of Policy
His Excellency the High Commissioner in approving this 
policy has suggested the need for criteria, by which progress 
may be measured.
With this end in view it is intended to tabulate various 
important features of the policy and to set down the progress
made at stated intervals.
It is suggested that the matters to be included in 
the table should be the following':
a). The number of non-Mohammedans in relation to the
total.Government staff under headings of administrative, 
clerical, and technical, with'a report on the use of English
by Government employees of non-British origin,
b). The number of British officials who have qualified in 
the local languages. ' ' ' " .
c). Number of immigrant traders of various-nationalities 
from the North,- ' -
d)-. Number of Mission schools, elementary, intermediate 
and technical respectively, w
e). Number of Government schools.
f). The amount.spent on education including:
Subsidies to mission schools;
cost of Government schools;
cost;, of supervisory: educational staff,
5).. Introduction• of English words of-command in-military or 
police forces; with a report, as to the'extent to which Arabic- 
is disappearing, as the language in use among the men of 
these forces, : ., - ‘ - ' ‘
h). Notes on the progress of the use of English instead of 
Arabic where communication in the vernacular is impossible.
i) . . Progress made in. the production,,of text-books in the group 
languages for use in .the schools, and grammars and vocabularies 
for use of missionaries and officials.
, It is. proposed to give information in the Annual Report
under;these heads for the years 1924,,1927 and 1930 and for
each subsequent year. ' .
Civil Secretary's Office, .
Khartoum, . January 25th, 1930. -- . . , * ■ ,
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APPENDIX NO. 'VII
1.946 Memorandum-on Southern-Policy
CS/SCR/I.C.I.
Subject: Southern Sudan Policy ‘Civil Secretary’s Office,..,
SECRET 1 Khartoum, December l6th, 1946
Financial Secretary (2) ?
Legal Secretary (2)
Kaid . , • (3) :
Director of Agriculture & Forests (3)
Director of'Economics & Trade (2)
Director of Education (3)
Director of Medical Service (3)
General- Manager, . Sudan Railways (2) . ;
Director, Veterinary Service (2)
Governor, Equatoria Province (12)
Governor, Upper Nile Province; (10)
Will you please refer to Khartoum Secret Despatch No. 89 of 
August 4th, 1945, of which copies were sent to you (or to your 
predecessors in Office) personally under this .number.
2. You-will see that in paragraph 2 of the "despatch there *- '
are contemplated three possible political futures'for the
Southern Sudan. ' The crucial sentence Is;
; It is only by economic and educational development ■ 
that; these people can be equipped to stand up for 
themselves in the future, whether their lot be 
eventually cast with the. Northern Sudan or. with 
East Africa (or partly with each). %-
3. ' Since the despatch was written, and since the .decisions ■ '
on policy'which it records were taken not only have further 
decisions on policy for the South been taken (of which a list
is attached) but great changes have taken place in the 
political outlook for the country as a whole. Whatever may 
be the final effect, inside the Sudan, of the present treaty 
negotiations, it is certain that the advance of the Northern 
Sudan to self-government, involving the progressive reduction 
of British executive authority, and public canvassing of the 
Southern Sudan, question, will be accelerated. ■ It is therefore 
essential that, policy for. the Southern Sudan should be • 
crystallized as soon as possible and that it should be 
crystallized in a form which can be publicly explained and 
supported and which should therefore be based on sound and 
constructive social and economic principles. These prin­
ciples must not only bear defence against factious opposition, 
but must also command the support of Northern Sudanese who are 
prepared to take logical and liberal points of view: while
the relief of doubts now in the minds of British political 
and departmental staff who have the interests of the South , 
at heart is also pressing and important.
4. . You will see from the foregoing paragraph that I do not 
suggest that the future of the two million inhabitants of 
the South should be influenced by appeasement of the as yet 
immature, and ill-informed politicians of the Northern Sudan. 
But it is the : Sudanese, northern and southern, who will live 
their lives and direct, their affairs in future generations 
in this country: and our efforts must therefore now be
concentrated on initiating a policy, which is not only sound 
in Itself , but which can be. made acceptable to, and eventually 
workable by patriotic and reasonable Sudanese, northern 
and southern alike'.
5.' . Apart.from the recent rapid political development in 
the North the following conclusions have further emerged 
since His Excellency’s 1945 despatch and enclosures were 
written: ■
a) with reference to Appendix I to the despatch,
Section 7 last sentence of penultimate paragraph.
East Africa's plans regarding better communications 
with the Southern Sudan have, been found to be 
nebulous, and contingent on the Lake Albert Dam. 
Whatever the possibilities we have no reason to . 
hesitate between development of trade between the
-South and E, Africa and development of trade between 
the Southern and the Northern Sudan. Our chance of 
succeeding depends I think upon confining ourselves 
to the one aim of developing trade in the South, and 
between the,North and the South. .
b) In Education, I believe that while the South may 
hope to have a secondary school, it cannot hope to 
support post-secondary education, and I believe 
that Southerners should get this at the Gordon 
Memorial College - Arabic is not essential there, but 
should I think be taught to Southerners as a subject 
from intermediate school level upwards.
c) The distinction in rates of pay and other conditions 
of government service, the artificial rules about 
employment of Southerners in the North, attempts at 
economic separation, and all similar distinctions 
are becoming more and more anomalous as the growing 
demand for Northerners to be employed in Southern 
Development Schemes, the rapidly growing communication
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.and travel between North' and South, and the very
application, of the policy.of pushing forward in the
South, break down the previous isolation of the Southern
’ Provinces and strain these distinctions further.
6,' The preceding paragraphs are an attempt to indicate
briefly the reasons which have led. me to think that an
important decision on Southern policy must now be taken.
The biennial report, to His Britannic Majesty's Government
is due early next year-. Subject to your comments on this
letter, I propose'to advise His Majesty's Government to
approve, that two of the alternatives mentioned in paragraph
2 above be ruled out as practical politics at the present
time. It may in future' be proved that it would be to the.
advantage of certain of the most_ southerly tribes,' e.g. of
Opari or Kajo Kaji, to join Up with,their relatives in
Uganda. . It may be that the feeling which now exists ■
among a few of the wisest Northern Sudanese,; that they
should not, when'self-governing, be asked to shoulder the
financial and communal burden which they believe the
South will always .prove to.be, may become an important
political policy among them. But we should now work on
the assumption that the Sudan, as'it present constituted,
with possibly minor boundary adjustments, will remain one:
and we should therefore restate-our Southern policy and do
so publicly, as follows:
"The policy of the Sudan Government ‘ 
regarding the Southern Sudan is to 
act upon' the. facts that the peoples 
of the Southern.Sudan are'distinctively 
African and Negroid, but that geo­
graphy and ..economics combine (so far 
as can be foreseen at the present time) 
to render them inextricably bound for.
future1 development to the middle- 
- eastern and arableized Northern 
Sudan:, and therefore to ensure, 
that they shall, by educational 
and economic development, be equipped ; 
tO' stand up for themselves in the/' 
future as socially and economically 
the equals of their partners of ■
the Northern,Sudan in the Sudan , of 
the future." J
7. Certain changes -of detail, in each sphere of Government' , 
activity in the South, would I think have to follow the 
approval and publication of a policy 33o defined. You 
will wish to suggest briefly the,major points.
8*. ; Will you please consider this matter carefully,
consult the senior members of your staffs upon it 
(particularly of course those who have experience of the 
South), and let me have your views as: briefly as possible. 
Those of any individual' member of your staff which you 
wish to forward separately with your comments will also 
be welcome.
The views of senior Sudanese .in.whose judgment and 
discretion you have confidence may also be asked for.
9. ' Finally I ask you to read again the late Sir Douglas 
Newboldfs note to Council No. CS/SGR/l.C.14 of 3.4.44, repro­
duced as Appendix 1B f Cl) to the- despatch, and to bear in
mind that urgency is the essence of the 'problem. ' We no
longer have time to aim at the ideal: we must aim at doing
what is the best for the Southern peoples in the present 
circumstances.
.J. W. ROBERTSON, 
Civil Secretary
Copies to: Governors: Blue Nile' Khartoum - 2 copies each
■' Darfur Kordofan
Kassala . Northern
/ .Sudan Agent, Cairo (2) ;
.v Sudan. Agent, London (2)
APPENDIX NO. VIII
Proceedings of the Juba Conference on the 
Political Development of the Southern Sudan,
June.1947
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL :
The following were present;
J.W. Robertson, Esq., MBE, Civil Secretary, Chairman
F.D. Kingdon, Esq., Governor.Upper Nile 
B.V. Marwood, Esq., Governor Equatoria
G.H. Barter, Esq., Director of Establishment
M.S’.A. Keen, Esq., Assistant'Civil Secretary (Councils) 
•T.R.H. Owen,' Esq., Deputy Governor Bahr al Ghazal 
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti 
Ibrahim Eff. Badri 
Kamyangi Ababa-. . •
Sgt. Major Philemon Majok
Clement Mboro
Hassan Fertak
James Tembura
Chief Cir Rehan
Chief Gir. Kiro •
Pastor Andrea Apaya 
Chief Ukuma Bazia 
Edward Adhok 
Buth Diu
Chief Lolik Lado 
Chief Lapponya 
Father Guido Akou
Siricio Iro
Chief Tete '
Chief Luoth Ajak
Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman
Dr. Habib Abdulla.,
Sheikh Serur, Mohd. Ramli
The meeting opened at 9.30 a.m. on Thursday, June 12th.
The Chairman in his opening speech said;
Gentlemen,
I should first of all like to say how glad I am to see 
you all.here today, and on behalf of those of us who are 
visitors I wish to thank the Governor, Mr. Marwood, and the 
other residents in Juba, who have welcomed us so hospitably 
and generously.
The origin of this meeting lies in the recent developments 
of administration and policy in the Northern Sudan. Last 
year, the Governor-General, Sir Hubert Huddleston, set up a 
Conference in the North to seek ways and means of associating, 
the Sudanese more closely with the government of their 
country,. As you know, there has been in the Northern 
Sudan for the last three years, an Advisory Council, and one 
of■the recommendations made by the Conference is. to develop 
the Advisory Council into a more authoritative and responsible 
body, with the power of making laws and to some extent, of 
controlling the work of the administration.
The Advisory Council has not had power to concern itself 
with the two Southern Provinces of Equatoria and the Upper 
Nile and there are therefore no Southern Sudanese on the 
Advisory Council. The report of the Conference however, 
itfhich has just been published, recommends that the Southern
Sudan should send representative's to the- new’ Assembly 
which it is proposed should be set up, and in paragraphs 
12 and 13 of this report you will find its recommendations 
and the reasons for them, ’ ‘
The reasons are important;: the main consideration is
that the Sudan, though a vast country in area, is small in 
wealth and population,, and if the. ’Sudan is ever really to 
become self-governing and self-dependent ,it must not' be . - 
divided up into small weak.units. Those who prepared the 
report believe that ‘ the' sooner Southern and" Northern-Sudanese . 
come together and work together,, the sooner they, will begin 
to coalesce and cooperate in the-advancement of; their :
country. This belief is sincerely and genuinely held by 
many Northern Sudanese, and they hope that by including 
Southern Sudanese in the future Assembly,'’ the process of 
..unification will be hastened. I am confident that their, 
recommendations are based on the very highest motives, and 
think they do not seek opportunities of exploiting backward 
tribes in the South.
The Conference in Khartoum did not include Southern 
representatives, but I invited’ the Governors of Equatoria 
and the Upper Nile to attend in order that they should know 
what was being proposed, and should be able to inform the 
Conference of conditions and feelings in the South. This they 
did.
Now that the report of the Conference has been submitted 
to the Sudan Government and action on it is expected, I have 
summoned this meeting here of men both from, the North5 and 
the South, in order to consider the. unification of the two 
parts of the country. I should like to explain to you •.
present Government policy in regard to the South.
The policy was defined in 1945 as follows:
It is only by economic and educational development 
'that these peoples can be equipped to stand up for 
themselves in the future, whether their lot'be 
eventually cast with the Northern Sudan or with 
East Africa, or partly with each.
Since 1945 there have been developments both economically 
and educationally in the South, and.it has begun to be clear,
I think, that the Southern Sudan, by its history and by the.
accidents of geography, river transport.and so on, must turn 
more to the North rather5 than to Uganda or the Congo, and I 
believe that our policy regarding these areas should be 
restated as follows: .
The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the.
Southern Sudan is to act upon, the facts that the 
peoples of Southern Sudan are distinctly African 
and negroid, but that geography and economics 
combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present 
time) to render them inextricably bound for future 
development to the Middle East and Arabs of the
Northern Sudan and therefore to ensure that they
shall by educational and economic developments"he 
equipped to take their places in the future as 
socially and economically the equals of their 
partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the 
future. •
; If this is to be the Governments policy regarding the 
Southern Sudan, I should like the'views of this meeting on 
one or two points of immediate importance.
You have all received copies of a'Memorandum giving 
the terms of reference of this meeting and I think have' 
already had opportunity to discuss them and form your opinion.
Memorandum
The Sudan Administration Conference, in paragraphs 12 and 13 :
of its report dealing with the future closer association of '■ 
the Sudanese with the Central Government has made certain 
recommendations about the Southern Sudan.,
In order to- study the implications of these recommendations 
about which I shall have to advise "His Excellency the 
Governor-General, I have decided to hold a meeting in the 
Southern Sudan at which I wish to discuss the proposals with 
Southern Sudanese and with officials, who have Southern 
experience, both British and Sudanese. I have therefore 
arranged for a meeting to be held at Juba on June 11th, 1947 
at which I hope representatives from Equatoria and the Upper 
Nile Province will attend.
The terms of reference of the meeting will be:
1) to consider the recommendations of the Sudan 
Administration Conference about the Southern Sudan;
2) to discuss the advisability of the Southern Sudanese 
being represented in the proposed assembly and if
■; it is decided to be advisable to decide how such
representation can best be obtained in the present 
circumstances; and whether the representation 
proposed by the Sudan Administration Conference is 
suitable;
3) to discus.s whether safeguards can be introduced 
into the forthcoming legislation setting up- the' 
new Assembly, to ensure that the Southern Sudan
with its difference in ..race, tradition, language, 
customs and outlook is not.hindered in its social 
and political advancement;
4) to discuss whether or not an Advisory Council for 
the .'Southern, Sudan should be set up to deal with 
Southern affairs from which representatives might
be appointed to sit on the assembly,-as representatives
; of the Southern Sudan;
5) to consider the recommendations of the Sudan
Administration Conference in paragraph 13 of their 
report which deals with matters not strictly 
relevant to the political development of the Sudan, 
which the Conference recommended as essential if the 
unification of the Sudanese peoples is to be achieved.
; Chief Ukuma Bazia then laid before the meeting a set of 
written answers to the points raised in the Civil Secretary's 
Memorandum. .
Minutes of the Preliminary Meeting of the " .
Members Referring to Civil Secretary's .
Memorandum ■
2) No, but-to send people who will sit and merely
study. . -
3) TO leave the matter of race tradition; language 
customs and outlook die by itself,’through 
education and civilization,' More safeguards to 
be added.
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4) We agree to set up our Advisory Council in the 
South but in link with the- North. Before- passing, 
laws for the whole Sudan the Legislative Council in 
the North should consult the Advisory Council here 
until such.-time when the South...will be capable to 
send representatives to voice for itself. Since we
consented in para. 2 we also welcome people from
the North to attend our meetings and advise us.
People to be sent should be of legal respect.
5) Permits to trade order 1928 to be cancelled on the 
following conditions:
i) Only the-'peopie with good ' capitals should be , - 
admitted.
ii) That these capitalists should build their shops 
in red.;bricks and corrugated iron sheets in 
places permitted by* this council. 
iii) That .Southern Sudanese should be encouraged to 
trade and the only way-of doing'this is by 
employing agents from 'the South.
5a) One educational policy to be adopted for North and 
South.. The teaching of language should be in bush 
.schools. English and Arabic, in Elementary to 
Higher Schools. , " ; •,
5b) The improvement of communications between the two 
parts* encouragement of transfers, the unification 
of the system of establishment should be the- same and 
should be started-NOW. „
Mohamed Saleh Eff, Shingeiti referring to Answer.No.2 
asked if- the Southerners could explain why the South should be
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unable to send representatives to the Central Legislative 
Assembly just as the other outlying tribes and areas of the 
North, for instance the.,Bejic>, the Kab&bish, etc. If 
Southerners were going to attend the Assembly why should they 
not take part' in it, and speak for their own people? Since
the more distant tribes of the Northern Sudan were to be'
represented in the proposed assembly why should not the South?
•Kamyangi Ababa replied that Southerners were like 
recruits compared with old soldiers and the Southerners wanted 
more training before they could rtake part in an assembly 
with Northerners. The other tribes which the last'speaker 
mentioned had already had some experience in the Advisory 
Council which Southerners had not had.They did not wish to 
close the door to Southern representation in the Legislative 
Assembly, but the 'time was not yet ripe.
The Chairman referred the meeting to the basic question
as to whether they considered that the South was essentially 
to\be one with the North.
.. James Tembura said that education had not advanced far 
enbugh in the South to allow 'for full representation.
- Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti returned to the point’ that 
many of the Northern tribes were, as backward as anyone in the 
South and had not previously had Councils of their own. We 
suggested that there should be Province Councils in each of 
the Southern Provinces which should send representatives.
Chief Ukuma Bazia asked why the South had not been 
included.in the Advisory Council. ,
Mr. ■ Kingdonsaid that Sir Douglas Newbold had answered 
that question at the time when the Advisory Council was first 
started. He said Southerners had not reached a standard of
education which would enable them to represent their com­
patriots in such a Council.
,Chief Ukuma Bazia asked if, when Sir Douglas Newbold 
gave this explanation, the Northern Sudanese were satisfied 
with it.
, Mohd'. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti replied emphatically that the 
Northern Sudanese'were not satisfied.
Sgt. Major Philemon stated that the Southerners were 
like children in their relations with the grown-up 
Northerners and that, as children must drink milk before 
they eat kisra, so the Southerners must first study self- 
government before participating in governing.
Chief Cir Rehan said that the South was distinct from 
the North. If he went to the North, would the Northerners 
listen to his words as the pre^-representative of the Southern 
peoples? .
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said they would.
Chief Cir Rehan replied that the Southerners should go 
on learning under their British Administrators and in due 
course they would acquire understanding. He could not see 
that at the present time, Northerners could understand the 
needs of Southerners.
.Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that he was understanding 
them now and that if they came to the North then the Northerners 
and the Southerners would have the opportunity of understanding 
each other even better.
Chief Cir Rehan was still dissatisfied and said that the 
Southerners must have training in Councils before they could 
represent their people.
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Dr. Habib'Abdulla remarked .that in his opinion all 
the Southerners present .were labouring under-;-the’ misconception 
that all Northerners have great training and Southerners' • h 
was much less than they thought , in fact it was ..negligible.
The Southerners should"not be afraid of being-at disadvantages 
via a vis the Northerners in matters of self government.
Sgt. Major Philemon admitted.that that was in fact what 
he was afraid of, and could not see why the Northerners. "
should not simply invite them North'to enable them first of 
all to observe the procedure. He added’that - the Southerners 
could not ignore past history.
Hassan Fertak, replying to Judge Shingeiti', said that 
everything had to have a beginning. The1 North had had its 
Advisory Council for four years and was now ready for the 
next steps, a Legislative Assembly'; They were like pupils 
who had. been through class I and now were going into class II.. 
The South had ’.not yet been .through Class I,-and it would be 
absurd to put them straight into class II. -
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti explained■that members of 
the Advisory Council had not all b.eenuirv the same stage, 
some were more advanced than others and the less advanced 
had learnt a lot from the more advanced.
Hassan Fertak pointed out that the-less advanced had 
at any rate many contacts and much in common'with the more 
advanced members. - .
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti drew attention to the fact 
that the Conference in which they;- were engaged was very similar' 
to a meeting of the Advisory Council, and if Southerners could 
speak for themselves in this Conference why should they not 
do so in a legislative Assembly?
348.
Mr. Marwood stressed the difference between an Advisory 
Council and a Legislative Assembly which would have powers 
to make laws and would have some control over the admini­
stration. Judge Shingeiti ‘ had not yet given any convincing 
reason why the first step of an Advisory Council which had 
been found necessary in the North should not be equally, 
necessary in the South.
Sheikh Serur Mohd. Ramli wished to return to the basic 
point of whether the Sudan was to be a single united' nation. 
Before details of representation were discussed it was 
necessary to have that point settled.
Mr. Marwood nominated a speaker to reply but objection 
was taken to this by Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti■who said 
that if anybody wanted to speak they should do so without 
prompting from the Governor.
The Chairman asked whether anybody present had any 
objection to the Unity of Sudan,
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti complained that this was 
outside the meeting1s terms of reference hut the Civil 
Secretary refused to admit this,1 The Civil Secretary 
again addressed the.meeting and said that ih nobody spoke 
on this subject3 then they would, assume agreement on the 
principle of the Unity of the Sudan.
Chief Lapponya stated that the principle of unity could 
only be decided later when the Southerners were grown up, by 
.which time they would be in a position to decide whether to 
join the North or go to the Belgian Congo or Uganda.
The Chairman explained that people could not get up 
and go where they like just like’that.
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Mr. Owen addressed the Northern Sudanese present and 
explained that they were still suffering from the sins of 
Zubeir Pasha and the slavers. "Thesins of the Fathers 
shall be visited upon their children even unto the third 
and fourth generation". He said that the South had hot 
forgotten the days' of oppression even if the North had done so, 
and even today the Southerners would never willingly join 
the .North until the latter should prove by their acts, not 
merely by their words, that they had undergone a change 
of heart.
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti stressed that Northerners 
had no desire to, dominate the South. They maintained that the 
country was one. and the policy of this country was made in 1 
Khartoum,'so the Northerners wanted the Southerners to join 
with them in the formation of policy for a whole country.
Mr. Owen had referred to the slave trade ... but he felt 
bound .to point out that the British had in their time been 
the biggest slave traders in history. The West Indies were 
populated by Africans who had been enslaved in the past by . , ' ; 
the British but with the growth of public opinion the British 
had come to realize the evils of the slave trade.. What 
had happened in England had now happened in the Northern :
Sudan where it was fully realized that slavery.was barbaric 
and harmful. It has happened that, under this.Government, slaves 
had been introduced into the Sudan from Abyssinia. He had 
himself been a Sub-Mamur in the White Nile at that time and 
had personally taken part in the freeing of these slaves. This 
trade had been discovered by the vigilance of Sudanese Officials. 
Northerners had no evil intentions towards the South. If they 
had'they, would not have been prepared to put up the. money for
the Zande Scheme,
; ’■» Chief Lapponya said that when British and Northerners 
had first come to their country in 1914 the Northerners had 
/despised and insulted Southerners. Southerners were also 
envious'oh the Northerners because- they were paid at higher 
'rates. .
1 " Chief Glr-.Kiro admitted that the’Sudan was a single
country but said! that this was the first time ..they had ever ■„ 
taken part in a conference of this kind how could they be 
expected to send representatives to an assembly in Khartoum. 
The Northerners were their older brothers and were inviting 
them to swim across the river with the .Northerners.
Chief Cir Rehan said, that he and Chief-Gir Kiro were 
answerable to their people and must speak for them. At the 
Gogrial and Tonj Councils their people had said they had no. 
objection to live as brothers with the Northerners but they 
wanted first to wait and learn before joining them. That is 
what he and Chief Gir Kiro were saying now.
Mohd,. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that the Southerners 
could best learn in the‘course of, the work they would do in
the Province and District Councils. " , ;
The Chairman summed up at this point, and said that so far 
the discussion boiled down to two facts. Firstly, that most 
Southerners present (Shingeiti Eff, "All of- them") were 
■agreed that the Sudan was one country. Secondly, that the,. 
Southerners were not-yet advanced^enough to take part in the
legislative Assembly but would in' their opinion, be able to
participate after a period of educational training -in Southern 
Councils. V  , .
The meeting then adjourned for fifteen minutes.
The Chairman referred to note 2 of the Minutes of
the Preliminary Meeting. If- it was proposed to send
people to. the Legislative Assembly as-learners, how many
would they wish to send and how would they be chosen?
.The administration Conference, had recommended that there
should be fifteen.representatives from the'South. ,
. Chief Ukuma Bazia said that this point had. not been
discussed as they did not know if the suggestion would be '
accepted. They would certainly wish to select them them- ' r
selves rather than,.they should be appointed by Government.
Siricio Iro said that they would'.wish at first to send
a large number, probably more than the number suggested.
. ... language or .
* Mr . Kingdon asked what/ languages would be used in the 1
Legislative Assembly.. If there were too many it-1 would
cause serious delay in the proceedings.
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that the proceedings
would be in English and Arabic, but there would be no
difficulty in having them translated into the;language of any
member who did not understand either of these. ■
Mr, Kingdon pointed out that the absence of a large
:number of the leading personalities for prolonged periods
would cause a serious.delay in the advance of-local Government
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Singeiti said that the Government
of the people must b.e representative. and that the foundation.
of Representative Government lay in the Town, Rural District,
and Province Councils. Thus he considered that In the
South there should be- town councils in places like Juba, and,
Wau, Rural Councils in the Districts,- and a Province Council-
formed,from the leaders of the Town and Rural Councils. This' 
he considered could-be achieved in one year in the South. Some 
three or four of the Southern- representatives of the Legislative 
Assembly could be chosen from the Province Council. The ■ 
Province Governor could nominate others, being guided only by 
the interests of the Province. In due course these nominated, 
members to the Legislative Assembly would be replaced by 
Members selected or elected from the Province Council, which 
in the normal course of its deliberations would automatically 
effect the necessary training and education of its members.
All this had already taken place In the North, and he saw 
no reason why the same should not happen in the South.
Clement Mboro.asked what would happen if the Legislative 
Assembly were to meet before these Province Councils are 
set up.
The Chairman pointed out that it was hoped that the 
Legislative Assembly would be set up fairly soon, but there 
might be some delay.
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti presumed that Governors 
would nominate representatives in that case, but emphasized 
that Southern representation was essential or the North would 
have everything its own way.
Clement Mboro thought that considerably more than thirteen 
• should be sent from the South, even though they did not take 
part in the debates, in order to study the art of government.
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti pointed out that the place to 
learn the art- of government was in Local Government.
Clement Mboro, pleaded' for patience till the Southerners 
were sufficiently advanced to play their part in the Assembly.
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti .said that the North could not 
wait until the South caught, up. If Southerners .could take 
part in an Advisory Council they could take part.in a 
Legislative Assembly. ’V
Clement Mboro again stressed the essential difference 
between an Advisory Council-and a Legislative Assembly. The 
number of representatives to be sent to the North should be 
more than thirteen;. . When asked by the Chairman to explain his 
reasons, for this, he said, it would form a wider field for 
selection when the time came to appoint the. thirteen 
members,to the Legislative Assembly proper.
Mr. Owen asked Clement Mboro if these Southerners would 
go! to the North to study the Legislative Assemblyonly, or 
would they have to report back to a Southern Advisory Council.
Clement Mboro said they would have to report back to 
the Southern Advisory Council.
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti ..protested ■ that the Conference 
was useless as long as Southern Members present- came with 
fixed ideas which they had conceived before the Conference 
began. -'1 . :
' ’The Chairman replied that the Conference was quite open 
and that what was taking place now was an elucidation of the 
Southerners1 reasons for the various decisions they had come 
to. ■'
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti-repeated that the, Southerners1 
ideas had already been fixed, and that therefore the Conference 
was fruitless. ■ -,f " - '■
The Chairman,summed up the.previous discussion as,follows 
first, that the Southerners vw;.ere agreed to send a number of 
representatives to the North, in order to observe the process ..
rof Government, to broaden their minds, and to report back to 
the Southern Advisory Council. Secondly, that no fixed 
numbers had been agreed upon but that more than thirteen 
should go. .He went on to ask how these representatives were 
to be selected.
Clement Mboro replied that the Government•should begin 
now with Local Councils which in due course would be able to - 
send representatives, but in the meantime the Government should/ 
nominate representatives.
Dr. Habib Abdulla deprecated the separatist tendency that 
would be fostered by any proposals to treat, the Southern Sudan 
on a different footing' from the North.
Father Guido Akou said that the North wanted immediate 
Southern representation in an Assembly which would legislate 
for the whole Sudan. Southerners were afraid of this because 
they .felt, that, through lack of understanding, • their 
representatives might agree to laws- which would prove harmful.
Edward Adhok considered that there was -no-one from Upper 
Nile capable of representing his people in such an assembly.
The Shil.luk Council had not been a success so far owing to lack 
of experience of members. He himself did not feel qualified 
to represent his own people or take: the responsibility of . 
committing them to laws which, owing to a- lack of understanding 
on his part, might not be for the benefit of his people.
Ibrahim Eff. Badri said that when a man thinks he is 
backward it is difficult to persuade him'that he Is not, and 
that the Northern Sudanese must appreciate, this difficulty.
Chief Lolik Lado regretted that’he was not ready for these 
. discussions as he had not been able to consult his people befor 
coming to Juba. He said however, that a girl who has been
asked' to marry a young man usually wants time to hear 
reports of that, young'man from other people before consenting; 
likewise bdfore coming to any fixed decisions about their 
relations with the Northerners. The ancestors of the,Northern 
Sudanese were not" peace-loving and domesticated like cows.
The younger generation claim that they mean no harm, but 
time would show what they would in fact do.. He agreed to 
unification with the North but- insisted 011 the Southerners1 
need for protection and:for,further time to consider the 
matter in conference with the elders of the people-. An 
immediate decision could hot, be taken now.
Sheikh Serur Mohd.Ramli thought that Southerners need 
have no fear of laws which interfered with their customs for 
they could be administered with discretion. He quoted-the 
law against pharaonic circumcision which had-been passed by- • 
the Sudan Government at the, request of the Advisory Council. 
This lawwas only enforced on-the express direction of the 
Governor who .took into account all the circumstances. Any 
laws passed by the Legislative Assembly which -ran^counter 
to Southern custpms could doubtless make similar provision.
Chief Tete said that Northerners still despised and 
frequently insulted Southerners.. A child must be brought 
up gradually and Southerners must learn to walk before they 
try to run.
The Chairman then referred to para, 3 of the Memorandum 
and the minute of the preliminary meeting, and asked what 
safeguards the/Southerners had in mind. ,
Chief Ukuma Bazla instanced the customs of his.people 
to draw their-teeth and feared that Northerners who think 
this a barbarous, custom might try to stop it by law.
Dr. Habib Abdulla said that the best safeguard was that 
Southerners should be members of 1 the Legislative. Assembly.
Chief Buth Diu said that Northerners claim to have no 
desire to dominate the South, but this was not enough and 
there must be safeguards. Thera should be no settlement 
by Northerners on land in the- South without permission. * 
Secondly there must be no interference from the North in 
Local Government in the South. Thirdly there should be a 
law to prevent a Northerner calling a Southerner a slave.
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti pointed out .that such an 
insult was in fact punishable under the penal code.
James Tembura said, on the subject of safeguards, that 
they must ensure, that Northerners who have children by Southern 
women must not desert them when they go back to the North.
Mohd. Saleh Eff, Shingeiti replied that this was the 
Governments fault since the Government bids these wives and 
children.to go North.
James Tembura in reply to a question by the Chairman 
asserted that he was referring to cases where Northerners 
were properly married to Southern women both by. local custom 
and by Muslim law.
Dr. Habib Abdulla thought that the reason for these 
cases of desertion were to be found in the variety of laws 
governing marriage■in the Sudan, and that this could be 
rectified by future legislation.
The Chairman thought that furtherdiscussion on this 
point would not be profitable as it had little to do with 
the safeguards they were at present discussing. ■, - .
Mr. Marwood said that one sort of safeguard he had in 
mind was that laws affecting local customs could only be .
enforced.at the discretion of the Governor.
The Chairman then referred to the suggestion to set up 
an Advisory Council for the Southern Sudan and the Minute from 
the Preliminary Meeting on this point. In particular he asked 
what was meant by the-'expression • "people of legal respect".
. Clement Mboro,' said, that they had intended by this phrase 
men who had experience of Local Government and of the working 
of Councils and people-'who . know and sympathize with" Southerners..
'Mohd. , Sale.h Eff. Shingeiti asked how long such an 
Advisory Council would last.
Clement Mboro thought that it would be like the Advisory 
Council for the Northern Sudan and last a few years only, but 
that it might possibly be necessary to keep it in existence 
after.. Southern representatives had, taken their place in the 
Legislative Assembly.
'Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman felt that this, would mean 
separation, of North and'South., - =. ■
The Chairman deplored the tendency to regard any 
suggestion that Southern problems should be treated in a 
different manner from those in the North as a conspiracy 
to divide North from the. South.
Dr. Habib Abdulla thought;, that' there would be some delay 
in setting up the Legislative Assembly and that if in. the. 
meanwhile real progress should be made with the advancement 
of Local Government and Local Councils, Southerners might 
feel that a suitable ..form of representation could .be worked 
out by them in which-they could have confidence.
Hassan Pertak thought that a Southern Advisory Council 
would have the merit of providing, a reserve-of potential 
representatives to the Legislative Assembly.
: The Chairman pointed out in reply' that this could 
equally Well -be- done by Province Councils once they started.
Sheikh Se'rur Mohd. Ramli considered that the differences .: 
between North and South would no longer present any difficulty 
once Local Government developed in the South.
The meeting then adjourned until 9.30 a.m. on June 13th
1947.
The Conference reopened'at 9.30 a.m. on Friday, June 13th.. 
The Chairman'explained that the nature of the conference 
was exploratory only and that no decisions were being taken.
They were all there to learn each others1 ideas. The decisions, 
if any, would be taken-later by the Central Government. ,
He.-deplored the mutual suspicion; which seemed to exist between 
Northerners and Southerners. The Northerners on the one 
hand were suspecting the Southerners of wanting'to separate 
from the North (and the Government of desiring this 
separation). The Southerners on the other hand were suspecting 
that the Northerners wished to dominate them.
It was essential to get away from these suspicions 
so that they would all talk together.
Summing up the discussion of the day before the Chairman ., 
said that the following conclusions had been arrived at.:
Firstly that the Southerners want a unified Sudan.
Secondly, that they want to participate in the.proposed 
Legislative Assembly, but that
Thirdly, they were not sufficiently advanced to do^  so 
immediately. ' ,
Fourthly, it was important to hasten the establishment 
and the development of Local Government in the South.
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Fifthly, that at first Southerners should attend the 
Legislative Assembly as observers. These should be 
more than the thirteen eventual members.
Questions were asked about safeguards but they had 
been misunderstood.' Southern spokesmen had referred to 
these specific hurts they" wished to be defended from 
rather than the general method to be adopted to protect 
them from these hurts.
The Chairman referred to para. 4 the Southerners' :
answers t:o the Questions put in his Memorandum. Some 
reference had been made to it the day before but the dis--' 
cussion had not been complete., ' He personally thought that 
a Southern Advisory Council was unnecessary, and the Province 
Councils would be adequate. In Province Councils there 
would be great opportunity for more people to meet and 
discuss and thereby learn the art of Government. He also- 
thought that this would be more agreeable to the people of 
the North. The Chairman invited comments on this subject.
Dr. Habib Abdulla referred to the differences of opinion 
and suspicions between the North and South which had been 
mentioned by the Chairman, and asked permission to go over 
the ground of yesterday's debate to bring out certain 
important points. There were certain essential things which 
must be agreed before other matters could be discussed. 
Firstly, the Sudan is one country because of geographical 
condition. Secondly, there was no reason why, laws made for 
the Sudan as a 'whole should be harmful to one part of it. 
There were two kinds of laws, laws which protected person 
and property which were welcome to everybody, and laws 
relating ,to taxation, etc., which nobody liked. Reference
360.
had frequently been made to political backwardness of 
Southerners. This ,was purely a relative matter. There were 
some 200 tribes in the Sudan, each with its'own customs 
and conditions. They were all of the same- economic standard 
for they were all poor and in need of economic advance.
Religion might differ, but. each had his own. >. There 
was no reason to say that any one section was more backward 
than another. It was true that some Southerners went naked, 
but some Northerners never wash. No one'wished to upset the 
Government. The Government Wished to teach the Sudanese 
to govern themselves and told them they could not learn to 
do' so without taking responsibility. Finally he wished to 
know why the Southern members had asked for an Advisory 
Council, for the South.
The Chairman pointed out this had been answered the 
previous day when the Southerners had said that the- North 
had had practice in an Advisory Council for four years, that 
a baby had to drink milk before it could eat kisra. This 
appeared to be a full answer to the question. The point now 
before the .meeting was whether there should not be Province 
Councils instead of a,single Advisory Council.
= Sirieio Iro thought that Province Councils would be a 
good thing and that. Southern Members to the Legislative :
Assembly could later be drawn from these councils. There 
was. no wonder or mystery about these councils. It was a 
matter of common pense and the .councils would be comparable 
to the present Chief1 s.courts. The experience gained in
these councils would assist the Southerners in-their deliberation 
with the Northerners. - '
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Kamyangi Ababa referred to the difference between 
Northern and Southern rates of pay for work which was, in 
effect, the same, and to the reasons given for this by his 
District Commissioner, that is to say, lack of education in 
the South, and lower rates of taxation in the South. He 
referred also to the higher standard of housing enjoyed by 
Northern officials, and concluded that although they were the 
sons,of one father it seemed to him that father was treating 
< his, brother better than himself.
Clement Mboro stated that since the conference of the day 
before he had fundamentally changed his mind and now con­
sidered that the best way to which the Southerners could 
protect themselves would be to go to Khartoum now to 
Legislate together with the Northerners. Any Councils formed 
in the South would'be defenceless before the Legislative 
Assembly. An Advisory Council was advisory only and its 
advice could easily be rejected by the Legislative Assembly- 
or. similar body. It was best for the Southerners to go and 
legislate now in spite of their backwardness; since,the 
Southerners could speak for themselves in the present con­
ference there,, was no reason why they could not speak for 
themselves in a Legislative Assembly. If any law was 
proposed which was not agreeable to the South they could,, stand 
up and object. The Southerners must defend themselves and 
speak and think for,themselves.
Mr. Owen asked Clement Mboro what his safeguard would be 
if in spite of the Southern objections in the Legislative 
Assembly a law was passed which was against the interests of 
the Southerners.
Clement Mboro replied, that the Government would, protect 
them. „ ' .., ;
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti protested against Mr. Owen’s 
question. His protest was- over-ruled. '
Clement Mboro went on to. say that if the 'Government could 
not protect them there must be rules and, legislation in the 
■^Legislative Assembly which, would, do fs6_. Meantime the 
Government must press- on without delay-with the, establishment, 
of Province, District, and Town Councils in the South;
Chief Cir, Rehan said that in ..their country . they, had 
originally been given courts, and;when- they had learnt to use 
them the Government had set up a Council of about- f orty1'men 
with three officials, who were responsible for the work of 
the,court, and for the chest. They had found this very 
different from- the Court work*-and, had. itf not been for- the 
help of the D..C. they could not have made work-at all. They, 
had found this conference different again. When they dis­
cussed amongst themselves the first day they took five hours 
to reach their decisions. . He, was certain that Northerners 
would have completed the business-in one hour (laughter).
What they had said yesterday was not their own opinion, only 
but that of their people. They'had agreed to join the North 
in a Government .for the whole Sudan only'if they were given 
time. Was he to go' back and tell his people that the Northerner 
insisted on their coming in at, once or not at' all? ' He did 
not feel that it showed a brotherly.feeling to try to force 
them. ■. . ' : - a; _
. James Tembura said that he agreed 'emphatically with what 
Clement Mboro had said with regard tofimmediate representation 
in the Legislative Assembly.
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The Chairman asked him why he had changed his mind since 
the ‘previous day.
James Tembura replied that Judge Shingeiti had said that 
if they did not do so they would have no say in the future 
Government of the Sudan, and he had thought this over very 
carefully, the previous night after considering what had been 
said during the day.
Chief Tete said he wanted to study in the South until he 
was clever enough to go to the North. One could not begin to 
do work which.-one did not understand.
Sgt. Major■Philemon Majok said that they were speaking 
on behalf of their people and that they, as spokesmen, could 
see more clearly than the people. He thought that if the ; 
Southerners adopted a "go slow" policy now they would never 
reach the required level. The Southerners could speak 
•their mind in a Legislative Assembly just as a Chief could . 
speak to Chief's Court or as a Major Court member could 
speak,to D.C. presiding. In a Legislative Assembly there 
would be somebody to defend them and guide them. In spite 
of his Statement the day before he now thought that there 
■ was■no danger in sending Southerners to the North to join 
in the Legislative Assembly as soon as it was formed.
Chief Lolik Lado said that the day before they had 
spoken for their people and could not change their words 
today. The Southerners wanted to send representatives'to the 
North but so far they had found nobody to send. The Govern­
ment would later select the right people to go to speak on 
their behalf.
Chief Lapponya thought that if representatives were to 
be sent to a Legislative Assembly they should have had
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• previous experience in councils of .their own. It was 
impossible to send untrained recruits into battle.': When the
Governor thought they were sufficiently trained he would send, 
them into the firing line.-’ , 1, ./y : .
* Hassan Fertak said that they were all, or nearly all, , "
agreed that the Sudan was one country and that was the 
most important decision that had to-be made. They were also 
agreed that Province Councils should be formed. He wanted 
to know when the .Legislative Assembly was likely to be set 
up.
. . The Chairman said they hoped it would be- very soon but 
-he could not say exactly when.
Hassan Fertak could see no reason why their representatives 
should not, for the time being* watch the proceedings in ' , .
order to learn, without,, being fulLvoting members.
The Chairman said that there seemed to have been a 
change- of mind ampngCsome of the,: Southern members but that' 
the discussion had been a useful one. He would now.like to
, ‘ r
return to the question he asked at the beginning of the ■ 
session. Did they wish to have one Advisory Council for 
the south or a Province Council for ea’ch Province. From 
what had been said, it appeared that-they, favoured Province 
Councils, and that these Councils should send, representatives, 
to the Legislative Assembly. There was some difference of 
opinion whether these representatives should be full voting 
■members’ from the start-,- or whether they should at' first .watch ' 
the proceedings until they had' some experience of procedure.
Chief Buth Diu thought the Southerners,(Sshould-send - 
representatives to the North not only to study but to 
participate in legislation, finance, and administration."' He /
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referred to para. .2 of the Civii SecretaryTs Memorandum, 
and thought that the best way of representing'the South 
would- be to sehd people who had- been attached-.to oubstations 
for three or four years, and also those who. had served a ‘ 
long time with the Government. The Government could 
appoint the best representatives. Four-representatives.from 
Upper Nile Province were enough.5 Of the ten members to be 
nominated by the Governor General, two could be from Upper ; 
Nile Province. An Advisory Council for the .South would be 
the first step towards separation. • It was much better 
to have Province Council's. Laws made by” the Legislative 
Assembly; should .not be enforced without the consent of the 
Governor or the Governor-General.,
The Chairman explained that:in any case according to the 
report of the.administration Conference all laws made by the 
Legislative Assembly would be referred to the Governor- 
General for his comments. , ■ ,
Chief Luoth Ajak agreed with Buth Diu.
The meeting adjourned for fiteen minutes. ,When the 
conference reopened the Chairman referred the Members to 
para. 5 of.his Memorandum, and said that some of the subject 
matter therein had already been discussed by the Southerners 
at their, own meeting held prior to the opening, of the present 
conference; With regard to Permits to Trade'the'. Southerners 
had expressed their opinion in their para., 5 sub-para.
1, 2 & 3. The Council referred to in para. 5, sub-para.2  ^
was presumably a Local Council* District or. Province.
Sheikh Serur Mohd. Ramil i said that if the conditions 
stipulated by the Southerners were necessary it would, be a 
matter for the Local Council to'decide.
The Chairman asked ..whether the condition laid, down by 
the Southerners had reference to Northern traders only or 
to all non-Southern traders. - r
Chief Ukuma Bazia and others explained that they 
referred to all non-Southern.traders.
Mohd. Saleh Eff.- Shingeiti explained that the licensing 
authority would probably be the Local Council who. would have 
power to attach what conditions they like to-the licence.
It was not necessary to define these conditions now. If 
the Local Councils were given adequate power the conditions 
attached to trader’s licences could safely be left to them.
The Chairman asked Mohd. Saleh Eff, Shingeitiif he was 
speaking on behalf of the. Legal Secretary or for himself 
only.
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that he was speaking 
for himself only.
The Chairman.explained that, his reason for asking that 
question was that the Legal Secretary adhered firmly to the 
view that licences should be bought over the Merkaz' 
counter and that there should be no restrictionsi
Mr. Marwood pointed out that Local Government Authoritie 
were not, in law,the-issuing authority for traders1 licences. 
If Judge Shingeiti's proposal-to hand over this authority 
to Local Governments and to enable them to impose what 
conditions they liked were adopted, it would presumably 
apply in the North as well, as in the South.
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that in the North 
there were no restrictions (apart from certain temporary 
restrictions resulting from- the war) attached to. the issue 
of traders1 licences. It was-open to the conference however,
to recommend that Local Authorities, be empowered to make 
such restrictions.
The Chairman explained 'that.in the South there were two 
licences which a non-Southern trader had to take out. One' 
was the ordinary, trader’s licence without .restrictions., and 
the other a special licence under the Permits to Trade Order. 
The reason for this was that..in the past many Gellaba with 
little capital and a tendency to.exploit the unsophisticated 
came to the South and the Permits to Trade Order was brought 
in to protect the tribesmen from this type of trader. If 
the Permits to Trade Order was cancelled, how was the South- 
to be protected from.a possible influx of such people?
Chief Buth Diu said that at the preliminary meeting 
they had decided to recommend that the Permits to Trade 
Order be cancelled under contain conditions. The reason 
for this was that'the Sudan Administration Conference had 
felt strongly that the Permits to Trade Order - was a hindrance 
to the unification of.the Sudan. The majority at that meeting 
were against the'cancellation of this Order, but the minority 
had persuaded the majority to agree, provided certain 
conditions were laid down. -
Chief Luoth Ajak emphasized the fear of the Southerners 
that a crowd of hungry Gellaba would invade the South and. 
swamp, them and--cheat the people.
James Tembura said that the feeling at the preliminary 
meeting was that rich traders from the North and elsewhere- 
should, be restricted to the big towns, leaving the bush shops 
for Southerners who wished to' learn shop-keeping.
Mr. Owen asked James Tembura if he thought there were'
enough Southerners who wanted to open bush shops, as in 
his experience there were disappointingly few who wished 
to do so.,
' James Tembura replied that he thought that there were 
enough.
Chief Lolik Lado was sure that many Southerners wanted 
to open shops.
. - . Chief Tete.agreed and added that many ex-soldiers wanted 
to open shops with their gratuities.
* The Chairman,thought that, what the Southerners wanted 
was a safeguard-that Northerners should not come and;open 
shops in the villages but that village shops.should be 
reserved for Southerners. .He asked Mohd, Saleh Eff. Shingeiti 
if the Legal Secretary would aghee to that. ‘ Mohd. Saleh Eff. 
Shingeiti thought that he would.
The Chairman thought there was little difference between 
this and the old Permits to Trade Order.
Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman thought that,the difference 
lay in this: that although local Authorities should have
power to refti.se a licence disappointed applicants would 
still have the right of appeal against■ their decision.
Mr. Marwood thought that present legislation in the 
Sudan was deficient. A permit to trade was merely a piece ■ 
of financial machinery, but there‘was, no Ordinance governing' 
the proper conduct of trade in the Sudan. Some legislation 
was necessary to ensure.the proper conduct of trade, and this 
legislation should apply to the whole of the Sudan. The pro­
posed Legislative Assembly might consider this in due course.
Clement Mboro explained that what the Southerners had 
intended was that adequate opportunity should be left to the
Southerner to become a trader.
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti explained; Mr. Marwoodrs 
point’ that before conditions, could be att ached to the 
issue of a traderfs licence a law must be enacted to that 
effect. 1
The Chairman said this seemed to imply a Permit to 
Trade Order .for the whole Sudan in fact;(laughter).
Chief Ukuma Bazia thought that 1928 Order should stand 
until they heard what the Legislative Assembly had' to say 
about it. , "
Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman thought, that there ;was no 'basic 
difference of opinion between Northerners and. Southerners 
with regard to the need for protecting villagers-against 
adventurers of whatever nationality.
The Chairman considered that that was what'the Permits 
to Trade Order was, in effect, doing at'present. There was 
a good deal of ' muddled thinking about this Order in the 
North.
, Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti agreed that this may be so, 
’but explained that the Northerners considered that the 
Permit to-Trade Order was being applied, in such a way as. to
hinder economic development.in the ,South. The best remedy
lay in ensuring that disappointed applicants should have
right of appeal to a Court of Justice. :rA
Mr. Marwood thought there was a common misconception 
that his office was full of rejected applications to tra.de. 
Up till very recently he had received no- application from 
people outside the province. In the past.,three or four 
months only one. or two had come iriV .In one of these cases 
he had asked- the trader where he wanted t,o trade, and .what
capital he had to build shops, and buy lorries for transport 
etc. He awaited his reply. The Permits to Trade Order 
had been interpreted exactly as this meeting would',:-have 
liked it to be interpreted. Small, traders with a capital' of.'-v 
only £10 or so were not wanted. Responsible traders,with 
capital, are wanted. The last thing he wanted to do.'was to ' ., 
hinder .economic development. v
The Chairman summed up and thought they were all agreed 
that, it was necessary to improye trade and.that merchants 
with capital were wanted to improve and develop the country, 
arid that people should be protected against adventurers 
and exploiters. He thought that the Southerners wanted to 5 
stress that there should be enough places left in the villages 
to give Southerners the opportunity to set up as traders,; and. . 
in due course build up bigger businesses of their own. When' 
they returned to Khartoum they would consider the recom- . -< .
mendations of this meeting. -. -
The next point for discussion was the question of 
unification of educational policy in the North and South,' and 
the teaching of Arabic.
Mr. Owen asked for a clarification of the phrase "one, 
educational policy1'.
Mr. Kingdon thought that the reply to this question by 
the preliminary meeting, of'the Southerners in their minute 
• 5a was self-contradictory.
Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman thought that this meant merely 
that the curricula in Northern and Southern schools should be 
the same. He did not find any contradiction in the 
•'recommendation that education in'bush schools-'Should be in 
vernacular and that English and Arabic should be taught in
Elementary and Higher, schools.
James*Tembura .said that the Southerners felt strongly 
that a boy,, should first learn to read and write in his own 
“language and could later go ,.on to^other languages-.
■ Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti ' felt that it should'be left 
to the educationalist to say if a boy could learn, two 
foreign languages in the elementary stage.
The Chairman pointed out that the essential difference 
in practice between-North and South was'that in the North a 
boy learnt in Arabic,to the end of the elementary stage and 
did not start to learn a foreign•language before then.
The meeting felt that Arabic should be taught as soon as the 
boy was able to learn it, but that it should be left to the 
educationalist -to say when this- stage was reached.
Pastor Adrea Apaya asked if the introduction of Arabic 
would, apply to Mission Schools.
The Chairman thought that-this was the general opinion 
of 'the meeting. -
Dr. Habib Adballa thought that Southerners were still 
thinking of education in terms. of preparation for government 
service, an idea still held by many Northerners, and he 
thought that the-reasons Southerners were so anxious for the 
same'education as the Northerners was to strengthen their 
claim to receive the same'rates of pay as the, Northerners.
The Chairman referred to the. great shortage .of teachers 
In the North, and .-doubted if Northerners would ,be. prepared 
to restrict their educational expansion to send Arabic 
teachers to the South.
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti felt that the available 
teachers should be equally distributed between North and
South, and even more generously to the South to help them 
catch up. If the Northerners were not willing to do this 
they should not claim that the Sudan was a single country.'
Buth Diu thought that there must be no delay in the 
introduction of Arabic to Schools:. to enable them to catch 
up with the North,
Chief Lolik Lado thought that there might be some 
difficulties caused by introduction of Arabic. lie had 
found that Catholics and Protestants did not readily 
..cooperate, and he feared that this would be a new complication.
Pastor Andrea Apaya said that both English and Arabic 
were difficult languages and doubted if boys at the elementary, 
stage could assimilate both. He was not against the intro­
duction of Arabic, and in fact, welcomed it, but doubted if f' ‘ 
it was feasible at that stage.
The Chairman felt that it must be left to the Director;-' 
of Education to say at what stage a pupil could start 
learning a second language. •,
Father Guido, Akou asked for an explanation of the 
phrase "single educational policy".
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti thought that it meant 
.'firstly that the standards of equivalent schools should 
be roughly equal, and secondly that a boy leaving a Southern" 
Intermediate School should be able to go straight to a 
Northern Secondary School. In addition pupils of both parts 
of the country should have,a similarity of outlook.
Father Guido Akou asked if this unification of policy 
was to be implemented at once. '
The Chairman thought that there was a misunderstanding 
in the use of this phrase, in that the bush schools
corresponded to Sub-Grade Schools in the North, elementary : 
schools in both,..areas were on the same •■'footing,’ and so- 
were Intermediate schools and from this point of view ’ . , -
educational policy was in fact the same ,in. North: and:-South,
Mr. Marwood said that for the last ten years- the .Education 
Department had been exercising more and more supervision in 
Mission Schools and the Inspector had devoted much time.and . 
energy to working with the Mission School authorities to, 
.ensure that curricula and standards should approach thos.e of. 
the North as closely and-quickly as possible. ■
Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman was grateful to Mr, Marwood for 
dispelling much of the misunderstanding.which existed on the 
question of unified education. H,e thought it ’not irrelevant . 
to request that.the sending of Southern boys to Uganda should 
"be discontinued. The medium of instruction>in the. North 
is English in Higher and Secondary:education,-, and Arabic 
was studied only as a subject. Southern boys should there­
fore go North for Higher and- Secondary education.
The*. Chairman said that- the sending of b.oys to Uganda 
had been a temporary expedient since the schools in the 
North were too full to take them.' In due- course there would / 
be a. Secondary School for the South and Southerners would go 
to Gordon College for higher' ecLucation.
The Chairman then raised the.question of improvement 
of communications.. The, meeting was, generally in favour of 
an improvement of communications between .North and South.-
The Chairman then went on to consider the. question of , 
transfer of officials, and.,; thought that this could be best 
discussed in a small committee with, the Director of Establish­
ment as it did not concern all the Members present..
Mr. Marwood thought' that the Chiefs were concerned in so 
far as the proposed Local Council would require educated 
staff and must find money to pay'this staff. in the North 
he believed that at present most local Councils employed 
seconded-government officials on government rates of pay, 
but that the time- will come when the -Council would- employ 
staff independently of the government. In the south the 
local Councils would have to decide how much they could 
afford to pay for their staff, and choose between a highly 
paid government official and a local boy requiring less 
remuneration.
The Chairman wanted to know what the Southerners meant - 
by the. term "encouragement of transfers". A transfer-' was 
a transfer and brooked no discussion. He referred to instances 
where some Northerners had attempted to evade service in the 
South on medical grounds.
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti admitted that such instances • 
■had occurred, but said that most Northerners who came South' * 
.wanted to stay on there. . . . '
But-h Diu thought that Northerners were unwilling to come 
South not only because they were afraid of losing their, 
children through malaria, but also because they were afraid 
of lions. He suggested that better housing would remove 
this unwillingness. The Southerners on the other hand were: ' 
unwilling to go-North because of the extensive use of Arabic t 
in offices. s ■
Clement Mboro referred to para. 5b of the minute of the . 
Southerners' preliminary meeting, and he said he-wished to s 
stress, how strongly they adhered to the unification of the 
system of establishment. This must be decided in this- ,
conference. ..And not in separate committee. Refusal to unify 
establishments’was in his opinion the greatest obstacle in" '
•the way of a unified Sudan.
■ The Chairman considered that it was pot'; easy to discuss 
such ah-intricate matter at this conference. He noted the 
.Southerners’ view. But thought a small committee was best fitted 
to consider the,.matter in detail. - MohdV Saleh, Eff. Shingeiti 
asked if they could not agree on the broad lines.
The Chairman replied-that the' Southern members present, 
were already agreed on the broad lines. 'I ' '
: The Chairman in closing, the conference thanked the 
members for coming andi felt .that .‘the deliberations had been 
of considerable value; to. Southerners, to Northerners, and to 
the Government. ' He could not promise that every suggestion 
would-be carried out, nor ■ When it" would'be carried out, but 
he thanked them for their advice and recommehdations which 
were of definite value.
-Mr. Marwood said that this was the first opportunity 
that Southerners had had to come together from all over the 
Southern Provinces to discuss these things. He himself had 
felt, after the report of, the Sudan Administration Conference, 
that it was essential that Northern Sudanese and. members 
of the Central Government should hear from their ’own lips 
what’ Southerners felt about these .'proposals. He was very 
grateful to the Civil. Secretary and the other-members who had 
, come from the North for affording them this opportunity.
■Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti on: behalf of the Northern 
Sudanese Members, thanked the Civil Secretary and the two 
Governors,i The Civil Secretary as' Chairman had given
everyone complete freedom to speak his-min'd. This was. 
an essential feature of such a conference. He thanked Mr. 
Marwood for giving, them this opportunity to meet the 
Southerners and hear their point of view. He had been much 
impressed with what the Southerners had said and the way 
they had said it, and wished them then every success in the 
Local Councils so that they would be able to send representative 
to take a full part in the Government of Sudan.
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